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SUMMARY
Good corporate governance should be the cornerstone of all company management.
Directors ought to know in whose interests the company should be managed. This
thesis attempts to answer the following question: whose interests must be granted
primacy in the management of a company?
In chapter 1 it is stated that shareholders’ interests are traditionally granted primacy
in the management of a company. There has, however, been a shift in public opinion
towards recognition of a wider variety of interests that should be considered than only
those of the shareholders. These interests include, inter alia, environmental interests
and those of the investors, employees and consumers. This thesis thus focuses on the
primary stakeholders, namely individual shareholders, creditors, employees,
consumers and suppliers.
In chapter 2 a theoretical foundation is provided on the nature of a company. The
different theories on the nature of a company, emphasising either shareholder
primacy or stakeholder protection, are discussed. A combined new theory is
proposed. It is suggested that the confusion relating to the meaning of “the company”
needs to be eliminated.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 provide an international comparison of the company law in
Botswana, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The focus falls, firstly,
on directors’ duties, secondly, on the question in whose interests directors should
manage a company and, thirdly, on the codification of their duties.
In chapter 6 the South African position is evaluated. First, the possible stakeholders
are identified and the protection currently afforded them is explained. The reports of
the King Committee on Corporate Governance, the Policy Document on company
law reform as well as the Companies Bill of 2007 are discussed. Draft clauses are
iv
recommended to be incorporated in new company legislation to provide directors
with clarity on what is expected of them.
It is the aim of this thesis to provide clarity on whose interests should receive primacy
when directors manage a company. The outcome of this research should provide a
clear indication to South African directors of what is expected of them and who the
beneficiaries of their fiduciary duties are.
This thesis includes the law as at 30 April 2008.
KEY TERMS
codes of best practice, codification, consumers, creditors, directors, directors’ duties,
employees, shareholder value, shareholders, stakeholder model, stakeholders, triple-
bottom line.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A company is a legal entity separate from its management and shareholders.1 The
directors, who are normally responsible for managing the company, have various
duties and responsibilities. They are allowed a measure of discretion when exercising
these duties, which include onerous fiduciary duties, and obligations of care and skill
in terms of the common law; various statutory duties in terms of the Companies Act;2
and the duties imposed by the articles of association or in a separate agreement.
Directors’ fiduciary duties entail that they must act in good faith and in the best
interests of the company as a whole.3 This obligation and its scope are considered in
this thesis.
1 The words “company” and “corporation” are both used and the same meaning should be denoted to
these terms.
2 Act 61 of 1973 (hereafter the Companies Act). See, for example, ss 234–241 in respect of directors’
duties and specifically the duty to disclose an interest in a material contract of the company. Section
234 concerns the duty of a director to disclose any interest in a contract, s 235 describes the manner
and time of such disclosure, s 237 states when the particulars of interest should be stated in the notice
to a meeting and s 240 concerns the register of interests. See Henochsberg Commentary on the
Companies Act 409–455.
3 Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 380; Du Plessis “Direkteure se Pligte Teenoor Partye Anders as
die Maatskappy” 378–392; Havenga “The Company, the Constitution and the Stakeholders” 134;
Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors 2, 25; Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 139;
Pennington Company Law 709; Davies Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 371;
Mongalo “The Emergence of Corporate Governance” 176–177; The Policy Document for Corporate
Law Reform, SA Company Law Reform for a 21st Century May 2004 available at
www.polity.org.za/pdf/notice (accessed 20 April 2007) (hereafter the Policy Document) and the Draft
South African Companies Bill of February 2007. At the time of writing it was anticipated that the
Companies Bill would be submitted to Cabinet during May 2008. This version will subsequently be
2The duty of care and skill is discussed in the South African,4 United Kingdom5 and
Australian6 chapters for the sake of completeness when discussing directors’ duties. It
is important that directors exercise the necessary care and skill when acting in the
best interests of the company. This duty is, however, not the focus in this thesis and is
therefore not discussed when considering the various corporate governance
initiatives, company law review documents, Bills and legislation in the different
jurisdictions. The fiduciary duty of good faith, and specifically in whose interests
directors should manage a company, is the focus.
Shareholders’ interests are traditionally granted primacy in the management of a
company. Thus the function of directors is that of profit maximisation for the
shareholders.
There has, however, been a shift in public opinion towards recognition of a wider
variety of interests that should be considered than only those of the shareholders.7
The wider variety of interests includes, inter alia, environmental concerns and the
interests of the following stakeholders: investors, employees, consumers, the general
public and the environment. This thesis focuses on the primary stakeholders, namely
individual shareholders, creditors, employees, consumers and suppliers.8 These
stakeholders have an interest in the way the company is managed by the directors.
The Constitution9 and other legislation also compel consideration of their interests.
submitted to the State Legal Advisors and should be introduced to Parliament by June 2008. The
second version was not publicly available when this thesis was finalised, and the discussion in this
thesis is therefore restricted to the aspects contained in the Draft Bill of 2007. (I did contact the
Department of Trade and Industry requesting a copy of the amended version of the Draft Companies
Bill of 2007 for research purposes, but they declined my request.)
4 Chapter 6 par 3.4.5 below.
5 Chapter 3 par 3.2 below.
6 Chapter 4 par 3.3 below.
7 Havenga “Directors’ Fiduciary Duties Under our Future Company-law Regime” 314.
8 This thesis focuses on the protection that these stakeholders receive in legislation other than company
legislation. These stakeholders may also be protected in terms of general common law, but this is not
considered further.
9 See the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution).
3Shareholders have a permanent stake in the profits of the business, whereas creditors
provide loan capital to the company. Shareholders usually receive a fixed income
from their investment and invest for a limited period. Their interests are often
secured. The interests of employees lie in job security. Consumers and the general
public are concerned with the company as a source of products and services.
Suppliers (as a special type of creditor) are concerned with timely payment for their
services. Increasingly, social, safety, health and environmental factors have been
advanced as issues to be considered by company management. The so-called triple-
bottom line approach10 embraces not only financial performance, but also imposes
social responsibility on companies.11
Two important schools of thought relating to the question of in whose interests the
company should be managed are the enlightened shareholder value and pluralist
approaches.12 In the enlightened shareholder value approach the primary role of the
directors is seen as the promotion of the success of the company for the benefit of the
company as a whole and to generate maximum value for shareholders.13 This
conclusion is based on the “too many masters” argument; namely if more
stakeholders were recognised in whose favour the duties of directors had to be
exercised, the various stakeholder groups would have to be identified, and the nature
and the extent of directors’ duties and responsibilities to each of them would have to
be determined. The result would be that directors would not effectively be held
10 The “triple-bottom line” refers to economic, social and environmental factors. Directors should
consider all three of these factors when they manage a company. See the King Report on Corporate
Governance for South Africa 2002 (hereafter King II) at 11 par 17.3 and s 4 ch 4. See also the
Executive Summary of King II at par 17 available at http://www.eccg.org/codes/country_document
/south_africa/executive_summary.pdf. (accessed 10 May 2007) (hereafter the Executive Summary of
King II).
11 Crook “The Good Company” 1–18; Freemantle & Rocky The Good Corporate Citizen 7. See par 2
below for a discussion of the concept of social responsibility.
12 See ch 2 par 3 for a discussion of the different theories relating to stakeholder protection. These
terms were used during the company law reform processes in South Africa and the United Kingdom.
13 Chapter 2 par 5.1; Dawson “Acting in the Best Interest of the Company” 81; Havenga “The
Company, the Constitution and the Stakeholders” 135 where she refers to the Berle–Dodd debate as
summarised in Hodes “The Social Responsibility of a Company” 485; Sheikh “Introduction to the
Corporate Governance Themed Issues” 267, 268; Cheffins “Teaching Corporate Governance” 515–
525; the Policy Document ch 3 par 3.2.2.
4accountable to anyone, since there would be no clear yardstick for judging their
actions.14
The second school is that of pluralism, which sees shareholders as one constituency
among many and recognises the interests of various groups.15 Thus, a company’s
existence and success are regarded as intertwined with the consideration of the
interests of its employees and other potentially qualifying stakeholders in the
business, such as suppliers and customers.16
The aim of this thesis is to determine in whose interests directors must manage the
company when they exercise their fiduciary duties. In order to achieve this aim, I
attempt to answer the following question and address the related issues from a legal
perspective: should directors manage the company for the benefit of only the
shareholders, or should they consider a wider variety of interests?17 If directors
should consider the interests of other groups, then it must be determined whether they
have a direct duty to those groups to consider their interests, thus changing the
traditional viewpoint that directors must manage the company for the benefit of the
company as a whole. Alternatively, it could be that the directors may consider the
interests of other groups, but only when so directed in terms of the Constitution or
related legislation and in circumstances where it will be in the best interests of the
shareholders collectively.
A further aim of this thesis is to determine whether directors’ duties should be
codified in a comprehensive or partial manner in order to provide directors with clear
guidelines regarding their fiduciary duties.
14 Proctor & Miles “Duty, Accountability and the Company Law Review” 21.
15 Sealy “Directors’ Wider Responsibilities” 173; Dean “Stakeholding and Company Law” 66; Miles
“Company Stakeholders” 56; the Policy Document ch 3 par 3.2.2. See further ch 2 par 5.1.
16 Havenga “The Company, the Constitution and the Stakeholders” 173; the Policy Document ch 3 pars
3.2.1–3.2.2; Roach “The Paradox of the Traditional Justifications for Exclusive Shareholder
Governance Protection” 9.
17 See Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors; Anderson Corporate Directors’ Liability in which the
focus is on one stakeholder group, namely creditors. See ch 6 par 3.2 for a detailed discussion of this
aspect.
52 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE PROTECTION OF
STAKEHOLDERS
2.1 Definition
As stated above, social, safety, health and environmental factors have been
introduced as important factors to which company management must have regard.
This thesis focuses on the protection of different stakeholders by directors when they
manage a company. Commentators have widely divergent views on corporate social
responsibility and how directors should give effect to it when managing a company.18
A theoretical foundation for shareholder primacy and the protection of stakeholders’
interests is provided in chapter 2, which is a discussion of the different theories and
models of corporate governance.19
A company is said to be socially responsible when directors manage a company in
such a way that the company “voluntarily expends its resources to do something not
required by law and without immediate economic benefits”.20 Mayson et al.21 state
that “corporate social responsibility is the responsibility of each company for its
effect on the society in which it operates”.22 Parkinson states that “every large
18 On corporate social responsibility, see Pettet’s analysis in “The Stirring of Corporate Social
Conscience” of whether the law should assume that the sole purpose of a company is to make as much
money as possible for the shareholders or whether it should propose that the corporation also has major
responsibilities to its customers, its workers and its community; and Vettori Alternative Means to
Regulate the Employment Relationship ch 9 on the meaning of corporate social responsibility.
19 Chapter 2 pars 2–5 below.
20 Per Gavin Relly in Hodes “The Social Responsibility of a Company” 468. See also McBarnet et al.
“Corporate Social Responsibility” 1–37.
21 Mayson et al. Company Law 30.
22 Three documents dealing with corporate social responsibility were issued in the United Kingdom:
Business and Society: Developing Corporate Social Responsibility in the UK (URN 01/720) (2001);
Business and Society: Corporate Social Responsibility Report (URN 02/909) (2002) Corporate Social
Responsibility: A Government Update (2004). These reports were issued by the Department of Trade
and Industry of the United Kingdom and deal with the priorities of government relating to corporate
social responsibility. Their priorities include the following: to raise the profile and highlight the
importance of corporate social responsibility; to make responsible behaviour a consideration of core
business; and to promote transparency in corporate social responsibility. A number of
recommendations on how socially responsible behaviour can be improved were listed. These
recommendations include implementing a Corporate Social Responsibility Academy to train directors
to act socially responsible, engaging institutional investors on recognition of the impact of social and
environmental factors on long-term business performance and encouraging CSR reporting. Not much
6corporation should be thought of as a social enterprise, that is, an entity whose
existence and decisions can be justified only in as far as they serve public or social
purposes”.23 He suggests that company directors should take some social
responsibility for the decisions they make when managing a company. He refers to
this suggestion as “profit-sacrificing social responsibility”.24 However, he states that
“profit-sacrificing social responsibility” may lead to an increase in profitability over
the long-term.25 Parkinson believes that the duty on directors and the internal
structures of major companies should be altered to take account of stakeholders’
interests beyond that required of directors in terms of the law. By creating favourable
relations with other stakeholders, profits would also increase.26 He proposes the
following: that the fiduciary duties of directors should be extended to include
interests other than merely the shareholders; the social costs the company is inflicting
should be disclosed; consultation with local communities and consumer bodies
should be mandatory; and representatives of other interest groups should be
introduced onto the board of directors.27
Alcock has an opposing viewpoint.28 He states that the recognition of all stakeholders
in an enterprise sounds attractive, but to allow directors to take into consideration all
has come from these reports, see Mayson et al. Company Law 30. However, section 172(1) of the new
Companies Act of 2006 addresses stakeholder interests, see ch 3 par 4.3.3 below.
23 Parkinson Corporate Power 23 where he quotes RA Dahl “A Prelude to Corporate Reform” in
Heilbroner RL, London P (eds) Corporate Social Policy (1975) at 18.
24 Parkinson Corporate Power 261.
25 Parkinson Corporate Power 261. See also McCabe “Are Corporations Socially Responsible” 4
(corporate social responsibility relates to management doing “good works”, but does not mean that
they should disregard profit maximisation al together); Wedderburn “The Social Responsibility of
Corporations” 4–6 he says that the justification for businesses is a “single-minded pursuit of profit
maximisation”, but managers’ pursuit of short-term profit maximisation is realistically tempered by the
need to ensure the future viability of the corporation by having a social responsibility to a wide variety
of stakeholders; Slaughter “Corporate Social Responsibility: A New Perspective” 321 holds that what
is considered to be socially responsible conduct is often also good for businesses over the long-term
because it will increase a company’s reputation which may result in profit maximisation.
26 Parkinson Corporate Power 261ff.
27 Parkinson Corporate Power chapters 8 and 12. See also ch 6 par 3.3.2.1 below on the two-tier board
structure applicable in Germany.
28 Alcock “Corporate Governance: A Defence for the Status Quo” 898.
7stakeholders’ interests, the scope of directional discretion has to be widened. This
will mean that structural checks and balances would have to be implemented to
counteract widened powers of directors.29 He argues further that a firm that operates
according to a board where various stakeholders are represented is a “recipe for
disaster”.30 He refers to Hansmann31 who points out that homogeneity of interests
represented on the board of directors lessens decision costs.
Beuthin also discusses the issue of corporate social responsibility and specifically in
whose interests directors should manage the company. He refers to the Savoy Hotel32
case where counsel advised the directors that they should manage the company in the
best interests of both present and future members. He then refers to the well-known
case of Ford Motor Company, where Henry Ford tried to take the interests of other
stakeholder groups into account and to ignore the interests of the shareholders:
‘My “ambition”,’ said Ford, ‘is to employ still more men to spread the
benefits of this individual system to the greatest possible number, to help
them build up their lives and their homes. To do this we are putting the
greatest share of our profits back into the business.’33
These proposals were rejected by an American court (Michigan Supreme Court)
which stated that the directors were not entitled to conduct the affairs of the company
for the mere incidental benefit of the shareholders.34
Hodes discusses various theories relating to social responsibility.35 The functional
theory holds that the function of business is to provide necessary goods and services
29 Alcock “Corporate Governance: A Defence for the Status Quo” 912.
30 Alcock “Corporate Governance: A Defence for the Status Quo” 907.
31 Hansmann “Ownership of the Firm” 279.
32 This case never reached the courts. See Beuthin “The Range of a Company’s Interests” 157.
33 Beuthin “The Range of a Company’s Interests” 157.
34 Dodge v Ford Motor Company 170 N.W. 668 (Mich 1919). The real problem is, however, whether
or not directors can take account of the interests of other stakeholders in addition to those of the
shareholders. See Beuthin “The Range of a Company’s Interests” 158.
35 Hodes “The Social Responsibility of a Company” 486–492.
8to consumers at a reasonable profit for the suppliers. If these tasks are performed
well, society will benefit. The pragmatic theory determines that the bigger the
dividend, the more the shareholders will receive. By rendering good services and
maintaining high profits, a company will improve its commercial service and the
community will benefit. According to the social theory, there should be no need for
companies to concern themselves with social responsibility, since it the government’s
responsibility.
2.2 Corporate Social Responsibility Facilitated Through Law
The above-mentioned assumption that corporate social responsibility is voluntary and
that it relates to a company extending its resources to do what is not required by law
merits further attention. Other legislation, such as the South African Broad Based
Black Economic Empowerment Act or Labour Relations Act,36 can still be used to
facilitate socially responsible conduct by directors. The role of legislation and other
forces facilitating socially responsible conduct is considered by McBarnet.
McBarnet discusses corporate social responsibility beyond law, through law and for
the law. She states that corporate social responsibility is traditionally characterised as
a voluntary act by companies to do more than what is legally required of them.
However, she argues that corporate social responsibility is no longer merely a
voluntary act due to external and market forces requiring companies to act in a
socially responsible manner beyond that required of them in terms of legislation.
These forces include, first, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that put pressure
on companies to adopt policies on corporate social responsibility and, second,
protests by civil societies on certain practices of companies (see, for example, the
campaign against Nike and their use of cheap labour).37
McBarnet argues further that law also plays an important role in enforcing corporate
socially responsible behaviour. Governments are fostering corporate social
36 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereafter the Labour Relations Act) and the Broad Based
Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (hereafter the Black Economic Empowerment Act).
37 See McBarnet et al. “Corporate Social Responsibility” at 4ff.
9responsibility through indirect regulation. The pension regulation in the United
Kingdom is a case in point. This legislation requires pension companies to state how
they complied with social, environmental and ethical issues. It does not place an
enforceable obligation on companies to do this, but merely states that companies
should disclose whether they did consider social, environmental and ethical issues
when making business decisions.38 McBarnet states that corporate social
responsibility can no longer be seen as merely voluntary. First, external and market
forces are “pushing” companies to act in a responsible manner. Second, governments
also enforce corporate social responsibility, sometimes in a subtle and indirect
manner, through legislative regulation.39 She states that “what is emerging in the area
of CSR is a complex interaction between government, business and civil society”.40
With legislation indirectly compelling companies to act in a socially responsible
manner, one can no longer describe corporate social responsibility as merely a
voluntary act. If corporate social responsibility is still regarded as voluntary and
legislation compels certain socially responsible behaviour, would companies have to
do even more to be socially responsible? In other words, do they have to do more
than what the legislation compels? And if so, how would this be determined? I
propose a definition of corporate social responsibility that takes legislation that
indirectly compels directors to act socially responsible into account. Thus corporate
social responsibility should rather be aimed at social conduct where stakeholders’
interests are taken into account, be it by way of indirect legislation or by way of
voluntary conduct.
Various corporate governance initiatives and legislation facilitating corporate social
responsibility and the recognition of stakeholders’ interests are discussed in this
thesis.
38 The Pension Act of 1995. This disclosure requirement was added to this Act during July 2000.
39 McBarnet et al. “Corporate Social Responsibility” at 18ff.
40 McBarnett et al. “Corporate Social Responsibility” at 37.
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When discussing the law in the United Kingdom in chapter 3 section 172(1) of the
United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006 is evaluated.41 This section is another
example of where socially responsible behaviour is facilitated through legislation. In
terms of this section, directors should have regard to a number of factors when
managing a company, such as the interests of the company’s employees, and the
impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment.42
However, the stakeholders listed in this section, other than the shareholders, will not
have standing to compel directors to take their interests into consideration, unless it
can be established that the interests of the company itself were contravened.43 It is
within the specific director’s discretion when to consider the interests of the various
stakeholders listed.
Various reports, such as ASX’s Best Practice Recommendations and Principles44 and
the Corporate Responsibility Report,45 have also been issued in Australia. Chapter 4
of this thesis explains that listed companies should ensure that stakeholders are aware
of decisions made by management in terms of ASX’s Principles and
Recommendations. This should be included in a company’s code of conduct. Non-
listed companies should also strive to keep stakeholders informed. In chapter 446 it is,
furthermore, indicated that the Corporate Responsibility Report defines “corporate
responsibility” as implying that companies take an “enlightened” approach to
consider the interests of company stakeholders.47
41 Chapter 3 par 4.3.3.
42 See ch 3 par 4.3.3 below for an evaluation and discussion of s 172.
43 This will have to be done by way of a shareholder derivative action (in terms of the derivative action
in ss 260–264 of the United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006). See ch 3 par 4.3.3 below.
44 The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council: Principles of Good
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (March 2003 and August 2007).
45 Issued by the Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services
during June 2006.
46 Chapter 4 par 4.3 below.
47 See ch 2 par 2.7 of the report.
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Section 130, which codifies directors’ duties in terms of the new Botswana
Companies Act is evaluated in chapter 5 to determine whether directors should
consider stakeholders’ interests when managing a company.48
It is argued in chapter 6 that the current Companies Bill of South Africa is unclear as
to whether or not directors should consider the interests of stakeholders when they
manage a company, or whether directors should only have regard to the shareholders
as primary beneficiaries of their duties.49 The King Report on Corporate Governance
of 2002 does, however, recommend that companies adopt a “triple-bottom line”
approach when managing companies.50
It is therefore generally accepted that modern companies cannot ignore their social
responsibility. Social responsibility is based upon the concept of good citizenship. A
company has a duty to society beyond that of an ordinary citizen due to its power and
size and the benefits associated with its status as a separate legal entity,51 and should
therefore recognise its social role.52 The unique South African context, including the
best interests of its citizens and the mandates of the Constitution, cannot be ignored.53
The Constitution enshrines the rights of dignity, equality and freedom in respect of all
people.54 All law, including company law, should comply with the values and
requirements of the Constitution and related legislation.55 In view of the fact that
companies should be socially responsible, directors need to be clear on what is
expected of them and specifically on how they should give effect to corporate social
responsibility.
48 Chapter 5 par 3.1.2.2.
49 Chapter 6 par 4.3 below.
50 King II par 17.1.
51 Havenga “Directors’ Fiduciary Duties Under Our Future Company-law Regime” 312ff.
52 Hodes “The Social Responsibility of a Company” 490.
53 Policy Document ch 2 par 2.2.2.
54 Sections 9, 10 and 12 of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution.
55 Policy Document ch 2 par 2.2.2. The principles of the Constitution are reflected in recently enacted
legislation, for example, the Labour Relations Act; the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of
2000 (hereafter the Promotion of Access to Information Act); the Black Economic Empowerment Act.
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3 A REVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANY LAW
South African company law is based on foundations that originated in the middle of
the nineteenth century in England. The current South African Companies Act of 1973
is still based on a framework and general principles derived from English Law.56
These principles were questioned in the land of its origin during a major review of the
United Kingdom’s company law in 2002 and 2003.57
In May 2004 the Corporate Regulation Division of the Department of Trade and
Industry issued a policy document with guidelines for a comprehensive review of
South African corporate law.58 It envisaged a review of South African corporate laws,
including the Companies Act, the Close Corporations Act59 and the common law
relating to these corporate entities.60 The protection of the interests of different
56 Company law has existed in South Africa since 1861. It began with the Joint Stock Exchange
Companies Limited Liabilities Act 23 of 1861 of the Cape Colony. This was identical to English
legislation. In 1926 the first national companies legislation was introduced with the Union Companies
Act. This Act has been supplemented from time to time by amending Acts. A commission (chaired by
Mr Justice Lansdowne) was appointed to consider amendments to the 1926 Act, in view of new
developments in English company law. The Companies Amendment Act 23 of 1939 was passed. The
Companies Amendment Act 46 of 1952 was promulgated after a report of the Millin Commission. In
1963 the Van Wyk De Vries Commission was appointed and its recommendations led to the
Companies Act of 1973. A standing advisory committee was established (s 18 of the Companies Act).
The committee makes recommendations from time to time regarding amendments to company law. It
issued a major policy document in 1985 on future developments in company law. In 1997 the Standing
Advisory Committee issued an important press statement through the Department of Trade and
Industry on the development of entrepreneurial law in South Africa. Five principle statutes were
envisaged in terms of the strategic framework. See Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 23–28. The
Department of Trade and Industry has moved away from this plan. See also the Policy Document ch 2
par 2.1; De La Rey “Vroeë Maatskappyereg” 18–24.
57 The Policy Document, foreword by the Minister of Trade and Industry, M Mphalwa; De Lacy The
Reform of United Kingdom Company Law 3–43, 43–57, 147–178; Goddard “Modernising Company
Law” 402–424; generally, www.dti.gov.uk. See the United Kingdom’s Companies Act of 2006 (which
received assent on 8 November 2006). This Act was partially implemented in 2007. See
www.publications.parliament.uk for the Minister of Industry and Regions statement on which
provisions in the Act came into force during January 2007 and which came into force during April
2007. The remainder of the provisions will be in force by October 2009. The United Kingdom
Companies Act is applicable in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. See further ch 3 par 1.
58 See generally, the Policy Document. See ch 6 par 4.2 for a detailed discussion of the Policy
Document.
59 Act 69 of 1984.
60 The review does not include partnership law. The review process aims to identify the fundamental
rules regarding procedures for company formation, corporate finance law, corporate governance,
mergers and acquisitions, the cessation of the existence of a company, and the administration and
enforcement of the law.
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stakeholders, such as shareholders, creditors and employees, were seen as
fundamental to the review process.61 In February 2007 the Companies Bill was
published. It provides that directors should act honestly and in good faith, and in a
manner the directors reasonably believe to be in the best interests, and for the benefit
of the company.62 The Bill also provided for a partial codification of directors’ duties.
This thesis focuses on these issues.
4 RESEARCH METHOD
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical foundation, which is relevant to the remainder of this
thesis. Shareholder primacy and the protection of stakeholders are discussed in this
chapter. Theories relating to the nature of a company and models of corporate
governance are then considered. A proposed combined theory on the protection of
stakeholders is recommended.
An international comparison is provided in chapters 3, 4 and 5.63 The United
Kingdom, Botswana and Australia are the area of focus. However, when discussing
61 For a concise synopsis of the Policy Document see Pretorius “The Future of South African Company
Law” 66.
62 Clause 91(1)(b) of the Companies Bill 2007. See ch 6 par 4.3 for a discussion of this.
63 Comparative law can be defined as a reciprocal comparison of different legal systems and legal rules
with a view to obtaining new critical insights; see Zweigert & Kötz An Introduction to Comparative
Law 1–63. They say that comparative law can be practised on a large or small scale. When it is done
on a large scale (macro comparison) a comparison is made between methods of handling legal
problems, such as comparing different techniques of regulation. When comparing specific legal
problems (e.g. whether or not a certain person will be liable in a specific situation) one has to do with
micro comparison. See Zweigert & Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law 4ff and De Cruz
Comparative Law 227ff on micro and macro comparisons. When comparing the laws in the countries
chosen and trying to determine whether directors have a duty to stakeholders when managing a
company one has to do with micro comparison. But when evaluating the views of different countries
on the codification of directors’ duties one is comparing the laws and practices of the different
jurisdictions on a larger or macro scale. When conducting comparative research, one should have
regard to the various sources of law. Generally, in civil law countries codes and legislation are the
primary legal sources, whereas case law is more important in common law countries. A general
knowledge of the structure of the specific legal system as well as the social environment is also
important (see De Cruz Comparative Law 26). See further David & Brierley Major Legal Systems
which provide an introduction to comparative law. Comparative legal studies are also done with
specific objectives in mind. One of the aims is to determine whether a comparative system will enable
a better understanding of a specific legal system and whether it offers solutions to situations which are
unclear in the specific legal system (see Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors 4).
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the protection afforded employees in terms of South African company law, the
Corporate Governance Code for Listed German Corporations is also relevant and
discussed.64 General international codes or sets of principles on corporate
governance, such as the OECD Principles,65 are not discussed in this thesis.
64 This code was adopted in February 2001. The two-tier German board structure is compared with the
unitary South African board structure. See ch 6 par 3.3.2.1 below.
65 The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) consists of a group of 30
member states sharing a commitment to a democratic government and a market economy. The original
Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development was signed on
14 December 1960 (see www.oecd.org). It is important to note, for purposes of this thesis that
Australia ratified the Convention on 7 June 1971 and the United Kingdom ratified it on 2 May 1961.
South Africa and Botswana are not member states of the convention. The aim of the convention is to:
“promote policies designed (a) to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment
and a rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to
contribute to the development of the world economy; (b) to contribute to sound economic expansion in
Member as well as non-member countries in the process of economic development; and (c) to
contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non discriminatory basis in accordance
with international obligations” (see art 1 of the Convention). One of their projects was to develop a set
of corporate governance principles. The first set of corporate governance principles was published in
1999. The idea was that these principles can be applied in OECD as well as non-OECD countries.
These principles should be interpreted as a minimum set of principles and not one single corporate
governance model for OECD countries. In 2004 another set of more defined principles were published
and accepted by the OECD countries. The document containing the OECD Principles is divided into
two parts. The first part contains the core principles and the second contains commentary on the
principles, facilitating a clear understanding of the principles. The principles in the first part ensure a
basis for effective corporate governance, it also deals with shareholder rights and key ownership
functions, the role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency and the responsibilities of the board.
Part IV relates to the role of stakeholders in corporate governance. It states the following: “The
corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders established by law or
through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders
in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises.” This principle on the
role of stakeholders is discussed in the second part of the OECD Principles. The drafters start by
stating that corporations should realise that the contributions of stakeholders constitute a valuable
resource for building competitive and profitable companies. It is important to note that the different
OECD countries follow different models of corporate governance. Some of these countries are more in
favour of the stakeholder model, whereas others favour the shareholder model. The principles are
therefore broad corporate governance principles and should be adapted for the specific country. The
drafters do not state which model is best to follow. To explain this a bit further: when the drafters refer
to the position of employees, they state that employee practices depend on national laws and practices.
Different mechanisms are in place in various countries to protect employees, for instance, by way of
participation on board level or through works councils. The drafters do not indicate which method of
employee participation they prefer, they rather provide broad principles, stating that employees should
receive adequate information in order to participate meaningfully in company decisions. The aim of
these principles is to assist governments in their efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, institutional
and regulator framework concerning corporate governance. The drafters do not favour a specific model
of corporate governance. On the OECD Principles see Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary
Corporate Governance 179–180.
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In chapter 3 the law applicable in the United Kingdom is reviewed66 and stakeholder
protection is discussed. The company law review processes and the Companies Act
of 2006 of the United Kingdom are discussed and evaluated. The main reason for
considering this jurisdiction is that South African company law is largely based on
the English system.67 Furthermore, the recent review of company law in the United
Kingdom may provide useful guidelines for the South African company law review.68
The objectives, principles and opinions of the drafters in the various company law
review documents are not unique to the United Kingdom, but important for any
country to consider in order to compete in the international business community.69
Chapter 4 considers corporate law in Australia. The company laws in Australia are
based on English law. Australian company laws were also subject to comprehensive
reviews, which led to considerable deviation from English law.70 The developments
in this jurisdiction may therefore contain important guidelines for South African
company law.
In chapter 5 developments in the Southern African Developmental Community
(SADC) are considered, with specific reference to Botswana.71 It is important to
consider the laws in SADC countries, because their circumstances are similar to those
66 The United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006 is applicable in England, Wales, Scotland and
Northern Ireland. See ch 3 n 2 where the application of the 2006 Companies Act is discussed.
67 The Policy Document, foreword. The fiduciary obligation, as a legal principle, originated in the
English rules of equity (ch 3 par 3.1).
68 See, for example, the Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance
chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury 1992 (hereafter the Cadbury Report); Directors’ Remuneration Report:
Report of a Study Group chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury 1995 (hereafter the Greenbury Report);
Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance Final Report 1998 (hereafter the Hampel Report);
Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report Volume 1 and 2 URN 01/942 and
URN 01/943 released in July 2001 (hereafter the Final Report); Modernising Company Law: The
White Paper March 2005 (hereafter the White Paper 2005). See ch 3 for the position in the United
Kingdom. One of the main aims of comparative law is to aid the legislator, see Zweigert & Kötz An
Introduction to Comparative Law 15.
69 Du Plessis “Corporate Governance” 81.
70 South Africa also deviated from English law during the recent company law review process.
Developments in the European Union were taken into account when English law was reviewed.
71 www.sadcreview.com (accessed 15 June 2006).
16
in South Africa and to facilitate harmonisation of business laws in SADC countries.72
The company law of Botswana is given specific consideration, in view of recent
developments in that jurisdiction. The Botswana Companies Act of 200373
established a new corporate culture in Botswana and is discussed in this chapter with
specific emphasis on the duties of directors.74 This new 2003 Act is based on New
Zealand company law. The relevant provisions of the New Zealand Companies Act75
are therefore considered in order to interpret the Botswana Companies Act.
Chapter 6 considers the law in South Africa and various initiatives based on it. The
various stakeholders are identified and the protection currently afforded them is
indicated. The King Reports,76 the Policy Document as well as the Companies Bill of
2007 are discussed, illustrating current opinion on the recognition of the different
stakeholders and the codification of directors’ duties.77
In this chapter I attempt to clarify whether or not directors should manage the
company by only taking the shareholders into account or whether they should
consider a wider variety of interests. If specific groups are advanced, the issue arises
as to which groups should be considered and what mechanisms should be adopted to
enforce such a duty to all stakeholders. Should companies take the interest of all
stakeholders into account or may they take the interests of all stakeholders into
account? Clause 91(1)(b) of the Companies Bill of 2007 is discussed and evaluated.
The Bill also provides for a partial codification of directors’ duties. The advantages
and disadvantages of a codification of directors’ duties are illustrated. In this chapter
72 The Policy Document ch 3 par 3.5; Havenga “Regulating Directors’ Duties” 609.
73 Act 32 of 2004. This Act is referred to as the “Companies Act of 2003”. It was enacted by
Parliament on 10 December 2003. It only received Presidential Assent on 2 September 2004; therefore
it is cited as Act 32 of 2004. This Act took a long time before it came into force, because there were no
regulations until June 2007. The Act eventually came into operation on 3 July 2007.
74 Kiggundu Botswana Company Law.
75 Act 105 of 1993.
76 King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 1994 (hereafter King I) and the King Report
on Corporate Governance for South Africa 2002.
77 Chapter 6 pars 4; 5 below.
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the preferred view regarding the recognition of the different stakeholders in a South
African context and its motivation are identified and discussed.
Chapter 7 contains a summary of the research undertaken. Some conclusions are
drawn in respect of the position in South Africa, taking developments in the other
jurisdictions considered into account. Finally, some recommendations are made.
5 REFERENCE TECHNIQUES
Company directors are referred to in the masculine form. Authorities are referred to
in abbreviated form in the footnotes. The full references (with an indication of the
abbreviated reference) are contained in the bibliography at the end of this thesis.
In the bibliography under the heading “Further Reading” other relevant sources are
listed. These sources are valuable as they act as background to the topic of this thesis,
but are not directly relevant when discussing the protection of stakeholders.
18
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
1 INTRODUCTION
2 SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY VERSUS STAKEHOLDER PROTECTION
3 THEORIES ON THE NATURE OF A COMPANY
4 MODELS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
5 THEORIES RECENTLY APPLIED
6 CONCLUSIONS
1 INTRODUCTION
As stated in chapter 1, the main aim of this thesis is to determine in whose interests a
company should be managed. In order to address this question, it is necessary to have
a sound theoretical foundation concerning shareholder primacy and the more current
development of recognising the interests of different stakeholders, such as employees,
creditors and consumers. This chapter therefore focuses on the various theories of
corporate governance and the models that are based on them and which relate to the
objectives of companies.
A number of competing explanations of corporate governance, specifically relating to
the interests of different stakeholders, have developed over time.1 The debate
1 See Clarke Theories of Corporate Governance. This book provides a valuable explanation of
corporate governance and its theoretical foundations by leading academics in the field such as Berle,
Chandler, Jensen, Meckling, Clarke, Gordon and Coffee. In the introduction at pp 1–30 Clarke defines
corporate governance, discusses theories of corporate governance (such as the agency and stakeholder
theories) and provides post-Enron theories. See also the much older, but still relevant, work of Berle
“The Impact of the Corporation” 25–40. He offers a review of the modern corporation Chandler “The
Managerial Revolution” examines the managerial revolution. He explains how the shift towards
managers running a corporation exerted great influence on determining the size and concentration of
the United State’s industry. As the corporation grew in size and diversity, and its managers became
more professional, the management of the corporation and its ownership became separated. See Clarke
“The Stakeholder Corporation” 182–194 where he holds that managers are concerned with stakeholder
interests, but at the same time they manage companies in order to maximise shareholder value.
Managers find it difficult to satisfy the claims of shareholders and other stakeholders simultaneously;
Gordon “What Enron Means for Management” 1233–1250; Coffee “What Caused Enron?” 269–309
(both these articles deal with Enron and its effect on the management of companies). Different theories
of corporate governance are discussed in par 3 below.
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between Berle and Dodd is considered first.2 Their debate (especially Berle’s
viewpoints) centred on shareholder primacy, and the obligation of directors to
recognise shareholder interests and the maximisation of their wealth. They (and more
so Dodd) also addressed the interests of a wider variety of beneficiaries. The
shareholder–stakeholder issue is, however, still an ongoing debate and the viewpoints
of more recent commentators are also considered.3 The protection of stakeholders
was also discussed during the South African and United Kingdom company law
review processes; this is considered in paragraphs 2 and 5.
The different theories on the nature of a company, emphasising either a shareholder
or stakeholder approach,4 are then discussed together with the various corporate
governance models. The theories on the nature of a company are concerned with the
origin and purpose of corporations, and shape the model that a company adopts.5 The
first theory discussed, the agency theory, sees the company as a legal recognition
afforded business people and deals with shareholder primacy.6 The concession and
the communitaire theories focus on the role of the State as well as the recognition of
stakeholders.
2 As early as 1930, Professors Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd debated this issue. See Dodd “For
Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?” 1145; Berle “For Whom Corporate Managers Are
Trustees” 1365; Berle “Corporate Powers” 1049; Berle & Means The Modern Corporation and
Private Property.
3 On the shareholder–stakeholder issue, see generally Coase “The Nature of the Firm” 386–405 (his
work is of importance regarding the transaction cost economics. He holds that the minimisation of
transaction costs are important, rather than the maximisation of profits); Jensen & Meckling “Theory
of the Firm” 305–360 and Cheung “The Contractual Nature of the Firm” 1–21 who refer to and discuss
the work of Coase. See also Hodes “The Social Responsibility of a Company” 468; Fisch “Measuring
Efficiency” 646–648 (shareholder primacy defines the objective of the firm as profit maximisation. In
this article it was argued that empirical research relied on by scholars is not sufficient to state that
shareholder primacy should dominate regulatory policy); Fairfax “The Rhetoric of Corporate Law”
681–682 (this article deals with a growing embrace in stakeholder rhetoric, being at odds with current
corporate practice) and Mallin Corporate Governance 10–12 who briefly discusses the different
theories of corporate governance.
4 See, for example, Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 21 who indicates that the communitaire
theory is the basis for the stakeholder model.
5 Dine “Company Law Developments” 245.
6 Sheehy “The Reluctant Stakeholder” 200.
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Lastly, the approaches applied during the South African and United Kingdom
company law reform processes are discussed. A proposed combined theory on the
recognition of stakeholder interests is recommended.
These theories and models are illustrated in the following diagram, which serves as a
point of reference for the discussion below:
Communitaire
theory
Contractual model
Contractual
theory
Theories on the nature of companies
Models of companies
Stakeholder/Concessionary/Managerialist
model
Inclusive approachTriple-bottom line
approach
Enlightened shareholder
value approach Pluralist approach
Concession by
the State Bottom-up
Concession theory
2 SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY VERSUS STAKEHOLDER PROTECTION
Two perspectives are relevant concerning the normative role of a corporation. The
first concerns the shareholder primacy model7 and holds that it is a director’s duty to
7 On shareholder primacy, see generally Sheehy “The Reluctant Stakeholder” 208 indicating that this
does not mean that other parties (or stakeholders) should be ignored, but that shareholders should
receive primacy when directors manage a company. He discusses the shareholder theory, indicating
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maximise the profits of a company for the benefit of the shareholders. The second
perspective concerns the stakeholder theory.8 In terms of this theory, directors should
extend their obligations to a wider variety of stakeholders and not only to the
company’s shareholders.9
As early as 1930 Berle and Dodd debated the issue of shareholder primacy versus the
protection of different stakeholders in America. Berle argued in favour of the
shareholder primacy norm.10 He stated that directors hold the property of
that the main objective of the corporation is to maximise shareholder wealth. See also Anderson
Corporate Directors’ Liability 42 who states that the shareholder primacy theory recognises the
special place of shareholders as residual owners of the company. Eisenberg “The Conception that the
Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts” 825 refers to the “ownership” rights of shareholders due to their
rights to possess, use and manage and the rights to income and capital. The issue of the separation of
ownership and control is discussed in more detail below (see n 10 below).
8 The term ‘stakeholder theory’ was first used in 1963 at the Stanford Research Institute, although it
can be traced back to work done by Dodd in the 1930s. See Clarke “The Stakeholder Corporation”
182–194; Sheehy “The Reluctant Stakeholder” 200. On the stakeholder theory, see generally Friedman
Capitalism and Freedom; Freeman & Evan “Corporate Governance” 337–360 (defining organisations
as multilateral agreements between the corporation and its stakeholders); Clarkson “A Stakeholder
Framework” 92–117; Donaldson & Preston “The Stakeholder Theory” 65–91; Clarke & Glegg
Changing Paradigms; Fairfax “The Rhetoric of Corporate Law” 681. In the book Theories of
Corporate Governance edited by Clarke, various authors discuss the different theories, including the
stakeholder theory (see pp 10–11 and part 6 on the stakeholder theory).
9 Penrose in Theory of the Growth of the Firm laid the intellectual foundations for the stakeholder
theory in her concept of “the company as a bundle of human assets and relationships”. See also Clarke
“The Stakeholder Corporation” 182–194 and Fisch “Measuring Efficiency” 647. Blair Ownership and
Control in the foreword states that corporations may be conceived as institutional arrangements for
governing the relationships between all the parties that contribute company-specific assets, including,
for example, employees who contribute specific skills (see Clarke Theories of Corporate Governance
171). See also Sheehy “The Reluctant Stakeholder” 201 where he discusses the stakeholder theory,
stating that economics and efficiency are not ultimate values and that the distribution of costs and
benefits for society’s resources are also important.
10 Berle “For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees” 1372. He bases his argument (of trusteeship)
on the fact that shareholders are owners of a company. Directors’ obligations to shareholders are based
on their role as trustees or agents to the shareholders (who are seen as the owners). He classifies a
company in terms of the separation of ownership and control. He refers to the shareholders as owners
and the directors as the people being in control. The classification of shareholders as owners has been
criticised, see Roach “The Paradox of the Traditional Justifications for Exclusive Shareholder
Governance Protection” 13; Sheehy “The Reluctant Stakeholder” 226; Millon “Theories of the
Corporation” 221. See also King II Introduction par 17.3. The critics argue that there are substantial
differences between shareholders and traditional property owners. Shareholders own stock; which
gives them claims to control and certain financial rights. They do not, however, have direct control
over a company’s underlying assets. Directors are also not directly controlled by their principals (as is
the case with traditional agents). Directors’ powers are largely statutory. The debate between Berle and
Dodd provides insights into the historical foundations of the shareholder primacy norm. It does not,
however, provide sufficient justification for defining a company in terms of shareholder primacy. The
agency theory, based on the works of Coase, “The Nature of the Firm” 386; Alchain & Demsetz
“Production, Information Costs” 777–795; Jensen & Meckling “The Theory of the Firm” 305–360;
Fama & Jensen “Separation of Ownership and Control” 301–325 found it strange that the public
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shareholders in trust for the sole benefit of the shareholders.11 The exclusive
obligation of directors was therefore the maximisation of shareholders’ property.
Dodd, in contrast, argued that directors serve as trustees for the entire community
rather than for individual shareholders. Therefore, directors should use the company’s
resources to address the interests of a wider variety of stakeholders. By so doing,
directors would behave in a socially responsible manner.12 The crux of the debate
concerned the issue of whether directors should serve only shareholders when they
manage a company, or whether they should also act for the benefit of other interest
groups.
In 1942 Dodd acknowledged that it was misleading to treat directors as trustees for
employees, consumers and other interest groups.13 Berle also conceded that directors
have the discretion of whether to consider the interests of other groups and manage a
company in the general interests of society.14 They therefore distinguished between
the obligations of directors towards shareholders and those towards stakeholders, but
they acknowledged the legitimacy of the interests of other stakeholders.
The discussion of the shareholder-versus-stakeholder theories is still ongoing, and has
been much debated by various international and local commentators since the debate
company with its separation of ownership and control has survived for so long (see Ramsay “Law and
Economics” 48). See also, generally, Fisch “Measuring Efficiency” 650. The agency theory is
discussed in more detail below in par 3.1. See also on the problem of the separation of ownership and
control Yavasi “Corporate Governance Problems in the EU” 162.
11 Berle “Corporate Powers” 1049.
12 This theory of Dodd is referred to as the ‘natural entity theory of the corporation’. It amounts to the
following: directors are the agents of a corporate entity. Directors may therefore act in a manner that is
to the shareholders’ detriment if it is to the advantage of the company, as a separate legal entity.
Management works for the company and their obligations to the shareholders are therefore only
secondary. According to Dodd, businesses have “a social service as well as a profit-making function”
(Dodd “For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?” 1147–1148). On the natural entity theory, see
generally, Millon “Theories of the Corporation” 217–219. On the Berle–Dodd debate see also Hodes
“The Social Responsibility of a Company” 485–487; Ramsay “Law and Economics”48–49; Sheehy
“The Reluctant Stakeholder” 195; Fairfax “The Rhetoric of Corporate Law” 681; Anderson Corporate
Directors’ Liability 40.
13 Dodd “Book Review” 547; Dodd “For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?” 1148; Fisch
“Measuring Efficiency” 648.
14 Berle “For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees” 1356; Fisch “Measuring Efficiency” 648.
23
between Berle and Dodd.15 Jensen,16 for example, refers to the stakeholder theory,
indicating that this theory implies that managers are accountable to all stakeholders.
This will have the effect of managers not knowing to whom they are accountable,
because there are no defined measurable objectives. Sternberg17 opposes the
stakeholder theory. She argues that the stakeholder theory is incompatible with
business and corporate governance, because it undermines private property, agency
and wealth. Havenga states that “profit-sacrificing social responsibility”18 lies at the
heart of the stakeholder theory. Instead of the company’s interests being identified
with its shareholders’ financial interests, the company is seen as a separate legal
entity where conflicting interests should be accommodated.19
The protection of stakeholders was also debated during the company law review
process of South Africa. The drafting of a new Companies Act provided the ideal
opportunity to resolve this issue, and to indicate which theory is preferred and how it
should be applied practically. However, as is indicated later, the drafters of the
Companies Bill of 2007 have, in my view, not addressed the matter sufficiently.20
It is, however, clear that the recognition of stakeholders’ interests in the management
of a company by directors is becoming more evident. Fairfax provides a number of
15 To name a few: Coase, “The Nature of the Firm” 386; Alchain & Demsetz “Production, Information
Costs” 777–795; Jensen & Meckling “The Theory of the Firm” 305–360; Hodes “The Social
Responsibility of a Company” 468; Fama & Jensen “Separation of Ownership and Control” 301–325;
Wishart “Models and Theories” 323; Du Plessis “Direkteure se Pligte Teenoor Partye Anders as die
Maatskappy” 378; Whincop An Economic and Jurisprudential Genealogy; Havenga “The Company,
the Constitution and the Stakeholders” 134; Wheeler & Sillanpää The Stakeholder Corporation;
Rosenfeld “A Pluralist Critique” 291; Dine “Company Law Developments” 245; Beuthin “The Range
of a Company’s Interests” 155; Crowther & Rayman-Bacchus Perspectives on Corporate Social
Responsibility; Mallin Corporate Governance; Farrar Corporate Governance; Clarke Theories of
Corporate Governance.
16 Jensen “Value Maximization” 8–21.
17 Sternberg “Stakeholder Theory” 5–9.
18 Chapter 1 par 2.
19 Havenga “The Company, the Constitution and the Stakeholders” 137.
20 See the discussion on the Draft Companies Bill of 2007 and the problems with its construction
concerning in whose interests directors should manage a company in ch 6 par 4.3 below. The
shareholder-stakeholder debate was also discussed during the United Kingdom’s company law review
process, see ch 3 par 4.2.3. This discussion on shareholder versus stakeholder protection is also evident
from the corporate governance initiatives in Australia, see ch 4 par 4.
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examples where companies refer to the protection of different stakeholders.21 Firstly,
company documents and websites increasingly refer to other groups and to the
importance of social responsibility. Companies’ annual reports justify the company’s
existence in terms of service to the community and not only in terms of profits
made.22 Websites of most companies also have a link to “social responsibility” and
include corporate activities, the granting of bursaries and charitable activities.
Secondly, companies are increasingly adopting codes of good practice, and
concentrate on other interest groups in these codes, which are sometimes required by
the listing requirements of the exchange where they are listed.23 Thirdly, companies
have changed their infrastructure to accommodate other interest groups. Some
companies employ people who are primarily responsible for the relations with
interest groups other than the shareholders. Other companies have board committees
to oversee the company’s programmes relating to social responsibility and the
interests of stakeholders.24 Finally, some business schools have included “stakeholder
protection” in their curriculum.25
21 Fairfax “The Rhetoric of Corporate Law” 693–696.
22 Crook “The Good Company” 4.
23 A Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct was also released in terms of the South African King II
Report; see pp 21–45. Paragraphs 2.1.5, 3.1.4, 3.2.3, 8.3 in King II concern stakeholder interests. See
also The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council’s Principles of Good
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (March 2003 and August 2007). In terms of these
principles a model code of good principles of corporate governance is suggested for companies (see p
59 of these principles and see the discussion in ch 4 par 4.1). See also the Cadbury Report and its Code
of Best Practice in the United Kingdom (see ch 3 par 4.1). In addition to requiring listed companies to
comply with King II, the JSE Limited (JSE) also launched a Socially Responsible Investment Index
(SRI Index) in May 2004. In terms of this Index the JSE developed criteria to measure the “triple-
bottom line” performance of the FTSE/JSE All Share Index. (See http://www.jse.co.za/sri/index.htm
(accessed 20 January 2008).)
24 Section 8, ch 8 of King II concerns board committees. King II suggests that companies should have
committees dealing with governance, environmental, safety and health issues and audit, nomination,
risk management and remuneration committees (at ch 8 par 6). It is stated in King II that committees of
the board can help to efficiently advance its business. The board is still the focal point of the corporate
governance system and is ultimately accountable and responsible for the affairs of the company. Board
committees are therefore a mechanism to aid and assist the board and its directors by giving detailed
attention to a specific area of the directors’ duties and responsibilities (at ch 8 par 1).
25 These are valid examples of companies’ involvement in society, but one has to ask whether this is
just lip service or “meaningless political exaggeration” (see Frost “Introduction to Classical Rhetoric”
613). Or is this precisely what is meant by the “triple-bottom line”? Companies should have regard to
the interests of society, but shareholders still receive primacy. This issue is discussed later when
determining which theory South Africa should follow, see par 5.2. See generally Fairfax “The Rhetoric
of Corporate Law” 711–712.
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Despite this growing interest in what Fairfax describes as “stakeholder rhetoric”,
many commentators continue to believe that a company should be managed in terms
of the shareholder primacy norm. The vast majority of commentators accept that the
primary objective of directors should be to manage a company in such a way that the
wealth of shareholders is maximised. Corporate conduct is therefore still measured in
accordance with the view that shareholders should receive primacy when directors
manage a company. The corporate governance model that a company adopts indicates
in whose interests directors should manage a company. These models are based on
various theories relating to the nature of a company. These theories are discussed
below.
3 THEORIES ON THE NATURE OF A COMPANY
The two schools of thought or perspectives on the nature of a company were
discussed in section 2 above. The first school advocates the advancement of
shareholder primacy and the second the recognition of the interests of other
stakeholders. These theories, emphasising either a shareholder or stakeholder
element, are discussed below.
Three theories on the nature of a company are the focus in this section. They are the
contractual (or contractarian/agency/nexus-of-contracts), concessionary and
communitaire theories.26 At the outset, it is important to highlight a number of issues.
26 On these theories see generally: Ramsay “Corporate Theory” 179–188, who refers to the
managerialist and contractual theories; Bottomley “Contractualism to Constitutionalism” 277–313
(specifically on the contractarian theory); Dine “Company Law Developments” 246; Bottomley “The
Birds, the Beasts, and the Bat” 243–264 (on the concession theory); Cheffins Company Law 3–41 (on
the contractarian theory); Keay “Directors’ Duties to Creditors” 672; Bolodeoku “Economic Theories”
411; Sheehy “The Reluctant Stakeholder” 193–240 refers to the contractarian, communitaire and
concession theories; Clarke Theories of Corporate Governance; Velasco “The Rights of the
Shareholder” 409–467 discusses the three main theories namely the contractarian theory (also referred
to as the “law and economics theory”), the concession theory and the communitaire theory; Fisch
“Measuring Efficiency” 656; Redmond “The Thrall of Shareholder Value” 79–83 who discusses the
conflict between maximising shareholder value and the expectations of corporate responsibility, the
demise of managerialism and the rise of shareholder value focus. He also provides alternatives to the
dominance of shareholder value maximisation. See further Anderson Corporate Directors’ Liability
(in ch 2 of her book she provides a good overview of policy and theoretical considerations especially
relevant when considering in whose interests directors should manage a company. Her focus is on
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Firstly, these theories are discussed by various commentators and not all of them
describe them in the same manner. Substantial differences in the commentators’
approaches are highlighted. An overview of the theories that are mostly accepted, as
debated by various commentators, is provided. Secondly, these theories are discussed
in order to provide the necessary historical and theoretical basis relating to the issue
of stakeholder protection, but they will not necessarily provide a clear answer to the
question of whom directors should serve when they manage a company.27 Thirdly,
the approaches recently applied in South Africa and the United Kingdom are
discussed and evaluated. Fourthly, a proposed theory on the recognition of
stakeholder interests is suggested.28
3.1 The Contractual or Agency Theory
There are, broadly speaking, two strands of law and economic scholarship in the field
of corporate law. The first is based on the agency theory or contractarian theory29 and
the second on the transaction-cost economics.30 The former is concerned with
addressing problems arising from the separation of ownership and control, whereas
the latter is concerned with discovering internal measures and mechanisms to reduce
costs linked to contractual hazards. In terms of the agency theory, the firm is seen as a
creditors as a specific group of stakeholders: at 13–63); Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 14–26
(also focusing on creditors).
27 Or to put it differently, the theories and models will not necessarily bring one closer to the correct
route to follow when determining in whose interests directors should manage a company.
28 Paragraph 5.2.
29 See n10 above where it is stated that the proponents of the agency theory (such as Alchain &
Demsetz and Jensen & Meckling) tried to understand why the shareholder primacy theory survived so
long, despite the agency problems based on the separation of ownership and control. See, more
recently, Hart “Corporate Governance” 678–689 he refers to problems associated with the agency
theory. These problems cannot always be resolved by way of a contract. Contracts are usually
incomplete due to the high costs involved in negotiating on every possible aspect. Governance
structures can be seen as a mechanism for making decisions that have not been specified in the original
contract.
30 Transaction cost economists are similar to contactarians as they also presume that individuals should
live how they choose to live and make whatever arrangements they deem fit. They see companies as
private initiatives and presume that all actors in the nexus of contracts are rational and desire to
maximise their benefits. Law and economic scholars add to the viewpoints of the contractarians by
emphasising financial economics and the need to reduce transaction costs (see Keay “Directors’ Duties
to Creditors” 674–675). Transaction cost economics are discussed in more detail below.
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“nexus of contracts”31 whereas the transaction-cost economists view it as a
governance structure.32 Although they have differences in emphasis, they also
complement each other.33
In terms of the contractarian or agency theory, the corporation is a web of contractual
relationships.34 Previously,35 the corporation was seen as a single product entity with
a commitment to the maximisation of profit, but the agency theory sees the
corporation as a constantly renegotiated contract where each party wants to maximise
his or her own utility. All relationships with the corporation are therefore contractual
in nature; each of the various stakeholders contributes certain inputs in exchange for
certain rights with respect to outputs. The details of the contribution and return
depend on the specific contract. Shareholders are therefore not owners, but merely a
type of investor.36 Many contractarians regard the company as nothing more than a
“number of complex, private contract-based relations, either expressed or implied,
and they consist of many different kinds of relations that are worked out by those
voluntarily associating in a company”.37 These contractual relationships are voluntary
in nature and corporate law is seen as an enabling set of statutes empowering
stakeholders to enter into contractual relationships. Stakeholders should be able to
structure their particular relationships as they deem fit. This theory is anti-regulatory
31 Velasco “The Rights of the Shareholder” 443; Mallin Corporate Governance 12; Anderson
Corporate Directors’ Liability 31.
32 Mallin Corporate Governance 12.
33 See Bottomley “Contractualism to Constitutionalism” 285. Some commentators discuss these two
theories together, see Anderson Corporate Directors’ Liability 30–40; Velasco “The Rights of the
Shareholder” 442–449.
34 In terms of the contractual theory, two or more parties conclude a contract to carry on a commercial
activity and it is from this contract that a company is born.
35 See the above discussion on the work done by Berle, Means and Dodd. See further Ramsay “Law
and Economics” 48; Clarke Theories of Corporate Governance 4, 57.
36 See Velasco “The Rights of the Shareholder” 443, 447–448; Anderson Corporate Directors’
Liability 31 stating: “Shareholders are just one of these factors of production, and their contribution of
equity capital is merely one type of input into which the company enters.” See also Millon “Theories
of the Corporation” 229; Sheehy “The Reluctant Stakeholder” 230; Clarke Theories of Corporate
Governance 5.
37 Keay “Directors’ Duties to Creditors” 672.
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and participants can opt out of rules should they wish to.38 The theory also suggests
that the shareholders are the principals and the directors or managers the agents. It
offers shareholders a pre-eminent position in the corporation, but as stated above, not
as a consequence of their being owners but rather due to their being residual risk
takers.39 Since the basis of the agency theory is the utilisation of self-interested value
maximisation, the relationship between shareholders and directors will be
problematic.40 Because of this, the agent may not necessarily act in the best interest of
the shareholder (or principal), or may do so only partially.41
The above-mentioned idea that a corporation is a series of contracts was developed in
a different way by new institutional economists.42 Instead of focusing on the
maximisation of profit, they focus on the minimisation of transaction costs.43
Efficiency is therefore of the utmost importance to them. Efficiency concerns the
38 Keay “Directors’ Duties to Creditors” 672.
39 In terms of the shareholder primacy theory, discussed above, shareholders receive primacy based on
their being seen as “owners” of the firm. The agency theory emerged from work done by Alchian &
Demsetz “Production, Information Costs” 777–795; Jensen & Meckling “Theory of the Firm” 305–
360. See Clarke Theories of Corporate Governance for an illuminating discussion of the agency theory
4–7. See Velasco “The Rights of the Shareholder” 447–448, who refers to shareholders receiving
primacy in terms of the agency theory, but not due to them being owners.
40 The essence of the agency problem lies in the separation of ownership and control. This problem is
referred to as “the agency cost problem”. See Fama & Jensen “Separation of Ownership and Control”
304–305; Jensen “Self-interest” 40–55; Clarke Theories of Corporate Governance 4, 57; Anderson
Corporate Directors’ Liability 34; Mallin Corporate Governance 10–12, who explain the agency cost
problem. See also Mitchell et al. “Shareholder Value and Employee Interests” 424 for a discussion of
the shareholder and stakeholder theories. The problem of the stakeholder theory is, in short, the lack of
stakeholder involvement in corporate decision making. The division between ownership and control is
problematic when applying the shareholder theory.
41 The agent may, for example, not take appropriate risks. The agent will also usually have more
information than the principal, placing the principal at a disadvantage. See Mallin Corporate
Governance 10–11.
42 See generally a working paper of Learmount “Theorising Corporate Governance”. The transaction
costs theory is based on the work done by, inter alia, Coase “The Nature of the Firm” 386–405;
Williamson “Transaction-Cost Economics” 233–261; Hart “Corporate Governance” 678–689. Coase
examines the existence of the firm in the context of a framework of the efficiencies of internal as
opposed to external contracting. He says (at 392) that “[t]he operation of a market costs something and
by forming an organisation and allowing some authority (an “entrepreneur”) to direct the resources,
certain marketing costs are saved. The entrepreneur has to carry out his function at less cost, taking
into account the fact that he may get factors of production at a lower price than the marker transactions
which he supersedes.” Williamson “Corporate Governance” 1197–1230 builds on the work done by
Coase. These viewpoints are also explained in Mallin Corporate Governance 13.
43 See Clarke Theories of Corporate Governance 6.
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relationship between the aggregate benefit of a legal rule and the aggregate costs of
such a rule. These scholars argue that any expansion of the responsibilities of
directors would produce inefficiencies in corporate governance.44 To impose
additional duties on directors would hamper transaction costs and prevent resources
from being used in the most productive and efficient way. Keay states that “the
concern is that any greater imposition on directors will make them less efficient in
their role as agents of the shareholders of the company, because amongst other things,
they will start to think of their own positions, rather than maximising profits”.45
3.2 The Concession Theory
Commentators’ discussions vary in their approaches. Some commentators discuss this
theory together with the communitaire theory.46
According to Sheehy, the concession theory holds that a corporation’s existence and
operation is a concession granted by the State to use this corporate tool.47 The
company is therefore seen as a creation of the State.48 This theory does not indicate
precisely who the beneficiaries of directors’ fiduciary duties should be. It is, however,
acknowledged that the beneficiaries include a wider variety of interests than the
contractarian theory, which focuses on shareholders as the main beneficiaries.
Parkinson states that the concession theory regards the company as owing its
44 Coase “The Nature of the Firm” 386–405; Anderson Corporate Directors’ Liability 35.
45 Keay “Directors’ Duties to Creditors” 676. In this article Keay provides some reasons why the
contractarian theory, as applied by the law and economics school, is opposed to a duty to consider the
interests of creditors. He focuses on efficiency and the undermining thereof if creditors are considered.
He argues further that efficiency is not the only factor that can determine whether directors should
have a duty to consider the interests of creditors. Fairness should also be considered. A duty to
creditors can actually enhance efficiency in certain cases. This is discussed in more detail in ch 6 par
3.2 below.
46 Anderson Corporate Directors’ Liability 30–40; Velasco “The Rights of the Shareholder” 442–449.
47 With the development of the discipline of economics, the contractarian theory became more
prominent as opposed to the concession and communitaire theories; see Sheehy “The Reluctant
Stakeholder” 232.
48 On the concession theory, see generally Berns & Baron Company Law and Governance 20 (the
corporation was originally seen as a public, rather than private institution); Dine “Company Law
Developments” 247; Bottomley “The Birds, the Beasts, and the Bat” 243–264; Mahoney “Contract or
Concession” 873–894; Kostant “Team Production” 674–676; Sheehy “The Importance of Corporate
Models” 463–514; Sheehy “The Reluctant Stakeholder” 230–234; Velasco “The Rights of the
Shareholder” 459–462; Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 18.
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existence to an exercise of State power. The company is therefore a creature of the
State that should promote public welfare. The State has the right to interfere in the
internal affairs of the company and need not confine itself to external or general law
regulation.49
According to Dine, the concession theory has two branches.50 The first branch is
similar to the discussion above, referred to as “a concession by the State theory”. The
second branch, referred to as the “bottom-up concessionary theory”, sees the
company as an extension of the contracting parties’ original agreement. By forming a
company, the parties have created an instrument with a real identity separate from the
original contracting parties.51 According to the second branch, directors should
consider a wider variety of interests when managing a company, but there is no
indication of how the different interests of various stakeholder groups should be
balanced.52
3.3 The Communitaire Theory
The third theory is the communitaire theory.53 It regards the company as an
instrument (and not a mere concession) of the State. According to this theory, the
aims of the company reflect the aims of society. The company does not have a strong
commercial character, but has become the tool used by the State to give effect to its
goals. The risk inherent in this theory lies in the fact that the commercial goal of a
company might be lost.54
49 Parkinson Corporate Power 25–33.
50 Dine “Company Law Developments” 247.
51 Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 21.
52 This problem is highlighted when the different stakeholder groups are discussed in the South
African chapter (see ch 6 par 3).
53 Academics who responded to the work done by the law and economics scholars (who rely on profit
maximisation) are usually termed ‘communitarian scholars’ see Kostant “Team Production” 668.
54 On the communitaire theory, see generally Bottomley “Contractualism to Constitutionalism” 277–
313; Sheehy “The Reluctant Stakeholder” 193–240, who discusses the communitaire and concession
theories under the same heading; Anderson Corporate Directors’ Liability 44–46; Lombard Directors’
Duties to Creditors 18. In Andriof & McIntosh Perspectives on Corporate Citizenship, Wood &
Logsdon discuss the communitarian revolution, stating that according to this revolution businesses
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The communitaire theory looks at the place of the company in the community.
According to this theory, stakeholders are vulnerable to abuse and should be
protected. Their goal is the long-term viability of the corporation and they rely on the
co-operation of all corporate stakeholders to achieve this. Ethical behaviour and
fairness are therefore also required. The company will consider the interests of the
stakeholders if it will benefit from doing so in the long-term.55 It is, however, unclear
how the communitaire theory intends to achieve this goal.56
In terms of this theory, companies should have political, social and economic
dimensions. Justice and co-operation are important values in terms of this theory. The
contractual theory is not rejected by proponents of the communitaire theory, but they
emphasise responsibility, instead of freedom (of contract). They argue that corporate
law should confront the harmful effects of shareholder maximisation on stakeholders.
They therefore do not accept profit maximisation for shareholders as the main
objective.57
At present the State does not play the role of concessionary, as described by the
concession and communitaire theories. The South African Companies Bill of 2007
provides individuals with the right to incorporate a company.58 These theories are,
however, still important because of their emphasis on the role of stakeholders instead
have a social role to play in communities, regardless of the costs involved. Businesses are more than
shells with which individual contracts are negotiated.
55 Kostant “Team Production” 674–676; Anderson Corporate Directors’ Liability 45.
56 Williams “Corporate Social Responsibility” 711–717 focuses on the importance of disclosure for
improved corporate social responsibility; Greenfield “Using Behavioral Economics” 642 emphasises
the importance of procedural fairness. According to Williams and Greenfield, corporations are public
as well as private entities and have an obligation to serve socially responsible goals.
57 Velasco “The Rights of the Shareholder” 455–459. He focuses on the stakeholder element of the
communitaire theory and not on the fact that a company is seen as an instrument of the State.
58 See clause 13 of the Companies Bill 2007. It is a core principle of company law that the formation
of a company is an action by persons exercising their constitutional right of freedom of association and
their common law right of freedom to contract (see the Explanatory Memorandum of the Companies
Bill of 2007 at p 10). Part IV of the current South African Companies Act of 1973 deals with the
formation of companies. In s 32 the mode of forming a company is explained. There is no specific
provision stating that a person has a right to incorporate a company.
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of profit maximisation for shareholders. In the next section the models that are based
on these theories are discussed.
4 MODELS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
As indicated above, the models that companies apply relating to corporate
governance, and specifically stakeholder protection, are based on the aforementioned
theories. The first model discussed below highlights shareholder primacy and the
second model the protection of the interests of stakeholders.
The contractual model is based on the contractarian or agency theory. As described
above, the company is seen as a nexus of contracts. Although the scholars of this
theory do not see the shareholders as the owners of the firm, they still award them
with primacy.59 The wishes of the shareholders are seen as the overriding factor when
directors manage a company. Directors should therefore manage a company “in the
best interests of the company”, being the shareholders collectively. Other interest
groups, such as employees and creditors are excluded, and not seen as direct
beneficiaries of directors’ fiduciary duties.60 The goal of this model is to maximise
shareholder wealth, and by so doing also benefiting society.61
The second model is the concession model. It is also referred to as the stakeholder or
managerialist model.62 This model is based on the concessionary theory and
especially the “bottom-up” concessionary theory, discussed above. There are two
variants of this “bottom-up” model, according to Dine: “The first variant of the model
59 See n10 above. See also Berns & Baron Company Law and Governance 18 who say that the
contractual model is aligned with the traditional economic model where the rights and responsibilities
within a corporation are considered to be a matter of private concern.
60 Dine “Company Law Developments” 248.
61 On the contractual model, see Botha “Confusion in the King Report” 33 who discusses the different
models of corporate governance in a South African context. He evaluates King I in view of these
models and states that the essence of this model is to maximise shareholder wealth. See also Berns &
Baron Company Law and Governance 18; Sheehy “The Reluctant Stakeholder” 228.
62 Botha “Confusion in the King Report” 26.
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sees the company as run in the interests of shareholders, it being in the interests of
shareholders to take account of other interest groups, because to ignore them would
damage shareholder interests”. She further states that “[i]n the second variant of the
model it is accepted that interests of other groups must be taken into account because
such an approach directly benefits the company. The ‘interests of the company’ are
seen as including at least the interests of employees and creditors as well as
shareholders.”63 I submit that the first variant is in line with the enlightened
shareholder value approach and the second with the pluralist approach.64 These
approaches are discussed in paragraph 5.1.
5 THEORIES RECENTLY APPLIED
5.1 The Enlightened Shareholder Value and Pluralist Approaches
During the South African and United Kingdom company law reform programmes the
drafters referred to two specific theories relating to the management of a company by
directors, namely the enlightened shareholder value and pluralist approaches or
theories.65 It is therefore important to understand where these approaches fit in when
discussing theories on the nature of a company and the models based on these
theories.
As stated above, these approaches are linked to the concession theory as explained by
Dine’s version of the “bottom-up” concession theory.66 Similar to the concession
63 Dine “Company Law Developments” 249 (emphasis added).
64 See also, generally, on the enlightened shareholder value and pluralist approaches: Sealy “Directors’
Wider Responsibilities”173; Havenga “The Company, the Constitution and the Stakeholders” 136–
137; Proctor & Miles “Duty, Accountability and the Company Law Review” 21–26; Dean
“Stakeholding and Company Law” 66; Miles “Company Stakeholders” 56. These terms were also used
during the South African and United Kingdom company law reform processes. See the Policy
Document ch 3.
65 See ch 3 par 4.2.3 for these approaches applied during the company law reform in the United
Kingdom and ch 6 par 4 for the South African position.
66 Paragraph 3.2.
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theory these approaches have a stakeholder element67 (the pluralist approach more so
than the enlightened shareholder value approach) and do not solely advocate
shareholder primacy as did Berle in the 1930s.68
The enlightened shareholder value approach provides for the maximum protection of
shareholders. Other stakeholders are also considered, but their interests are
subordinate to those of the shareholders. Ultimately, profit maximisation is the main
goal of the directors.69
The second school is that of pluralism. In terms of this approach, directors owe
fiduciary duties to different stakeholders. The interests of employees may in certain
instances receive priority over those of the shareholders collectively.70 Both the
United Kingdom and South Africa opted for the enlightened shareholder value
approach during their company law review processes. This indicates that shareholders
are still the primary beneficiary of directors’ duties. The advantages and
disadvantages of shareholder primacy are discussed below to determine whether there
are valid foundations for directors to treat shareholders as the primary beneficiary of
their fiduciary duties.
In chapter 371 these approaches are discussed as referred to during the United
Kingdom company law review and in chapter 6 as referred to in the South African
King Reports, the Policy Document and the Companies Bill of 2007.72
67 These approaches do not have the element of a company being a concession by the State.
68 Paragraph 2.
69 See n7 for authorities on shareholder primacy. See also generally: Sheikh “Introduction to the
Corporate Governance Themed Issues” 267, 268; Cheffins “Teaching Corporate Governance” 515–
525 and the Policy Document ch 3 par 3.2.2.
70 See n8 for academic articles dealing with the stakeholder theory. See generally Sealy “Directors’
Wider Responsibilities”173; Havenga “The Company, the Constitution and the Stakeholders” 136–
137; Proctor & Miles “Duty, Accountability and the Company Law Review” 21–26; Dean
“Stakeholding and Company Law” 66; Miles “Company Stakeholders” 56 and the Policy Document ch
3 par 3.2.2.
71 Chapter 3 par 4.
72 Chapter 6 par 4.
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5.1.1 Arguments for and Against Shareholder Primacy
The enlightened shareholder value and pluralist approaches, discussed above, moved
away from the traditional approach where shareholders received exclusive protection
when directors managed a company. Therefore, in the next section arguments that
support exclusive shareholder protection are evaluated.73
According to the first argument, the shareholders own the company and its assets and,
accordingly, have a legitimate claim to have the company managed in their own best
interest.74 There is, however, a flaw in this argument: from the date of incorporation
the company is a separate legal person with a separate legal personality and thus it
cannot be owned.75 Roach argues that despite this, shareholders are still seen as the
owners of the company, making this argument extremely resistant to change. A
possible reason is the narrow definition given to “assets”. This ownership argument
seems to be based on the premise that assets only relate to capital assets. However,
assets include anything useful or valuable and the financial definition of an asset is
therefore too narrow. For example, employees contribute labour to the company. It
may be argued that as the company benefits from this asset, those who contribute to it
should also benefit by being taken into consideration by directors when they manage
the company.76 It is justifiable to base arguments for shareholder primacy on
ownership, but stating that shareholders (or any stakeholder that contributes to the
company) own the company is misleading. It should rather be stated that since the
company owns, and benefits from, the assets, those who contribute to these assets
should also benefit.
73 These relate to arguments generally provided for and against exclusive shareholder protection.
Arguments relating to each specific interest group are discussed in detail in ch 6.
74 As advanced by Roach “The Paradox of the Traditional Justifications for Exclusive Shareholder
Governance Protection” 13. See also Esser “The Enlightened-Shareholder-Value Approach” 721. See
also n 10 for incisive authorities dealing with the issue of separation of ownership and control.
75 Aron Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL) (a company is legally separate from its
members). As stated by Lord Macnaghten: “The company is at law a different person altogether from
the subscribers to the memorandum” (at 51). See also Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 10, where the
consequences of separate legal personality are listed. They include that the assets of the company are
the exclusive property of the company and that members may only share in a division of the assets at
liquidation: S v de Jager 1965 (2) SA 616 (A) at 625. See further Sher “Piercing the Corporate Veil”
51; Dine “Company Law Developments” 246.
76 Roach “The Paradox of the Traditional Justifications for Exclusive Shareholder Governance
Protection” 13.
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The second argument in favour of shareholder primacy concerns the aspect of risk. It
is argued that as the shareholders bear the risk of poor corporate performance, they
should hold the right to the company’s residual income. The counter-argument is that
shareholders can substantially reduce their overall risk by way of a policy of
diversification. If the risk they face can be minimised, then the claim for exclusive
protection weakens too.77 Apart from private companies where the articles of
association or shareholder agreements can occasionally prevent shareholders from
selling their shares immediately by, for example, requiring that they should first offer
the shares to the current members. Shareholders in public companies can predict risk
and avoid sustaining losses by simply selling their shares. Over time there is virtually
no financial risk at all for the original providers of share capital. An increase in the
share price would soon reduce the risk for a shareholder to zero. If shares were
originally issued at R1 per share and the shareholder holds 1 000 000 shares, he could
sell 500 000 of the shares when the price reaches R2 per share to recoup his original
investment. This may sometimes take some time, but the shareholders are not totally
excluded from returns on their original investments since they would normally
receive dividends when profits are made. Shareholder risks are also reduced
considerably by way of large professional investment funds and the rapid rise of
institutional shareholders over the last three decades.78 The company’s constitution
forms a contract between the company and its shareholders and the shareholders
among themselves.79 This is indeed a special contract that can only be amended by
special resolution, but the shareholders have exclusive powers to amend it and this
provides for considerable contractual protection. There is also ample scope for
contractual protection of shareholders by way of shareholder agreements. Although it
is generally true that shareholders do not have protection under separate laws, there
77 Roach “The Paradox of the Traditional Justifications for Exclusive Shareholder Governance
Protection” 13.
78 See, generally, on the role of institutional shareholders in good governance Ramsay et al. “Corporate
Governance: The Perspective of Australian Institutional Shareholders” 110; Stapledon Institutional
Shareholders and Corporate Governance; Rademeyer & Holtzhausen “King II, Corporate Governance
and Shareholder Activism” 767.
79 See Du Plessis “Prominensie van die Statute” 94; 96 n18 where he discusses the articles of
association and the memorandum of incorporation of a company.
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are formidable protections imbedded in most modern economies to protect
shareholders. Shareholders are protected under company law in terms of statutory
derivative actions, continuous disclosure provisions, actions aimed at oppressive and
unfairly prejudicial conduct, insolvent trading provisions, reckless trading provisions
and insider trading provisions.80
The third argument is that shareholders should enjoy exclusive protection because
they cannot protect themselves contractually. They may rely on the articles of
association,81 but management lays down the conditions unilaterally in the original
articles of association.82 Other stakeholders, such as employees and creditors, can
protect themselves contractually, but this option is not open to the shareholders.83
The last argument, and probably the most valid of the three, is that most of the other
stakeholders have separate legislation protecting their interests.84 Shareholders do not
have separate legislation protecting their interests.
5.2 A Proposed Combined Theory Relating to the Recognition of
Stakeholder Interests
Owing to the flaws in shareholder protection mentioned above and based on the fact
that none of the theories discussed above provides directors with clear guidelines
80 Esser & Du Plessis “Stakeholder Protection” 358.
81 The articles of association determine how the company shall function. Among other things, the
rights, duties and powers of directors are set out in the articles of association. The articles of
association constitute a contract between the company and its members and between the members
amongst themselves. See s 65 of the Companies Act; Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 79–81. See
also Hickman v Kent or Romney Marsh Sheep Breeders’ Association [1915] 1 Ch 881 (it was held that
a member is contractually bound by a provision in the articles stating that disputes between the
member and the company should be submitted for arbitration); De Villiers v Jacobsdal Saltworks
(Michaelis and De Villiers) (Pty) Ltd 1959 (3) SA 873 (O) (the articles constitute a contract between
the company and its members, in their capacity as members).
82 The articles can be amended at the general meeting (see s 62 of the Companies Act).
83 Roach “The Paradox of the Traditional Justifications for Exclusive Shareholder Governance
Protection” 9–15. See in general Esser “The Enlightened-Shareholder-Value Approach” 721.
84 See, for example, the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 protecting the interests of employees. See ch
6 par 3.3 for a discussion on the position of employees in South Africa. See also Esser “The Protection
of Employees” 407–426.
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concerning the beneficiaries of their duties when managing a company, a proposed
combined theory on the protection of stakeholders is recommended in this section. It
is argued below that this proposed theory is based on a “merry-go-round approach”.85
The starting point of a sound model of corporate governance should be the
fundamental principle that directors owe their fiduciary duties to the company and to
the company alone, since the company is a separate legal entity from the moment it is
registered until it is deregistered.86
The company represents several interests. These include those of shareholders,
employees, consumers, the community and the environment. Thus, requiring of
directors to act in good faith in the interest of “the company” cannot mean anything
other than a blend of all these interests, but first and foremost acting in the best
interests of the company as a separate legal entity. The various interests therefore
have different weightings. It will also be appropriate for a court to consider any other
remedies under other legislation before it allows a particular interest to rely on
specific company law remedies. Such an approach by the courts may well reveal that
a particular interest is already well catered for under separate legislation. In view of
this, the protection afforded other stakeholders in South Africa, the United Kingdom
and Australia is discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 6.
It is proposed that an interest that may be primary at one particular moment in the
company’s existence, may become secondary at a later stage. This is an ongoing
process that could be compared to a merry-go-round (the company): many interests
are represented in this merry-go-round at any particular time. Just like a merry-go-
round there are sometimes short stops to let some participants get off and to take
other participants on board. But then the motion continues with the participants
85 See on this proposed approach Esser & Du Plessis “Stakeholder Protection” 358.
86 The importance of a company’s separate legal personality is evident from clause 12 of the South
African Companies Bill of 2007 which states that a company is a legal person:
(1) From the date and time that the incorporation of a company is registered, as stated in
its Registration Certificate, the company –
(a) is a juristic person, which exists continuously until it’s [sic] name is removed
from the Companies Register in accordance with this Act; and
(b) has all of the legal powers and capacity of an individual, except to the extent that
a juristic person is incapable of exercising any such powers, or having any such capacity.
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(interests) constantly moving up and down without any real finishing line and the
rotating speed may even vary, until it comes to a permanent standstill when the
company is liquidated. Even then it will require of the court to weigh up the various
interests of at least creditors, shareholders and employees. During the existence of the
company, the directors are required to focus on the interests of “the company”
(merry-go-round) as well as the various other interests, moving up and down just like
those who are enjoying the ride on the merry-go-round.
It should be remembered that the meaning of “the company” only becomes obscure if
the term is, for historic reasons,87 equated with the shareholders collectively. Thus,
the only solution is indeed for the legislature to step in and change this traditional
interpretation where “the company” is interpreted as meaning the shareholders
collectively.
It is argued that it is unnecessary to give any particular tag to this view of the
company, other than stating that it is based on a simple juridical reality (“teorie van
eenvoudige juridiese realiteit”) as Naudé already pointed out in 1970.88 The natural
entity theory postulates that directors are the agents of a corporate entity. Directors
could therefore act in a manner that is to the shareholders’ detriment if it is to the
advantage of the company, as a separate legal entity.
To summarise, the proposed theory states that a company is represented by various
interests and the degree of importance attached to these interests varies during the
existence of a company. Directors should be aware of this and should specifically
bear legislation, other than company legislation, protecting these stakeholders in mind
when managing a company.
87 See Naudé Die Regsposisie van die Maatskappydirekteur 13, relying on Sealy “The Director as
Trustee” 90.
88 Naudé Die Regsposisie van die Maatskappydirekteur 18–19.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter a theoretical foundation was provided for the theories on the nature of
a company and various corporate governance models. The agency, concession and
the communitaire theories were discussed.89 In terms of the agency theory, the
corporation is described as a “nexus of contracts”. The various stakeholders
contribute certain inputs in exchange for certain rights with respect to outputs. In
terms of this theory, the shareholders are the principles and the directors the agents.
Shareholders have a pre-eminent position in the corporation since they are the
ultimate risk takers. The separation of ownership and control is a problem when
applying this theory.90 The concession theory states that a corporation’s existence is a
concession of the State in granting the ability to use this corporate tool. Shareholders
are not the only beneficiaries of directors’ duties in terms of this theory, other
stakeholders are also important.91 A company is regarded as an instrument of the
State in terms of the communitaire theory. Stakeholders should be protected
according to this theory. The long-term viability of the corporation is important.92
Approaches on stakeholder protection that have recently been applied in South Africa
and the United Kingdom were also considered. The first approach, namely the
enlightened shareholder value approach, focuses on shareholder primacy and the
second, the pluralist approach, on the protection of stakeholder interests.93
It was found that the corporate governance theories and models have either a
shareholder or a stakeholder emphasis.94 It is, however, important to note that these
theories are not the only relevant approaches regarding corporate governance models
and specifically not as far as the protection of stakeholders are concerned. To analyse
89 Paragraphs 3.1–3.3.
90 Paragraph 3.1 above.
91 Paragraph 3.2 above.
92 Paragraph 3.3 above.
93 Paragraph 5.1 above.
94 Paragraphs 3, 4 above.
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the different theories of, and approaches to, company law is a complex task and
commentators hold widely divergent views relating to these theories and
approaches.95
Arguments for and against shareholder primacy were considered. A number of
shortcomings were identified.96 In view of these shortcomings, a proposed combined
theory was recommended on the recognition of stakeholder interests.97 In terms of
this theory, it cannot be denied that a company is a separate legal entity, representing
several interests, including those of shareholders, employees, investors, consumers,
the community and the environment. Directors should therefore consider the interests
of various stakeholders when acting in “the best interests of the company”. These
interests and the weighting attached to them may differ during the various stages of a
company’s existence. The protection that these stakeholders receive in other
legislation may also play a role when a court decides on the competing interests of
different stakeholders.98 Because legislation, other than company law legislation,
plays such an important role, the protection that stakeholders in the United Kingdom,
Australia and South Africa receive in other legislation is discussed in the rest of this
thesis.
95 Paragraph 3 above.
96 Paragraph 5.1.1 above.
97 Paragraph 5.2 above.
98 Paragraph 5.2 above.
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THE LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
1 INTRODUCTION
2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
3 THE POSITION RELATING TO DIRECTORS’ DUTIES PRIOR TO THE
COMPANIES ACT OF 2006: AN OVERVIEW
4 THE STAKEHOLDER DEBATE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
CODES, THE COMPANY LAW REVIEW PROCESS AND THE
COMPANIES ACT OF 2006
5 CONCLUSIONS
1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the company law of the United Kingdom is discussed. First, a general
overview of English company law, and specifically the law relating to directors’
duties, is provided. Traditionally, directors’ duties fall into two categories in English
common law, namely, the fiduciary duty of good faith and the duty of care and skill.
These directors’ duties are confirmed in case law, legislation and also in the articles
of association of individual companies.1
Various corporate governance codes and the recent company law reform process,
which led to the enactment of the Companies Act of 2006, are then considered. The
Companies Act of 2006 is applicable in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland.2 When discussing the codes, the consultation documents of the Steering
1 See generally Birds “The Reform of Directors’ Duties” 149; Keay “Section 172(1)” 106 (specifically
on the stakeholder debate and the Companies Act of 2006).
2 See the definition of “company” in s 1(1) of the Companies Act of 2006, in terms of which the
“Companies Act” extends to the whole of the United Kingdom. See also the Explanatory Notes on the
Act available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/bbf/co-act-2006/ (accessed 10 February 2008). Scotland and the
Welsh Assembly do not have legislative powers in the area of company law, although Scotland has the
power to legislate on certain matters such as the regulation of business names. The Scottish Parliament
agreed to a legislative consent motion on 16 March 2006. Northern Ireland has legislative powers on
company law. Previously, they enacted company law legislation mirroring those of Great Britain (see
the Companies (Northern Ireland) Order 1986) in terms of the 1985 Companies Act. In relation to the
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Group drafted during the company law review process and the Act, the emphasis is
on directors’ duties and specifically on the issue of in whose interests they should
manage a company. Section 172(1) of the Act, which deals with the protection of
stakeholders, is therefore discussed specifically. The exhaustive code provided for in
the Companies Act of 2006 is also considered.3 This code is exhaustive in the sense
that courts cannot develop new principles, but existing principles may be developed
with reference to existing case law.4
2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The history of English company law can be divided into the following stages: from
earliest times5 until the South Sea Bubble Act, from the Bubble Act until the first
Companies Act in 1844, from 1844 until the United Kingdom’s accession to the
Common Market and from 1972 until the present.6
new Companies Act an agreement was reached with Northern Ireland stating that they still have the
power to enact separate legislation (see s1284 of the Companies Act of 2006). See also Palmer
Annotated Guide 56, 933 on this issue.
3 The Steering Group referred to a “statement” on directors’ duties, but some commentators refer to it
as a “code”. For purposes of this thesis the same meaning should be attached to “statement” and
“code”. I submit that it is better to refer to a “statement of directors’ duties” if the common law is still
applicable, as is the case with the draft Companies Bill of 2007 in South Africa. If the common law is
no longer applicable, I suggest that it is preferable to refer to a “code of directors’ duties”. See also ch
6 par 5.
4 See ss 171–177 of the Companies Act of 2006. See also Modern Company Law Review for a
Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework, URN 00/656 (March 2000) available at
http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/modcolaw.htm (hereafter Developing the Framework) at pars 3.20, 3.82;
Modern Company Law Review for a Competitive Economy: Completing the Structure, URN 00/1335
(2000) available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/modcolaw.htm (hereafter Completing the Structure) at
pars 3.2, 3.6, 3.12; Modernising Company Law: The White Paper (March 2005) available at
http://www.dti.gov.uk/companiesbill/whitepaper.htm. (hereafter the 2005 White Paper) at par 3.3
stating that the code is exhaustive in nature and that it will replace the common law. Whether or not
the code is really exhaustive is evaluated in par 4.3.4 below.
5 As early as the fourteenth century.
6 See Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 15–24 on the general history of English company law and the
different stages in the development of English company law. See also Davies Gower and Davies’
Principles of Modern Company Law 19–54; Birds et al. Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 1–12.
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2.1 From Earliest Times Until the South Sea Bubble Act
In the Middle Ages, the principal trades were regulated by the guilds of the
merchants.7 The guilds regulated a broad branch of trade or conferred on their
members a monopoly of dealing in a particular kind of commodity.8 Groups of
merchants conducted business overseas. Each member conducted trade with its own
“stock” and for its own account, but subject to the rules of the guilds by way of
partnerships.9 Trading therefore took place through joint associations as opposed to
individual trading. The purpose of the guild was to ensure an adequate level of profit
to the poorest business. The guilds were part of the structure of municipal
organisation in England. They existed for social as well as economic purposes.
The commenda and the societas were two of the earliest business forms and bear
some resemblance to the modern partnership. The societas was a more permanent
association and similar to the modern partnership. The commenda was a cross
between a modern partnership and a loan. One person would advance money to a
trader on terms that should have a return which varied with the profits.10 At common
law the only means of incorporation was by way of Royal Charter.11 The purpose of
incorporation was to confer protection and status. Incorporation by way of Royal
Charter was rarely given to traders. The grant was often given for charitable
purposes, such as the founding of a new college. Later on, in the Elizabethan period,
the purpose of the grant was often to regulate a particular trade. With the
development of international and colonial trade in the fifteenth century, “merchant
ventures” developed. These ventures gave rise to regulated companies where each
member traded his own stock, but as a member of the “company”. The interests of
merchants did not lie in separate legal personality, but rather in the exercise of
governmental power and trading privileges.
7 This is similar to ceremonial and social activities of the free masons, for example. See Farrar &
Hannigan Company Law 15.
8 Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 15.
9 Lombard “’n Historiese Perspektief 1” 238.
10 Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 15–16.
11 There is some evidence that Papal Charters were also given to religious and educational bodies. See
Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 16.
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The next development was the concept of joint stock. In a joint stock company, the
company trades as a single person with stock that is contributed by its members.12
The East Indian Company was the first company to combine incorporation, overseas
trade and joint stock raised from the general public. Historically, this was linked to
the grant of a monopoly. A grant was made to a “company” of individuals who raised
stock for the exploitation of the monopoly. Not all joint stock ventures obtained
incorporation and some operated as partnerships. In 1694 a group of individuals lent
money to the government and their company was, in turn, incorporated as a joint
stock company. The underlying idea was that the money lent to the State constituted a
fund of credit against which loans could be made by the bank. In time a company
might venture to take over the whole national debt. Dealings in stocks and shares in
incorporated and unincorporated ventures began on the developing stock market in
1696. It is against this background that the South Sea Bubble Act should be
considered.13
2.2 The South Sea Bubble Act
In 1711 a lawyer formed a company called “the company of merchants of Great
Britain trading in the South Seas”.14 The main object of this company was to secure
trade in the South Sea. The company was very profitable and paid anyone who had a
government annuity the amount that was due on it. Payment was not in cash, but in
shares in the company. In 1720 the bubble burst and investors realised that they had
paid much more for the shares than they were worth. The Bubble Act15 then came
into operation and prohibited a company from acting as a body corporate and from
raising stocks without the legal authority of a Royal Charter or Act of Parliament. It
was difficult to obtain a Royal Charter and “deed of settlement companies” were
established.16 This type of company was a combination between a trust and an
12 Morse et al. Charlesworth’s Company Law 5.
13 Hahlo & Farrar Cases and Materials 5, 17.
14 Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 18–19.
15 6 Geo 1, c 18.
16 Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 19.
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association. Its assets were held on trust, but its business was managed by the
directors. The investor would obtain an interest in the trust fund. The Bubble Act was
repealed in 1825. Until 1843 there was still doubt concerning the “deed of settlement
companies” in terms of the common law, due to a provision in the repealing Act
which stated that the position of these companies should be as it was before the Act.
2.3 The United Kingdom’s Accession to the Common Market
In 1844 people realised that there was a need for legislation providing for registration
of deeds of settlement documents. This legislation was the first companies legislation.
The companies formed under the 1844 Act were unlimited companies. The
shareholders had unlimited liability for the debts of the company. Limited liability
was introduced with the Limited Liability Act of 1855. The practice developed and
there were major reforms almost every 20 years.17 The Companies Act of 194818 was
the last consolidating Act before the 1985 Companies Act.19
2.4 From 1973 Until 2007
In January 1973 the United Kingdom became a member state of the European
Communities. The communities were the European Economic Community, the
European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atlantic Energy Community.
The United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community in January 1973.
The basic guiding principle of the European Economic Community is to establish
undistorted competition in an undivided market, by way of treating nationals of
member states equally.20 In November 1993 the European Community became the
European Union, following the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union.21 The
United Kingdom’s membership to the European Union resulted from Treaties of
17 See, for example, the Companies Act of 1862 which introduces companies limited by guarantee and
unlimited companies. This remained the principal Act until 1908. The Directors’ Liability Act of 1890
introduced the rule that a director could be held liable for false statements in a prospectus.
18 11 & 12 Geo 6 c 38.
19 Hahlo & Farrar Cases and Materials 7.
20 Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 26.
21 The Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht Treaty) O.J.C 191 of 29.7.1992.
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Accession, which were given internal effect through the European Communities Act
of 1972. This Act provided for the recognition and enforcement of enforceable
community rights created or arising by way of, or under, the treaties. The Treaty of
Rome is important here, so too further treaties created thereunder or by way of
amendment. The United Kingdom was therefore subject to the Treaty of Rome which
dealt, inter alia, with the harmonisation of company laws in Europe.
Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome sets out the goals of the European Union, namely to
establish a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies
of member states; to promote throughout the community a harmonious development
of economic activities; a continuous and balanced expansion; an increase in stability;
an accelerated raising of the standard of living; and closer relations between the states
belonging to it. Article 3 provides that for the purposes set out in article 2, the
activities of the European Union shall include, inter alia, the abolition, as between
member states, of obstacles of freedom of movement for persons, services and
capital; and the approximation of the laws of the member states to the extent required
for the proper functioning of the common market. Article 100 is a general provision
on the approximation of laws stating that the council shall issue directives for the
approximation of provisions laid down in law, regulation or administrative action in
member states and directly affecting the establishment or functioning of the common
market.22
Directives concerning harmonisation of company law in the European Union were
issued between 1968 and 1989, and include the following:23 The First Directive24
mainly dealt with the ultra vires doctrine and directors’ authority. In section 9 of the
European Communities Act of 1972 the United Kingdom implemented the First
Directive into United Kingdom company law. The Companies Act of 1980
implemented the Second Directive relating to share capital and classification of
22 See Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 28–29 on the harmonisation of European company law. See
also Delport “European Community Directives” 199.
23 Hannigan Company Law 38–57 on the directives.
24 The First Directive 68/151/EEC.
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companies.25 The Companies (Mergers and Divisions) Regulation of 1987
implemented the Third Directive dealing with internal mergers within member
states.26 The Companies Act of 1981 implemented the Fourth Directive27 on company
accounts.28 The United Kingdom is one of the member states that have been most
effective in translating directives into national law.29
In 1985 a major reform was launched to restate the law in more modern language.
The result was the 1985 Companies Act.30 This Act was not a complete codification
of company law.31 The fiduciary duties of directors were mainly contained in case
law.
In 1998 the government set up an independent body, the Steering Group, to manage a
comprehensive company law review process. The Steering Group published a
number of consultation documents between 1999 and 2001, and published a Final
25 The Second Directive 77/91/EEC.
26 The Third Directive 78/855/EEC. See s 427A and Schedule 15A in the Companies Act of 1985,
which inserted this directive into United Kingdom company law.
27 The Fourth Directive 78/660/EEC.
28 See Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 22–23 and Delport “European Community Directives” 200ff
on these directives. See also the Draft Firth Directive, first proposed in 1972, dealing with worker
participation on board level. The Sixth Directive 82/891/EEC on scissions or divisions (where a public
company transfers all its assets and liabilities to a number of public companies within the same
member state in exchange for the issue of shares to the shareholders of the original company). This
directive was implemented by the Companies (Mergers and Divisions) Regulation 1987. The Seventh
Directive 83/349/EEC deals with group accounts and the Eighth Directive 84/253/EEC with the
qualifications and independence of auditors (both these Directives were implemented by the
Companies Act of 1989). A Draft Ninth Directive deals with group relationships. No action has been
taken on this directive. A proposal for a Tenth Directive was submitted during 1985 to facilitate a
Community-wide type of merger, referred to in the Third Directive. Negotiations on this directive have
been blocked. The Eleventh Directive 32 OJ 1989 deals with disclosure requirements in respect of
branches opened in member states by companies governed by the law of another state. This directive
was implemented in 1992. The Twelfth Directive 32 OJ 1989 allows for private companies with one
member. Lastly, a proposal was submitted during 1989 for a Thirteenth Directive dealing with
takeovers. An amended proposal was issued in 1996, but not accepted as yet.
29 Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 37.
30 See Farrar & Hannigan Company Law ch 2 for a concise summary on the history of English
company law.
31 It was more of a consolidation of statutory provisions as contained in the 1948, 1967, 1976, 1981
and 1982 Companies legislation. Other legislation such as the Company Directors’ (Disqualification)
Act of 1986 also played a role.
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Report in 1999.32 The government responded to these documents in a White Paper in
2002 and again in 2005. In 2006 the Companies Bill was issued and the Act was
promulgated in 2006. Some parts of the Act are already in force.33 The remainder will
be effective by October 2009. The consultation documents and the development of
the review process are discussed in detail later in this chapter.34
3 THE POSITION RELATING TO DIRECTORS’ DUTIES PRIOR TO THE
COMPANIES ACT OF 2006: AN OVERVIEW
As stated before, the Companies Act of 2006 provides for a new restatement of
directors’ duties. This new code of directors’ duties is discussed in paragraph 4.3
below. It is, however, necessary to examine briefly directors’ duties as they applied
before the enactment of the Act. This is necessary mainly because the common law
principles concerning directors’ duties are still relevant when interpreting the new
code of directors’ duties. Some directors’ duties are still uncodified, such as the duty
to consider the interests of creditors in certain instances.35 The common law therefore
continues to be important when evaluating these duties.36 Directors’ fiduciary duties
and their obligations of care and skill are discussed separately below.37
3.1 The Fiduciary Duty of Good Faith
The fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty are classified in different ways by
different commentators, but these duties are usually classified into five categories. It
32 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report Volume 1 and 2 URN 01/942 and
URN 01/943 released in July 2001 (hereafter the Final Report).
33 See par 4.3.1 below.
34 See Rickford “A History of the Company Law Review” 3–37; Eilís Progress Report for a discussion
on the company law reform process.
35 This is discussed in par 4.3.4 below.
36 See the Explanatory Notes on the Act par 306. See also Corporate Update: Special Client Briefing
(November 2006) by solicitors Clifford Chance on the Companies Act of 2006 at p 2.
37 See generally on directors’ duties Lowry & Dignam Company Law 290–347; Davies Introduction to
Company Law 5–9.
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is important to discuss the origin and basis of fiduciary duties briefly before
considering the different fiduciary duties of directors.38
The fiduciary obligation, as a legal principle, originated in English rules of equity.
The original fiduciary was the trustee. There have been many attempts to define the
concept “fiduciary”. The point of departure is that a fiduciary is someone who acts
for, or on behalf of, another person in a relationship of confidence and trust.39 Two
characterises are present when defining a fiduciary relationship. Firstly, the fiduciary
should have scope to exercise some discretion or power and, secondly, the fiduciary
must exercise the power in such a way that the interests of beneficiaries are affected.
Basically, a fiduciary relationship will arise when a person has access to assets of a
trusting party and the trusting party is vulnerable to the exercise of power at the
discretion of the fiduciary.40 Other fiduciary relationships that involve trust and
confidence were also recognised. Fiduciary relationships may, for example, arise in a
commercial context. The position of a director, as a fiduciary, is often compared to
that of trustees or agents. Directors are, however, not trustees or agents, but there are
similarities between these fiduciary positions. The relationship between a director and
a company remains separate.
The first category of directors’ fiduciary duties relates to the duty to act in good faith
and in the best interests of the company.41 The “company” has traditionally been
interpreted as the shareholders collectively.42 Broadly, “good faith” in this context
relates to fair conduct. Directors must exercise their powers for the benefit of the
38 Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors 7–11; DeMott “Fiduciary Obligations” 880; Finn
“Fiduciary Obligations” 64; Gautreau “Fiduciary Principle” 1; Gill “Fiduciary Duties” 122 on the basis
and origin of fiduciary duties.
39 Mayson et al. Company Law 447–449; Morse et al. Charlesworth’s Company Law 294–295; Pettet
Company Law 164–165.
40 See Flannigan “Fiduciary Doctrine” 322; 449; Gautreau “Fiduciary Principle” 7 on the definition of
“fiduciary”.
41 See generally on this duty, Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 383–391; Mayson et al. Company Law
454–463; Pennington Company Law 709; Dine & Koutsias Company Law 177–179; Davies Gower
and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 371; Sealy Cases and Materials 299.
42 See par 3.1.1 below where the traditional definition attached to “the company” is discussed in more
detail.
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company and not seek any collateral benefit for themselves.43 The test to determine
whether a director acted in the best interests of a company is subjective.44 The court
will not intervene, but will leave decisions relating to what is in the best interests of
the company to the business judgment of the specific director.45 A court will only
interfere when no reasonable director could have concluded that a particular action
was in the best interests of the company.46 When acting in the best interests of the
company, directors must act in the best interests of the present and future
shareholders collectively.47 Directors may also consider the interests of employees,
creditor, consumers and other interest groups, but only when they will ultimately
advance the interests of the shareholders.48
It is the above-mentioned duty to act in the best interests of the company that is the
focal point of this thesis. The duty is discussed in some detail below when
considering how the different codes of corporate governance, the documents
published as part of the company law review process and the Companies Act of 2006
address the stakeholder debate.
43 Pettet Company Law 164–165.
44 Mayson et al. Company Law 455; Morse et al. Charlesworth’s Company Law 297– 300.
45 See Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821 (PC) at 832, where the court held that
courts will not act as a kind of supervisory board over decisions within the powers of the management
that they honestly arrived at. See also Regentcrest plc v Cohen (2001) 2 BCLC 80 (CD) at 105 (the
question was whether the director had honestly believed that his act or omission was in the best
interests of the company. The issue was as to the directors’ state of mind).
46 See Mayson et al. Company Law 454–456; Re a Company, Ex Parte Burr [1992] BCLC 724 (CD);
Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd (1970) Ch 62 at 74. See generally Havenga
Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors 63 where she discusses the English law on this topic.
47 See Morse et al. Charlesworth’s Company Law 297; Mayson et al. Company Law 457. Directors
should not act in the best interests of their fellow directors, see Lee v Chou Wen Hsien [1985] BCLC
45 (PC); Brant Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc (1988) 80 DLR 161; Kohn v Meehan (2003) LTL All
ER 315 (D). See also JJ Harrison (Pty) Ltd v Harrison (2001) EWCA Civ 1467 (CA) where Judge
Chadwick said that “[t]he powers to dispose of the company’s property, conferred upon the directors
by the articles of association, must be exercised by the directors for the purpose, and in the interests, of
the company”. In Item Software (UK) Ltd v Fassihi (2004) EWCA Civ 1244 (CA) Judge Arden spoke
of the duty of good faith as “the fundamental duty to which a director is subject, that is the duty to act
in what he in good faith considers to be in the best interests of his company”.
48 The position of these stakeholders is discussed in more detail in pars 3.1.2–3.1.6 below. See
generally, Birds et al. Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 500–501; Sealy Cases and Materials 262–269;
Mayson et al. Company Law 458–463; Keenan & Bisacre Company Law 362–367.
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The second category of directors’ fiduciary duties relates to directors’ duty to
exercise the powers vested in them for a proper purpose.49 Directors should use their
powers for the benefit of the company and not to their own advantage. A company’s
memorandum of association limits the capacity of the company. Directors should
observe any limitations on their powers in the memorandum. Shareholders may,
however, ratify actions of directors that went beyond the powers conferred on them
by the memorandum in terms of a special resolution. Directors are liable if they
exceed their authority and their powers exercised for an improper purpose may be set
aside.50 Directors may even be liable if they have acted honestly, but for an improper
purpose.51 In the case of Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd52 two
shareholders between them held 55 per cent of the shares in a company. They
announced that they would vote against any offer from a bidder in an intended
takeover. The board of directors then allotted new shares to the bidder. The Privy
Council found that the board had acted for an improper purpose, even though the
directors had acted honestly (and not in any self-interest). They had used the shares
purely for the purpose of destroying an existing majority. The case of Hogg v
Cramphorn Ltd53 is also relevant in this regard. Directors of the defendant company
feared a takeover bid and their subsequent removal from the board of directors. Based
on this fear they allotted shares to persons who would support them in office.
Although they believed that it would be in the best interests of the company to
preserve their positions on the board, the court found that the directors had acted for
an improper purpose and declared the allotment of the shares to be voidable.54
49 On the proper purpose rule see Keenan & Bisacre Company Law 357; Morse et al. Charlesworth’s
Company Law 299–302; Sealy Cases and Materials 302–303; Dine & Koutsias Company Law 201–
202. See the discussion in par 4.3.2 below on directors’ duties in terms of the Companies Act of 2006.
50 Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 391.
51 Morse et al. Charlesworth’s Company Law 300; Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors
64–67.
52 [1974] AC 821 (PC). See Sealy Cases and Materials 306–307, who holds that if directors are
motivated by more than one purpose regard is to be had to the primary purpose in deciding whether
the court will intervene or not.
53 [1967] Ch 254. See Sealy Cases and Materials 303. In some cases “improper purpose” and
“improper motive” are used interchangeably. In the Hogg case, however, it was found that the
directors had acted with the necessary good faith, but that their “purpose” was still “improper”.
54 Buckley J in Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd distinguishes between the duty to act for a proper purpose and
the duty of good faith (at 266–268). The duty to act in good faith requires a subjective test, whereas the
53
Third, directors are regarded as “trustees” of the company’s property that is under
their control and they will be liable for any misapplication thereof. A misapplication
in this context means any disposition of the property of the company which the
directors are forbidden, incompetent or unauthorised to make in terms of the
constitution of the company, a statutory provision or a general rule of law. 55
Directors are not allowed to enter into any engagements in which they may have a
personal interest that will conflict or may possibly conflict with that of the
company.56 If a company enters into a contract in which one of its directors has an
interest, the contact is voidable at the option of the company.57 The members of the
company can, by way of a general resolution, permit a director to benefit from a
transaction with the company, provided there has been full disclosure of all material
facts. A director has a fiduciary,58 as well as a statutory duty,59 to disclose any
duty to act for a proper purpose requires an objective test. See also Punt v Symons & Co Ltd [1903] 2
Ch 506 where it was held that it is improper for directors to use their powers to issue shares in order to
rob the existing majority shareholders of their voting control. This case was followed in Piercy v S
Mills & Co Ltd [1920] 1 Ch 77. See also Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors 66 n 80;
Birds et al. Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 504–506; Palmer Annotated Guide 165–169 on these cases.
55 See Birds et al. Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 506–508 for further examples of misapplications. See
also In Re Exchange Banking Company (1882) 21 Ch D 519 (CA) and Allied Carpets Group plc v
Nethercott [2001] BCC 81 regarding the payment or recommendation to pay dividends out of the
capital and Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) v British Steel Corporation [1985] 2 WLR 908 (CA)
regarding the execution of a guarantee and debenture in breach of the articles and not in the bona fide
interests of the company. See also Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors 74–76 who
discusses this duty in the context of English law.
56 On the duty not to have conflicting interests, see Mayson et al. Company Law 463–465, 470–477;
Morse et al. Charlesworth’s Company Law 302–305; Pettet Company Law 166–167.
57 Gray v New Augarita Porcupine Mines Ltd (1952) 3 DLR 1 at 12–13.
58 On the fiduciary duty of a director to disclose conflicting interests see: Bentinck v Thomas Fenn
(1887) 12 App Cas 652 (HL) at 661, 667, 671.
59 These duties, in general law, were supplemented by a number of duties in part X of the 1985
Companies Act. See s 317(1) of the Companies Act of 1985. A director of a company who is in any
way, whether directly or indirectly, interested in a contract, or proposed contract, with the company
must declare the nature of the interest at a meeting of directors of the company. A declaration of
interest by a director does not in itself relieve a director from the operation of the no-conflict rule.
Only the members of the company can disregard that rule by way of a general provision in the articles
of association or by way of ratifying a specific transaction. See North-West Transportation Co Ltd v
Henry Beatty (1887) 12 App Cas 589 (PC) on the principle that a company may ratify a director’s
breach of his fiduciary duty not to have conflicting interests in a general meeting. Non-compliance by
a director of his statutory obligation in s 317(1), referred to above, does not render the contract void,
but voidable under the principles of equity: see Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd (1968) 1 QB 3 All
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material interests in a transaction to the company. A conflicting interest will be
present if the reasonable man, when considering the relevant facts, would think that
there is a possible conflict of interest. An example of a possible conflict of interest is
when a contract is concluded with the director’s own company.60
Lastly, a director will be accountable for any “secret profit” made through holding
the office of director.61 A secret profit relates to the situation where a director makes
a profit using a corporate asset to make that profit.62 The general prohibition on the
acquisition of “secret profits” is applicable to, inter alia, any secret commission or
“bribe” received by a director in the course of negotiating transactions on behalf of
the company63 or a profit derived due to the use of confidential information by the
director.64 This is clearly a breach of a director’s fiduciary duties.65 The fact that the
company itself could not have made the profit is immaterial.66 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v
ER 98 (Court of Appeal). See the discussion in par 4.3.2 below on the provisions of conflicting
interests in the Companies Act of 2006.
60 See Aberdeen Rail Co v Blaikie Bros (1854) 1 Macq 461 at 471: “no one, having such duties to
discharge, shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has, or can have, a personal interest
conflicting, or which may conflict, with the interests of those whom he is bound to protect”; Transvaal
Lands Co v New Belgium Land and Development Co [1914] 2 Ch 488 and Boardman v Phipps [1967]
2 AC 46 (HL) confirming that there should not be a conflict between the personal interests of the
director and the interests of the company. See also Birds et al. Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 508–509;
Sealy Cases and Materials 270–279.
61 This principle is equally applicable to former directors, if they have obtained the profit from an
opportunity that the company is still actively pursuing: Island Export Finance Ltd v Umunna [1986]
BCLC 460 and CMS Dolphin Ltd v Simonet [2001] 2 BCLC 704.
62 See Keech v Sandford (1726) SelCas Ch 61 and Keith Henry & Co Pty v Stuart Walker & Co Pty
[1958] CLR 342 where it was stated that a trustee may not use his position as trustee to make a profit
for himself. It was stated that this rule applies to all cases where a relationship of trust is present.
63 Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Cold Ltd v Ansell (1888) LR 9 Eq 480.
64 Gencor ACP Ltd v Dalby [2000] 2 BCLC 734.
65 See on the “secret profit” rule: Mayson et al. Company Law 472–477; Morse et al. Charlesworth’s
Company Law 302–303; Sealy Cases and Materials 279–290.
66 See Gencor ACP Ltd v Dalby (2000) 2 BCLC 734 (Ch). See further Industrial Development
Consultants Ltd v Cooley (1972) 1 WLR 443. In this case all of the following elements were present:
that what the defendants diverted for their own benefit was a “maturing business opportunity”, which
the company was pursuing, the defendants were participants in the negotiations, they resigned to
acquire the opportunity for themselves and it was their positions in the company, rather than a “fresh
initiative” that led to their acquiring the opportunity at a later stage. See also Sealy Cases and
Materials 287.
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Gulliver67 is a leading decision in this regard. The directors of the appellant company,
who owned a cinema, wanted to acquire two more cinemas. A subsidiary company
was formed to acquire the two cinemas. The capital of the company was 5 000 shares
issued at a par value of ₤1 each. A lease of two cinemas was offered, provided that
the subsidiary company’s capital was paid up. It was the intention of the directors of
the appellant company that the appellant company should own all the shares in the
subsidiary company. The appellant company could, however, only afford to invest
₤2 000. Accordingly, the directors and the solicitor each took 500 shares. Three other
investors also bought 500 shares each. Subsequently, the shares in the company and
the subsidiary company were sold, and the new shareholders sought to hold the
directors and the solicitor liable for the profit they made in respect of the subsidiary
company’s shares. The House of Lords held that they were liable for the profits
made.68 The directors made use of a corporate opportunity that the company was
unable to make use of. The directors acquired the profits only by reason of their
holding the office of directors. It did not make a difference that they had acted in
good faith and tried to assist the company in acquiring the opportunity.69
3.1.1 The Traditional Position: Directors’ Duties Owed to Whom?
The fiduciary duty of a director to act in the best interests of the company is central to
this thesis. It is necessary to refer to the traditional position regarding the
interpretation of this duty. It was stated above that the general rule is that directors
owe their fiduciary duties to the company as a whole70 and this has been interpreted
67 [1942] 1 All ER 378 (HL). See Sealy Cases and Materials 280; Keenan & Bisacre Company Law
354–356 on this case.
68 See Dine & Koutsias Company Law 187; Birds et al. Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 524–525 for a
summary of the facts.
69 See Hadjinestoros “Exploitation of Business Opportunity” 70–77. The United Kingdom is applying
a wide view of what the “company’s interests” are and will likely find that a reasonable possibility of
conflicting interests exist. He indicates, furthermore, that the new Companies Act also provide no
guidelines on how to interpret a “corporate opportunity”.
70 See par 3.1 above. See also Sealy Cases and Materials 259–261; Morse et al. Charlesworth’s
Company Law 297–299; Mayson et al. Company Law 454ff; Dine & Koutsias Company Law 189–190.
These authorities confirm that traditionally directors owe their duties to the company and thus the
members as a body and not to other stakeholders such as employees, creditors or individual
stakeholders. See also a document issued by the GC100. The GC100 is the senior legal officers of
more than 70 FTSE100 (Financial Times Stock Exchange top 100 highly capitalised companies on the
London Stock Exchange) companies collectively. The GC100 document is available at
http://www.practicallaw.com/jsp/binaryContent.jsp?item=:29689743 (accessed 14 November 2007).
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as the present and future shareholders collectively, and not to any third parties
directly.71 When considering the interests of both future and present members,
directors should balance the long-term view against the short-term interests of the
members.72 Directors do not owe their fiduciary duties to individual members.73
There has, however, been a shift in public opinion to include the interests of other
stakeholders.74 In the next section the protection currently afforded other stakeholders
is considered. The discussion is restricted to employees, creditors, individual
shareholders and consumers. Later in this chapter the new Companies Act is
discussed, section 172(1) is evaluated and it is considered whether or not this section
provides stakeholders with adequate protection.
This document discusses directors’ duties in terms of the Companies Act of 2006 and also refers to the
traditional position. It is stated that, in terms of the traditional position, directors must act in such a
way that they believe it to be in the best interests of the company and its shareholders, both current and
future. The duty is owed to the company as a whole and not to individual shareholders (see par 2 of the
GC100 document). See further Attenborough “The Company Law Reform Bill” 163: “Many
commentators traditionally view United Kingdom company law as adhering to the shareholder
primacy or shareholder conception of the company.” He then refers to Macey & Miller “Corporate
Stakeholders” 401; Hansman & Kraakman “The End of History for Corporate law” 441 who indicate
that there is “no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive
to increase long-term shareholder value”. See further Siems “Shareholders, Stakeholders” 147–159;
Deakin “Transformation of Shareholder Value” 11. Arsalidou “Shareholder Primacy” 67 also
discusses the traditional position that directors should manage a company in the best interests of the
shareholders collectively.
71 See the discussion in ch 6 par 2.1.1 where the position traditionally applied in South Africa is
considered. See generally Gaiman v National Association for Mental Health [1971] Ch 317 at 330;
Dine & Koutsias Company Law 178–179; Birds et al. Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 499; Davies
Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 371–379; Farrar & Hannigan Company Law
380–391.
72 Beuthin & Luiz Company Law 199.
73 See Percival v Wright (1902) 2 Ch 421 in this regard. See also on the protection of individual
shareholders: Mayson et al. Company Law 457ff; Pettet Company Law 164–165; Dine & Koutsias
Company Law 190; Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co v Multinational Gas and Petrochemical
Services Ltd (1983) Ch 258 at 288; Heron International Ltd v Lord Grade, Associated
Communications Corp plc (1983) BCLC 244 (CA) at 330. See further ch 6 par 3.1 where these cases
are referred to in the South African context.
74 Morse et al. Charlesworth’s Company Law 297–298.
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3.1.2 Individual Shareholders
It was stated above that directors should act in the best interests of the shareholders
collectively.75 Directors do not have direct fiduciary duties to individual
shareholders.76 In Allen v Hyatt77 it was held that directors may become agents of the
members for a particular transaction, in which case the situation of agency gives rise
to fiduciary duties. In Platt v Platt78 it was stated that the relationship between a
director and an individual shareholder does not in itself give rise to fiduciary duties,
but special circumstances may impose such a duty. It was confirmed in Peskin v
Anderson79 that in the absence of a special relationship, directors will not have
fiduciary duties towards individual shareholders.80
3.1.3 Creditors
A number of cases deal with the protection of creditors and whether or not directors
should have a fiduciary duty to protect their interests.81 They are discussed below.
Arguments concerning an extension of directors’ fiduciary duties to creditors and
some of the difficulties with the arguments of the different courts in the cases dealing
with directors’ fiduciary duties to creditors are mentioned briefly here, but discussed
and evaluated in detail in chapter 6.82 There is no South African case law on
75 See Schall et al. “Promoting an Inclusive Approach” 300–304 stating that directors do not have a
general duty to consider the interests of creditors, employees or consumers. Their duty is to the
shareholders as a “general body”.
76 Paragraph 3.1.1 above.
77 (1914) 30 TLR 444.
78 (1999) 2 BCLC 745 (CD).
79 (2001) 1 BCLC 372 (CA).
80 See Keenan & Bisacre Company Law 364–365; Sealy Cases and Materials 262–264 on the Allen v
Hyatt, Platt and Peskin cases.
81 See also ch 4 par 3.2.3 for Australian case law on the protection of creditors and ch 6 par 3.2 where
the possibility of a duty to creditors is evaluated. See further on the interests of creditors, Sealy
“Directors’ Wider Responsibilities” 164; Grantham “The Judicial Extension of Directors’ Duties to
Creditors” 13; Keay “Interests of Company Creditors: When is it Triggered?” 315; Keay “Directors’
Duties to Creditors” 665; Keay “The Duty to Creditors” 379; Keay Directors Taking into Account
Creditors’ Interests” 300; McKenzie-Skene “Directors’ Duty to Creditors” 499. See generally on the
protection of creditors, Dine & Koutsias Company Law 190; Sealy Cases and Materials 267–269;
Morse et al. Charlesworth’s Company Law 297–298; Mayson et al. Company Law 460–462; Keenan
& Bisacre Company Law 366.
82 Paragraph 3.2.
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directors’ duties to creditors. It is therefore important to rely on case law in other
jurisdictions to determine whether directors should have a direct fiduciary duty to
creditors in terms of South African company law.
Most of the English decisions confirm that directors have an indirect duty to consider
the interests of creditors when a company is “nearing” insolvency. In Lonrho v Shell
Petroleum Lord Diplock said that “[i]t is the duty of the board to consider . . . the best
interests of the company. These are not exclusively those of its shareholders, but may
include those of its creditors”.83 This viewpoint was confirmed in the decision in The
Liquidator of the Property of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd (in liq) v Dodd and
Another84 made in 1988. In this case, the interests of the company were found to
include the interests of creditors, because the company was insolvent. The court
adopted into English law a principle that had previously been enacted into Australian
and New Zealand law.85 In Horsley & Weight Ltd one of the instances where
creditors’ interests may be important was discussed. The court stated that a director
owes an indirect duty to creditors not to permit any unlawful reduction of capital.86 In
Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co v Multinational Gas and Petrochemical
Services Ltd it was held that directors do not owe fiduciary duties to creditors, but to
the company. It was stated that when a company is solvent, neither it nor its directors
owe any duty to its creditors.87
However, in Winkworth v Edward Baron88 the court referred to a duty directly owed
to creditors by directors. Lord Templeton said the following:
83 (1980) 1 WLR 627 at 634.
84 (1988) BCLC 250 (CA).
85 See the following Australian and New Zealand decisions: Walker v Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1
(HC); Ring v Sutton (1980) 5 ACLR 546; Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd (in liq) (1986) 10 ACLR
395; Jeffree v National Companies & Securities Commission (1989) 15 ACLR 217; Spies v The
Queen (2000) 201 CLR 603 (HC); Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd [1985] 1 NZLR 242 (CA). These
decisions are discussed in detail later in ch 4 par 3.2.3.
86 [1982] 1 Ch 442 (CA) at 442.
87 [1983] Ch 258 at 288.
88 [1987] 1 All ER 114 (HL).
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[A] company owes a duty to its creditors, present and future. The
company owes a duty to its creditors to keep its property inviolate and
available for repayment of its debts. The conscience of the company, as
well as its management, is confided to its directors. A duty is owed by the
directors to the company and to the creditors of the company to ensure
that the affairs of the company are properly administered and that its
property is not dissipated or exploited for the benefit of the directors
themselves to the prejudice of the creditors.89
It is, however, unlikely that such a change of the prevailing position was intended by
Lord Templeton as authorities in this area were not even considered by him.90
Subsequent courts also did not follow his dictum.91
These cases seem to indicate that directors should consider the interests of creditors,
at least in cases of doubtful solvency.92 When a company is insolvent or near
insolvency, the interests of the company and the interests of the creditors coincide to
a considerable degree.93 The duty of directors to consider the interests of creditors
where a company is financially distressed is therefore regarded as a well-established
principle, but important aspects of this duty are still unclear. It is uncertain at
precisely what stage directors should consider the interests of creditors. It is also
unclear what the position is in the case of a solvent company and what weight
directors should give to the consideration of the interests of creditors94 and whether or
89 At 118. See also Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 384; McKenzie-Skene “Directors’ Duty to
Creditors” 501. The existence of a duty to consider the interests of creditors was also recognised in
Brady v Brady (1987) 3 BCC 535 (CA). See also, more recently, Re MDA Investment Management Ltd
(2004) 1 BCLC 217 (CD). The interests of creditors should be considered when a company is
insolvent or in financial difficulty. The court specifically held that this duty arises where the company
“whether technically insolvent or not, is in financial difficulty to the extent that the creditors are at
risk” (at 227 par 70).
90 Davies Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 371–379; Farrar & Hannigan
Company Law 386.
91 Davies Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 373 n 13.
92 See MDA Investment Management Ltd 783. See also Mayson et al. Company Law 462; Kuwait Asia
Bank EC v National Mutual Nominees Ltd (1991) 1 AC 187 where Lord Lowry stated at 217 that: “A
director does not by any reason only of his position as director owe any duty to creditors or trustees for
creditors of the company.” This was later confirmed in Yukong Line Ltd of Korea v Rendsburg
Investments Corporation (No 2) (1998) 1 WLR 294.
93 Standard Chartered Bank v Walker (1992) 1 WLR 561.
94 See Dine & Koutsias Company Law 191. These uncertainties are also discussed in detail in ch 6 par
3.2 below with reference to articles by United Kingdom as well as South African commentators.
Australian and New Zealand case law are discussed at ch 4 par 3.2.3.
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not this duty to creditors is an indirect or direct duty. Is it an independent duty owed
directly to creditors, which creditors can enforce or is it an indirect duty owed to the
company that only the company can enforce? Most commentators and case law
follow the latter interpretation.95 It is also unclear who the creditors are. Does the
duty only extend to existing creditors or are future creditors also included? Most
cases are silent on this issue, but in the Winkworth decision it was held that future
creditors should also be included.96 Lastly, it is uncertain when the duty to creditors
arises.97 Some cases do not state that a company should be in financial distress before
directors will have a duty to consider the interests of creditors.98 In the decision of
Horsley & Wreight Ltd Lord Templeman refers to “doubtful solvency”.99 In West
Mercia it was stated, with reference to the decision of Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty
Ltd, that the duty arises when a company is insolvent.100 It therefore seems clear from
most decisions that “insolvency” (and circumstances short of insolvency, such as
doubtful solvency) will trigger a duty towards creditors. The cases do not, however,
define what is meant by “insolvency”.101
The protection afforded creditors was also discussed during the United Kingdom
company law reform process.102 It was argued that directors should not act in the best
95 See Walker v Wimborne; Yukong Line Ltd of Korea v Rendsburg Investments Corporation (No 2).
The exception is Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co at 118, as discussed above.  See also
McKenzie-Skene “Directors’ Duty to Creditors” 501–503. See ch 6 par 3.2 below on this uncertainty.
96 At 118. See, however, Brady v Brady 552, where the court confirmed the duty only to existing
creditors and Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd at 250 where the court took the view that future
creditors would normally take a company as it was and could look after their own interests. See
generally McKenzie-Skene “Directors’ Duty to Creditors” 503.
97 See ch 6 par 3.2 below on this problem.
98 See Walker v Wimborne; Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd; Winkworth v Edward Baron
Development Co Ltd.
99 Horsley & Weight Ltd at 442, 455.
100 (1986) 10 ACLR 395. This was also stated in the Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd decision at 249.
101 See ch 6 par 3.2 where this issue is discussed and a possible solution or test is suggested. See also
McKenzie-Skene “Directors’ Duty to Creditors” 510.
102 See par 4.2.3 below on the position of creditors as discussed by the Steering Group during the
company law review process. See specifically Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The
Strategic Framework, URN 99/654 (February 1999) available at http://www.lens-
library.com/info/DTI0399FINAL.html (accessed 10 February 2008) (hereafter Strategic Framework)
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interests of creditors. It was specifically concluded that creditors should not be listed
as stakeholders to whom directors should have regard when managing a company.103
This was mainly based on the fact that creditors receive sufficient protection in
section 214 of the Insolvency Act of 1986.104 It was therefore considered undesirable
to have detailed new rules protecting the interests of creditors. It is, however,
generally agreed that directors’ duties are subject to the overriding duty towards
creditors in insolvent situations, as was seen from the case law discussed above.105
3.1.4 Employees
A number of cases, decided mainly in England, deal with employee interests.106 The
courts considered whether the specific actions of the directors were in the sole
interests of the employees concerned or whether the company as a whole also
benefited from the actions.
In Hutton v West Cork Railway Company107 the court prohibited charitable activities
unless a direct benefit accrued to the corporation. In this case a railway company sold
its undertaking to another company at a price to be determined by an arbitrator. It was
decided that the purchase price would be applied to pay the arbitration costs, paying
off any revenue debts or charges to the company. The residue was to be divided
between the debenture holders and the shareholders. Once the transfer had taken
place, a general meeting was held where it was decided that a certain portion of the
purchase price would be applied to pay compensation to officials who would lose
their jobs as a result of the transfer. The court held that the company was no longer a
going concern, but only existed for the purpose of being wound up and that such a
par 5.1.4; Developing the Framework par 2.19; Completing the Structure par 3.12; the Final Report
par 3.11 and the 2005 White Paper par 3.10.
103 See Dine & Koutsias Company Law 190 stating that it it is clear that shareholders collectively
should still receive primacy in terms of the new s 172(1) of the Companies Act of 2006. Creditors are
excluded from s 172(1). See also par 4.3.3 below on s 172(1).
104 See Developing the Framework par 3.72. See the discussion below at par 4.2.2.2.
105 See Completing the Structure par 3.12. See par 4.2.2.3 below.
106 Most of these cases concern donations or corporate gifts to employees. See Hodes “The Social
Responsibility of a Company” 475.
107 (1883) 23 ChD 654 (CA).
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payment of compensation was invalid. It seems, from this decision, as if directors
may only have regard to the interests of employees to the extent that it would
contribute to the success of the company.
Parke v Daily News Ltd108 concerned a company, Daily News Limited, that
controlled two major newspapers. The copyright of the newspapers was owed by its
two wholly owned subsidiaries. The company suffered major losses. The board
decided to sell the copyright they had in the newspapers, as well as the newspapers’
plant and premises, to avoid further losses. The company intended to distribute the
balance of the purchase price to the employees as compensation, after the transaction
costs had been paid. The court declared these payments ultra vires.109 These
payments were also not regarded as in the benefit of the company as a whole.110 This
company was also in the process of being wound up.
The Parke and Hutton decisions,111 involving companies in the process of winding
up, should be distinguished from the decision in Hampson v Price’s Patent Candle
Company112 where the directors gave voluntary gifts, which were not ultra vires, to
the employees because of the very prosperous year the company had had. The court
held that this gratuity would result in a direct benefit to the company, as it would
motivate employees.
108 [1962] Ch 927.
109 In another English decision, Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd (1970) Ch 62, the
court also based its decision upon the issue of an ultra vires transaction rather than on directors’
fiduciary duties. No such problems relating to capacity or powers to make donations should, however,
arise in South Africa. Section 33 of the the South African Companies Act of 1973 states that a
company shall have the capacity determined by the main object stated in the memorandum and that
there shall be included in its capacity unlimited objects ancillary to the said main object, unless
expressly excluded in the memorandum and s 34 states that every company shall have plenary powers
to enable it to realise its main and ancillary objects, including the common powers in schedule 2.
These common powers include the making of donations. Lastly s 36 states that no act shall be void by
reason only of the fact that it is ultra vires. See on this issue Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company
Directors 45; Naudé “Section 36” 315; Hodes “The Social Responsibility of a Company” 476.
110 Mackenzie “The Employee and the Company Director” 688; Havenga Fiduciary Duties of
Company Directors 43; Hodes “The Social Responsibility of a Company” 468–469.
111 Beuthin “The Range of a Company’s Interests” 160–161.
112 (1876) 45 L.J Ch 437.
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In the end, the legal justification for gifts or any other benefit that directors may
allow employees to acquire is the ultimate benefit of the company as a whole. For
instance, directors can provide employees with pension benefits if the object is to
attract loyal employees, because it will be to the benefit of the shareholders.113 It is
clear from these cases that the concept of the company as a whole is of paramount
importance in England where directors manage a company. Section 309 of the
previous Companies Act of 1985 is relevant in this regard. Section 309 provided that
the matters to which directors were to have regard when they managed a company
included the interests of the company’s employees in general. The duty imposed by
this section was still owed to the company and was enforceable in the same way as
any other fiduciary duty owed to a company by its director.114 Employees could not
enforce this duty themselves, and the duty was owed to the company and not to the
employees directly. The interests of employees did not receive primacy over those of
the shareholders collectively. It was also very difficult to prove that directors did not
have regard to the interests of employees. This provision was therefore an attempt to
include the interests of employees, but was without any teeth.115 Employees are,
however, now listed in the new section 172(1) of the United Kingdom Companies
Act of 2006 as a factor that directors must have regard to when managing a company,
but they are not awarded with specific remedies to enforce their rights.116 The aim of
section 172(1) is not to provide stakeholders with direct rights, but rather to make
directors aware of the interests of stakeholders, other than shareholders. The new
United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006 emphasises that companies should have a
social responsibility towards their employees. A happy and stable workforce will
benefit the company and its prosperity.117
113 Beuthin “The Range of a Company’s Interests” 167–168.
114 See generally on the protection of employee interests, Mayson et al. Company Law 454ff; Sealy
Cases and Materials 269. See also Villiers “Section 309 of the Companies Act 1985” in Collins et al.
(eds) Legal Regulation ch 30.
115 Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 390; Schall et al. “Promoting an Inclusive Approach” 301.
116 See par 4.3.3 for a discussion of s 172(1).
117 Hodes “The Social Responsibility of a Company” 479.
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Employees are also protected in various other statutes in the United Kingdom.
Collective consultation between employers and their employees through recognised
trade unions or elected employee representatives is required in a number of specific
situations.118 These consultation obligations have steadily been expanded over recent
years in various regulations such as the Transnational Information and Consultation
of Employees Regulations of 1999,119 the Information and Consultation of
Employees Regulations of 2004120 and the Occupational and Personal Pension
Schemes (Consultation by Employees and Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations
of 2006.121 A company’s obligation to consider the effects of its decisions and actions
on its employees does not, however, derive only from these consultation obligations.
As stated above, directors also need to have regard to the interests of employees when
exercising their fiduciary duties.122
3.1.5 Consumers
Directors do not owe fiduciary duties directly to consumers,123 but there are a number
of reasons why consumers need to be protected. Firstly, consumers need to be
protected from fraudulent trading practices. The nature of modern markets is such
that consumers can no longer make prudent shopping decisions. Consumers are
subject to a wide variety of technologically advanced goods and not all of them have
the necessary skill and knowledge to make informed decisions on what to purchase.
Secondly, advertising and marketing strategies are very sophisticated and can result
in misleading or confusing information being provided to consumers. Thirdly,
consumers are generally awarded with credit and they also have high disposable
incomes. There are a large number of shopping malls that are easily accessible, but
consumers do not always have sufficient time to do research on what they want to
118 See, for example, the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 SI
2006/246 regulations 13–15, facilitated further by the Employment Relations Act 1999 s1.
119 SI 1999/3323.
120 SI 2004/3426.
121 SI 2006/349.
122 Wynn-Evans “The Companies Act 2006 and the Interests of Employees” 188–193.
123 See, generally, Keenan & Riches Business Law ch 14 on consumer protection in the United
Kingdom.
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buy. Fourthly, the underlying aim of consumer protection is to redress the balance of
power between consumers and suppliers.124
A “consumer transaction” generally has three essential elements, namely (1) an
individual who purchases goods or services for its own benefit, (2) a supplier who is
acting in a business capacity and (3) goods or services that must be intended for
private use or consumption.125 Consumers generally receive extensive protection.
There is legislation126 (and websites and public bodies)127 relating to the general
protection of consumers in the retail markets. The laws of competition and credit
protection also provide consumers with protection. Where consumers are also
creditors, they are entitled to the same protection as creditors. These different areas of
protection afforded consumers are discussed briefly below. The aim of the discussion
is to indicate that consumers receive extensive protection in the United Kingdom.
This is an important factor in view of the theory proposed in chapter 2 above.128 It
was suggested that directors need to consider the interests of stakeholders and that
other legislation protecting stakeholders should be taken into account. Directors must
be aware of how other legislation protects the interests of different stakeholders when
exercising their fiduciary duties.
124 Keenan & Riches Business Law 414.
125 See Keenan & Riches Business Law 413. The first element is usually defined in a very broad
manner and includes businesses. The Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977 provides, for example,
protection to those who “deal as a consumer” in s 12(1). The courts interpreted this section to apply
also to occasional purchases by a company. These purchases should, however, not be part of the main
business of the specific company. See R&B Customs Brokers Ltd v United Dominions Trust Ltd (1988)
1 WLR 321.
126 For example, the Enterprise Act of 2002 and the Consumer Credit Act of 2006.
127 See, for example, the Office of Fair Trading, a non-ministerial department established in terms of
the Fair Trading Act of 1973 (see www.oft.gov.uk). At www.consumerdirect.gov.uk consumers receive
advice on their rights concerning guarantees, buying on credit, refunding or cancelling of orders,
dealing in disputes and unfair clauses in contracts. This website is a government-funded telephone and
online service for consumers. At www.tradingstandards.gov.uk consumers are also advised on their
position in the United Kingdom. This website is supported by the Trading Standards Institute. See
Keenan & Riches Business Law 416–417.
128 Chapter 2 par 5.2 above.
66
The Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977,129 the Competition Act of 1998, the
Enterprise Act of 2002130 and the Consumer Credit Act of 2006131 are relevant, and
provide consumers with significant protection. The Unfair Contract Terms Act of
1977 deals with contracts where one party is a consumer. The Act provides that
where a party is in breach of his obligations, he cannot rely on any one of the terms of
the contract unless the term is reasonable. The test for reasonableness is set out in
section 11 of the Act and provides that one has to have regard to the circumstances
that were, or ought to have been, known or in the contemplation of the parties when
the contract was made in order to determine whether a specific term is reasonable or
not. The United Kingdom is also part of the European Union and the Directive on
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts of 1999132 is relevant. This directive sets a
framework within which firms must work when they draw up contract terms and
conditions. In terms of this directive certain qualifying bodies such as the Office of
129 See Dean “Unfair Contract Terms” 581, where she discusses the Unfair Contract Terms Act and the
EC Directive (93/13) of 1993 that addresses some of the inadequacies of this Act.  Dean maintains that
there is a remarkable absence of case law on the Unfair Contract Terms Act. This is mainly due to its
narrowness of scope and it is not widely known or used by consumers (at 589). The scope of the
directive is wider and applies, for example, also to insurance contracts.
130 The Enterprise Act of 2002 received royal assent in November 2002. The Act is divided into eleven
parts and has 281 sections and 26 Schedules. Part 1 of the Act establishes the Office of Fair Trading
(OFT), sets out its general functions, and provides for arrangements for making super-complaints to
the OFT. Part 2 establishes and makes provisions for proceedings before the Competition Appeal
Tribunal (CAT). Part 3 provides for a new merger regime, covering the definition of a qualifying
merger, the duty of the OFT to make references to the Competition Commission (CC); how references
are determined; the procedures that relate to certain public interest cases and other special cases;
powers of enforcement; undertakings and orders; and various supplementary matters, such as
information and publicity requirements and powers to require information. Part 4 makes provision for
new market investigations arrangements. It sets out the power of the OFT and the Secretary of State to
make references to the CC, and how the CC should report on the references. It provides for particular
arrangements to apply in public interest cases, and also covers powers of enforcement and various
supplementary matters. Part 5 deals with the CC, and provides for its rules of procedure. Part 6 deals
with the creation of a cartel offence. Part 7 deals with a number of miscellaneous competition
provisions, including powers to disqualify directors who engage in serious competition breaches. Part
8 deals with new procedures for enforcing certain consumer legislation, and miscellaneous related
matters. Part 9 provides for rules to govern the disclosure of specified information held by a public
authority, setting out the circumstances in which the information may be disclosed, and various related
matters. Part 10 changes insolvency law by providing for a new regime for company administration
and restricting the future use of administrative receivership; abolishing Crown preference; establishing
a new regime for the insolvency of individuals; and making changes to the operation of the Insolvency
Services Account. Part 11 contains a number of supplementary provisions, such as commencement,
short title and territorial extent. (See the Explanatory Notes on the Act at http://www.opsi.gov.uk
/acts/en2002/2002en40.htm (accessed 10 July 2007)).
131 The Consumer Credit Act of 2006 received royal assent in March 2006.
132 SI 1999/2083.
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Fair Trading should ensure that the terms in a contract are not unfair and challenge a
company if they are.
The Enterprise Act is also relevant and introduced a new procedure to allow certain
designated consumer bodies to make super-complaints to the Office of Fair Trading.
These complaints include “any feature or combination of features of a market in the
United Kingdom for goods or services is or appears to be significantly harming the
interests of consumers”.133 The Act also changed certain aspects of competition law,
consumer protection and insolvency law.134
The Consumer Credit Act provides for the regulation of all consumer credit and
consumer hire agreements subject to certain exemptions; provides for the licensing of
providers of consumer credit and consumer hire and ancillary credit services, and the
functions and powers of the Office of Fair Trading in relation to licensing; enables
debtors to challenge unfair relationships with creditors; and provides for an
Ombudsman scheme to hear complaints in relation to businesses licensed under the
Fair Trading Act of 1973,135 as amended by the Consumer Credit Act.136
Consumers are also sometimes creditors and are therefore also protected in terms of
the common law, as discussed above. There are also a further number of provisions in
the Companies Act of 2006 which indirectly protect creditors. Sections 1035–1039
concern company investigations and provide that the Secretary of State has the power
to give directions to a company investigator to investigate a company on a specific
subject matter, a specific transaction or over a certain period of time. The Secretary
133 Section 11 of the Enterprise Act.
134 For example, as regards competition law, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) will be given a new
power to apply to the court to disqualify directors involved in breaches of competition law (part 7 s
204). Persons harmed by a breach of competition law will be able to bring claims for damages before a
specialist competition body (the Competition Appeal Tribunal (part 2)). In the area of consumer
protection, a new regime is established for the OFT to approve business-to-consumer codes of
practice. Concerning the insolvency of individuals, provision is made for the automatic discharge of
nearly all bankrupts after a maximum of 12 months (s 279).
135 See the Fair Trading Act of 1973.
136 See also the Explanatory Notes on the Consumer Credit Act at http://www.opsi.gov.uk
/acts/en2006/ukpgaen_20060014_en.pdf (accessed 10 July 2007). For these Acts see
www.statutelaw.gov.uk.
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can also request that an inspector investigate certain documents of the company.
These provisions provide creditors (and consumers) with indirect protection as it
ensures insight into the company’s affairs and documents. Lastly, chapter 46 of the
Company Directors Disqualifications Act of 1986 provides for the disqualification of
directors and other persons on a variety of grounds. This chapter does not provide
creditors with a remedy, but directors can be held personally liable when acting in
breach of a disqualification. It therefore enhances creditor protection by removing
people from the system who do not meet the standard required to manage a
company.137
3.1.6 The Different Interest Groups: Concluding Remarks
It was argued above that directors do not have direct fiduciary duties to stakeholders.
Shareholders are the primary beneficiaries when directors manage a company.138
Protection afforded individual shareholders, creditors, employees and consumers was
discussed in the previous section. Directors do not have a direct duty to individual
shareholders. But special circumstances, such as agency, may impose a duty towards
individual shareholders.139
With regard to creditors, a number of cases were considered. It was indicated that
most of these cases require a duty to creditors when insolvency of a company is
“nearing”.140
A number of cases dealing with employee interests were also considered. It was
stated that the legal justification for any gift or benefit to employees should be the
ultimate benefit of the company as a whole. Collective consultation between
137 See, for example, s 6 of the Disqualifications Act stating that a court has a duty to disqualify a
director who has at any time become insolvent where his conduct as a director of any other company
or companies, makes him unfit to be concerned in the management of a company. See generally,
McKenzie-Skene “Directors’ Duties to Creditors” 526; Du Plessis “Diskwalifikasie en Persoonlike
Aanspreeklikheid” 435–441 (he discusses the regulations governing the disqualification of company
directors from being involved in the management of a company).
138 Paragraph 3.1.1 above.
139 Paragraph 3.1.2 above.
140 Paragraph 3.1.3 above.
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employees and employers, as well as trade unions, is also means by which employees
are protected.141
Consumers receive extensive protection in various statutes such as the Unfair
Contract Terms Act of 1977, the Competition Act of 1998, the Enterprise Act of 2002
and the Consumer Credit Act of 2006.142
The new Companies Act of 2006 opted for the enlightened shareholder value
approach by indicating that directors should still manage a company in the best
interests of the shareholders collectively.143 A number of factors are, however, listed
that directors should consider when managing a company in the best interests of the
shareholders collectively. These factors include that directors should have regard to
the likely consequence of any decision in the long-term; the interests of the
employees; the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers,
customers and others; the impact of the company’s operations on the community and
the environment; the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high
standards of business conduct; and the need to act fairly as towards various members
of the company. Section 172(1) seems to provide different stakeholders with
extensive protection. The Act is very clear on the preferred approach relating to the
stakeholder debate,144 but how it will be applied practically is still uncertain. This is
discussed in detail later in this chapter.145
3.2 The Duty of Care, Skill and Diligence
It is important for purposes of this thesis also to discuss this duty. It is indicated
below that when directors determine whose interests they need to take into account
when managing a company in the best interests of the shareholders collectively, they
141 Paragraph 3.1.4 above.
142 Paragraph 3.1.5 above.
143 See s 172(1) of the Companies Act of 2006, discussed in par 4.3.3 below.
144 The South African Bill of 2007, in contrast, is not clear on the preferred approach. See ch 6 par 4.3
below.
145 Paragraph 4.3.3 below.
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should act with the necessary care and skill. This is especially important in the
context of the new section 172(1), which states that directors should consider a
number of factors when managing a company.146 It is argued that when directors
consider these factors, they should act with the necessary care and skill. If not, they
can be in breach of both their fiduciary duty to the company as a whole, as well as
their duty of care and skill.147
The duty of care and skill represents the courts’ attempts to regulate the
entrepreneurial side of directors’ activities.148 If directors are negligent in the
performance of their duties, they will be liable for the damage caused by their
negligence.149 It is a duty both in equity and in the common law of tort (or delict).150
The standard of care and skill expected of directors was traditionally quite low, as
directors’ skills were judged subjectively.151 In Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co
Ltd152 the Court of Appeal found that a director need not show a greater degree of
skill when performing his duties than may be reasonably expected of a person of his
146 Paragraph 4.3.3 below.
147 Paragraph 4.3.2 below.
148 See Pettet Company Law 161–163 on the duty of care and skill.
149 Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbing (1989) BCLC 498 (Ch).
150 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew (1998) Ch 1 (CA) at 16–17; Base Metal Trading Ltd v
Shamurin (2004) EWCA Civ 1316.
151 A subjective test was applied in Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 425.
See also Re Forest of Dean Coal Mining Company (1878) 10 Ch D 450, where it was held that the
degree of skill of each individual will vary, but the standard of care required is such care as an
ordinary man might be expected to take in the same circumstances on his own behalf. See further,
Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 379–402; Pettet Company Law 160–162; Birds et al. Boyle & Birds’
Company Law 499–503; Birds “The Reform of Directors’ Duties” 152–154; Copp “Corporate
Governance: Part 2” 115–128; Worthington “The Duty to Monitor” 188 referring to the tests applied
by the courts concerning the duty of care and skill. The City Equitable decision made it quite easy for
directors to escape responsibility for corporate failures by relying on factors of a subjective nature.
These factors include the individual’s lack of experience or specialist expertise. See Sealy Cases and
Material 316 commenting on the City Equitable decision.
152 [1925] 1 Ch 407 (CA). The court reviewed some of the older cases on the duty of care and skill.
The cases referred to were: Overend Gurney & Co v Gibb (1872) LR 5 HL 480; Lagunas Nitrate Co v
Lagunas Syndicate [1899] 2 Ch 392. The court concluded that it is impossible to describe the duty of
directors in general terms because of the wide variety of companies and functions that would be
encompassed (at 426).
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knowledge or experience, thus relying on a subjective test. The knowledge and
experience of the specific director could therefore be less than the knowledge and
experience expected of a person in his position.153 Judge Romer said: “A director is
not bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of the company. His duties are of
an intermittent nature to be performed at periodic board meetings and committees of
the board on which he serves.”154
The Insolvency Act of 1986155 and the Company Directors Disqualification Act of
1986 provide for the disqualifications of directors and their possible personal
liability. The test to determine whether a director applied the necessary standard of
care and skill when managing a company has became more stringent and is now
based on the test formulated in section 214 of the Insolvency Act of 1986. Section
214 states that any director or shadow director of a company who has gone into
insolvent liquidation, some time before the winding-up of the company, can be liable
for a contribution to the companies’ assets if that person knew or ought to have
concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company could avoid going
into insolvent liquidation. A disqualification order may also be awarded.156 In order
to determine liability, the court will apply a test with objective and subjective
elements. The director’s behaviour will therefore also be tested against the standard
that may reasonably be expected of a reasonable director in his position.
In Norman v Theodore Goddard157 the court stated that the care a director of a
company owes to the company when carrying out his functions is the care that may
reasonably be expected of a person carrying out those functions. The court therefore
applied a test with both an objective and a subjective element. Furthermore, in the
153 At 428. See also Mayson et al. Company Law 454–455; Birds et al. Boyle & Birds’ Company Law.
The City Equitable decision was affirmed in Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbing at 498. In the
Dorchester case the failure to participate in activities of the company and the subsequent failure to
discover defaults of the managing director on the part of the directors in question were held to be
negligent.
154 At 429.
155 Section 214.
156 The Company Directors Disqualification Act of 1986 s 10.
157 [1991] BCLC 1028 (CD).
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decision of Re D’ Jan of London Ltd158 it was stated that section 214 of the
Insolvency Act of 1986 correctly sets out the common law duty of care of a
director.159
Re Barings plc160 is an important English decision on the duty of care and skill. This
case concerned disqualification orders sought against three of the company’s former
directors. A single trader carried out unauthorised activities in Singapore, which
resulted in major losses to the company. The integrity or honesty of the former
directors was not in question, but rather the way in which they managed the company
and especially the activities of this trader. The court held that the directors did not
comply with the objective standard appropriate of directors with their status and
experience. Judge Parker held that “[d]irectors have, both collectively and
individually, a continuing duty to acquire and maintain a sufficient knowledge and
understanding of the company’s business to enable them properly to discharge their
duties as directors”.161 He, furthermore, stated that although directors may delegate
some of their functions to those below them in the management chain, they still have
a duty to supervise the discharge of the delegated functions. The evaluation of the
proper exercise of this discretion to delegate will depend on the facts of each case.
The section 214 test therefore goes further than the test formulated in the Re City
Equitable decision, referred to above, which only relied on the specific director’s
knowledge and experience.162
158 (1994) 1 BCLC 561. In this case a director signed an insurance proposal form without paying
attention to its contents and was held negligent. In Re Westlowe Storage and Distribution Ltd [2000]
BCC 851 a director was also found to be negligent as he did not ensure that the company benefited
properly from transactions it concluded. It was that director’s responsibility to ensure that a proper
accounting system was in place. See also Mayson et al. Company Law 454–455; Birds et al. Boyle &
Birds’ Company Law 528.
159 This duty is not discussed in detail in this thesis. It therefore suffices to state that the Companies
Act of 2006 provides for this duty in s 174 (duty of reasonable care, skill and diligence). This duty is
more objectively formulated in the Companies Act of 2006, similar to s 214 of the Insolvency Act of
1986. See also ch 4 par 3.3 where the position on this duty in Australia is discussed.
160 (1999) 1 BCLC 433. This decision is discussed in Sealy Cases and Materials 332.
161 At 536–537.
162 Accepted by Knox J in Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd (No 2) [1989] BCLC 520 (CD).
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4 THE STAKEHOLDER DEBATE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
CODES, THE COMPANY LAW REVIEW PROCESS AND THE
COMPANIES ACT OF 2006
Even before the company law review, a number of corporate governance codes dealt
with the issue of in whose interests directors should manage a company. In the
following section some background is provided on the Cadbury, Greenbury and
Hampel Reports to determine the viewpoints of the various committees on the
protection of stakeholders. Against the background of these reports, the recent
company law review process of the United Kingdom is also evaluated and the various
documents drafted during the review process are discussed.163 A brief overview of the
consultation documents is provided, but the emphasis is on the arguments for and
against stakeholder protection and the codification of directors’ duties. Lastly, the
Companies Act of 2006 is referred to, focusing on section 172(1) and the exhaustive
code of directors’ duties. It is important to refer to the corporate governance codes
and specifically the consultation documents of the Steering Group during the
company law review in order to understand the Companies Act of 2006 properly.
There may be uncertainties as to how certain provisions of the new Act should be
interpreted, especially in respect of the duties of directors. It is therefore necessary to
refer back to previous sources, such as the consultation documents of the Steering
Group to understand, for example, why certain duties are included and others not.164
4.1 The Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Reports
It is necessary to refer briefly to the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Reports as they
provide a broad background on corporate governance, its definition and principles of
good governance.165 Firstly, it is important to refer to these reports concerning the
163 The review dealt with the main components of company law, but excluded insolvency law and
financial services. See Goddard “Modernising Company Law” 403.
164 See a document on directors’ duties in terms of the Companies Act of 2006 drafted by Ben Quiney,
who practices commercial law at the Crown Office Chambers in London (hereafter Quiney Directors’
Duties).
165 Goddard “Modernising Company Law” 403 holds that the company law reform was done against
the background of the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Reports. See also Dignam “Lamenting
Reform?” on the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Reports 286–288.
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protection of stakeholders. It will, however, be seen from the discussion below that
these reports did not deal with stakeholders extensively. The Cadbury and Greenbury
Reports had a focused application, but the Hampel Report was wider and dealt with
various issues of corporate governance.166 Secondly, and more importantly, these
codes are of a self-regulatory nature and contain important guidelines concerning best
practices in a company. In chapter 2 a theory was proposed on directors’ duties and
the protection of stakeholders. It was indicated that directors need to consider the
interests of stakeholders in certain instances. In order to consider the interests of
stakeholders sufficiently, directors need to have knowledge of the protection that
stakeholders receive in other legislation. It has been suggested that codes of good
practice can play an important role in this regard by providing directors with
guidelines on how to interpret their duties.167
4.1.1 Background on the Reports
Corporate governance had become prominent in the 1990s with the Cadbury,
Greenbury and Hampel Reports.168 These reports are each named after the chair of
each committee. In response to a number of financial scandals and the fear of low
standards of corporate governance in the United Kingdom the Cadbury and
Greenbury Committees were formed.169 It was stressed by these committees that the
166 See ch 6 par 4.1 where it is indicated that King II was much wider in its application than the
Cadbury Report.
167 The GC100 has also proposed that codes of good practice guidelines should be developed to
explain to directors how they should comply with s 172(1) of the Companies Act of 2006. In this way
directors will be clearer on how to comply with their new duties, potential liability of companies will
be reduced, the administrative burden will be minimised and it will demonstrate to stakeholders that
companies are taking the new duties seriously.
168 The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance chaired by Sir
Adrian Cadbury 1992 (hereafter the Cadbury Report); Directors’ Remuneration Report: Report of a
Study Group chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury 1995 (hereafter the Greenbury Report); Report of the
Committee on Corporate Governance Final Report 1998 (hereafter the Hampel Report). See Dine &
Koutsias Company Law 187–188 referring to the Cadbury, Hampel and Combined Code initiatives.
See also Mayson et al. Company Law 498 on these reports. Smerdon A Practical Guide to Corporate
Governance 2–4 discusses the historical evolution of contemporary United Kingdom corporate
governance and refers to the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Reports. See further Cheffins “Current
Trends in Corporate Governance” 5–42 on the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Reports. It is held by
Cheffins that these reports are self-regulatory in nature. It is, furthermore, stated that these reports did
not pay much attention to the stakeholder debate. The committees did, however, equate the interests of
“the company” with those of the shareholders collectively.
169 For instance, failures such as Polly Peck (Polly Peck International was a rag trade textile company)
and the Maxwell empire (Maxwell Communication Corporation plc (MCC) was formerly one of the
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board of directors can act as a corrective mechanism when corporate executives are
not sufficiently accountable for their actions.170
The accounting profession, the London Stock Exchange and the Financial Reporting
Council sponsored the establishment of the Cadbury Committee. The two main
reasons for this sponsorship were (1) a low level of confidence in the corporate
financial reporting regime in the United Kingdom and (2) fears that accounting
shortcomings were undermining the effectiveness of companies’ internal controls.171
The Cadbury Report mainly deals with financial accountability, and specifically the
responsibilities of directors and their relationships with auditors.172 These standards
of corporate governance are set out in a Combined Code of Best Practices,173
published in December 1992. In Britain the majority of companies were incorporated
under the Companies Act of 1985. This Act has now been repealed by the Companies
Act of 2006. The Act of 1985 distinguished between public and private companies. A
listed company had to comply with the Listing Rules of the London Stock
Exchange.174 All registered listed companies in the United Kingdom must comply
with the 1992 Code. Other companies are also encouraged to meet its requirements.
world’s ten largest media groups, with interests in information services and electronic school, college
and professional language instruction and publishing. Robert Maxwell drowned in 1991 while
yachting off the Canary Islands. After his death investigators discovered that Maxwell diverted
hundred of millions of pounds from pension funds and other sources. The Maxwell empire was
subsequently dissolved and sold off in the following year. See Younghusband “Corporate Governance
in the United Kingdom” 276. See Belcher “Compliance with the Cadbury Code” 11–17 for an outline
of the Cadbury Report; Cheffins “Current Trends in Corporate Governance" 5 for a discussion of the
Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Reports. See also Dine & Koutsias Company Law 187.
170 Cheffins “Current Trends in Corporate Governance” 10.
171 Cheffins “Current Trends in Corporate Governance” 12.
172 See Du Plessis “Corporate Governance” 81–90 who discusses the main features of the Cadbury
Report. See also Villiers “Draft Report by the Cadbury Committee” 214 who confirms that the Code of
Best Practice issued in terms of the Cadbury Report is self-regulatory.
173 The code is part of the Cadbury Report available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents
/cadbury.pdf (accessed 4 July 2007) (hereafter the 1992 Code).
174 Cheffins “Current Trends in Corporate Governance” 9.
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The Listing Rules require that listed companies should state in their annual reports
whether or not they complied with the rules during the period under review.175
The Cadbury Report deals with issues relating to the remuneration of directors, and
makes recommendations relating to disclosure and the establishment of a
remuneration committee. Despite this, there was still concern regarding the huge
remuneration packages of directors and departing directors. In January 1995 the
Greenbury Committee was established as a discussion group on the remuneration of
directors. The report of the committee was issued in July 1995. A Code of Best
Practice was published simultaneously.176
In November 1995 the Hampel Committee was established to review the
recommendations of the Cadbury and Greenbury Committees.177 The brief of the
Hampel Committee covered all issues relating to corporate governance, and was
therefore not as restricted as those of the Cadbury and Greenbury Committees. The
remit of the committee was to review the Cadbury Code and its implementation and
to ensure that the original purpose is being achieved. The commissioners were also
asked to pursue any relevant matters arising from the Greenbury Report. But they
also had an additional task, namely to look afresh at the roles of directors,
shareholders and auditors in corporate governance. In January 1998 the Hampel
Committee issued its Final Report.178
On 25 June 1998 the London Stock Exchange published the Code of Best Practices
(the Combined Code), which resulted from the work done by the Hampel
175 See Gregory “Overview of Corporate Governance” referring to the Cadbury Report and the attempt
to design corporate governance guidelines and a code of “best practice”.
176 The code is part of the Greenbury Report available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes
/code.php?code_id=131 (accessed 4 July 2007) (hereafter the 1995 Code).
177 See Riley “The Final Report of the Hampel Committee” on the Hampel Report.
178 See Younghusband “Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom” 275–280 relating to the
Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Reports. See also Sheikh “Introduction to the Corporate Governance
Themed Issues” 267–274; Dignam “Exporting Corporate Governance” 70–76; Barnard “The Hampel
Committee Report” 110–115.
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Committee.179 In July 2003 it was replaced with a new Combined Code.180 The 2003
Combined Code derives from a review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive
directors by Derek Higgs and a review of audit committees by Sir Robert Smith.181
The 2003 Combined Code is an appendix to the Listing Rules, but does not form part
of it. The Listing Rules do not oblige companies to comply with the principles of the
Combined Code, neither does the Combined Code have any statutory backing. Its
objective is not to compel companies to comply with the Combined Code, but rather
to ensure disclosure so that investors may have adequate information regarding
corporate governance practices.182 The emphasis of the 2003 Combined Code is
therefore on compliance with broad principles and, in addition, specific provisions
contained in a Code of Best Practice.183
The 2003 Combined Code is divided into two sections. Section 1 relates to companies
listed in the United Kingdom and section 2 deals with institutional investors.184
Section 1 consists of 14 principles of good governance. These principles are divided
into four parts. The first part deals with directors. The overriding principle in this
regard is that every listed company should have an effective board of directors who
179 The Combined Code is annexed to the Listing Rules available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs (accessed
27 July 2006) (hereafter the 1998 Combined Code). See also Riley “The Final Report of the Hampel
Committee” 179–180; Dignam “Exporting Corporate Governance” 70–76. Pettet “The Combined
Code” 394–400 discusses the Combined Code of 1998. The Combined Code is based on compliance
with broad principles of corporate governance. More specific provisions are contained in the Code of
Best Practice. An analysis of the broad principles is provided by Pettet. He distinguishes between
broad principles and code provisions. For example, there is the broad principle that every company
should be headed by an effective board. The code provision on this board principle is that an effective
board should include non-executive directors.
180 Available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs (accessed 27 July 2006) (hereafter the 2003 Combined Code).
181 See Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors by Derek Higgs (January
2003) available at www.aar.com.au (accessed 27 July 2006) (hereafter the Higgs Report); Audit
Committees Combined Code Guidance by Sir Robert Smith (January 2003) available at
http://www.football-research.org/docs/smithreport-30-01-03.pdf (accessed 5 July 2007).
182 Belcher “Compliance with the Cadbury Code” 11–17; Cheffins “Current Trends in Corporate
Governance” 26. Belcher conducted a small scale study on whether or not companies comply with the
listing requirements. She concluded that compliance with the code was effective. This study concerned
the Cadbury Report and their Code of Best Practices (1992 Code).
183 The Hampel Committee strongly disapproved of box-ticking. Box-ticking concerns complying with
the letter of the law, but not with the substance. See Pettet “The Combined Code” 394–400 for a
detailed discussion of the 2003 Combined Code.
184 Sections E1–E2 of the 2003 Combined Code.
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should lead and control the company. The board should also consist of a balance of
executive and non-executive directors. The board should be provided with relevant
information to make decisions in a timely manner. There should be a formal and
transparent procedure relating to the appointment of directors.185 Part 2 concerns
directors’ levels of remuneration and provides that remuneration should be of such a
nature that it attracts directors to manage a company successfully. A portion of the
remuneration should be based on corporate and individual performance.186 Part 3
relates to relations with shareholders. Greater shareholder activism is required.
Boards should use the annual general meeting, for instance, to communicate with
private investors and to encourage their participation.187 Part 4 deals with
accountability of directors and auditing requirements. The board should present a
balanced and clear assessment of the position of the company and its prospects.188
Section 2 concerns institutional shareholders. Dialogue between institutional
investors and managers, and evaluating governance disclosures by taking all relevant
factors into account are discussed in section 2. It is also stated that institutional
investors should make use of their votes in a responsible manner. This section is
important as it provides recommendations on how institutional investors can be more
active in monitoring directors’ actions. This falls beyond the ambit of this thesis and
section 2 is therefore not discussed further.
In December 2006 the 2003 Combined Code was updated. The Financial Reporting
Council is responsible for updating the Combined Code on a regular basis. This 2006
code also has various sections with a main principle, supporting principles and code
provisions. The layout is similar to the 2003 Combined Code and not much has
changed.
185 Sections A1–A7 of the 2003 Combined Code. See also Pettet “The Combined Code” 395–396.
186 Sections B1–B2 of the 2003 Combined Code.
187 Sections D1–D2 of the 2003 Combined Code.
188 Sections C1–C3 of the 2003 Combined Code. See Barnard “The Hampel Committee Report” 110–
115 regarding the Hampel Report.
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4.1.2 The Stakeholder Debate
The Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Reports confirm that there is no universal
definition of ‘corporate governance’. Generally, corporate governance concerns
directors’ duties to a company with board responsibility and accountability as
important elements. As stated above, directors’ duties were traditionally owed to the
shareholders,189 and profit maximisation was directors’ ultimate goal when they
managed a company.
The Cadbury and Greenbury Reports did not specifically deal with the issues of
stakeholder protection and in whose interests directors should manage a company.190
The committees equated a company’s interests with those of its shareholders and they
based their recommendations on this viewpoint.191 They therefore favoured the
traditional stance and they missed an ideal opportunity to discuss this issue.
Fortunately, it was discussed in detail during the company law review process
launched in 1998.192 The policy documents drafted during the review process are
discussed in detail later in this chapter.193
It was indicated above that the Hampel Committee dealt with corporate governance
in a more general sense than the Cadbury and Greenbury Committees. The Hampel
Committee says the following on the stakeholder debate:
Our next step was to consider the aims of those who direct and control
companies. The single overriding objective shared by all listed
companies, whatever their size or type of business, is the preservation and
the greatest practicable enhancement over time of their shareholders’
investment . . .
A company must develop relationships relevant to its success. These will
depend on the nature of the company’s business; but they will include
189 Paragraph 3.1.1 above.
190 They did not, for instance, consider employee participation on board level. See Du Plessis
“Corporate Governance” 87.
191 Cheffins “Current Trends in Corporate Governance” 29.
192 Paragraph 4.2.1 below. Cheffins “Current Trends in Corporate Governance” 29.
193 Paragraph 4.2.3 below.
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those with employees, customers, suppliers, credit providers, local
communities and governments.
This recognises that the directors’ relationship with the shareholders is
different in kind irom [sic] their relationship with the other stakeholder
interests. The shareholders elect the directors. As the CBI put it in their
evidence to us, the directors as a board are responsible for relations with
stakeholders; but they are accountable to the shareholders. This is not
simply a technical point. From a practica1 point of view to redefine the
directors’ responsibilities in terms of the stakeholders would mean
identifying all the various stakeholder groups; and deciding the nature
and extent of the directors’ responsibility to each. The result would be
that the directors were not effectively accountable to anyone since there
would be no clear yardstick for judging their performance. This is a
recipe neither for good governance nor for corporate success.194
[Emphasis added]
From this it can be deduced that the Hampel Report is in favour of other interest
groups being taken into account, but only if shareholders will ultimately benefit. A
company must develop relationships relevant to its success and these relationships
will include those with employees, creditors, customers and suppliers. The
stakeholders that directors will consider will vary depending on the business of the
company. The Hampel Committee supports the view that the overall duty of directors
is the welfare of shareholders, specifically profit maximisation. The committee states
that it would be difficult to identify all stakeholder groups and to determine the nature
and extent of the duties relating to each group. Ultimately, directors would be
accountable to no one, because being accountable to “everyone” can result in no
accountability.195
4.1.3 Self-Regulation Versus Codification
The objectives of the codes of best practices referred to above were not to prescribe
any specific corporate behaviour in detail. Rather, the codes are intended to be self-
regulatory in nature. They are based on a voluntary approach and not on compulsion
through legislation.196 The aim of the codes was to raise the standards of corporate
194 Paragraphs 1.16–1.17 of the Hampel Report.
195 Sheikh “Introduction to Corporate Governance Themed Issues” 268–269.
196 Sheikh “Introduction to Corporate Governance Themed Issues” 272.
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governance, financial reporting and auditing.197 The Cadbury Report states: “We
believe our approach, based on compliance with a voluntary code coupled with
disclosure will prove more effective than a statutory code. It is directed at
establishing best practice, and at allowing some flexibility in implementation.”198 The
Greenbury Committee had the same idea, stating in their report that “[t]he way
forward as we see it lies not in statutory controls, which would be at best unnecessary
and at worst harmful, but in action to strengthen accountability and encourage
enhanced performance”.199 The Hampel Committee refers to the danger of box-
ticking in their report. Box-ticking refers to the situation where corporate governance
boxes are ticked, indicating that there was compliance with a specific aspect. There
must be compliance with the rule and not just with the form.
As stated before, the United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006 now contains an
exhaustive codification of directors’ duties.200 Directors’ duties are therefore no
longer self-regulated in terms of United Kingdom company law.201 It is, however,
important to note that to have a code of directors’ duties (whether comprehensive or
partial) does not imply that there will no longer be self-regulatory codes of best
practice. The exhaustive code in the Act concerns the contents of directors’ duties.
Codes of best practice can (and must) still provide directors with guidance
concerning the exercise of their duties and create high standards of corporate
governance.202
The code of directors’ duties as formulated in the Companies Act of 2006 is
discussed in detail in paragraph 4.3 below.
197 Esser & Coetzee “Codification of Directors’ Duties” 27–28; Belcher “Compliance with the
Cadbury Code” 11–17; Cheffins “Current Trends in Corporate Governance” 21.
198 Paragraph 1.10 of the Cadbury Report.
199 Paragraph 1.13 of the Greenbury Report.
200 The South African Bill only provides for a partial codification of directors’ duties.
201 See ch 6 par 5 relating to the position in South Africa.
202 See, for example, the suggestion in ch 2 par 5.2 below that directors should receive guidance on the
protection of stakeholders in codes of best practice. These codes can provide information on the
protection that stakeholders receive in other, separate legislation.
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4.2 The United Kingdom Company Law Review Process
4.2.1 Historical Overview
By the middle of 1997 it had become clear that company law in the United Kingdom
was no longer in line with modern business practices. It had been reviewed at
approximately 20 year intervals.203 In 1962 the Jenkins Commission was established,
but the recommendations of this committee were never really implemented.204 After
1972 the legislative programme was dominated by the need to incorporate European
Community harmonising directives.205 The 1980s were dominated by the
criminalisation of insider dealings. Therefore, in short, by 1997 the company law of
the United Kingdom had many outdated provisions. A large part of company law was
also to be found in case law. The Department of Trade and Industry drafted a series
of protocols during the 1990s relating to the possible consultation on the review of
company law, stating that there was a need for a simpler system of company law.206
In 1991 a paper of the Law Society supported a need for company law reform. This
paper proposed the establishment of a company law commission,207 but the
commission was not able to deal adequately and quickly with all the problems of
company law reform.208 In 1998 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
announced a three-year fundamental review of core company law. This review was
led by an independent steering group. Their aim was to develop a simple, modern,
efficient and cost-effective framework to carry out business activity in Britain for the
203 Reform had taken place in a typically piecemeal approach. See the Loreburn (1907), Greene
(1928), Cohen (1945), Jenkins (1963) Reports. See Goddard “Modernising Company Law” 403.
204 Freedman “Reforming Company law” 209 argues that the Jenkins Commission did not stimulate or
excite and was too cautious by referring to Pennington “Reports of Committees” 703–710. She also
refers to Gower who said that the committee had broken down and that the taking of oral evidence was
a waste of time.
205 Paragraph 2.4 above.
206 As stated above, in the 1990s the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Reports were issued.
207 The Reform of Company Law, Law Society Legal Practice Directorate, No 255, July 1991 Law
Society (1991) (hereafter the Law Society Company Reform). See Rickford “A History of the
Company Law Review” 3–37 for a detailed discussion of the history of company law reform in the
United Kingdom.
208 Rickford “A History of the Company Law Review” 3–9.
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twenty-first century.209 The Steering Group’s point of reference amounted to the
creation of a “framework of company law which promoted the competitiveness of
British companies, struck the proper balance between the interests of those concerned
with companies, in the context of straightforward, cost-effective and fair regulation,
and promoted consistency, predictability and transparency in the law”.210
In the course of the review process, various consultation documents were drafted.
Some of the reasoning for the final recommendations is therefore found in earlier
documents.211 The Steering Group adopted three core principles when reviewing the
United Kingdom Companies Act, namely to apply a “think small first” approach; that
the regime of corporate governance should be improved; and that a flexible and
institutional structure for rule-making and enforcement should be set up.212 The
Steering Group also had regard to the following general principles of company law
reform: company law reform should succeed on a technical level, reform should
satisfy economic criteria and company law should also succeed at a philosophical
level. The Steering Group also listed a number of guiding principles. Firstly,
company law should be primarily enabling and efficient.213 Secondly, company law
should enhance international competitiveness.214 Thirdly, entrepreneurial freedom
209 See www.dti.gov.uk/cld/review (accessed 20 June 2006). See also Attenborough “The Company
Law Reform Bill” 162–169 where he discusses the company law reform of the United Kingdom as
undertaken by the Steering Group.
210 Final Report n4 at par 1. 3 as referred to in Rickford “A History of the Company Law Review” 10.
211 This thesis will focus on Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy (March 1998)
available at http://www.lens-library.com/info/DTI0399FINAL.html; (the Strategic Framework);
Developing the Framework; Completing the Structure; the Final Report; the White Paper of 2005. See
also Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Reforming the Law concerning Overseas
Companies (October 1999); Company Formation and Capital Maintenance (October 1999); Company
General Meetings and Shareholder Communication (October 1999); Capital Maintenance Other
Issues (June 2000); Registration of Company Charges (October 2000); Trading Disclosures (October
2000). All these documents are available at www.dti.gov.uk/bbf/co-act-2006 (accessed 25 June 2006).
212 See Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy (March 1998); Arden “Reforming the
Companies Acts” 581–582; Alcock et al. Companies Act 2006 3–11 on the company law review
Steering Group.
213 Company law should provide the needs for those involved in businesses to manage their affairs in a
way in which they believe will lead to success and productive activity, see the Final Report at par 1.26
and Goddard “Modernising Company Law” 406.
214 Goddard “Modernising Company Law” 408.
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should be coupled with transparency215 and regulation must be justified.216 Company
law must therefore be accessible, the language must be simple and clear, and the
common law should be codified.217 Fourthly, company law should take account of the
modern asset mix and should be suitable for all the different kinds of companies.218
The Steering Group made various recommendations.219 This thesis focuses primarily
on the recommendations relating to corporate governance issues, especially the
protection of stakeholders and directors’ duties.220
4.2.2 The Different Phases in the Review Process
It was indicated above that the United Kingdom engaged in a company law review
process in 1998. The different phases of this process, as reflected in the various
company policy documents, are briefly discussed below.221 A more detailed
discussion follows on the views expressed in these company law review documents
on the issue of the codification of directors’ duties, as well as the question of in
215 The basic framework of company law should provide as much as possible freedom to the
participants, but combined with the necessary transparency to exercise this freedom, see the Final
Report par 1.15; Goddard “Modernising Company Law” 409.
216 Deregulation and simplification is important, especially concerning smaller companies. Goddard
“Modernising Company Law” 409.
217 Compliance is dependent on the way in which the law is understood. This relates to the statutory
statement of directors’ duties. See Goddard “Modernising Company Law” 409.
218 Arden “Reforming the Companies Acts” 583. See generally on the company law reform process:
Goddard “Modernising Company Law” 402; 404–405 with regard to a brief background on the
company law reform process. The stakeholder debate is specifically focused on referring to the
enlightened shareholder value approach.
219 The Steering Group made certain recommendations with regard to private companies. Companies
differ from one another, especially concerning size. It was therefore important to establish whether the
company law review process was applicable to all companies. See Arden “Reforming the Companies
Acts” 583–586 regarding the recommendations of the Steering Group relating to private companies.
The Steering Group also made recommendations concerning a new institutional framework. They
recommended that there should be a number of bodies responsible for enforcing and updating
company law. See Arden “Reforming the Companies Acts” 583–597; the Final Report at pars 3.56–
3.66; 5.13–5.101.
220 The Final Report at pars 3.7; 7.33–7.51; 7.5–7.16.
221 As stated before, various policy documents were issued during the company law review process. A
brief overview is provided, but only the chapters dealing with the question of in whose interests
directors should manage the company and the codification of directors’ duties are discussed in detail.
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whose interests directors should exercise their duties when they manage a
company.222
4.2.2.1 The Strategic Framework
The Steering Group held their first meeting in June 1998 to decide on a basic
philosophy and a plan concerning the review process. In February 1999 the outcomes
of these consultations were reflected in a document entitled the Strategic Framework.
A number of key issues to be addressed during the consultations and the preferred
way forward were discussed in this document. These issues included the scope of
company law, the needs of small and closely held companies, company formation,
capital maintenance, regulation and boundaries of the law, international issues, and
information and communications technology.223 These selected key issues were
discussed in different working groups.224
Chapter 5.1 of the Strategic Framework is important for the purposes of this thesis.225
Chapter 5.1 analyses the interests that company law should serve, stating that
222 It was clear (after the Department of Trade and Industry had launched its company law reform
process by issuing a consultation paper) that the stakeholder issue was at the heart of the review, the
issue as to whether or not directors’ duties should be codified also attracted many comments. See
Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy (March 1998) at par 3.7; Strategic Framework at
p 3. See also Omar “The Company We Keep” 223–225, in which he refers to the company law review
process in the context of the formation of a company.
223 See pp 33–114 of the Strategic Framework. See also Rickford “A History of the Company Law
Review” 11–20 for a detailed discussion of the Strategic Framework.
224 The seven issues discussed in ch 5 of the Strategic Framework were allocated to three different
working groups. Membership of the working groups was decided on by the Steering Group, in
consultation with the Department of Trade and Industry. Each working group was led by a member
from the Steering Group. The Steering Group met monthly where the minutes from the various
working groups were discussed.
225 Chapter 2 of the Strategic Framework sets out the overall approach to be taken. The objective of
the reform process is to have a modern law supporting a competitive economy. See pp 8–20 of the
Strategic Framework. A “think small first” approach was taken. Chapter 3 (pp 21–23 of the Strategic
Framework) relates to the European Union and human rights and chapter 4 (pp 24–32 of the Strategic
Framework) briefly reviews current trends in other jurisdictions. Chapter 5.2 addresses the needs of
small and closely-held companies indicating that they are not well served in terms of the Companies
Act of 1985 (see pp 56–69 of the Strategic Framework). It was recommended that small- and medium-
sized companies should be retained in the current framework, but the framework should be
restructured to meet their needs. Chapter 5.3 and 5.4 concern company formation and capital
maintenance. The introduction of no par value shares and to remove the need for court approval of
capital reductions are some of the proposals to simplify the law (see pp 70–91 of the Strategic
Framework). Chapter 5.5 presents boundaries between various regulatory and enforcement
jurisdictions. There is, for example, a proposal to move in the direction of non-statutory regulation,
away from criminal and civil sanctions (see pp 92–95 of the Strategic Framework). Chapter 5.6
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directors should serve the interests of a wider variety of groups than just the
shareholders. In this regard a distinction is drawn between the enlightened
shareholder value and the pluralist approaches.226 This aspect of the review process is
discussed in more detail below.227
4.2.2.2 Developing the Framework
This document is similar to the Strategic Framework consultation document and
draws together the work done by the second phase working groups, which were
established to deal with the following issues: small companies, the scope of company
law, the role of directors, the role of shareholders, technical issues on shares,
accounting and reporting, and registration of information by companies. It was
published in March 2000.
Chapters 2 and 3 are important for purposes of this thesis.228 Chapter 2 provides a
background and overview,229 followed by chapter 3 which deals with the duties of
directors and company officers.230 Reference is made to the stakeholder debate in
examines the current international attractiveness of United Kingdom company law (see pages 96–106
of the Strategic Framework) and chapter 5.7 relates to information and communications technology,
referring to company meetings and communications with members (see pp 107–114 of the Strategic
Framework). Chapter 6 describes the key issues relating to financial reporting. These include the form
and content of accounts; the role of accounting standards and international standards; exemptions for
small- and medium-sized companies; and the report of a director. Chapter 7 deals with the work done
by the English and Scottish law commissions (see pp 115–125, 126–133 of the Strategic Framework).
In chapter 8 options for the form or shape of new legislation and methods of keeping the law up to date
are discussed. Chapter 9 describes the way forward and what the next stage should entail (see pp 134–
148 of the Strategic Framework).
226 Pages 33–55 of the Strategic Framework. See ch 2 par 5.1 for a discussion of these approaches.
227 See par 4.2.3 below.
228 Chapter 1 provides an introduction and some general background. Part 1 of this document deals
with governance issues. These governance issues are discussed in chapters 2–5. Chapter 4 deals with
shares and shareholders. Chapter 5 deals with reporting and auditing (see pp 7–200 of Developing the
Framework). Part 2 relates to small and private companies and alternative vehicles (see chapters 6–10
and pp 219–369 of Developing the Framework). Issues such as reports and accounts for small
companies and a proposed simplification for private companies are discussed.
229 In this chapter the scope of company law is discussed.
230 A legislative statement of directors’ duties is proposed.
87
chapter 2. Chapter 3 contains a legislative statement. These two chapters are
discussed in more detail below.231
4.2.2.3 Completing the Structure
This was the last consultation document issued before the Final Report was issued in
May 2001.232 This document mainly takes the issues discussed in Developing the
Framework forward. Chapter 3 deals with corporate governance issues, specifically
relating to the scope of company law, directors’ duties and the Operating and
Financial Review.233 For purposes of this thesis, the issues in chapter 3 are important
and are discussed below.234
4.2.2.4 The White Papers of 2002 and 2005
In July 2002 the government released its first response to the above-mentioned
company law review process in the form of a White Paper.235 Most of the
recommendations of the Final Report were accepted in the White Paper of 2002.236
231 Paragraphs 4.2.3.2, 4.2.4.2.
232 Completing the Structure was issued in November 2000.
233 The OFR. In Completing the Structure a new mandatory OFR is proposed. The OFR should be
published by all public and very large private companies as part of their annual report. The directors
should account for the performance and direction of the business, including a fair review of
achievements and trends, and strategic direction. This is an important development concerning
directors’ duties as it requires of directors to report on the company, including the recognition of wider
relationships by directors: see Completing the Structure par 3.2. Chapter 1 contains an introduction
and some background, confirming that this is the third consultation document by the Steering Group.
Chapter 2 concerns small- and medium-sized companies. Chapter 4 concerns unlisted and smaller
quoted companies, directors and the market in corporate control. Chapter 5 deals with shares and
shareholders. Chapter 6 deals with reporting, accounting and audit. Chapter 7 deals with capital
maintenance and chapter 8 with company registrations and the provision of information. Chapter 9 is
concerned with alternative corporate vehicles and access to limited liability. Chapter 10 deals with
company law and groups of companies233 and chapter 11 relates to reconstruction, mergers and
jurisdictional migration. Chapter 12 provides for a regulatory and institutional framework for company
law and chapter 13 deals with sanctions (see pp 169–338 of Completing the Structure).
234 Paragraphs 4.2.3.3, 4.2.4.3.
235 White Papers are issued by the government as statements of policy and often set out proposals for
legislative changes, which may be debated before a Bill is introduced. Some White Papers may invite
comments. On the 2005 White Paper, see Sheikh “Company Law Reform” 13–21; Howell “The
Company White Paper” 203–210.
236 For example, they declined the proposal of the Steering Group for a statutory company law and
reporting commission, as a way to keep company law up to date. The government said that there is no
need for such a commission, because the Bill is drafted in such a way that future needs are being met
(through flexible secondary legislation). See Edwin “White Paper and the Draft Companies Bill
Published” 308.
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The White Paper of 2002 is divided into five parts, namely: (1) an introduction, (2) an
outline of the government’s policy, (3) notes on the draft clauses, (4) a regulatory
impact assessment and (5) a conclusion relating to their viewpoints. A draft
Companies Bill and a number of further questions for consultation were also part of
the White Paper of 2002. The White Paper of 2002 is of less importance in view of
the fact that another White Paper was published in 2005.
In November 2005 the Company Law Reform Bill was introduced to Parliament. The
White Paper of 2005 sets out a range of measures relevant to the proposed Company
Law Reform Bill. The contents of the White Paper of 2005 were similar to the
recommendations made by the Steering Group.237 Four objectives are crucial, when
these measures are considered.238 The first objective relates to enhancing shareholder
engagement and long-term investments. The second and third objectives concern
better regulation and a “think small first” approach. Although the vast majority of
companies in the United Kingdom are small companies, company law had been
written with the larger company in mind. The Steering Group wanted to restore this
balance and make the law easier for all to understand.239 In terms of the last objective,
unnecessary burdens should be removed when incorporating a company.
This thesis focuses on the first objective, namely to enhance shareholder engagement
and long-term investments. When discussing the first objective, the drafters refer to
the enlightened shareholder value approach. They state that directors should manage
a company for the benefit of the shareholders, ensuring that they are informed and
involved in business decisions.240 Directors’ decisions should be based on the long-
term view of a company and not just on immediate returns. The Steering Group also
refers to the codification of directors’ duties in order to clarify their responsibilities
237 Page 9 of the 2005 White Paper.
238 Foreword of the 2005 White Paper.
239 Pages 5–6 of the 2005 White Paper. See also ch 4 of the 2005 White Paper.
240 Pages 33–55 of the Strategic Framework; Completing the Structure ch 3.
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and to improve the law regulating their duties.241 These two issues are discussed in
detail below, and this White Paper, as well as the three other consultation documents
referred to above, are considered.242
In 2006 the Company Law Reform Bill was published as the Companies Bill.243 The
Bill completed the Commons Committee stage on 20 July 2006. The Bill amends and
restates many of the provisions of the 1985 Companies Act. It also codifies certain
provisions derived from case law.244 In November 2006 the Companies Act was
published.245 Some of its provisions came into effect during 2006, 2007 and 2008.
The remainder of the provisions will be effective by October 2009.246 The relevant
aspects of this Act are discussed in detail later in this chapter.247
4.2.3 The Stakeholder Debate
The protection of stakeholders is one of the issues that received considerable
attention during the company law review process. This issue refers to the question of
whose interests company law should serve and the legal means by which it should do
so.248 This matter is closely linked with the codification of directors’ duties. The duty
241 Developing the Framework pars 3.17–3.19; Completing the Structure par 3.3.
242 Pages 5–6 of the 2005 White Paper.
243 Companies Bill 190 (hereafter the Companies Bill).
244 See www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmbills/190 regarding the Companies Bill
(accessed 20 August 2006). The Bill is divided into three volumes. Volume I contains clauses 1 to 482.
Volume II contains clauses 483 to 1000. Volume III contains the remaining clauses and the Schedules.
The structure of the Bill is as follows: Parts 1–7 deal with the fundamentals of what a company is, how
it can be formed and what it is called, parts 8–12 deal with members/shareholders and the management
of a company (the part on directors, part 10, is especially important for this thesis), parts 13 and 14
deal with company decision making, parts 15 and 16 deal with the safeguards for ensuring that the
officers of a company are accountable to its members, parts 17–24 deal with the raising of capital,
annual returns and takeovers, parts 25–33 deal with the regulatory framework, parts 34 and 35 deal
with business names and statutory auditors, part 36 deals with transparency obligations and parts 37–
40 with general matters.
245 The Act received royal assent on 8 November 2006. See Keay “Section 172(1)”; Linklater
“Promoting Success” for a brief history of the different stages of the company law reform process.
246 See par 4.3.1 below for the exact dates.
247 Paragraph 4.3 below.
248 Developing the Framework ch 2 par 7. See Schall et al. “Promoting an Inclusive Approach” 304–
306 on the approach followed by the Steering Group during the company law review.
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of directors to act in the best interests of the company is addressed in the code of
directors’ duties. In this section the general viewpoints expressed in the various
consultation documents on stakeholders and their interests are evaluated.
The Steering Group, “for ease of reference”, referred to two basic approaches as far
as company interests and the stakeholder debate are concerned, namely the so-called
enlightened shareholder value approach and the pluralist approach.249 They
summarised the two different approaches as follows:
A distinction is drawn between the enlightened shareholder value
approach, which asserts that [productive relationships] can be achieved
within present principles, but ensuring that directors pursue shareholders’
interests in an enlightened and inclusive way, and the ‘pluralistic’
approach, which asserts that co-operative and productive relationships
will only be optimised where directors are permitted (or required) to
balance shareholders’ interests with those of others committed to the
company.250
It should be noted that the Steering Group acknowledged that what they called the
enlightened shareholder value is often referred to in the literature as “enlightened self
interest”251 and that “current law is not widely recognised as embracing the
enlightened shareholder value approach”.252 The Steering Group seems to strongly
favour the so-called enlightened shareholder value approach.253
When perusing the consultation documents of the Steering Group drafted during the
company law reform process, it may seem as if these two approaches are the only
relevant approaches on the nature of companies. It is submitted that the Steering
Group referred to these two approaches to emphasise two possibilities when
considering the interests of stakeholders, namely shareholder primacy or the
249 See the Strategic Framework at p 37, par 5.1.11. These approaches are discussed in detail in ch 2
par 5.1 above. It has been stated that the enlightened shareholder value approach has a strong emphasis
on shareholder primacy and the pluralist approach on the protection of stakeholders.
250 The Strategic Framework at p iv, par 5.
251 The Strategic Framework at p 37, par 5.1.11, fn 27.
252 The Strategic Framework at p vi, par 6.
253 The Strategic Framework at p 39, par 39; p 42, par 5.1.23; pp 43, par 5.1.25 ff.
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protection of different stakeholders. The Steering Group did not provide an adequate
theoretical background on the different theories of company law. It is a very broad
field, as was seen from chapter 2 above, and it would have been an extensive exercise
for the Steering Group to refer to all the different theories and the interpretations
given to the theories by different commentators. Not only do the theories of the
corporation and approaches to company law vary considerably, but there are also so
many nuances and variations of the various theories and approaches to company law
that it would be totally misleading if the impression is created that these theories and
approaches boil down to a simple choice between an enlightened shareholder value
approach and a pluralist approach. Many other labels could be used, such as “the
constituency theory”, “the shareholder primacy theory”, “the associative theory”, and
“the inclusive stakeholder theory” to explain different approaches to company law as
far as directors’ duties are concerned.254 It is therefore important to keep in mind that
these two approaches are not the only relevant ones. They are only referred to, to
provide the two ends of the scale, namely shareholder primacy and stakeholder
protection.255
254 Chapter 2 par 5.1 above. It should also be appreciated that the Steering Group defined the
enlightened shareholder value approach and pluralist approach in such a way that they seem to be
completely competing approaches. None of the variations of these approaches was analysed in the
Discussion Papers, neither does it provide any in-depth discussion of the recent developments
regarding perceptions of social and other responsibilities of large corporations. It also neglected to
analyse the importance of the entity theory and the associated, but very important, legal principle that
directors owe their duties towards “the company as a separate legal entity”. See Esser & Du Plessis
“Stakeholder Protection” 351; Attenborough “The Company Law Reform Bill” 165 in this regard.
255 See Esser & Du Plessis “Stakeholder Protection” 351; Attenborough “The Company Law Reform
Bill” 165 in this regard. See also McKenzie-Skene “Directors’ Duties to Creditors” 511–528 where she
discusses the stakeholder debate and the codification of directors’ duties in the context of the
consultation documents of the Steering Group. See further Keay “Enlightened Shareholder Value”
where he refers to the company law reform of the Steering Group that started in 1998. He specifically
refers to the stakeholder debate. He refers to the two approaches adopted by the Steering Group,
namely the enlightened shareholder value and pluralist approaches (at 346–347). The enlightened
shareholder value approach was favoured. Shareholders collectively should receive primacy when
directors manage a company, but not with exclusive concern to short-term goals (at 361). He discusses
the first and second White Papers (2002 and 2005). The government was in favour of a codification of
directors’ duties. Lastly see Roach “The Legal Model of the Company” 98, who distinguishes between
the enlightened shareholder value and pluralist approaches. He indicates that the Steering Group
followed a shareholder approach, but not as strict as traditionally applied. Directors should also
consider the interests of other stakeholders.
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4.2.3.1 The Strategic Framework
Chapter 5.1 of the Strategic Framework deals with the protection of stakeholders. It
confirms that the traditional position is that companies are formed and managed for
the benefit of the shareholders, subject to safeguards for the benefit and protection of
creditors.256 It was further stated that directors are obliged to manage a company
“honestly, in their best judgment, for the benefit of the company. This traditionally
means for the benefit of the shareholders as a whole.”257 Accounting and disclosure
requirements also operate to protect creditors and the community as a whole.258 It is
acknowledged that directors should, where appropriate, have regard to the need to
ensure productive relationships with interested parties and to long-term interests. It is
argued that it is necessary to protect the interests of those who are dependent on the
company or those who made significant investments in the company or who carry
real residual risks.259
A distinction is made between the enlightened shareholder value and pluralist
approaches, as explained before. When opting for the enlightened shareholder value
approach, the traditional company law does not have to change significantly as the
ultimate objective of companies remains the same, namely profit maximisation for
the shareholders.260 In the Strategic Framework it is, however, suggested that
directors should adopt a broader and longer-term view of their role. This is referred to
as an “inclusive approach”.261 Should one opt for the pluralist approach, reform of
company law will be necessary, because the interests of other stakeholders are also
taken into consideration. For example, shareholders’ control over the company
256 The Strategic Framework par 5.1.4. See the following articles discussing the Strategic Framework:
Rickford “A History of the Company Law Review” 11–20 (it is stated that the enlightened shareholder
value approach was recognised as a “broadly correct statement of the law”) at 15; Goddard
“Modernising Company Law” 404–409 (This paper examines the White Paper and the role that it
ascribes to company law in general).
257 The Strategic Framework par 5.1.5.
258 The Strategic Framework par 5.1.4.
259 The Strategic Framework par 5.1.5 n 23.
260 The Strategic Framework par 5.1.12
261 The Strategic Framework par 5.1.17.
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through their determination of the composition of the board will have to be
changed.262 In the Strategic Framework the enlightened shareholder value approach
is preferred, but it is stated that the traditional law does not embrace this approach in
a satisfactory manner.263 It is noted that the issue of stakeholder protection will be
discussed in more detail in subsequent consultation documents.
4.2.3.2 Developing the Framework
In Developing the Framework this issue of stakeholder protection is taken further in
chapter 2 of the Framework. The Steering Group argues that the overall objective of
wealth maximisation can best be achieved through an inclusive approach. In other
words, directors need to have regard to all relationships that might have an impact on
the short- and long-term consequences of the company, with a view to achieving
success for the company’s shareholders as a whole.264 The proposed way forward
concerning the protection of stakeholders is then discussed. The Steering Group
states that a statutory statement of directors’ general duties will provide guidance to
directors and articulate developments in case law.265 One of the duties in the code is
that directors should achieve success of the company for the benefit of the
shareholders collectively, by taking proper account of all relevant factors for that
purpose.266 This includes a balance between short- and long-term considerations.
Relationships with consumers, employees and suppliers, for instance, should also be
sustained.267 Companies should therefore be managed in a way that maximises
overall competitiveness, and wealth and welfare. This should not be done at the
expense of turning companies into moral, political or economic arbiters.268 The key
components of this duty of directors to promote the success of the company are
262 The Strategic Framework par 5.1.13.
263 The Strategic Framework par 5.1.6.
264 Chapter 3 in Developing the Framework.
265 See Developing the Framework par 3.40. See also Rickford “A History of the Company Law
Review” 20–27 where the enlightened shareholder value approach and a possible codification of
directors’ duties are discussed as considered by the Steering Group in Developing the Framework.
266 Developing the Framework par 2.19.
267 Developing the Framework par 2.19.
268 Developing the Framework par 2.21.
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therefore the inclusive duty and broader accountability.269 Directors should have
regard to the company’s business and wider external relationships. Directors should
act in the best interests of the shareholders collectively, but this can only be achieved
when wider interests are also considered.270
Although the Steering Group states that directors should act in the best interests of
the shareholders collectively, the reference to the so-called enlightened shareholder
value approach is far less prominent. There is, in fact, just one reference to it in the
main text of chapters 2–4.271 The pluralist approach is mentioned on 21 occasions in
chapters 2–4, but the main purpose of these references is to reject the approach rather
than trying to explain it further or to emphasise variations of such an approach. The
Steering Group rejected the pluralist approach as an approach that should be followed
in defining directors’ duties.272
4.2.3.3 Completing the Structure
In Completing the Structure, firm conclusions are adopted concerning the protection
of stakeholders. It is confirmed that the pluralist approach will not be adopted. This
decision is based mainly on the problems associated with the enforcement of
directors’ duties when a number of stakeholders are provided with direct
protection.273 In chapter 3 of this Consultation Document, which deals with directors’
duties, no reference is made to the so-called enlightened shareholder value approach.
The pluralist approach is only mentioned once in the main text and only to observe
that the Steering Group saw it as a key objection that the supporters of the pluralist
approach did not suggest “a practical means of dealing with the crucial question of
how such a duty could be enforced”.274
269 Developing the Framework par 2.22.
270 Developing the Framework pars 2.19–2.26.
271 Developing the Framework p 14, par 2.21.
272 See in particular pars 3.1; 3.20ff in Developing the Framework. See Esser & Du Plessis
“Stakeholder Protection” 351.
273 Completing the Structure par 3.5.
274 Completing the Structure par 3.5.
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4.2.3.4 The White Paper of 2005
In the White Paper of 2005 the enlightened shareholder value approach is referred to.
The government agrees with the Steering Group in stating that directors should
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its shareholders. This can,
however, only be achieved by taking short-and long-term factors and stakeholders,
such as employees, suppliers and customers, into account. The government therefore
agrees that the enlightened shareholder value approach is the best one to follow as it
drives long-term company performance, and maximises competitiveness and
wealth.275
This approach is reflected in the statement of directors’ duties, discussed in the next
section.
4.2.4 Self-Regulation Versus Codification
The codification of directors’ duties was one of the main aspects considered by the
Steering Group during their review process.276 The viewpoints of the Steering Group
as reflected in the various policy documents are considered in this discussion.277
4.2.4.1 The Strategic Framework
The Steering Group agreed that directors’ duties should be codified.278 In the first of
the three consultation documents, the Strategic Framework, the Consultation
275 In Completing the Framework par 3.12 it was stated that the new statement on directors’ duties
should state that “the duties operate subject to other provisions in the Act and to the supervening
obligations to have regard to the interests of creditors when the company is insolvent or threatened by
insolvency”. In the Final Report par 3.11 it was stated that “the duties of directors to have regard to the
interests of creditors where there is a risk of insolvency”. The government, however, decided not to
include a reference to creditors in the statement on directors’ duties, see the White Paper of 2005 at par
3.10.
276 See ch 6 par 5.2 relating to arguments for and against a codification of directors’ duties.
277 The Strategic Framework, Developing the Framework; Completing the Structure; the White Paper
of 2005 and the Companies Bill are discussed. Reference is also made to the Law Commission Paper
No 153 Scottish Law Commission Paper No 105 “Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interest
and Formulating a Statement of Directors’ Duties” (September 1998) available at
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/library/lc261/lc261.pdf (hereafter Law Commission 153, 105 Paper) as
well as the Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission “Company Directors: Regulating
Conflicts of Interest and Formulating a Statement of Duties” No. 261, SLC No 173 (1999) paper
available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/library/lc261/lc261.pdf (hereafter Law Commission 261
Paper). These two papers refer to the codification of directors’ duties extensively.
278 Developing the Framework pars 3.17–3.19; Completing the Structure par 3.3.
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Document entitled “Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interest and
Formulating a Statement of Directors’ Duties”279 issued by the Law Commission in
1998 is largely relied on in support of the view that directors’ duties should be
codified.280 In this document of 1998 the Law Commission considered whether
part X of the 1985 Companies Act dealing with provisions that regulate transactions
in which directors have a conflict of interest should be reviewed with the view to
simplifying it.281 It was stated that if directors’ duties are made more accessible
through a statement of duties, then it may lessen the need to legislate for conflicts of
interest situations in such a complex manner as currently embedded in part X of the
Act.
The Steering Group also considered whether a statutory statement of directors’ duties
is the preferred way to regulate this aspect of company law and whether or not such a
codification should be an exhaustive or a partial code.282 It was explained in the
Consultation Paper of 1998283 that directors’ duties would be made more accessible
through a statement, making detailed regulation of conflicts of interest of directors
unnecessary.284 Several questions were therefore identified for consultees to consider.
These questions included whether or not detailed amendments should be made to
part X of the 1985 Companies Act, whether or not directors’ duties should be
codified and, if so, whether or not this should be a comprehensive or a partial
codification.285
279 In this Consultation Document only the Law Commission 153, 105 Paper is referred to. In
September 1999 a further paper was issued, the Law Commission 261 Paper. The Law Commission
261 Paper is referred to in Developing the Framework.
280 Chapter 7 of the Strategic Framework.
281 The Strategic Framework par 7.2. The provisions in part X of the Companies Act of 1985 were
very detailed and fragmented in some respects. It proved to be a defective regulation of directors’
duties.
282 The Strategic Framework par 7.7.3.
283 Law Commission 153, 105 Paper pars 3.11–3.20. See s 175 of the Companies Act of 2006 dealing
with conflicts of interest.
284 The Strategic Framework par 7.5.
285 The Strategic Framework pars 7.14–7.16.
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Part A of the Consultation Paper deals with the first question, namely, whether or not
amendments should be made to part X of the Companies Act of 1985.286 For purposes
of this thesis, part B of the Law Commission’s Consultation Paper is important and is
discussed below.
Part B of the Consultation Paper287 considers the possibility of a statutory statement
of directors’ duties. A number of options were considered by the Law Commission of
1998 relating to such a possible codification. These options include a comprehensive
codification of all the duties under the general law; a partial codification of the duties
that are not in doubt; a statutory statement of the main duties of directors under the
general law, but which does not replace the general law; and a non-binding statement
of directors’ duties.288 A draft statement of the main duties of directors is attached to
the Strategic Framework Consultation Paper, as Annexure “H”.289 The Strategic
Framework relied on the Law Commission Paper of 1998 and supported the proposal
of a codification of directors’ duties. It is, however, unclear at this stage how
comprehensive such a code should be. The Law Commission of 1998 suggested that
directors should sign a statement, in order to confirm that they did read the statement.
They proposed pamphlets explaining directors’ duties to them in clear language as a
286 Issues such as whether or not directors should disclose all interests to the board, or only those
interests that are material, and if they only need to disclose material interests how “material” should be
defined were addressed in part A. Part A of the Strategic Framework also considered whether part X
should be written in more simplified language; see the Law Commission 153, 105 Paper pars 9.34–
9.43.
287 Law Commission 153, 105 Paper pars 14.22–14.40.
288 The Strategic Framework par 7.14. See the Law Commission 153, 105 Paper pars 14.22–14.31.
289 This draft statement of directors’ duties includes duties of obedience, not to make secret profits, and
a duty of care, skill and diligence. In terms of the duty of obedience, a director must act in accordance
with the company’s constitution and he must exercise his powers only for the purposes allowed by
law. The secret profit rule states that a director must not use the company’s property, information or
opportunities for his own or anyone else’s benefit, unless he is allowed to by the company’s
constitution or the use has been disclosed to the company in general meeting and the company has
consented to it. A director must also act with the necessary care, skill and diligence by having both the
knowledge and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person in the same position as the
director; and the knowledge and experience which the director have. There is also a provision in the
statement indicating that directors should sign the statement acknowledging its contents. The statement
of the Law Commission was developed as a non-legislative statement at a high level of generality, see
par 3.18 of Developing the Framework. See Birds “The Reform of Directors’ Duties” 151.
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possible method of making these duties more accessible to directors.290 The Law
Commission did not, however, consult on the contents of a statement of directors’
duties.291
The Law Commission of 1998 states that such a codification will make the law more
accessible; and accessibility is one of the guiding principles of the company law
reform.292
4.2.4.2 Developing the Framework
Directors’ duties are also considered in Developing the Framework.293 In their
consideration of a possible codification of directors’ duties, in Developing the
Framework, the Steering Group accepts the Law Commission’s 1999294 proposal of a
legislative restatement of directors’ duties and significant changes to part X.295 The
Steering Group points out that the possible lack of flexibility is the main disadvantage
of a codification of directors’ duties. The Law Commission also stated in its 1999
report that inflexibility should be dealt with by ensuring that the statement is at a high
level of generality, and that it should be an exhaustive and binding statement of law,
but that the courts should not be prevented from inventing new principles outside the
field.296 The Steering Group also refers to a survey that the Law Commission
290 The Strategic Framework par 7.15. See the Law Commission 153, 105 Paper par 14.42. The Law
Commission also refers to the duty of care and skill, and especially the standard of care and skill that is
expected of a director. They also debated whether or not this duty should be purely subjective, thus
only considering the knowledge and experience of the specific director or purely objective,
considering the knowledge and experience of a reasonable person in the position of the director. They
preferred the “twofold” test, relying on both the objective and subjective standard. See the Strategic
Framework par 7.16; see also the Law Commission 153, 105 Paper part 12.
291 Arden “Reforming the Companies Acts” 587.
292 Birds “The Reform of Directors’ Duties” 155.
293 Part 1, ch 3 of Developing the Framework.
294 Law Commission 261 Paper.
295 Paragraph  4.2.4.1 above.
296 Developing Framework par 3.15. Earlier case law may be considered when interpreting the
provisions in the code (of directors’ duties), but new case law should be consistent with the code.
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conducted in 1998, noting that directors are in favour of such a statement and that a
number of directors indicated that they were uncertain of their duties.297
In Developing the Framework, based on the 1998 Law Commission’s draft statement
of directors’ duties, a trial draft statement of duties with explanations is provided. It is
confirmed that the main aim is to have a statement that is both flexible and
accessible. The statement must be at a sufficiently high level of generality to give
judges appropriate flexibility to develop and adapt law to meet new circumstances. It
should also be simple, short and accurate enough to give comprehensive and useful
guidance to company directors.298
The draft statement in Developing the Framework is based on five principles, namely
(1) compliance and loyalty,299 (2) independence of judgement, (3) conflict of interest,
(4) fairness and (5) care, skill and diligence.300 It is important to consider the trial
statement, as it was used as a basis for the code of directors’ duties in the 2006 Act.
The trial draft statutory statement of directors’ duties, contained in Developing the
Framework, reads as follows:301
The general duties of a director of a company
Preamble
The performance of a director’s functions is governed by the following
general principles:
1 Compliance and Loyalty
a. A director must exercise his powers honestly and for their proper
purpose, and in accordance with the company’s constitution and decisions
taken lawfully under it
297 Developing Framework par 3.14. The draft statement of directors’ duties, drafted by the Law
Commission of 1998 (Law Commission 153, 105 Paper), is also attached to Developing the
Framework for reference and comparison purposes.
298 Paragraph 3.37 of Developing the Framework.
299 This principle relates to the question in whose interests directors should manage a company, which
is discussed in more detail below.
300 Paragraphs 3.40–3.67 in Developing the Framework.
301 Developing the Framework par 3.40. See Jones “Directors’ Duties” 364–368 discussing the draft
statement of directors’ duties as contained in the 2005 White Paper.
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b. Subject to that requirement, he must (so far as he practically can)
exercise his powers in the way he believes in good faith is best calculated
in the circumstances, taking account of both the short and the long term
consequences of his acts, to promote the success of the company for the
benefit of its members as a whole.
c. The circumstances to which he is to have regard for that purpose
include, in particular, (as his duties of care and skill may require):
aa. the company’s need to foster its business relationships, including
those with its employees and suppliers and the customers for its products
and services;
bb. the impact of its operations on the communities affected and on the
environment; and
cc. its need to maintain a reputation for high standards of business
conduct.
2 Independence of Judgement
a. A director must not (except as lawfully permitted under the
company’s constitution) restrict his power to exercise an independent
judgement.
b. But this does not prevent him doing anything necessary to carry
out an agreement entered into in accordance with his duties.
3 Conflict of Interest
A director must not:
a. authorise, procure or permit the company to enter into any
transaction in which he has an interest unless the interest has been
disclosed to the relevant directors to the extent required under the Act;
nor
b. use any property, information or opportunity of the company for
his own or anyone else’s benefit, nor obtain a benefit in any other way in
connection with the exercise of his powers, unless he is allowed to make
such use or obtain such benefit by the company’s constitution, or the use
or benefit has been disclosed to the company in general meeting and the
company has consented to it.
4 Fairness
A director must act fairly as between the company’s members.
5 Care, Skill and Diligence
A director must exercise the care, skill and diligence which would be
exercised by a reasonably diligent person with both the knowledge, skill
and experience which may reasonably be expected of a director in his
position and any additional knowledge, skill and experience which he
has.
This statement can be explained as follows:
101
The first duty of compliance refers to the duty to obey the law and the constitution of
a company. Directors can only use their powers for their proper purpose.302 Loyalty
refers to the exercise of all powers for one overall objective, namely in good faith
taking both short- and long-term circumstances of the directors’ specific actions into
account.303 It is specifically stated that the directors should promote the success of the
company for the benefit of the shareholders as a whole.304 It is therefore clear from
this Consultation Paper that shareholders are still the primary beneficiaries of
directors’ duties.305 In order to promote the success of the company, for the
shareholders collectively, directors need to have regard to a number of factors. The
company’s need to foster business relationships, the impact of its operations on the
community affected as well as the need to maintain a reputation for high standards of
business conduct are examples of factors that have to be considered. This list is,
however, not exhaustive and directors will have to use their own discretion as to what
is relevant and what not.306
Principle 2 relates to independence of judgement. Directors may not commit
themselves to act according to someone else’s wishes.307 Directors should maintain
their independence. Delegation can, however, be authorised by the constitution of the
company. Care and skill is necessary when directors select someone to act on their
behalf and in the monitoring of such a delegate.308
302 The duty to use powers only for a proper purpose is not defined; it is left to case law to develop this
duty. See Developing the Framework par 3.47. See par 3.1 above where the duty of a director to act for
a proper purpose is discussed.
303 Directors often only act with the short-term consequences in mind, due to pressure from
shareholders.
304 Developing the Framework par 3.54.
305 Directors will still consider the interests of other groups, as far as is practically possible. See
Developing the Framework pars 3.50–3.53.
306 Developing the Framework par 3.56.
307 Directors should exercise an unfettered discretion, see Kregor v Hollins (1913) 109 LTR 225 (CA)
and Clark v Workman (1920) 1 IR 107 (it is improper for directors to give undertakings to third parties
“that they will look after their interests”). See Sealy Cases and Materials 293.
308 Developing the Framework pars 3.59–3.60. See principle 5 (par 3.66) on the duty of care, skill and
diligence. This duty is also discussed in par 3.2 above.
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Principle 3 concerns conflicts of interests. A director is not allowed to participate in
any transaction where his personal interest may conflict with that of the company,
unless permitted in terms of the constitution. Directors must account to the company
for any benefit derived from any transaction in which the director has an interest,
whether or not the director participated in the transaction.309 The constitution of the
company may, however, provide that it is not necessary for a director to account for
any benefit derived from a transaction. Section 317 of the Companies Act of 1985310
imposed an obligation on a director to disclose any interest to the board of directors.
Companies usually permit directors to have such interests. According to the trial
statement, directors may only have personal interests if these interests have been
disclosed to the board of directors. This obligation will not, however, arise if the
director had not authorised, procured or permitted a transaction in which he has an
interest.311 A conflict of interests can arise if a director exploits an asset which
belongs to the company, including a business opportunity, for his or her own benefit
or for the benefit of someone else.312 It is not clear whether this also includes
opportunities that a director heard of outside the course of his functions as a director.
The courts will have to provide guidance on this issue.313 A conflict of interest can
also arise if a director receives a benefit in connection with the exercise of his or her
duties. The company’s constitution or the general meeting can, however, authorise
such benefits.314
309 Thus, a director who did not participate in a specific transaction will still have to account to the
company.
310 See par 3(a) of the statement above.
311 See Developing the Framework par 3.62. See Keay “Shareholder Primacy” examining the principle
of enlightened shareholder value being based on shareholder primacy.
312 See the first part of par 3(b) of the statement above. Section 175 of the 2006 Companies Act deals
with possible conflicts of interest between a director and a company, see par 4.3.1 below.
313 It would be wise for the director to seek a waiver from the general meeting in such a case. See
Developing the Framework par 3.63.
314 See the second part of par 3(b) of the statement above.
103
Principle 4 concerns fairness, indicating that directors should treat all shareholders
with equal fairness.315
The last principle concerns a director’s obligation to act with care, skill and diligence.
This relates to the standard that directors should satisfy when they exercise their
duties as imposed by the other principles. The question is whether an objective or
subjective test should be followed to determine whether a specific director acted with
the necessary care and skill. In Developing the Framework, a test containing both an
objective and a subjective element was suggested. It was proposed that a director will
be liable if he failed to show the care or skill of a reasonable person in his position,
taking into account any additional knowledge, skills or experience that the specific
director may have.316
The possibility of a business judgment defence317 was also considered in Developing
the Framework. The business judgment rule states that a director will escape liability
for an unsound business decision if the decision was taken on an informed basis and
the decision was rational. The business judgment rule originated in the United States
and states that a director who acts in good faith and with due care in the process of
decision making will not be liable if the decision itself was not one that would have
been made by the ordinary prudent person.318 The plaintiff who alleges that a director
315 Developing the Framework par 3.65. Directors do not have to treat all shareholders equally, but
they are not allowed to discriminate unreasonably between shareholders.
316 Developing the Framework pars 3.66–3.68.
317 Directors have to take a number of risks when managing a company. Some of these risks will not
pay off. There may be a danger that courts will apply hindsight in such cases, and reach unduly harsh
conclusions based on alleged lack of care and skill. This is the main argument in favour of a business
judgment rule or defence (the business judgment rule is a “safe harbour” for directors. Courts will not
interfere with business decisions taken by directors if they acted reasonably within their duties). United
Kingdom courts do, however, show a reluctance to enter into the merits of commercial decisions. The
government is therefore not in favour of a statutory business judgment rule (see par 3.69 of the 2005
White Paper). See ch 4 par 3.3 below where the business judgment rule as applied in Australia is
discussed.
318 See Aronson v. Lewis 473 A.2d 805 Supreme Court of Delaware, 1984 at 473, the business
judgment rule is defined in this case as “a presumption that in making a business decision the directors
of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company”. See Hippert “The Business Judgment Test” 18–20; Giraldo
The Business Judgment Rule on the business judgment rule. See also on the business judgment rule in
the South African context: Lombard “Importation of a Statutory Business Judgment Rule” 614;
McLennan “Duties of Care and Skill” 94; Havenga “The Business Judgment Rule” 25–37. Lombard
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failed to comply with this duty of care and skill would have to rebut the presumption
of the business judgment rule and prove that the director did not comply with these
criteria. The business judgment rule can have the effect of courts applying hindsight
with unduly harsh consequences for directors. Courts are therefore usually reluctant
to enter into the merits of commercial decisions taken by directors.319 The Steering
Group opposed a legislative business judgment rule in Developing the Framework.320
4.2.4.3 Completing the Structure
In Completing the Structure it was stated that only a small number of respondents
were opposed to a statutory statement of directors’ duties.321 The general view was
that such a statement of directors’ duties would address the need for clarity and
certainty on the duties of company management.322 A number of concerns were
raised in Developing the Framework regarding a statement of directors’ duties in
general, as well as the specific contents of such a statement. The concerns and
questions are considered in Completing the Structure. 323
The first concern is that of the relationship between a statutory statement and the
common law. This type of statement must be written in very general terms in order
argues against the rule. A statutory business judgment rule would offer limited protection. The
business judgment rule only protects directors from compensation liability not resulting from the
exercise of their powers for an improper purpose. There is also uncertainty as to the exact parameters
of the rule and its application. A statutory business judgment rule would also confuse two separate
duties, namely the duty of care and skill and a director’s fiduciary duty of good faith. The element of
the business judgment rule that presumes that a director acted with the necessary care and skill relates
to the duty of care and skill in terms of South African law. The other element that presumed that a
director acted in good faith without a personal interest, concerned the fiduciary duty of good faith. See
on the business judgment rule in the United Kingdom: Pasban “The Business Judgment Rule” 201.
This article deals with s 727 of the 1985 United Kingdom Companies Act. This section deals with the
exercise of judicial discretion to protect directors. It is stated that the section allows for the
incorporation of something similar to the business judgment rule, as applied in the United States. See
also ss 170–181 of the 2006 Companies Act on directors’ duties and specifically s 173 on a director’s
duty to exercise an independent judgment. It states that directors should not subordinate their powers
to the will of others (see par 4.3.1 below on this duty).
319 Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821 (PC) at 835.
320 Developing the Framework pars 3.69–3.70.
321 The main concerns came from two bodies representing lawyers, who indicated that a legislative
statement is not achievable. See Completing the Structure par 3.6.
322 Completing the Structure par 3.3.
323 Completing the Structure par 3.12.
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for it to be capable of judicial development. The Steering Group believed that this is
achieved by the current draft of the statement of directors’ duties in Developing the
Framework.
Second, in Developing the Framework the Steering Group included a duty to act
honestly. This duty is now removed from the trial statement as people can interpret
the term “honest” in different ways. Such a duty can result in directors acting against
the benefit of the company as a whole.324
Third, a number of concerns were raised regarding the duty of loyalty in paragraph 1
of the trial statement, quoted on pages 99–100 above. First, the hierarchy of duties
listed in the trial statement caused some confusion.325 The Steering Group proposed
that the duty of directors to comply with the constitution and to use their powers for a
proper purpose should be overriding.326 Only when these duties are complied with are
directors bound to promote the success of the company for the benefit of the
members.327 Second, a director’s duty to act in good faith in the interests of the
company requires the director to consider the short- and the long-term consequences
of his acts. This does not mean that directors should give effect to the long-term
consequences if there are none, or if they, in good faith, regard them as immaterial.328
Third, “for that purpose”,329 in principle 2(c) of the trial statement in Developing the
Framework, was said to be unclear.
The drafters of Completing the Structure therefore suggested that paragraph 1 of the
trial statement be amended as follows in order to clarify the hierarchy of duties:
324 Completing the Structure pars 3.12–3.15.
325 Completing the Structure par 3.15.
326 Completing the Structure par 3.15.
327 See pars 1(a) and (b) of the trial draft statement in Developing the Framework par 3.40.
328 Completing the Structure par 3.18.
329 In other words, in determining in good faith what is judged to be most conducive to the overall
directors’ statutory objective of success for the benefit of the members.
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1. to obey the constitution and decisions of the company which bind
the director;
2. to promote what he calculates in good faith to be likely to promote
success for members’ benefit; and
3. as part of that process, to take account of the factors (after
identifying and assessing them in accordance with his duty of care and
skill) which he believes in good faith to be relevant for that purpose
including (where he believes them relevant) the matters listed in
paragraph 1c. 330
No major concerns were raised regarding principle 2 of the trial statement relating to
a director’s independence of judgement.331 Principle 3 concerns conflicts of interests
and raised a few concerns. The trial statement does not resolve the issues that may
arise if a person is a director of more than one company, with conflicting interests.
The effect of the provision is, however, that a director has to declare a material
interest in the case of a transaction where he can make a secret profit.332
4.2.4.4 The White Paper of 2005 and the Companies Bill
The White Paper of 2005 contains the government’s proposals regarding the
company law review recommendations. Directors’ duties are discussed in paragraph
3.3 of chapter 3 of the White Paper of 2005. The White Paper confirms that the
general duties of directors are currently found in case law, but that the Law
Commissions of 1998 and 1999 and the Steering Group333 proposed that there is a
need to make the law more accessible and certain. The government therefore agreed
that directors’ duties should be codified in a statutory statement.334 The intention was
that this statutory statement should be exhaustive and replace the existing common
law. The White Paper of 2005 recommended that the duties of directors would be
owed to the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.335 The statement of
330 Completing the Structure par 3.19.
331 Completing the Structure par 3.25.
332 Completing the Structure par 3.25. See par 3.1 above on “secret profits”.
333 See the Strategic Framework; Developing the Framework; Completing the Structure and the Final
Report discussed above.
334 The White Paper 2005 par 3.3.
335 The White Paper 2005 par 3.3.
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directors’ duties should be drafted in a way that reflects modern law needs and wider
expectations of responsible business behaviour.336
The Company Law Bill was introduced in the House of Lords on 1 November 2005
and was brought forward to the House of Commons on 24 May 2006. The Bill
completed the Commons Committee stage on 20 July 2006. Part 10337 of the
Companies Bill of 2006 deals with directors and replaces parts 9,338 10 and 25339 of
the Companies Act of 1985. Part 10 in the Companies Bill contains the new
exhaustive statutory statement that was proposed in respect of directors’ duties.340
The Steering Group opted for a codification of director’s duties, mainly to provide
clarity on what is expected of directors and to make the law more accessible.341
336 The White Paper of 2005 ch 3 par 3.3.
337 See clauses 154–246 of the Companies Bill. Chapter 1 of part 10 deals with the appointment and
removal of directors, chapter 2 deals with the duties of directors, chapter 3 deal with the declaration of
interest in existing transaction or arrangement, chapter 4 deals with transactions with directors
requiring approval of members, chapter 5 deals with service contracts of directors, chapter 6 with
contracts with a sole member who is a director, chapter 7 with directors’ liability, chapter 8 with the
director’s residential address, chapter 9 with supplementary provisions. See Harris “Company Law
Reform Bill” 95–96 on criticisms from the Law Society concerning the Company Law Reform Bill.
He refers to the codification of directors’ duties in part 10 of the Bill and that the codification should
clarify the duties that directors owe to a company. The Law Society supports the aim of clarification,
but feels that this aim has not been achieved. According to the Law Society the new duties of directors
will lead to greater uncertainty and increased costs.
338 Containing provisions relating to directors.
339 Dealing with confidentiality orders.
340 The statutory statement departs from the current law in two aspects. First, clause 176 provides that
transactions or arrangements with the company do not have to be authorised by either the shareholders
or by the board, but that these interests should be declared to the other directors. Secondly, dealings by
a director with third parties should be authorised by the board (the director whose own interests are
concerned should not participate in the authorisation).
341 See Explanatory Notes on the Company Law Reform Bill 190 available at
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmbills (accessed 28 August 2006) (hereafter the
Explanatory Notes on the Bill). These notes are, however, based on the Company Law Reform Bill of
24 May 2006 and not on the Companies Bill of 20 June 2006. See also Keay “Enlightened Shareholder
Value” where he discusses the enlightened shareholder value principles as applied by the Steering
Group in the White Paper and the Companies Bill. See further Arsalidou “Shareholder Primacy” 67–
69 arguing that the Bill, in clause 173, does not oblige directors to consider the interests of other
stakeholders, it is only a general obligation to consider the interests when and if the directors seem fit.
He furthermore states that the language of the Bill (especially clause 173) is vague and imprecise and
allows directors to pay lip service to the factors listed when managing a company.
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Part 10 of the Companies Bill regulates the appointment and removal of directors. All
companies are required to have directors.342 A private company should have at least
one director and a public company two.343 At least one director should be a natural
person.344 Chapter 2 concerns the general duties of directors.345 These duties are
owed by the directors, including de facto directors.346 These general duties set out
how directors should behave, but does not indicate in detail what they should do. As
stated before, these duties are currently derived from the common law and case law,
and are not regulated in legislation. It is stated that these duties should be applied in
the same way as common law rules. The courts should also interpret these duties in a
way that reflects the nature of the rules and the principles they replace.347 When
interpreting these duties, courts can refer to the common law.348
These statutory duties do not cover all the duties that a director owes to the
company.349 Some duties remain uncodified, such as the duty to consider the interests
of creditors in cases of possible insolvency.350 Many of the duties will overlap. For
example, the duty not to take a bribe from a third party, the duty not to accept
benefits from third parties351 and the duty to promote the success of the company for
342 A company is a legal person and cannot act on its own. Directors, as natural persons, act on behalf
of a company.
343 Clause 154 of the Companies Bill. See also ss 282, 292, 303 of the Companies Act of 1985.
344 Clause 155 of the Companies Bill. See clauses 156–170 regarding the remainder of clauses dealing,
inter alia, with the appointment of directors, the register of directors, particulars of directors and the
removal of directors. See also s 282 of the Companies Act of 1985.
345 Clauses 171–182 of the Companies Bill; pars 279–341 of the Explanatory Notes on the Bill.
Directors’ duties were not regulated in the 1985 Companies Act.
346 See clauses 250, 251 of the Companies Bill for the meaning of a director.
347 Clause 171 of the Companies Bill.
348 Clause 171(4) of the Companies Bill.
349 Many duties are contained elsewhere in the Bill, for example, the duty to deliver accounts and
reports to the registrar of companies (clause 452 of the Companies Bill). See the discussion in par
4.3.4 below on whether the code of directors’ duties is truly exhaustive.
350 See par 3.1.3 above.
351 Clause 177 of the Companies Bill.
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the benefit of the members352 clearly overlap. Companies may impose further duties
upon directors through their articles of association. The articles may not, however,
water down these statutory duties.353
Various duties have been codified.354 The first duty concerns the duty to act within
the powers conferred upon a director and for a proper purpose.355 The specific
circumstances will indicate what constitutes a proper purpose. It is also stated that a
director should comply with the constitution of a company.356 The second duty
provides that a director must promote the success of the company for the benefit of
the shareholders as a whole by having regard to certain factors listed.357 This duty is
in line with the enlightened shareholder value approach, as advocated by the
company law reform process and the White Paper of 2005. The factors to be
considered are listed in clause 173 of the Companies Bill, and include the interests of
company employees and the impact of the company’s operations on the community.
However, the list is not exhaustive.358 The third duty is to act with reasonable care,
skill and diligence. Traditionally, a greater degree of care and skill than may
reasonably be expected from a person with that director’s knowledge and experience
352 Clause 173 of the Companies Bill.
353 Clause 172 of the Companies Bill.
354 See the Explanatory Notes on the Bill.
355 See clause 172 of the Companies Bill. On the duty to act for a proper purpose, see Hely-Hutchinson
v Brayhead Ltd (1968) 1 QB 3 All ER 98 (Court of Appeal); Freeman and Lockyer v Buckhurst
Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA) stating that the validity of an act that is not in
accordance with the company’s constitution depends upon the rules of agency. If powers were
exercised for a variety of purposes, then the “substantial” or “dominant” purpose will be relevant:
Hindle v John Cotton Ltd (1919) 56 SLR 625 at 631. Also the Australian case of Whitehouse v Carlton
Hotel Pty Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 285 (HCA).
356 See clause 172 of the Companies Bill. Directors should not act for any collateral purposes: In Re
Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] 1 Ch 304 (CA) at 306. The powers given to the directors by the articles
must not be exercised for an improper purpose: Vatcher v Paull [1915] AC 372 at 378.
357 See clause 173 of the Companies Bill. See par 4.3.3 below on s 172(1) of the Companies Act of
2006. See Schall et al. “Promoting an Inclusive Approach” 326–327, where it is argued that clause 173
of the Companies Bill will put pressure on directors to follow an inclusive approach, keeping the
interests of stakeholders in mind when managing a company. But the issues of priority between
different stakeholders and the lack of direct enforcement will lead to uncertainty. For stakeholders’
interests to be recognised a shift in the mindset of directors will have to occur.
358 The Guidance of Key Clauses issued with the Bill makes this clear. See McKenzie-Skene
“Directors’ Duties to Creditors” 521. See also Keay “Enlightened Shareholder Value” and Dignam
“Lamenting Reform?” 292 on the approach followed in the Companies Bill.
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was not expected of directors (the subjective test).359 The provision, including an
objective and subjective element, now reads as follows:
A director owes a duty to his company to exercise the same standard of
care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably diligent
person with:
a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably
be expected of a person carrying out the same functions as the director in
relation to that company (an objective test); and
b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director
actually has (a subjective test).360
A director should, in terms of this provision, have acted with care and skill that a
reasonable person in the same position as the director, would have exercised.
Other duties of directors include the duty to exercise independent judgement,361 the
duty to avoid conflicts of interest,362 the duty not to accept benefits from third
parties363 and the duty to declare an interest in a proposed transaction or
arrangement.364
Before discussing the new codification of directors’ duties as regulated in the
Companies Act of 2006, it is important to consider the codification of directors’
duties generally and to decide whether such a codification should be partial or
exhaustive. This matter was considered by the Steering Group during the company
law reform process. The question was also raised by the Law Commission in 1999.365
In Developing the Framework, an exhaustive code is proposed. “Exhaustive” is
interpreted as not leaving room for judges to develop new principles concerning
359 See par 3.2 above on the duty of care and skill.
360 Clause 175 of the Companies Bill.
361 Clause 174 of the Companies Bill.
362 Clause 176 of the Companies Bill.
363 Clause 177 of the Companies Bill. See par 3.1 above on these duties in terms of the common law.
364 Clause 178 of the Companies Bill.
365 Law Commission 153, 105 Paper.
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directors’ duties.366 Provisions in other legislation will, however, still be applicable
and need not necessarily be entrenched in this statement. In Completing the Structure,
the point is made that this statement of directors’ duties should be exhaustive, thus
not open to courts to develop new principles, as opposed to developing the existing
principles.367 In the White Paper of 2005 it is held that “[i]t is important that the
statement of duties enables the law to respond to changing business circumstances
and needs. It will therefore leave scope for the courts to interpret and develop its
provisions in a way that reflects the nature and effect of the principles they reflect.”368
Against the background of these consultation papers it is clear that an exhaustive
code of directors’ duties is proposed. Courts should not be able to develop new
principles, but they should be able to refer to existing cases to interpret the duties of
directors.
4.2.5 Conclusions
In the above section the company law review process was discussed focusing on the
various consultation documents and the Companies Bill of 2006. Two issues were
focused on, namely (1) the protection afforded stakeholders and (2) the codification
of directors’ duties. It is clear that the consultation documents and the Bill favour the
enlightened shareholder value approach.369 Directors should manage a company in
the best interests of the shareholders collectively. They should, however, adopt an
inclusive approach by considering short- and long-term consequences, as well as the
interests of various other stakeholders when they manage a company. The
consultative documents and the Companies Bill state that directors’ duties should be
codified in an exhaustive code.370 This implies that courts cannot develop new
principles, but they can refer to previous cases to interpret the principles as contained
in the code. In the next section the Companies Act of 2006 is evaluated against the
background of the recommendations made by the Steering Group.
366 Explanatory Notes on the Act at pars 305; 326.
367 Completing the Structure par 3.31.
368 The White Paper of 2005 par 3.3.
369 Paragraph 4.2.3 above.
370 Paragraph 4.2.4.4 above.
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4.3 The Companies Act of 2006
4.3.1 Introduction
The Companies Act of 2006 received royal assent on 8 November 2006.371 Some of
the sections in the Act have already come into force, and the other provisions will
come into force during 2008 and 2009.372 All of the provisions should be effective by
October 2009. The Act with its 1 299 sections is the longest-ever Companies Act in
the United Kingdom.
One of the most important changes to the previous company legislation is the
statutory statement of directors’ duties. 373 The Act also contains a new procedure for
the enforcement of these duties.374 Sections 170–187 concern directors’ duties375 and
sections 260–264 deal with derivative actions.376 Section 172(1) is of specific
importance as it deals with the protection of stakeholders. In the next section of this
thesis, sections 171–177 dealing with the general duties of directors and sections
182–187 dealing with declarations of interests are discussed, followed by a detailed
evaluation of section 172(1).
4.3.2 Directors’ Duties in Terms of the 2006 Companies Act
Chapter 2 part 10 of the Companies Act regulates company directors. Sections 154–
156 deal with the requirement that each company should have directors. A private
371 See “Legislative Comments” in the Company Lawyer of (2007) 28 at 144–145 and 2007 (28) at 46.
See also Steinfeld et al. The Companies Act 2006 1–10 who provides an overview of the new
Companies Act.
372 See www.berr.org.uk for the commencement timetable.
373 Sections 170–174 and 178–179 dealing with general duties of directors came into force on
1 October 2007. But the duty to avoid conflicts of interest and not to accept benefits from third parties
(sections 175–177) will only be effective from 1 October 2008. Sections 182–187 on declarations of
interests will also come into force on 1 October 2008.
374 See Corporate Update: Special Client Briefing (November 2006) by the solicitors Clifford Chance
at p 2.
375 See Quiney Directors’ Duties par 6. Sections 171–177 concern general duties of directors.
Supplementary provisions are listed in ss 178–181 stating, for example, that a director can be in breach
of more than one duty at the same time, and sections 182–187 concern the declaration of interests in
existing transactions and arrangements.
376 See par 4.3.3.3 below on derivative actions. These sections came into force on 1 October 2007.
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company must have at least one director and a public company at least two.377 One of
the directors must be a natural person.378 If a company is in breach of these
requirements, the Secretary of State will make a declaration requiring the company to
make the necessary appointments.379 Sections 157–161 concern the appointment of
directors. The minimum age for appointment as a director is 16 years.380 This does
not affect the validity of an appointment that is not to take effect until the person
appointed attains that age. An appointment made in contravention of this section
(157) is void. However, the Secretary of State may make provision, by regulation, for
cases in which a person who has not attained the age of 16 may be appointed as a
director of a company.381 Acts of a person acting as a director are valid
notwithstanding that it was discovered afterwards that there was a defect in his
appointment, that he was disqualified, that he ceased to hold office or that he was not
entitled to vote on a specific matter.382 In terms of sections 162–167 every company
must keep a register of its directors containing the required particulars of a director.
The register must be available for inspection at the company’s registered office.383
The Companies Act of 2006 provides for a comprehensive code of directors’ duties.
Sections 171–177 set out their general duties. The scope of the general duties is listed
in section 170. It states that the duties specified in sections 171–177 are owed to the
company by the directors. The general duties are based on certain common law rules
and equitable principles. These duties should be interpreted and applied in the same
manner as common law rules and equitable principles.384
377 Section 154.
378 Section 155.
379 Section 156.
380 Section 157.
381 Section 160.
382 Section 161.
383 Section 162. Section 164 states which particulars of a director should be noted in the register.
Sections 154, 160 and 161 came into force on 1 October 2007. Section 155–159 will be effective from
1 October 2008 and sections 162–167 from 1 October 2009.
384 Section 170(4). See par 3.1 above for the duties as applied in terms of the previous 1985 Companies
Act. That Act did not have a statutory statement of directors’ duties.
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Section 171 concerns the duty to act within the powers conferred upon a director in
accordance with a company’s constitution and to do so for a proper purpose.385 It is
stated in the Explanatory Notes on the Companies Act of 2006 that what constitutes a
“proper purpose” must be ascertained in the context of the specific situation.386 The
“company’s constitution” is defined in section 17387 of the Act and includes decisions
taken in accordance with the company’s articles of association, and any resolutions
and agreements of the company.388 The effect of the reference in section 171 of the
new Act to the “company’s constitution” is that there are potential risks for the
unwary director who does not follow the progress of the decisions taken by the
members by resolution as such resolutions fall within the definition of “the
company’s constitution”, as defined in section 17.
Section 172 concerns the duty to promote the success of the company having regard
to a number of factors.389 These factors include that directors should have regard to
the likely consequence of any decision in the long-term; the interests of the
employees; the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers,
customers and others; the impact of the company’s operations on the community and
the environment; the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high
standards of business conduct; and the need to act fairly as between members of the
company.390 This duty is evaluated in detail below.
385 See par 3.1 above where the traditional duty to act with a proper purpose is discussed.
386 Paragraph 3.2.3 of the Explanatory Notes on the Act.
387 Section 17 does not fully come into force until 1 October 2008, but comes into force for the
purposes of section 171 of the Act with effect from 1 October 2007. See the Explanatory Notes on the
Act at pars 323–324.
388 In s 257 it is stated that any reference to the company’s constitution in this part of the Act, dealing
with directors’ duties, will include “[d]ecisions taken in accordance with the company’s articles; and
other decisions taken by the members (or a class of them) if they are virtue of any enactment or rule of
law as decisions of the company, decision taken by informal unanimous consent of all the members”.
This is in addition to the matters listed in section 17.
389 See par 3.1 above on the traditional position to act in the best interests of the company.
390 See s 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006. See Alcock et al. Companies Act 2006 144–146 on this
duty.
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Section 173 codifies the duty to exercise an independent judgement.391 This duty is
not infringed if the director acts in accordance with an agreement duly entered into by
the company that restricts the future exercise of discretion by its directors or in any
way authorised by the company’s constitution.392 Directors should not subordinate
their powers to the will of others by way of, for example, delegation.
It is likely that possible breaches of section 173 will simultaneously result in breaches
of section 172 (the duty to promote the success of the company) and section 175
(duty to avoid conflicts of interest)393 rather than establishing separate claims.
Section 174 deals with the duties of care, skill and diligence.394 It was discussed
above that the standard of care and skill that a director had to apply when managing a
company was traditionally quite low.395 The modern view is a stricter and more
focused approach, based not only on subjective standards, but also on objective
ones.396 The government specifically stated that the new law is modelled on section
214 of the Insolvency Act of 1986.397 When directors exercise their duty to promote
the success of the company in terms of section 172, they must bear their duties of
care and skill in mind. In other words, this duty of care and skill will be relevant
when directors act in terms of section 172. When directors determine which of the
factors listed in section 172 are relevant to a business decision and to what extent
they need to be taken into account, they should act with the necessary care and skill.
391 See par 3.1 above on this duty as interpreted in terms of the common law. On the new statutory
duty see Alcock et al. Companies Act 2006 146.
392 Section 173(2).
393 Which duty and section will only come into effect on 1 October 2008. See Quiney Directors’
Duties par 41, 42.
394 See par 3.2 above on case law dealing with the interpretation of this duty. On the statutory duty see
Alcock et al. Companies Act 2006 146–147.
395 See Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co [1925] 1 Ch 407 (CA) at 428–429. This case is discussed
above, see par 3.2.
396 See Re D’ Jan of London Ltd (1994) 1 BCLC 561 (CD) discussed at par 3.2 above.
397 See the Explanatory Notes on the Act at par 336. It was stated in Completing the Framework (par
3.12) that s 214 is a carefully balanced statutory provision applicable in wrongful trading situations
and should be used as a basis for the test applicable to determine whether a director breached his duty
of care, skill and diligence (see also the Strategic Framework par 5.48).
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If a director made the wrong decision as to what will promote the success of the
company the decision could be open to challenge if the directors fail either the
subjective or the objective test in section 174 of the Act.398
Section 175 provides for possible and actual conflicts of interest between a director
and the company. A director of a company must avoid a situation in which he has, or
can have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the
interests of the company.399 This includes conflicts that arise from the use or
disposition of company property, information or an opportunity for personal
interest.400 This duty does not apply to a conflict of interest arising in relation to a
transaction or arrangement with the company; this is covered in sections 177, 182–
187. This duty, in section 175, is not infringed if the situation cannot reasonably be
regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest or if the matter has been
authorised401 by the directors.402
At present conflicts of interests should be authorised by members of the company.
The Steering Group recommended that this requirement may “stifle entrepreneurial
activity”.403 It was recommended that in the case of a private company an
398 This was argued by David Cabrelli at a seminar presented at Thorntons Law LLP. See also Quiney
Directors’ Duties pars 43–46.
399 Section 175(1).
400 See s 175(2) stating on the duty to avoid conflicts of interest: “This applies in particular to the
exploitation of any property, information or opportunity (and it is immaterial whether the company
could take advantage of the property, information or opportunity).” See Alcock et al. Companies Act
2006 147–148 on this duty.
401 Authorisation may be given by the directors where the company is a private company and nothing
in the company’s constitution invalidates such authorisation, by the matter being proposed to, and
authorised by, the directors; or where the company is a public company and its constitution includes
provision enabling the directors to authorise the matter. The authorisation is effective only if any
requirement as to the quorum at the meeting at which the matter is considered is met without counting
the director in question or any other interested director, and the matter was agreed to without their
voting or would have been agreed to if their votes had not been counted (see s 175(4)–(6)).
402 Section 175(4).
403 The Explanatory Notes on the Act at par 342.
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independent director should be able to authorise possible conflicts, unless the
company’s constitution prevents such authorisation.404
Section 176 states that a director should not accept a benefit from a third party.405
This section codifies the rule prohibiting the exploitation of the position of director
for a personal benefit. For example, the duty prohibits the acceptance of bribes.
Conduct in breach of section 176 could simultaneously breach section 175 as the
expectance of a benefit may give rise to a potential conflict of interest. It is unclear
what is meant by “a benefit”. Companies might have to draft policies setting out
whether or not a benefit could be accepted.406
Section 177 provides that a director should declare an interest in a proposed
transaction or arrangement.407 If a director of a company is in any way, directly or
indirectly, interested in a proposed transaction or arrangement with the company, he
must declare the nature and extent of the interest to the other directors.408 The
declaration may be made at a meeting of directors or by notice to the directors. The
declaration must be made before the company enters into the transaction or
arrangement.409
Most of the duties mentioned above are similar to the traditional duties of directors,
discussed above.410 It was noted that section 170(4) provides that “regard shall be had
to the corresponding common law rules and equitable principles in interpreting and
404 The Explanatory Notes on the Act at par 344.
405 Alcock et al. Companies Act 2006 148–149 on this duty.
406 Burges Salmon Briefing (February 2007) on the New Companies Act 2006 at p 3.
407 Alcock et al. Companies Act 2006 149 on this duty.
408 Section 177(1).
409 Section 177(4).
410 See par 3.1 above on the traditional duties of directors.
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applying the general duties”.411 The common law principles can therefore be used
when interpreting directors’ statutory duties.
Sections 182–187 deal with declarations of interest in existing transactions or
arrangements. Where a director of a company is in any way, directly or indirectly,
interested in a transaction or arrangement that has been entered into by the company,
he must declare the nature and extent of the interest to the other directors in
accordance with this section.412 This section does not apply if, or to the extent that,
the interest has been declared under section 177, discussed above. The declaration
must be made at a meeting of the directors, or by notice in writing413 or by general
notice.414 If a declaration of interest under this section proves to be, or becomes,
inaccurate or incomplete, a further declaration must be made.415
4.3.3 Evaluation of Section 172
As stated before, the United Kingdom Companies Act 2006 provides for an
exhaustive statement of directors’ duties. Section 172 of the United Kingdom
Companies Act of 2006 provides as follows:
172 Duty to promote the success of the company
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good
faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the
benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst
other matters) to —
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,
(b) the interests of the company’s employees,
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers,
customers and others,
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the
environment,
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high
standards of business conduct, and
411 See Burges Salmon Briefing (February 2007) on the New Companies Act 2006 and what it means
for directors at p 2.
412 Section 182(1). A director who fails to make such declaration commits an offence, see s 183.
413 Section 184. Section 186 and 187 concerns declarations made by a company with a sole director
and by a shadow director.
414 Section 185.
415 Section 182(3).
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(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company.
(2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist of or
include purposes other than the benefit of its members, subsection (1) has
effect as if the reference to promoting the success of the company for the
benefit of its members were to achieving those purposes.
(3) The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any enactment
or rule of law requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or
act in the interests of creditors of the company.
4.3.3.1 Explanation of Section 172
It is stated in the Explanatory Notes on the Act that this section enshrines in statute
the enlightened shareholder value approach by stating that a director must promote
the success of the company with reference to a number of important factors. With
regard to subsection (1) it is explained that the list of factors is not exhaustive, but
highlights areas of particular importance, which reflect wider expectations of
responsible business behaviour, such as the interests of the company’s employees. In
having regard to the factors listed, the duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and
diligence (section 174) will apply as discussed above.416 Directors have to determine,
with the necessary care and skill, which factors are relevant at what stage of the
existence of a company. Subsections (2) and (3) are explained as follows in the
Explanatory Notes:
Subsection (2) addresses the question of altruistic, or partly altruistic,
companies. Examples of such companies include charitable companies
and community interest companies, but it is possible for any company to
have ‘unselfish’ objectives which prevail over the ‘selfish’ interests of
members. Where the purpose of the company is something other than the
benefit of its members, the directors must act in the way they consider, in
good faith, would be most likely to achieve that purpose. It is a matter for
the good faith judgment of the director as to what those purposes are, and,
where the company is partially for the benefit of its members and partly
for other purposes, the extent to which those other purposes apply in
place of the benefit of the members. Subsection (3) recognises that the
duty to promote the success of the company is displaced when the
company is insolvent. Section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides a
mechanism under which the liquidator can require the directors to
contribute towards the funds available to creditors in an insolvent
winding up, where they ought to have recognized that the company had
no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation and then failed
to take all reasonable steps to minimise the loss to creditors. It has been
suggested that the duty to promote the success of the company may also
be modified by an obligation to have regard to the interests of creditors as
416 Paragraph 4.3.2 above.
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the company nears insolvency. Subsection (3) will leave the law to
develop in this area.417
4.3.3.2 Shareholder Primacy Retained
In terms of this duty embedded in section 172, directors are primarily expected to act
in good faith to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as
a whole.418 In other words, shareholder primacy has been retained. However, the
directors may also have regard to other matters, including and primarily those listed
in section 172(1)(a)–(f). As was mentioned above, this list is not exhaustive.419 The
list provided in section 172(1) is probably the most comprehensive list of factors that
directors should consider when managing a company contained in any modern
company legislation. It is also, probably, the clearest recognition in modern company
legislation of the importance of interests apart from the interests of shareholders,
namely those of other stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, customers and
others.
4.3.3.3 The Practical Application of Section 172
The practical application of this section is, however, unclear. This uncertainty can be
explained as follows: firstly, directors are provided with an unfettered (or unlimited)
discretion in terms of this provision. They should manage a company in a way they
consider would promote the success of the company, for the benefit of its members.
But there are no objective criteria indicating how they should exercise this important
discretion. According to the Ministerial Statements of June 2007, there are two ways
of looking at the statutory statement of directors’ duties. On the one hand, it codifies
the existing common law obligations of company directors. On the other hand, it
417 See pars 325–322 of the Explanatory Notes on the Act. The Steering Group was against the
inclusion of creditors as beneficiaries of directors’ duties.
418 See Esser & Du Plessis “Stakeholder Protection” 353 and Richardson “The Companies Act of
2006” 138 on s 172(1). See further Wesley-Key “Companies Act 2006” 422–429 arguing that s 172(1)
does not provide stakeholders with sufficient protection. The duty to consider the interests of
stakeholders is still subjective. Miles “Company Stakeholders” 56–59 also argues that it is within the
discretion of the directors whether to consider other stakeholders or not. See also Attenborough
“Recent Developments in Australian Corporate Law” 312–323 stating that s 172(1) does not appear to
represent a great movement away from shareholder value (at 317). Section 172(1) places merely a
general obligation on directors to consider the interests of other stakeholders. Shareholders are still the
primary beneficiaries of directors’ duties.
419 See Nakajima “Enlightened Shareholder Value” 353–354 stating that the statement of directors’
duties is not an exhaustive list.
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marks a radical departure in “articulating the connection between what is good for a
company and what is good for society at large”.420
Secondly, it is stated that the new statutory statement of directors’ duties captures a
cultural change in the way in which companies conduct their business. The current
Minister of Justice states that she strongly believes that businesses will perform better
when they have regard to a wider group of interests in pursuing success. The new Act
is based on a new approach to pursuing the interests of shareholders and considering
the interests of stakeholders. These approaches are complementary approaches and
not contradicting ones. It therefore seems as if the Minister is arguing that there is a
new emphasis in company management, namely that directors should have regard to
the interests of different stakeholders. The Minister does not, however, provide any
guidelines on how directors should have regard to the interests of stakeholders. It is
stated in a “Corporate Update” by Ashurst 421 that section 172(1) will at least have the
effect of making directors think harder about their duties.
Thirdly, the list of issues directors need to have regard to is also not exhaustive. It is
specifically stated that directors need to consider these issues “amongst other
matters”. There is no indication of what these “other matters” entail. Fourthly, there
is no definition concerning “the success of the company”.422
Firthly, none of the stakeholders other than shareholders will have standing to compel
directors to take their interest into consideration, unless it can be established that the
interest of the company itself was contravened. This will have to be done by way of a
shareholder derivative action (in terms of the derivative action in sections 260–264 of
the United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006).423 Section 260 sets out the key aspects
420 See the introduction to the Ministerial Statements of June 2007.
421 See the “Corporate Update” of Ashurst of November 2006 on the Companies Act of 2006. This
document was provided to me by David Gabrelli of the University of Edinburgh.
422 Keay “Section 172(1)” 109.
423 This was one of the dilemmas employees faced under s 309 of the United Kingdom Companies Act
of 1985. See par 3.1.4 above where s 309 of the Companies Act of 1985 is discussed. See also Du
Plessis & Dine “The Fate of the Draft Fifth Directive” 23, 46; Davies Gower’s Principles of Modern
Company Law 68; Roach “The Paradox of the Traditional Justifications for Exclusive Shareholder
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of a derivative claim. There are three elements to a derivative action: (1) the action
must be brought by a member of the company; (2) the cause of action is vested in the
company; and (3) relief is sought on the company’s behalf. Section 260(3) provides
that a derivative claim “may be brought only in respect of a cause of action arising
from an actual or proposed act or omission involving negligence, default, breach of
duty or breach of trust by a director of the company”. A derivative claim may
therefore be brought in respect of an alleged breach of any of the general duties of
directors in chapter 2 of part 10, including the duty to exercise reasonable care, skill
and diligence.424
The extent of the protection afforded in section 172(1) is therefore uncertain. It would
seem that the only practical consequence of recognising these other interests in the
legislation is that the actions of directors would not be open for any challenge if they
have not only taken the interests of the company as a whole (defined as the collective
interest of the current and future shareholders) into consideration in making
decisions, but also other interests. Under the common law, other interests, such as
employees’ interests, were considered to be pertinent only when they coincided with
the company’s best interests.425
4.3.3.4 Conclusions on Section 172
The drafters can, however, be commended for clearly stating which approach they
prefer regarding the stakeholder debate. The Act seems to provide a theoretical
answer to the stakeholder debate, but its practical application is far from clear. It may
well be that over time guidelines on its practical application may be provided in
codes of best practice. The business review is another method of ensuring that
directors comply with their duties. Sections 415–419 of the Companies Act concern
the directors’ report. Section 417 provides what must be contained in the business
review element of the directors’ report. All companies, other than small companies,
Governance Protection” 12, 15. It has been said that one effect of s 309 was to dilute directors’
accountability to shareholders rather than to strengthen their accountability to employees.
424 Section 174, discussed above. See also Paragraph 494 of the Explanatory Notes on the Act.
425 Hampson v Price’s Patent Candle Co (1876) 45 L.J Ch 437; Hutton v West Cork Railway Co
(1883) 23 ChD 654 (CA); and see also Klein & Du Plessis “Corporate Donations” 69; 70; 81–82; 97.
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will need to produce a business review, as required by the European Union Accounts
Modernisation Directive.426 The purpose of the review is to inform members of the
company and to help them assess how directors performed their duties under section
172.427
The Act clearly refers to the interests of other stakeholders and to the fact that
directors should have regard to the interests of other stakeholders when promoting the
success of the company for the benefit of its members.428 Thus the Act is very clear
on the preferred approach to stakeholders protection. Shareholders should still be
seen as the primary beneficiaries of company’s management in comparison to other
stakeholders. But directors have a discretion in this regard. Directors should only
consider the interests of these stakeholders when it would be in the interests of the
shareholders collectively to do so.
4.3.4 Codification of Directors’ Duties: Exhaustive or Partial?
The Steering Group’s suggestion that the codification of directors’ duties should be
exhaustive was followed in the Companies Act. It is specifically stated in section
171(3) and (4) that: “(3) The general duties are based on certain common law rules
and equitable principles as they apply in relation to directors and have effect in place
of those rules and principles as regards the duties owed to a company by a director.
(4) The general duties shall be interpreted and applied in the same way as common
law rules or equitable principles, and regard shall be had to the corresponding
common law rules and equitable principles in interpreting and applying the general
duties.” This makes the well-established law in this area more accessible and brings it
into conformity with modern business practice.
It is clear from the consultation documents of the Steering Group and the Explanatory
Notes issued with the Companies Act that the statement of directors’ duties is
intended to be exhaustive.429 It seems, however, that the new codification does not
426 2003/51/EEC.
427 Paragraph 670 of the Explanatory Notes on the Act.
428 Section 172(1) of the Companies Act of 2006.
429 Paragraph 305 of the Explanatory Notes on the Act.
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offer a complete codification of the existing law. 430 First, the misapplication of assets
by directors is, for example, not included in the code. The duty to consider the
interests of creditors, as formulated in the case law, is also not included in the
code.431 It was argued above that a codification of directors’ duties makes the law
more certain, but is not necessarily flexible enough. It has, however, been submitted
that courts can still refer to existing case law when they interpret the principles
contained in a code of directors’ duties.432 Such a code should also be drafted as
comprehensivly as possible and attempt to include all the duties of directors.433
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter the position in the United Kingdom was considered with reference to
two issues, namely the protection of stakeholders and the codification of directors’
duties.
Various corporate governance codes, the consultation documents of the company law
reform committees, the Companies Bill of 2006 and the Companies Act of 2006 were
considered.434
It was stated that the objectives of the codes of best practices were not to prescribe
any specific corporate behaviour in detail. The codes are rather intended to be self-
430 It is clearly stated that a duty to creditors is not included and that judges can refer to case law in
order to interpret the duties.
431 See par 3.1.3 above, where it is stated that the government decided not to include creditors in s
172(1) of the new Act. See also par 3.1.3 above for the relevant case law addressing the interests of
creditors.
432 Paragraph 305 of the Explanatory Notes on the Act.
433 See, for example, the situation in Australia. There has been no recent reported case law on common
law duties in Australia. All of the cases were based on statutory provisions in the Act. Du Plessis et al.
Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 259 therefore argue that the statutory duties are far
more important than the duties at common law or in equity.
434 Paragraph 4 above.
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regulatory in nature.435 On the protection of stakeholders it was argued that the
corporate governance codes, especially the Hampel Report, are in favour of directors
managing a company in the best interests of the shareholders collectively with
reference to the interests of other stakeholders.436 The Cadbury and Greenbury
Reports did not specifically deal with the issues of stakeholder protection and in
whose interests directors should manage a company. The committees did, however,
equate a company’s interests with those of its shareholders and they based their
recommendations on this viewpoint. 437
The various consultation documents issued by the Steering Group were considered,
their viewpoints on stakeholder protection and the codification of directors’ duties
were focused on.438 First with regard to the protection of stakeholders: the Steering
Group distinguished between the enlightened shareholder value and pluralist
approaches, and followed the enlightened shareholder value approach.439 The
Companies Act of 2006, following the recommendations of the Steering Group,
prefers the enlightened shareholder value approach and states this in clear terms. It
was argued that it is unclear how this provision will operate in practice.440 It would
seem that the Act only provides a theoretical answer to the stakeholder debate, but its
practical application is far from clear. It was indicated that the only practical
consequence of recognising the interests of stakeholders in the Companies Act of
2006 is that the actions of directors would not be open for any challenge if they have
not only taken the interests of the company as a whole (defined as the collective
435 Paragraph 4.1.1 above.
436 Paragraph 4.1.2 above.
437 Paragraph 4.1.2 above.
438 Paragraph 4.2.3ff above.
439 These approaches are also discussed in ch 2 par 5.1 above. It was, furthermore, argued that it may
seem as if these two approaches are the only relevant approaches on the nature of companies, but it is
submitted that the Steering Group referred to these two approaches to emphasise two possibilities
when considering the interests of stakeholders, namely shareholder primacy or the protection of
different stakeholders (see par 4.2.3 above).
440 The South African Companies Bill is unclear on the preferred approach. This is discussed in ch 6
below. In view of this, a proposed combined theory is recommended (see ch 2 par 5.2 above).
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interest of the current and future shareholders) into consideration in making
decisions, but also other interests.441
As regards the codification of directors’ duties, it was stated that the Companies Act
of 2006 contains an exhaustive code of directors’ duties. This was also recommended
by the Steering Group during the company law review process.442 Courts can still
refer to existing case law when developing directors’ duties. A statement of directors’
duties relates to the contents of directors’ duties. Self-regulatory codes of best
practice are still relevant; especially concerning guidelines as to how directors should
interpret their duties as entrenched in a comprehensive code.443
441 Paragraph 4.3.3. above.
442 Paragraph 4.3.4 above.
443 Paragraph 4.3.4 above.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Financial failures in Australia1 led to corporate governance review initiatives using
binding and non-binding rules, international recommendations, industry standards2
and the formation of various committees and commissions.3 Australian corporate law
is of comparative value when considering South African company law, because it is
also based on the English common law.4 The recent review of Australian corporate
1 Such as OneTel (a telecommunications company) and HIH (a general insurance company). See
generally, Von Nessen “Corporate Governance in Australia” 197.
2 For instance, the Corporate Law Economic Reform Programme, especially the Corporate Law
Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure Act 103 of 2004) (hereafter
CLERP 9) amendments to, inter alia, the Corporations Act 50 of 2001 (hereafter the Corporations Act
2001), which deals with corporate governance reforms, including mandatory rules dealing with auditor
independence, financial reporting and shareholder participation and the Australian Stock Exchange
(ASX) Corporate Governance Council’s Principles of Good Governance and Best Practice
Recommendations (March 2003 and August 2007) (hereafter ASX’s Best Practice Principles and
Recommendations). These initiatives are discussed in detail below. See also, generally, Grantham
“Corporate Governance Codes” 218.
3 For instance, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC); the report by Professor
Ramsay on Audit Independence in October 2001 (hereafter the Ramsay Report). See Von Nessen
“Corporate Governance in Australia” 198 on this report. See also Du Plessis et al. Principles of
Contemporary Corporate Governance 156 in this regard. The Report on Corporate Responsibility:
Managing Risk and Creating Value by the Parliamentary Joint Committee and Corporations and
Financial Services (June 2006) (hereafter the Corporate Responsibility Report of June 2006); the
Social Responsibility of Corporations Report (December 2006) issued by the Corporations and
markets Advisory Committee (hereafter the Social Responsibility Report of December 2006) and the
HIH Royal Commission’s Report on the Failure of HIH Insurance (2003) (hereafter the HIH Report)
are also relevant.
4 See Cassidy Corporations Law 1ff on the historical development of corporations law as well as
specific developments in Australia.
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law is, furthermore, of value, especially concerning the regulation of corporate
governance issues and the protection of stakeholders’ interests.5
This chapter discusses the position in Australia. First, a brief background on
Australian corporate law is provided. This is followed by a discussion on the
statutory and general duties of directors in Australia. It is important to understand
these duties in order to answer the question most important to this thesis: whose
interests should receive primacy in the management of a company or corporation?
Recent corporate governance initiatives such as the Corporate Responsibility Report
of June 2006 and ASX’s Best Practice Principles and Recommendations are then
discussed, focusing on the views of the drafters concerning stakeholder protection.
2 BACKGROUND
Most Australian states independently enacted corporation legislation based on the
English model, with certain modifications.6 Differences in the states’ corporation
legislation made it difficult for corporations to operate in more than one jurisdiction.
Uniform legislation across the states was introduced in 1961 and 1962 by way of
Uniform Companies Acts (based on the English Victorian model).7 These Acts were,
however, not uniform, and with the passing of time and amendments to different state
legislation, the variations increased. In 1974 the non-labour states8 established an
Interstate Corporate Affairs Commission to provide a uniform system of corporate
regulation. The commission did perform good work, but as it was confined to specific
5 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 129, 146; Du Plessis “Enkele
Internasionale Maatskappyregtelike Ontwikkelings” 562.
6
“No liability” companies for mining projects were introduced (see the Mining Companies Act 1871
(Vic)). It also distinguished between public and proprietary companies, and required public companies
to comply with compulsory audit requirements.
7 Cassidy Corporations Law 5.
8 These sates were New South Wales, Queensland and later, after a change of government, Western
Australia. These states did not want to relinquish their powers over corporate affairs to the federal
government.
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states, the differences stemming from disparate corporations legislation continued. In
1978 the incoming liberal government addressed this problem and negotiated an
agreement with the states for a uniform companies code. The result was that in 1981
a Companies Code was enacted and adopted by each state under the Companies Act
of 1981,9 and in 1989 the Corporations Act was promulgated.10 In the decision of
NSW v Commonwealth11 the High Court held that the Companies Act of 1989
exceeded the federal government’s legislative powers because the Commonwealth
Parliament lacked legislative powers to create a regime for incorporating
companies.12 The states then reached an agreement at Alice Springs,13 which allowed
Australian company and securities law to be federalised with the compliance of the
states.14
The complexity of the Corporations Law led to an extensive period of legislative
activity, which resulted in the Corporations Act of 2001.15
In the late 1990s the implementation of sound practices was not first on the corporate
law agenda of Australia, but was rather considered as an unnecessary burden on
9 Company law issues were therefore founded in the different states or territories. Although the
Companies Code of 1981 was the basis for the company law of each state, there were differences
between the laws of the different states. The Corporate Affairs Commission of each state was
responsible for its administration. See generally, Du Plessis “Enkele Internasionale
Maatskappyregtelike Ontwikkelings” 565; Cassidy Corporations Law 5.
10 The Australian Securities Act of 1989 and the Close Corporations Act of 1989 were also passed.
These Acts were known as the Corporations Law. The Corporations Act introduced a national body,
the Australian Securities Commission and a new business form similar to the limited partnership. The
Act was amended by the Corporations Legislation Amendment Act 110 of 1990. See Du Plessis
“Enkele Internasionale Maatskappyregtelike Ontwikkelings” 566; Henning & Wandrag “Oorsig van
die Herkoms van die Private Maatskappy” 38; Cassidy Corporations Law 6.
11 (1990) 8 ACLC 120.
12 Cassidy Corporations Law 6.
13 With effect from 1 January 1991. Company law is now being administered through the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC).
14 Blackmore “Regulating Regime” 43–45. See also Baxt et al. Corporations ch 3; Cassidy
Corporations Law 1 ff; Redmond Companies and Securities Law 47ff on the development of company
law regulation in Australia and Austin et al. Company Directors ch 1 on corporate governance reports
and principles. See also Luiz The South African Securities Regulation Code 235–246 for a concise
historical overview of the development of Australian company legislation.
15 Blackmore “Regulating Regime” 44.
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businesses. Strict corporate governance rules were blamed for the under-performance
of companies.16 In 1990 a Working Group was established by several leading players
in the financial sector17 and chaired by Henry Bosch.18 The abuses in the 1980s
contributed to the establishment of this working group. It was not a specific scandal,
such as Maxwell in the United Kingdom,19 which triggered the establishment of the
working group, but rather a general move to “improve the performance and
reputation of Australian businesses”.20 Three Bosch Reports were issued, the original
one in 1991,21 and two reports in 199322 and 1995 that reviewed the 1991 report.23
The Bosch Reports dealt with corporate governance issues and specifically with
directors’ duties and responsibilities. The reports were designed as a guide for
directors, auditors and accountants and related to accepted principles of corporate
governance. In 1993 the Hilmer Report was released.24 This report deals with the
16 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 90.
17 These leading players included the Australian Merchant Bankers Association, the Australian Stock
Exchange Ltd, the Australian Institute of Company Directors and the Securities Institute of Australia.
See Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 91.
18 Former chairperson of the National Companies and Securities Commission. See Du Plessis et al.
Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 91. It is interesting to note that recent Australian
textbooks give little attention to the Bosch and Hilmer Reports. There is nothing, for example, on these
reports in Cassidy Corporations Law or Tomasic et al. Corporations Law.
19 See ch 3 par 4.1.1 on the Maxwell scandal.
20 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 92.
21 Business Council of Australia, Corporate Practices and Conduct, Melbourne, Information Australia
(1991). The main aim of this report was “to improve the performance and reputation of Australian
business by encouraging and assisting the general adoption of higher standards of corporate conduct”
(see the foreword). This report introduced several principles of good governance, for example that
guidelines should be provided to assist directors in carrying out their duties and responsibilities. See,
generally, Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 91; Austin et al.
Company Directors 1.11 on the Bosch Report.
22 Business Council of Australia, Corporate Practices and Conduct, Melbourne, Information Australia
(1993). There are only a few differences between the 1991 report and this one, for instance the fact
that the functions of the board are explained in much more detail in the 1993 report. See also Du
Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 92.
23 Business Council of Australia, Corporate Practices and Conduct, Melbourne, Information Australia
(1995). This report added little substance to the 1991 and 1993 reports: see Du Plessis et al. Principles
of Contemporary Corporate Governance 93–96.
24 In AWA Ltd v Daniels (t/a Deloitte Haskins & Sells) (1992) 10 ACLC 933 Rogers CJ had to
consider various issues on the duties of directors. He approached the Sydney Institute to facilitate
discussions on corporate governance. The result was the Hilmer Report: Strictly Boardroom:
131
following three questions: (1) what is the principle contemporary concern about the
roles of the board, directors, management and auditors? (2) What are the key
functions of a board that require greater emphasis if this concern is to be addressed?
(3) What is the responsibility of directors or other parties involved in corporate
governance and what changes are needed in board composition and processes? In
1998 a second Hilmer Report was published.25
In the early 2000s the corporate governance debate was reopened.26 The Corporate
Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) was established to perform ongoing
reviews on issues such as corporate governance. Many mechanisms27 were
implemented to restore good governance, with CLERP 9 as the best example. CLERP
9 contains the bulk of corporate governance law reforms in Australia.28
A number of recent corporate governance initiatives in Australia are discussed below.
This thesis focuses on ASX’s Best Practice Principles and Recommendations,
CLERP,29 the Corporate Responsibility Report of June 2006 and the Social
Responsibility Report of December 2006.
Improving Governance to Enhance Company Performance. See Du Plessis et al. Principles of
Contemporary Corporate Governance 97.
25 Under the same title. There were no major changes to the 1993 report. See Du Plessis et al.
Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 100.
26 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 90.
27 Such as codes of good practice, continuous disclosure and the recognition of independent directors.
28 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 111. CLERP 9 did not deal
with directors’ duties and in whose interests directors should manage a company. The CLERP 9 Act
deals with, inter alia, financial reporting, audit reform, proportionate liability and the remuneration of
executive directors.
29 The discussion below focuses on Paper 3 of CLERP, dealing with directors’ duties.
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3 DIRECTORS’ DUTIES
3.1 General Law Duties versus Statutory Duties
In order to discuss stakeholder protection in Australia, it is necessary to consider
directors’ duties in terms of the law in this jurisdiction.
Directors’ duties are classified as duties in terms of the general law as well as
statutory duties. Duties in terms of the general law include duties that can arise by
way of a contract, principles of equity or the common law.30 Directors’ duties are also
entrenched in legislation. The Corporations Act of 2001 provides a partial
codification of directors’ duties. The common law is therefore still applicable.31 The
statutory duties are regarded as more relevant than the general law duties.32 As is the
case in South Africa, directors’ duties in terms of Australian law are divided into two
main categories. The first category concerns the fiduciary duties of loyalty and good
faith, and the second one concerns the duty to act with care and diligence.
Equity principles require a high standard of loyalty from directors. The standard of
loyalty is reflected in a number of positive and negative duties. The positive duties of
loyalty include the duty to act bona fide and in the best interests of the company.33 It
30 See Austin et al. Company Directors 243; Farrar Corporate Governance 100–101; Cassidy
Corporations Law 200 ff. A duty owed to a company by an executive director employed under a
contract of service with the company will arise from an express term in the contract or from an implied
term. These general law duties may be supplemented by statutory duties.
31 Sections 179(1) and 185 of the Corporations Act of 2001 make it clear that the statutory duties in the
Act do not exclude the operation of other laws, including the general law.
32 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 258–260 do not even discuss
the general law duties in detail. They argue that directors’ duties are covered comprehensively and
clearly in the statutory provisions. It is therefore unnecessary to rely on case law although the
legislation did not intend to codify directors’ duties at common law or in equity. Statutory duties form
the basis of most litigation on directors’ duties in Australia. This issue is dealt with in this discussion
on the codification of directors’ duties and whether or not there is a significant difference between a
partial and comprehensive codification. See ch 5 par 3.1.2.2, where this is discussed in the context of
Botswana and New Zealand’s company law. See further ch 6 par 5 on the position in South Africa.
33 This duty is of paramount importance for purposes of this thesis and is discussed in par 3.2.1 below.
See Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150 (HC) concerning the scope of the duty to act in good faith. The
question of how directors are required to take the interests of the company into account rather then
their own interests was discussed. It was held that directors are usually also shareholders in the
company of which they are directors. Therefore, in promoting the interests of the company, a director
will also promote his own interest. It would be ignoring realities and creating impossibilities in the
administration of companies to require that directors should not advert to, or consider, in any way, the
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also includes acting with a proper purpose and unfettered discretion. These positive
duties are general law duties, but they are also reinforced in the Corporations Act of
2001.34 The negative duties concern those duties requiring directors to avoid conflicts
of interest. There are also provisions in the Corporations Act of 2001 dealing with
conflicts of interest. 35
The enforcement of directors’ statutory duties is very important. A breach of these
duties gives rise to remedies available to the company in terms of the general law.
These remedies include that the company can claim back any profits made by
directors as a result of their breach of duty or it can compel directors to rectify their
actions in breach of their duties.36 Directors could be in breach of one of their
fiduciary duties even if they acted without fault.
The Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) can also enforce civil
penalty provisions. The most important duties of directors are listed as civil penalty
provisions. If a breach of any of these provisions is proved, the court will make a
declaration of contravention.37 The ASIC38 can then seek a disqualification order, a
effect of a specific transaction on their own interests as shareholders. See also Farrar Corporate
Governance 104; Baxt et al. Corporations 339–342.
34 Section 181 of the Corporations Act 2001; Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate
Governance 258–260; Farrar Corporate Governance 107. See also the English decision of Howard
Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821 (PC) regarding a “proper purpose”. This case
concerned the issue of shares and it was stated that the absence of any self-interest is not enough to
make an issue valid. See Baxt et al. Corporations 371–378 on this case. See also Klein & Du Plessis
“Corporate Donations” 69 on the duty to act with a proper purpose.
35 Section 182, 183 of the Corporations Act 2001.
36 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 259.
37 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 261.
38 ASIC is a statutory body corporate, consisting of between three and eight members appointed by the
Governor-General and nominated by the Commonwealth Attorney-General. Its objects are listed in s 1
of the ASIC Act 51 of 2001 and include:
[T]o provide for the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC )
which will administer such laws of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory as
confer functions and powers under those laws on ASIC; and to provide for ASIC's
functions, powers and business; and to establish a Corporations and Markets
Advisory Committee to provide informed and expert advice to the Minister about
the content, operation and administration of the corporations legislation (other than
the excluded provisions), about corporations and about financial products and
financial markets; and to establish a Takeovers Panel, a Companies Auditors and
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pecuniary penalty order or a compensation order.39 In certain circumstances criminal
liability will be incurred.40 The main aim of the civil penalty provisions is to highlight
the core provisions concerning directors’ duties and to serve as a warning tool.41
The duty to act in good faith in the best interests of the company and for a proper
purpose, as well as the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, are civil penalty provisions
in terms of the Corporations Act of 2001. The non-fiduciary duty of care and
diligence is a general law duty, but is also entrenched in legislation.42 The duty of
care and diligence is also a civil penalty provision. There are no criminal penalties for
a contravention of this duty.43
Other civil penalty provisions relating to directors’ duties in the Corporations Act of
2001 include the duty not to use information to gain personally or cause detriment to
the corporation,44 the duty concerning related party transactions,45 the duty relating to
share capital transactions,46 duties imposed by financial reporting,47 the duty to
Liquidators Disciplinary Board, a Financial Reporting Council, an Australian
Accounting Standards Board, an Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, a
Financial Reporting Panel and a Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and
Financial Services.
See Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 138; Du Plessis
“Reverberations After the HIH” 225–245 on ASIC.
39 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 261; Austin et al. Company
Directors at par 9.29 and ch 18.
40 Austin et al. Company Directors 232; Cassidy Corporations Law 229 ff; Redmond Companies and
Securities Law 377 ff.
41 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 262.
42 Section 180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001; Austin et al. Company Directors 229; Permanent
Building Society (in liq) v McGee (1993) 11 ACSR 260 at 287. In the Permanent decision it was held
that the duty of care and skill should not be equated with or “termed” a “fiduciary duty”. It is a duty in
law and equity.
43 Austin et al. Company Directors 231; Ford et al. Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law par 8.305;
Cassidy Corporations Law 210 ff.
44 Sections 182 and 183 of the Corporations Act 2001.
45 Part 2E and ss 208–229 of the Corporations Act 2001.
46 Part 2H and ss 256B, 259A, 259B, 1317(1)(c) of the Corporations Act 2001.
47 Parts 2M.2, 2M.3 of the Corporations Act 2001.
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prevent insolvent trading,48 duties concerning managed investment schemes,49 the
duty to disclose certain information on a continuous basis,50 the duty not to be
involved in market misconduct51 and the duty relating to disclosure for proposed
demutualisation.52
Directors’ duties are discussed in more detail below with particular emphasis on the
duty to act in good faith in the best interests of the company.
48 Part 5.7B and s 588G of the Corporations Act 2001.
49 Part 5C of the Corporations Act 2001. A managed investment scheme is:
(a) a scheme that has the following features:
(i) people contribute money or money’s worth as consideration to acquire rights
(interests) to benefits produced by the scheme (whether the rights are actual,
prospective or contingent and whether they are enforceable or not);
(ii) any of the contributions are to be pooled, or used in a common enterprise, to
produce financial benefits, or benefits consisting of rights or interests in property,
for the people (the members) who hold interests in the scheme (whether as
contributors to the scheme or as people who have acquired interests from holders);
(iii) the members do not have day-to-day control over the operation of the scheme
(whether or not they have the right to be consulted or to give directions); or
(b) a time-sharing scheme;
but does not include the following:
(c) a partnership that has more than 20 members but does not need to be
incorporated or formed under an Australian law because of regulations made for the
purposes of subsection 115(2);
(d) a body corporate (other than a body corporate that operates as a time sharing
scheme);
(e) a scheme in which all the members are bodies corporate that are related to each
other and to the body corporate that promotes the scheme;
(f) a franchise;
(g) a statutory fund maintained under the Life Insurance Act 1995 ;
(h) a regulated superannuation fund, an approved deposit fund, a pooled
superannuation trust, or a public sector superannuation scheme, within the meaning
of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 ;
(i) a scheme operated by an Australian ADI in the ordinary course of its banking
business.
50 Part 6CA of the Corporations Act 2001.
51 Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act 2001. Market misconduct includes market manipulation and false
trading and market rigging (to create a false or misleading appearance of active trading).
52 Subsection 29(6) of Schedule 4 in the Corporations Act 2001. Some of these duties are discussed in
more detail below when discussing specific duties of directors.
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3.2 The Fiduciary Duty of Good Faith
Fiduciary relationships exist between persons who stand in a position of trust and
power over another and the law requires the former to act in the latter’s best interests.
The fiduciary duties of a director, in terms of Australian corporations law, include the
duty to act in good faith in the best interests of the corporation, not to fetter
discretions, to exercise his powers for a proper purpose and to avoid conflicts of
interest.53 Most of these general duties have also been embedded in legislation. This
is discussed below.
The first fiduciary duty of directors is the duty to act in good faith in the best interests
of the company. As stated above, the duty to act in good faith in the best interests of
the company is a general law duty. This duty has been affirmed in legislation. Section
181(1) states that directors should act in good faith and in the best interests of the
company for a proper purpose.54
Fiduciaries are generally subject to higher standards of behaviour than parties
involved in arm’s length transactions. It is, however, important to know to whom
directors owe these duties. In paragraph 3.2.1 below the general Australian
interpretation given to the “best interests of the company” is considered.
Directors should also exercise the powers vested in them for a proper purpose.
Directors powers must be exercised for the purpose for which they were conferred
and in a manner that promotes the interests of the shareholders as a whole.55 The bulk
53 Cassidy Corporations Law 200–201.
54 The second part of s 181(1), namely “for a proper purpose” is discussed below. Although s 181(1)
refers to directors acting in good faith and for a proper purpose, these are two separate duties imposed
on directors. This is also clear from ss 184(1) and 187 of the Corporations Act 2001 which treat them
as two separate duties. See, generally, Austin et al. Company Directors 266, 271; Ford et al. Ford’s
Principles of Corporations Law par 8.065; Baxt et al. Corporations 337–361. See, for instance, Mills v
Mills at 162–163 concerning the duty of directors to act in good faith, especially when the directors are
also shareholders (see further Baxt et al. Corporations 339–342 on this case); Hospital Products Ltd v
Unites States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41 (HC) at 69 and News Ltd v Australian Rugby
League Ltd (1996) 21 ACSR 635 stating, inter alia, that directors have certain legal discretions and
they should use those discretions honestly.
55 Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance v Ure (1923) 33 CLR 199 at 217; Mills v Mills (1938) 60
CLR 150 at 169; Cassidy Corporation Law 212.
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of cases where it had to be decided whether a director had used his powers for a
proper purpose or not were either in the context of a takeover or where there was a
contest for corporate control, usually associated with the issue or failure to issue
shares.56 This is a general law duty, but it has also been entrenched in Australian
legislation.57 As was stated above, although section 181(1) refers to directors acting
in good faith and for a proper purpose, this amounts to two separate duties. The
“proper purpose” duty applies to officers of organisations generally. The principles
applicable when directors act for an improper purpose are provided in the decision of
Permanent Building Society (in liq) v Wheeler.58 In this case the court found that
there was a strong inference that at least some of the directors entered the company
into a sale agreement for an improper purpose, namely to persuade a prospective
bidder to proceed with the purchase of a related company. The directors therefore
used their positions as directors to gain advantages that would cause harm to the
company. These principles, applicable when determining whether a director is acting
for an improper purpose, include that fiduciary powers granted to directors should be
exercised for the purpose for which they were given. It must be shown that the
substantial purpose of the directors were improper or collateral to their duties as
directors. The issue is therefore not whether their business decisions were good or
bad, but rather whether the directors had acted in terms of their fiduciary duties.
Honest behaviour does not prevent a finding of improper conduct.59 The court must
determine whether, but for the improper purpose, the directors would have performed
the acts in dispute.60 The onus of showing that a director acted for an improper
56 Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel Pty Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 285 (HCA); Darvall v North Sydney Brick and
Tile Co (1988) 6 ACLC 154.
57 Section 181(1) of the Corporations Act 2001. See, generally, Austin et al. Company Directors 288–
289; Baxt et al. Corporations 365–383.
58 (1994) 14 ACSR 109 at 137. The claim on the ground of a breach of duty based on improper
purpose failed. The breach in this case was, as claimed in the alternative, for the duty to act with
reasonable care, skill and diligence. See Baxt et al. Corporations 447; Redmond Companies and
Securities Law 392–401.
59 Emlen Pty Ltd v St Barbara Mines Ltd (1997) 24 ACSR 303 at 306. However, in Darvall v North
Sydney Brick and Tile Co 154 the court suggested that the validity of an exercise of power depends on
whether the directors where doing what they honestly believed to be in the best interests of the
company.
60 Austin et al. Company Directors 289; Cassidy Corporations Law 212ff. In the English case of
Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821 (PC) it was held that it is the “substantial
purpose” for which the power is exercised that must be analysed to determine whether the power was
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purpose rests on the person asserting the misuse.61 In determining whether a director
acted for an improper purpose, the court will first ascertain, as a matter of law, the
purposes for which the power may, and may not, be exercised and then determine, as
a matter of fact, the purpose for which the power was exercised.62
Directors are, furthermore, bound to act for the company and their decision making
authority cannot be limited to provide for another’s interest. 63 Directors cannot agree
to exercise their discretion in a particular manner64 or act blindly at the discretion of
others.65
Directors are also subject to the fiduciary duty not to have conflicting interests
between their personal interests and those of the company. This duty is part of the
general duty that directors should act in good faith and in the best interests of the
company. This duty prevents directors from contracting with the company without
making full and proper disclosure of their interests in the contract.66 Directors should
avoid conflicts of interest, especially where such conflict concerns the personal
improperly used or not. If there is more than one purpose, whether there is a breach or not, will depend
on which factor was the “trigger” for the director’s actions: Darvall v North Sydney Brick and Tile Co
at 154; Emlen Pty Ltd v St Barbara Mines Ltd at 307.
61 Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance Co Ltd v Ure (1923) 33 CLR 199 (HC) at 206 and 219 (the
directors, in exercising their discretion, refused to register a transfer of shares); Ascot Investments Pty
Ltd v Harper (1981) 148 CLR 337 (HC) at 348. See also Austin et al. Company Directors 289.
62 Austin et al. Company Directors 293–294.
63 Austin et al. Company Directors 228; Cassidy Corporations Law 211 ff. This duty is not specifically
entrenched in legislation.
64 Davidson v Smith (1989) 15 ACLR 732; Fulham Football Club v Cabra Estates plc [1992] BCC
863.
65 Austin et al. Company Directors 259–261. See the English decision of Russell v Northern Bank
Development Corp Ltd [1992] BCLC 1016 (HL) concerning the duty to retain discretions (a company
cannot fetter its statutory power to increase capital by entering into an indefinite undertaking to do so).
See also Thorby v Goldberg (1964) 112 CLR 597 (HCA) at 605–606 where it was held that directors
can still contract to exercise their powers in future in a particular manner, provided that, in deciding to
make the contract, they give proper consideration to the desirability of entering into the contract and
they decide to do so in the best interests of the company as a whole.
66 Cassidy Corporations Law 218. This duty extends to avoid being placed in a position where such a
conflict is even possible: Chan v Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178 at 199; Hospital Products Ltd v Unites
States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41 (HC) at 103; and the English decision of Boardman v
Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL).
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exploitation of opportunities or where the directors benefit someone other than the
company by way of their actions.67 Austin distinguishes between five closely related
and largely overlapping equity rules that apply to conflicts of interest by company
directors and senior officers. These five fiduciary rules are: (1) the conflicts of
interest rule, (2) the conflict of duties rule, (3) the misappropriation rule, (4) the no-
profit rule and (5) the business opportunity rule. The conflicts of interest rule states
that a director may not have an interest that conflicts with his duty to the company,
except with the company’s fully informed consent.68 The conflict of duties rule
provides that a director may not have an inconsistent engagement with a third party
(such as being a director of another company), except if the company is fully aware
thereof.69 According to the misappropriation rule, a director must not misappropriate
the company’s property for personal or a third party’s benefit.70 The no-profit rule
states that a director should not misuse his or her position for personal or a third
party’s possible advantage. He should account to the company for any gain made due
to the fiduciary office.71 Lastly, the business opportunity rule holds that a director
should not divert any profit-making opportunity in the same line of business as the
company’s present or prospective business, unless with the full consent of the
company.72
67 See Baxt et al. Corporations 384–412; Cassidy Corporations Law 217 ff; Redmond Companies and
Securities Law 418ff for a discussion of this duty and relevant case law interpreting it.
68 The director’s interest may even be small, he may only be one of many shareholders with an interest
in the contracting company: Transvaal Lands Co v New Belgium Land and Development Co [1914] 2
Ch 488. See also Capital Investments Corporations Pty Ltd v Classic Trading Pty Ltd (unreported
Federal Court, 28 September 2001) in which it was held that a director’s diversion of a business
opportunity to another company, associated with the director, was a breach of the director’s fiduciary
duty to the company. See Baxt et al. Corporations 385.
69 See Austin et al. Company Directors 313. In some cases disclosure is not enough, and the director of
both competing companies may be obliged to abstain from taking part in negotiations or voting on the
specific transaction: see Jenkins v Enterprise Gold Mines NL (1992) 6 ACSR 539.
70 Paul A Davies (Australia) Pty Ltd v Davies & Sons (1984) 8 ACLR 1; Furs Ltd v Tomkies (1936) 54
CLR 583.
71 See Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1995) 69 ALJR 362 for a discussion on how to calculate
the profits for which a director might be accountable.
72 As discussed in Austin et al. Company Directors 313. See also Austin et al. Company Directors
326–334 for a discussion of the conflicts of interest rule and 335–341 for a discussion of the conflict of
duties rule. See George Bray v John Rawlinson Ford [1896] AC 44 (HL) at 51 where the court found
that a director is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interests conflict with those of the
company. See further Permanent Building Society (in liq) v McGee 260 where it was held to merely
disclose the conflict and to abstain from voting on the proposal at the relevant board meeting was
140
The fiduciary duty of a director to avoid conflicts of interest has also been
supplemented with statutory provisions. Sections 191–196 of the Corporations Act of
2001 deal with disclosure of material personal interests and voting of interested
directors.73 Sections 182 and 183 determine that directors should not use their
position or information they obtain improperly to gain personally or for the benefit of
a third party. 74
3.2.1 The Traditional Position: Directors’ Duties Owed to Whom?
A director must act bona fide in the best interests of the company. The first issue to
consider is whether there is a difference between stating that a director should act in
“the interests of the company” compared to the “best interests of the company”. The
question that arises is whether the inclusion of the word “best” implies that directors’
decisions should be exercised in such a way that it is best for the company. This
would indicate that directors should consider all options and choose the best possible
one.75 Ford76 submits that there is no significant difference between the two phrases.
Directors’ decisions are not required to be the best possible for the company, but
directors are required to act in the interests of the company. In some cases the two
insufficient in the specific circumstances. See also R v Byrnes, R v Hopwood (1995) 17 ACSR 551,
discussed by Baxt et al. Corporations 404–412, where it was held that a duty not to allow a conflict
will operate both at common law and under the Corporations Act of 2001.
73 The provisions include “de facto” and “shadow” directors, but not non-executive directors: see s 9 of
the Corporations Act 2001. See also Austin et al. Company Directors 317; Farrar Corporate
Governance 110–111. Section 192 provides that a director should give notice about a material interest:
see Boardman v Phipps at 124 on the real possibility of a conflicting interest and not some theoretical
or rhetorical conflict. It was further stated that a person who is in a fiduciary position is not, unless
expressly provided, entitled to profit from that position. Where he does make a profit, based on his
position as fiduciary, he must account for it (at 123).
74 These sections apply to directors, officers and employees of the corporation. A “corporation”
includes any body corporate, see s 57A of the Corporations Act 2001. Section 182 also applies to
secretaries. See s 9 of the Corporations Act 2001. See Austin et al. Company Directors 317–318; Du
Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 264: Cassidy Corporations Law 228
ff.
75 The issue of the inclusion of the word “best” was also considered by Klein & Du Plessis “Corporate
Donations” 85. They argue that the Corporations Act 2001 refers to “best interests” suggesting that
directors should consider all possible alternatives, and choose the best one. They argue, however, that
this does not appear to be the requirement imposed by the courts, referring to Charterbridge
Corporation Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd (1970) Ch 62 at 75.
76 Ford et al. Ford’s Principles on Corporations Law par 8.065.
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phrases are used interchangeably, indicating that there is no significant difference
between them.77
Second, it is necessary to understand what is meant by “the company”.78 In some
cases it has been stated that directors should act in the best interests of the company,
whereas other cases use the term “the company as a whole”.79 The Corporations Act
of 2001 only refers to “the company”. The general or traditional viewpoint is that
directors owe their duties to the company and that no independent duties are owed to
any third parties.80 It seems that the words “the company” do not indicate that
directors should act in the best interests of the company as a separate legal entity, but
rather that they should act in the best interests of the members collectively.81
77 See, for example, Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel Pty Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 285 (HCA) at 293. In this
case it was specifically held that directors of a company cannot ordinarily exercise a fiduciary power
to allot shares for the purpose of defeating the voting powers of existing shareholders by creating a
new majority. For a discussion of this case, see Baxt et al. Corporations 378–382.
78 In the English case of In Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] 1 Ch 304 (CA) at 306 it was held that
directors must do what they honestly believe is in the best interests of the company. The court cannot
substitute the directors’ view on what is best for the company with their own view. See generally Ford
et al. Ford’s Principles on Corporations Law par 8.065; Cassidy Corporations Law 201.
79 See Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas [1951] Ch 286 at 291 and Darvall v North Sydney Brick and
Tile Co at 154, where it was held that directors should not just consider existing shareholders when
managing a company, but also future shareholders.
80 Berkahn “Directors Duties” 367 refers to the traditional viewpoint when discussing directors’ duties
to creditors. See also Austin et al. Company Directors 274–276; Du Plessis et al. Principles of
Contemporary Corporate Governance ch 2; Baxt et al. Corporations 343–344; Langton & Trotman
“The Best Interests of the Corporation” 164 on the traditional meaning of “the company” referring to
the shareholders collectively. See also Australian Innovation Ltd v Petrovsky (1996) 21 ACSR 218 at
222 stating that the duty is owed to the company, to the exclusion of the shareholders. Recent cases,
especially in New South Wales, suggest that when one is dealing with a company with wider public
interests, the interests of stakeholders may be significant. In both NRMA v Geeson (2001) 39 ACSR
401 and NRMA v Geeson (2001) 40 ACSR 1 it has been suggested that in an organisation such as
NRMA (an insurance company in Australia) there may be a “public duty” on the part of directors to
disclose information concerning the activities of the board to the public via the press. In Geneva
Finance Ltd (rec and mgr apptd) v Resources Industries Ltd (2002) ACLC 1427 it was held that the
dicta of the above-mentioned cases do not constitute a positive duty on the part of directors to consider
the interests of certain stakeholders.
81 See Ngurli v McCann (1953) 90 CLR 425 at 438 (HCA). In this case the directors benefited one
group of shareholders at the expense of the other shareholders. See also Ford et al. Ford’s Principles
on Corporations Law par 8.095; Dawson “Acting in the Best Interest of the Company” 78. See Teck
Corporation Ltd v Millar (1973) 33 DLR at 288 (a director’s duty is to the company, the company’s
shareholders are the company and therefore no interests outside of those of the shareholders can be
considered by the directors). See, however, People’s Department Stores Inc v Wise (2004) 244 DLR at
564 (in determining whether directors acted in the best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate
to consider the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and
the environment). See ch 2 par 5.2 on the proposed theory of the company as a separate legal entity.
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In the next section the protection afforded specific stakeholders is considered. 82 The
position of shareholders, creditors, employees and consumers are dealt with. The
various corporate governance initiatives in Australia are also referred to in order to
determine how different stakeholders are treated.
3.2.2 Individual Shareholders
Directors do not have a direct fiduciary duty towards individual shareholders.83 Their
duty is to the company in the absence of special facts giving rise to a fiduciary
relationship with particular shareholders.84
It has been suggested85 that directors should consider the interests of existing
members in certain circumstances due to the fact that they have risked their capital in
the hope of gain. Mallin treats shareholders differently from other stakeholders, and
argues that shareholders invested their money to provide risk capital to the company
and that their rights are enshrined in law, whereas those of other interest groups are
82 These different interest groups are also considered in the review of the South African law. Much of
the case law referred to in this chapter is also discussed in chapter 6 (especially regarding creditors, see
ch 6 par 3.2). In New World Alliance (Pty) Ltd; Sycotex (Pty) Ltd v Baseler (1994) 51 FCR 425;
Fitzroy Football Club Ltd v Bondborough Pty Ltd (1997) 15 ACLC 638 it was confirmed that
directors’ fiduciary duties are owed to the company and not a specific stakeholder. See also Lumsden
& Fridman “Corporate Social Responsibility” 173 on the protection afforded to stakeholders in
Australia.
83 See, however, Brunninghausen v Glavanics (1999) 17 ACLC 1247 at 1254 where the court held that
directors should consider the interests of individual shareholders. In this case a company had two
directors who were also the only shareholders. The one director sold his shares to the other. The buyer
had negotiations with another third party and received an offer from him. The court held that a director
has a fiduciary duty towards a shareholder and that the director who had purchased the shares should
have disclosed the negotiations to the seller. This decision highlights the willingness of the courts to
adopt a commercial approach in closely held companies, but it does not contemplate a separate duty to
shareholders. The decision is rather based on the specific facts of the case: see Baxt et al. Corporations
351–355. In Mesenberg v Cord Industrial Recruiters Pty Ltd (1996) ACLC 519 it was held that in a
“two person” company a director’s duties are owed to the other shareholder/director as much as to the
company.
84 Farrar Corporate Governance 106; Ford et al. Ford’s Principles on Corporations Law par 8.095
argues that “the interests of the company” include considering the interests of existing members and
even future members. I suggest that it is preferable to indicate that directors should have regard to
long-term benefits, which would include those of the future members. See also Provident International
Corporation v International Leasing Corp Ltd [1969] 1 NSWR 424 at 440 suggesting that directors
should consider the interests of future and existing members. See Austin et al. Company Directors at
par 7.8 on this case.
85 Austin et al. Company Directors 275.
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not.86 She further suggests that shareholders are recipients of the residual free cash
flow. Shareholders have a vested interest in trying to ensure that resources are used to
maximum effect, but this should also be to the benefit of society as a whole.87
3.2.3 Creditors
Some Australian cases suggest that directors have an indirect duty to consider the
interests of creditors when managing a company in circumstances where the company
is nearing insolvency.88
In Walker v Wimborne89 Justice Mason held: “It should be emphasised that the
directors of a company in discharging their duty to the company must take account of
the interests of its shareholders and its creditors. Any failure by the directors to take
into account the interests of creditors will have adverse consequences for the
company.”90 The decision in Walker v Wimborne was cited with approval by the
Supreme Court of New South Wales in Ring v Sutton.91 In Ring v Sutton it was stated
that directors should consider the interests of creditors when exercising their fiduciary
duties to the company. In Kinsela v Russell Kinsela (Pty) Ltd (in liq)92 it was held that
directors can consider the interests of creditors when a company is solvent, but as part
of their duty to the company. When a company is insolvent or nearing insolvency, the
creditors’ interests displace those of the shareholders collectively and directors must
86 Mallin Corporate Governance referred to in Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate
Governance 19.
87 Mallin Corporate Governance referred to in Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate
Governance 19.
88 Austin et al. Company Directors 276; Baxt et al. Corporations 344–351; Cassidy Corporations Law
204–207. See also ch 6 par 3.2.
89 (1976) 137 CLR 1 (HC) at 449.
90 Emphasis added. See Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 116; Havenga Fiduciary Duties of
Company Directors 32–42; Finch “Directors’ Duties Towards Creditors” 23–24; Fourie “Die Plig van
Direkteure Teenoor Maatskappyskuldeisers” 28–40 for a discussion of this case.
91 (1980) 5 ACLR 546 at 550. See also the English decision of Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National
Mutual Nominees Ltd (1991) 1 AC 187 where it was held that a director does not by reason only of his
position as director owe any duty to creditors. It was, however, stated that although directors are not
liable as such to creditors, a director may in terms of an agreement assume a special duty to a creditor
of a company.
92 (1986) 10 ACLR 395 at 401.
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have regard to creditors’ interests. In New World Alliance (Pty) Ltd; Sycotex (Pty) Ltd
v Baseler93 the court rejected the possibility that directors can have a direct duty to
consider the interests of creditors. In Spies v The Queen94 it was clearly stated that
directors’ duties are not owed directly to creditors.95
In sharp contrast to these cases, other cases in Australia and England interpreted the
dicta in the Walker decision as pointing to a direct duty, and not an indirect duty as
discussed above.96 The statement of Lord Templeman in the English case of
Winkworth v Edward Barron Development Co Ltd97 can be understood as providing
support for a direct duty. His Lordship held: “A duty is owed by the directors to the
company and to the creditors of the company to ensure that the affairs of the
company are properly administered and that its property is not dissipated or exploited
for the benefit of the directors themselves, to the prejudice of the creditors.”98 This
statement was confirmed in the Australian decision of Jeffree v National Companies
and Securities Commission.99 But it has been argued that the Winkworth decision is
not compelling evidence for a direct duty towards creditors because Lord Templeman
only made the remark obiter.100 The West Mercia Safetywear Ltd (in liq) v Dodd101
93 (1994) 51 FCR 425 at 550.
94 (2000) 201 CLR 603 (HC).
95 At 635. See Hargovan “Directors’ Duties to Creditors” 390–409 for a detailed discussion of the
Spies decision. In New Zealand the court in Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd [1985] 1 NZLR 242
(CA) also held that the duties of directors are owed to the company.
96 See ch 3 par 3.1.3 for the English cases.
97 [1987] 1 All ER 114 (HL) at 118. See also ch 3 par 3.1.3 on this case.
98 Emphasis added. See also Keay “The Duty to Creditors” 384; Hargovan “Directors’ Duties to
Creditors” 394; Fourie “Die Plig van Direkteure Teenoor Maatskappyskuldeisers” 35; Wishart
“Models and Theories” 326.
99 (1989) 15 ACLC 217 at 228. In Grove v Flavel (1986) 11 ACLR 161 a separate direct duty to
creditors was also suggested.
100 Sealy “Directors’ Wider Responsibilities” 177; Riley “Directors’ Duties and the Interests of
Creditors” 89; Fourie, Havenga and Lombard agree: Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 118;
Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors 40; Fourie “Die Plig van Direkteure Teenoor
Maatskappyskuldeisers” 37. In Spies v the Queen at 636–637 it was said that it is doubtful whether
Mason J intended to suggest that directors owe an independent duty directly to creditors. See also
Yukong Lines Ltd of Korea v Rendsburg Investments Corporation (No 2) (1998) 1 WLR 294 where
Toulson J rejected the notion of a direct duty being owed to creditors.
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decision imported the principles of Walker v Wimborne, Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ)
Ltd and Kinsela v Russel Kinsela Pty Ltd (in liq)102 into the English law. The West
Mercia decision confirmed that company directors owe duties to creditors, but that
they should be exercised when directors act in the best interests of the company as a
whole. This decision therefore extends the meaning of the “interests of the company”
by including the interests of creditors, but on an indirect basis. The interests of the
company as a whole are still of paramount importance. A separate duty to creditors is
therefore not recognised in this decision.103
It is clear that most of the Australian decisions still view the company as the ultimate
beneficiary of directors’ fiduciary duties, thus applying the indirect duty.104 This is
especially so after the Spies v The Queen decision where it was clearly held that
directors’ duties are owed to the company and not directly to the creditors. The
interests of creditors would therefore receive priority in certain instances, even if this
consideration can be to the detriment of the shareholders. The rationale for this lies in
the fact that the company is effectively trading with the creditors’ money when the
company is in financial distress.105 The cases do not provide clear guidelines as to
when such a duty would arise.
Section 588G106 of the Corporations Act 2001 also imposes a duty on directors to
prevent the company from trading whilst insolvent and a corresponding duty to
prevent their subsidiaries from engaging in such conduct.107
101 [1988] BCLC 250 (CA). See ch 3 par 3.1.3 on this case.
102 (1986) 10 ACLR 395.
103 See ch 3 par 3.1.3 on this English decision. See further Finch “Directors’ Duties Towards
Creditors” 23–24 for a discussion of the West Mercia decision. See generally, Keay “Interests of
Company Creditors: When is it Triggered?” 315 for a discussion of the case law focusing on a direct
and indirect duty towards creditors.
104 Keay “Interests of Company Creditors: When is it Triggered?” 316.
105 Keay “The Duty to Creditors” 385–386.
106 Previously s 592.
107 The new Corporations Law Amendment (Employees Entitlements) Act 2000 extended this
provision that employees are also treated as creditors (see par 3.2.4.1 (c) below).
146
Paper 3 of CLERP refers to the position of creditors when discussing the general law
duties of directors. It provides that directors should manage the company in the best
interests of the corporation. It is specifically stated that the courts developed this duty
further to require directors to consider the interests of creditors in certain
circumstances, especially when the company is nearing insolvency.108
The issue of how creditors’ interests should be protected is therefore complex and
questions such as: should this duty towards creditors be an indirect or a direct one,
who should be the beneficiary of the duty and when should the duty arise, create
difficulties. These questions are further discussed in chapter 6109 and these Australian
cases are referred to. New Zealand and English case law is also considered. These
cases are referred to in the South African chapter in order to answer the questions
raised above. There is no South African case law on directors’ duties to creditors.
3.2.4 Employees
It was stated before that directors should treat the interests of shareholders as
paramount when managing a company.110 They can consider the interests of other
groups, but only when this will be in the interests of the company or prescribed in
terms of other legislation like labour laws.
There is some overlap in the fields of labour law and corporate law, and a separation
between these two fields is neither desirable nor sustainable. Employees have a
number of interests in a corporation, such as job security, pleasant working
conditions, remuneration and the provision of pension benefits. In essence,
108 At p 16. The document refers to Walker v Wimborne and Kuwait Asia Bank v National Mutual
Nominees Ltd (1991) 1 AC 187 concerning directors’ duties to creditors. See the discussion below on
the ASX’s Best Practice Principles and Recommendations where the original principle 10 relates to the
recognition of the legitimate interests of stakeholders (including creditors). These recommendations
were reviewed during 2007 (see discussion below in par 4.1).
109 Paragraph 3.2.
110 As was seen in the above discussion, the traditional viewpoint in Australia is that directors owe
their duties to the company as a whole, being the shareholders collectively. See Mitchell et al.
“Shareholder Value and Employee Interests” 432.
147
employees are concerned with the running of the corporation they work for because
their livelihood depends on it.111
In the “outside” or shareholder model, which is applicable in Australia, the United
Kingdom and South Africa, employees do not have a dominant role in the day-to-day
management of the corporation.112 The position in other countries, such as Germany,
is very different and employees play a much more active role with representation on
board level.113 The link between the specific model of corporate governance and the
extent of its reliance on the increase of shareholder value and the protection of
employees is very important. Increasing shareholder value may lead to a deterioration
of the position of employees. It was argued that stakeholders (such as employees) are
usually in a more favourable position when the stakeholder model is followed.114
Because of this possible deterioration, some Australian companies provide employees
with share option schemes to protect them in a limited way, because the better the
111 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 19–22. See also See Baxt et al.
Corporations 355–361 on the position of employees.
112 In terms of the shareholder theory, the maximisation of shareholder wealth is of the utmost
importance. This theory is sometimes referred to as the “nexus of contracts” or “agency theory”. There
are, however, a few differences between the shareholder theory and the nexus of contracts or agency
theory. In terms of the latter theory, shareholders are only one of many groups that have contractual
claims against the corporation. This theory recognises a division between ownership and control. The
main disadvantage of this model is the fact that directors may act in their own interests instead of those
of the company, at the expense of the shareholders. However, shareholders have a number of remedies
at their disposal to prevent such conflicts of interest. They have voting rights when important corporate
issues such as the appointment and removal of directors are at issue. But shareholders are usually quite
inactive and do not necessarily vote or enforce directors’ duties. In terms of this model, employees do
not have board representation. See ch 6 par 3.3 where the unitary board structure is discussed. The link
between the applicable board structure and stakeholder protection is also discussed. See ch 2 pars 3, 4
on the theories and models of corporate governance.
113 See ch 6 par 3.3.2.1 for a detailed discussion of the two-tier board system and co-determination
applicable in Germany. The protection that a specific country affords its employees is closely linked to
the model of corporate governance it follows (see ch 2 par 3 for a discussion of the different theories
of corporate governance). In Germany, for instance, a long-term orientation is followed, which is to
the advantage of employees. Directors do not solely base their decisions on financial factors, but also
consider the interests of employees. In the United Kingdom, where employees do not have the same
level of participation as in Germany, short-term interests play a significant role when directors take
decisions. Directors will consider the interests of other stakeholders (such as employees), but wealth
maximisation is their ultimate aim. See s 172(1) of the United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006
(discussed in ch 3 par 4.3.3 above). See further Mitchell et al. “Shareholder Value and Employee
Interests” 419–420.
114 See ch 2 par 3 above. It is, however, the co-determination element of the two-tier board structure
that provides employees with protection and not the specific board structure.
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company does, the better the employees (holding shares) will do.115 There is also
separate legislation in Australia protecting the rights of employees.116
A number of corporate governance reports117 also deal with the protection of
employees. The specific legislation protecting employees as well as the reports
dealing with this issue are discussed and evaluated below. A conclusion is then drawn
on whether or not employees are sufficiently protected in Australia.
3.2.4.1 Specific Labour Legislation
Despite the fact that Australian corporate law favours shareholder primacy, directors
are obviously still subject to specific labour law legislation.118 In this section the
effectiveness of employment contracts, compulsory arbitration and conciliation, and
legislation protecting the rights of employees are considered.
a) Employment Contracts
Employees are protected in employment contracts. This gives employees a degree of
certainty as to their rights. Mitchell et al. suggest that if one sees employment
contracts as a “wages-for-work” bargain, then they are certain and complete. A list of
tasks and time periods is provided in the contract followed by a description of the
relevant benefits. Employees are, however, usually uncertain, at the time of
concluding the contract, of what is exactly expected of them. Employment contracts
are sometimes incomplete regarding the specifications of a specific job.119 Many of
the terms of employment contracts are only specified in the course of the relationship
115 Reynolds “Employee Stakeholder Interests” 95–108. The object of employee share option schemes
is usually to achieve financial participation rather than participation in decision making (at 104). The
employees who hold shares in a company usually have short-term financial goals, rather than to act in
the best interests of employees generally and over the long-term.
116 For example, the Workplace Relations Act 86 of 1996. See the discussion in par (c) below on
separate legislation protecting employees.
117 For example, the ASX’s Best Practice Principles and Recommendations; the Corporate
Responsibility Report of June 2006 and the HIH Report.
118 Paragraph 3.2.1 above.
119 Deakin & Morris Labour Law 238.
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between the employee and employer.120 Employees’ expectations are directly linked
to the success of the specific organisation. This is an interest that cannot be protected
by way of a contract. Thus, an issue such as job security cannot be protected by way
of a contract, but is rather dependent upon day-to-day decisions made by the
employers or management.121 Much of labour law is a response to the employment
relationship and not a continually re-negotiated contact between equal parties.122
b) Conciliation and Arbitration
During most of the twentieth century the federal regulation of labour law in Australia
was governed by the conciliation and arbitration power in the Federal Constitution.123
The federal government had the power to make laws in respect of conciliation and
arbitration for the settling of interstate industrial disputes. The Australian Industrial
Relations Commission (AIRC) had, until 2006, the exclusive power to settle such
disputes.124 This system of compulsory arbitration consisted of independent, quasi-
judicial tribunals that arbitrated or certified legally binding awards. Awards defined a
range of minimum standards including wage rates, overtime, standard hours and
leave entitlements. Awards were usually multi-employer in kind, resulting in the
wages being centralised and uniform across the different industries.125 Australia
therefore had a centralised wage-fixing system. The awards determined by AIRC
were binding on the parties. It was quite easy to terminate an employees’
employment as only a week’s notice was required. In 1984 awards started to include
120 Many of the terms of an employment relationship in Anglo-Australian law grew not out of the
private law of contract, but from penal masters and servants legislation of the nineteenth century. See
Working Paper No 203: The Contract of Employment issued by the Centre for Business Research,
University of Cambridge and written by Deakin; Mitchell et al. “Shareholder Value and Employee
Interests” 460.
121 Mitchell et al. “Shareholder Value and Employee Interests” 460–461.
122 Davies & Freedland Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law 18; Mitchell et al. “Shareholder Value and
Employee Interests” 460.
123 See s 51(35) of the Federal Constitution. See Wooden “Industrial Relations Reform” 243 (Industrial
tribunals and commissions in determining wages and conditions had been in place for over 70 years in
Australia.)
124 See generally on compulsory arbitration in Australia: Macintyre & Mitchell Foundations of
Arbitration.
125 Wooden “Industrial Relations Reform” 244 (Australian employees were heavily dependant on
highly prescriptive multi-employer awards.)
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national standards of redundancy and provisions on unfair dismissals. These
standards included that when an employer made material changes concerning
production, structure or technology that would probably have an effect on employees,
such as dismissals, transfers or restructuring, they first needed to consult with the
employees. This was, however, only a procedural obligation on employers as this
consultation with employees was only required at the implementation stage of the
possible dismissal, restructuring or transfer. It would therefore be an overstatement to
say that this consultation process limited employers’ rights. Employers could still act
in a manner that was in the best interests of the shareholders and to the detriment of
the employees.126
In the late 1980s and the early 1990s it was realised that in order for Australia to
compete globally, parties should have the ability to negotiate more flexible working
arrangements. The centralised fixation of wages and conditions of employment was
replaced with an enterprise-based employment system.127 In 1993 collective
bargaining was also introduced at enterprise level, without the Commission’s
involvement.128 Today parties can negotiate their terms and conditions of
employment at enterprise level.129
c) Legislation
The Workplace Relations Act of 1996130 brought about a paradigm shift in the nature
of employment regulation in Australia.131 This Act was the principal statute, at
126 Mitchell et al. “Shareholder Value and Employee Interests” 462–467.
127 These amendments were incorporated into the Industrial Relations Act of 1988 (Cth) in 1992 (see
Cairncross & Buultjens “Enterprise Bargaining” 475). An enterprise-based employment system relates
to bargaining between parties in single/specific enterprises and not across the whole industry in
Australia. The terms and conditions of Australia’s workforce are today generally determined without
the intervention of a third party. See also Dabscheck “The Slow and Agonising Death of the Australian
Experiment with Conciliation and Arbitration” 277.
128 See the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth). See Macdonald, Campbell & Burgess “Ten
Years of Enterprise Bargaining” 1.
129 Mitchell et al. “Shareholder Value and Employee Interests” 462–467.
130 Act 86 of 1988 as amended in 1996.
131 Mitchell et al. “Shareholder Value and Employee Interests” 462.
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federal level, that dealt with the protection of employees’ rights.132 The objects of this
Act were to encourage employment regulation that is in line with productivity,
flexibility and international competitiveness.133 It regulated workplace conditions,
wage-setting arrangements, conciliation and arbitration of workplace disputes
regarding pay and working conditions.134 In terms of this Act, consultation was
required with employees at a workplace level. Traditionally, the main instrument
regulating the working conditions of employees was by way of an award, as
discussed above. Awards now have less influence and are only allowed in certain
industries.135 The Act requires negotiation at workplace level if employees want to
supplement their award conditions. It introduced a number of enterprise-based
agreements to facilitate negotiations at workplace level.136 These agreements were
used to supplement award conditions or to derogate from the minimum standards,
subject to the fact that the agreements may not be to the disadvantage of the
employee.137 The Act weakened the position of trade unions. Unions may still seek
awards for individual members, but they are of limited value to the members due to
individual agreements concluded with the employees and non-union collective
agreements.138 The Workplace Relations Amendment Act (Work Choices) of 2005139
has further weakened the position of employees as the right to strike has practically
132 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 20. The Workplace Relations
Amendment Act (Work Choices) of 2005 replaced the Workplace Relations Act of 1996 in 2005.
133 Section 3(a).
134 See, for example, part 2, division 2 and part 12 division 4, subdivision B.
135 Section 89A of the Workplace Relations Act.
136 Part 8, division 2. These include collective agreements, non-union-based agreements and non-union
individualised agreements (referred to as Australian workplace agreements).
137 This is referred to as the “no-disadvantage” test. The test requires the regulatory authorities to
examine the conditions set down in the enterprise agreement in order to ensure that those conditions do
not “disadvantage” the employee when compared with the employee’s conditions under previously
applying regulatory arrangements. See the Final Report: Protecting the Worker’s Interest in
Enterprise Bargaining: The “No Disadvantage” Test in the Australian Federal Industrial Jurisdiction
prepared for the Workplace Innovation Unit, Industrial Relations, Victoria by Mitchell et al. (The
Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law School).
138 McCrystal “Shifting the Balance of Power” 193.
139 Act 153 of 2005. This Act was assented to on 14 December 2005. The bulk of the legislation came
into force on 27 March 2006. This Act replaced the Workplace Relations Act of 1996 entirely.
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been abolished. The legislation recognises the right to take industrial action within
collective bargaining, but in practice this does not really happen. When engaging in
industrial action a balance between the right of workers to engage in such action and
the welfare of the general community is needed. In terms of the Workplace Relations
Amendment Act (Work Choices) the welfare of the general community weighs
stronger than the right to industrial action.140 This constrains employees’ rights to
access to collective bargaining and union representation.141
Commentators argue that the shift to enterprise-based regulation and the weakening
of trade unions have strengthened the position of management.142 It would seem that
the Work Choices Act enables management to increase shareholder value by cutting
labour costs, restructuring the production process and excluding workers from
enterprise-level negotiations.143
It is submitted that employment contracts and the legislation dealing with employees
and their rights do not provide sufficient protection for employees. Employment
contracts do not protect employees sufficiently as the contracts are often incomplete.
Much of labour law is a response to the labour relationship and not a renegotiated
contract between parties. It would seem that employers are favoured by the
Workplace Relations Amendment Act (Work Choices) and that it does not create the
correct balance between employees and employers.
The Corporations Law Amendment (Employee Entitlements) Act of 2000, however,
emphasises the need for directors to consider the interests of employees when
managing a company, thereby improving the protection available to employees.144 In
140 See McCrystal “Shifting the Balance of Power” 193 for other changes that the Work Choices Act
brought about that has shifted the balance of power in collective bargaining in favour of employers.
141 Bottomley & Forsyth “Corporate Law” 20.
142 Mitchell et al. “Shareholder Value and Employee Interests” 470; McCrystal “Shifting the Balance
of Power” 193.
143 As argued in Mitchell et al. “Shareholder Value and Employee Interests” 470.
144 Senator Campbell said (10 May 2000) that these amendments were seen as a “very important
initiative which will supply real, deliverable support to employees, support that they can touch and
feel”.
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terms of this Act part 5.8A was incorporated into the Corporations Act of 2001.145
Part 5.8A introduces a new duty and offence into the Corporations Act to penalise
persons146 who intentionally enter into agreements or transactions with the purpose of
preventing or significantly reducing the recovery of entitlements147 by employees.
The court has the power to order such persons to compensate the company’s
employees. The object of this part of the Act is to protect the entitlements of a
company’s employees from agreements or transactions that are entered into with the
intention of defeating the recovery of those entitlements.
It is not clear how employees will enforce these rights.148 It is very difficult to prove
that directors were acting with the requisite intention under these provisions, namely
“inevitably [to] limit [their] scope and effectiveness as a protective mechanism for
employees”. Employees will have to show that their entitlements are “missing” and
that the directors (or other persons) entered into arrangements with the purpose of
ensuring that their entitlements will not be available.149 This Act still needs to be
tested in court.150
3.2.4.2 Corporate Governance Reports: The Position of Employees
The corporate governance initiatives of the past few years in Australia are discussed
in detail below.151 Inevitably, these reports discuss the interests of stakeholders and
how directors should consider their interests when they manage a company.
145 Symes “A New Statutory Directors’ Duty” 139–145; Bottomley & Forsyth “Corporate Law” 20 on
part 5.8A; Baxt et al. Corporations par 9.30.
146 This section does not refer to “directors”, but to “persons”. But one could safely assume that the
part is concerned with directors who have control over their company and who are forced to “care” for
employee entitlements (see Symes “A New Statutory Directors’ Duty” 142).
147
“Entitlements” are defined as wages, superannuation contributions, annual leave and long-service
leave (see s 596AA(2)).
148 See s 307 of the United Kingdom Companies Act of 1985, discussed in ch 3 par 3.1.4 above. It is
argued that employees did receive protection in s 309 of the Companies Act of 1985. But employees
were not awarded with any rights to enforce the protection afforded to them in s 309.
149 Symes “A New Statutory Directors’ Duty” 144.
150 Baxt et al. Corporations 355; Bottomley & Forsyth “Corporate Law” 14.
151 Paragraph 4 below. These initiatives include the Corporate Responsibility Report of June 2006 and
the Social Responsibility Report of December 2006.
154
ASX’s Best Practice Principles and Recommendations, the HIH Report and the
Corporate Social Responsibility Report of June 2006 specifically consider the
interests of employees when directors manage a company.
ASX listed companies have to comply with the ASX’s Best Practice Principles and
Recommendations. These principles and recommendations are not prescriptive rules,
but also not completely voluntary. If companies do not comply with the
recommendations, they should state in their annual report why they did not
comply.152 Principles of good corporate governance were established by the ASX
Corporate Governance Council. Principle 10 of the original ASX’s Best Practice
Principles and Recommendations, issued in March 2003, dealt with the recognition of
the legitimate interests of stakeholders.153 Recommendation 10.1 required directors to
“[e]stablish and disclose a code of conduct to guide compliance with legal and other
obligations to legitimate stakeholders”. This principle is discussed in more detail
below.154 It states that directors should consider the interests of stakeholders when
they manage a company, but they should still have flexibility when they manage a
company.
These principles were reviewed during 2007 and there is no longer a separate
principle dealing with stakeholder interests.155
The report by Royal Commissioner Mr Justice Neville Owen into the circumstances
surrounding the failure of the HIH Insurance Group was released on 16 April 2003.156
152 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 119.
153 See par 4.1 below for a discussion of ASX’s Best Practice Principles and Recommendations.
154 Paragraph 4.1 below. Whistleblowers are also protected, since it is stated in box 3.1 that public
companies should have a code of good conduct encouraging directors, among other things, to report
unlawful or unethical behaviour by employees and set in place protection for those reporting such
conduct. Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 21.
155 See par 4.1 below on the revised recommendations. Principle 3 is still relevant and determines that
companies must promote ethical and responsible decision making. To give effect to this
recommendation a company must have a code of conduct to guide directors to act in an ethical
manner. How directors should consider the different interests of stakeholders should also be addressed
in such a code.
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The report identified a number of possible breaches of the Crimes Act157 and the
Corporations Act of 2001. It also included 61 policy recommendations, 17 of which
relate to corporate governance issues.158 These recommendations include that the
disclosure and other requirements of the Corporations Act of 2001, the relevant
accounting standards and the Australian Stock Exchange Listing Rules that relate to
directors’ remuneration be reviewed to ensure that they achieve clear disclosure of all
the remuneration or other benefits paid to directors.159
The HIH Report also provides a valuable explanation of the position of employees in
the corporate world. Justice Owen states the following:
It is difficult to define with precision the part employees play in corporate
governance. It will depend on the extent to which the employee is
involved in or can influence the decision-making process. Senior
management is more likely to have such a role. But in large corporations
or complex groups it may be that employees further down the corporate
hierarchy have a decision-making function that involves elements of
control in the process. There is a danger in the current emphasis on the
role and responsibilities of the board of directors. It may cause to be
overlooked the reality of the necessarily greater part that executives and
other employees play in the day-to-day running of many corporate
businesses.160
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services issued
the Corporate Responsibility Report on corporate responsibility and “triple-bottom
line” reporting in June 2006. This report deals with employees in different contexts. It
refers to the position of stakeholders and to the different theories on stakeholder
protection. The drafters identify employees as a group that falls under the definition
of “stakeholders”.161 The committee favours the enlightened shareholder value
156 The report is available at http://www.aar.com.au/corpgov/clerp/hih/rec.htm (accessed 5 May 2008).
157 The Crimes Act of 1958.
158 See part 3 par 6 of the report.
159 See recommendation 1. Most of the other recommendations deal with financial reporting issues (see
part 3 par 7 of the report).
160 At p 47. See also Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 21.
161 Paragraph 2.16 of the Corporate Responsibility Report.
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approach concerning the protection of stakeholders, such as employees. The
committee also refers to employees when it deals with possible drivers of corporate
responsibility and state that to keep employees motivated is a driving force behind
successful corporate responsibility.162 The committee further refers to employees in
the context of sustainable reporting.163 It confirms that one of the reasons for
directors to report on the affairs of a company is the fact that employees (and other
non-shareholder stakeholders) should be informed. The committee is in favour of
directors managing a company in the best interests of the shareholders collectively.
They suggest that directors should, however, consider the interests of other
stakeholders as this will contribute to a maximisation of shareholder wealth. 164
3.2.4.3 Conclusions: Employees
It was indicated above that Australian employment contracts do not provide
employees with sufficient protection. Employee contracts are often incomplete and
employees’ expectations cannot be accurately reflected in these contracts.165
Conciliation and arbitration have improved over the past years. Today parties can
negotiate their terms and conditions of employment at enterprise level.166 Australian
labour legislation was also considered and it seems as if employees are not
sufficiently protected in this legislation. The Workplace Relations Amendment Act
(Work Choices) of 2005 replaced the Workplace Relations Act of 1996. It was
indicated that this Act of 2005 weakened the position of trade unions and employees’
right to collective bargaining. It was further seen that the position of employers is
strengthened by this Act. However, the Corporations Law Amendment (Employee
Entitlements) Act of 2000 emphasises the need for directors to consider the interests
of employees when exercising their fiduciary duties. But it would be very difficult for
employees to prove that directors did not consider their interests when managing the
162 Paragraph 3.39 of the Corporate Responsibility Report of June 2006.
163
“Sustainable reporting” refers to the practice of corporate reporting on economic, social and
environmental performance. Sustainable reporting is voluntary in Australia. See par 6.6 of the
Corporate Responsibility Report of June 2006.
164 See also par 4.3 below on this report.
165 Paragraph (a) above.
166 Paragraph (b) above.
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company.167 It seems as if corporate governance initiatives such as the Corporate
Responsibility Report of June 2006 favour shareholder primacy, subject thereto that
stakeholders such as employees should also be protected. In chapter 2 it was argued
that directors should manage a company in the best interests of the company as a
separate legal entity.168 The protection afforded various stakeholders will necessarily
differ during the existence of a company. The measure of statutory protection that a
specific stakeholder receives, other than corporate law legislation, plays an important
role in deciding whether or not directors should acknowledge the interests of a
specific stakeholder. It would seem that employees do not receive adequate
protection elsewhere and directors should keep this in mind when managing a
company.
3.2.5 Consumers
There is no case law stating that directors should consider the interests of consumers,
but legislation concerning consumer protection obviously also applies to companies.
The Trade Practices Act169 provides for the protection of consumers and prevents
some restrictive trade practices.170 The object of the Act is “to enhance the welfare of
Australians through the promotion of competition and fair trading and provision for
consumer protection”. With regard to restrictive practices, the general approach is to
prohibit anti-competitive business practices, unless it can be indicated that it give rise
to the public benefit.171 The provisions dealing with consumer protection prohibit
unfair and deceptive practices, and establish a set of implied warranties and
conditions. This part of the Act seeks to establish fair trading principles and to
167 Paragraph (c) above.
168 Chapter 2 par 5.2 above.
169 Act 51 of 1974. See Baxt & Brunt “Guide to the Trade Practices Act” 5ff; Sarre “Responding to
Corporate Collapses” 3, 23.
170 See www.answers.com/topic/trade-practices-act-1974 (accessed 5 March 2007). The Act is
administered by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. (See part II of the Act; see
also www.accc.gov.au for the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (accessed 10 March
2007)).
171 Part IV of the Act deals with restrictive practices. See Baxt & Brunt “Guide to the Trade Practices
Act” 6.
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promote the supply of information to consumers.172 Baxt and Brunt state in their
guide to the Act that as to scope, the coverage of restrictive and unfair practices in the
Act is among the most comprehensive in the Western world.173 The following parts
of the Act provide extensive protection to consumers:
Firstly, part V division 1 and part VC division 2 concern consumer protection and
deal specifically with unfair practices. Unfair practices include misleading and
deceptive conduct,174 unconscionable conduct,175 bait advertising,176 pyramid
schemes177 and certain misrepresentations.178
Secondly, part V, division 1A and part VC, division 3 deal with product safety and
information.179 The provisions in these parts deal with warnings to the public, product
safety standards, and unsafe goods and product information standards.
172 Part V of the Act deals with consumer protection.
173 Baxt & Brunt “Guide to the Trade Practices Act” 6.
174 Individuals and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission can take action against
corporations who engage in misleading or deceptive conduct. See s 52 of the Act which states that
“[a]corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is
likely to mislead or deceive”. No specific definition is given for “misleading” or “deceptive”.
175 The inclusion of unconscionable conduct in the Trade Practices Act is a codification of the common
law. An act is unconscionable if a party to a transaction is under a “special disability”, the other party
knows this, but continues to act in a way that makes it unfair or unconscionable to accept the offer of
the weaker party. To determine whether a person exercised “unconscionable conduct”, the court will
have regard to “the relative strengths of the bargaining positions of the corporation and the consumer;
whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by the corporation, the consumer was required to comply
with conditions that were not reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of the
corporation; whether the consumer was able to understand any documents relating to the supply or
possible supply of the goods or services; whether any undue influence or pressure was exerted on, or
any unfair tactics were used against, the consumer or a person acting on behalf of the consumer by the
corporation or a person acting on behalf of the corporation in relation to the supply or possible supply
of the goods or services; and the amount for which, and the circumstances under which, the consumer
could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or services from a person other than the corporation”
(see s 51AB of the Act). See s 51AC for unconscionable conduct in business transactions.
176 Advertising a product that is not reasonably available. See s 56 of the Act.
177 Section 65AAC of the Act.
178 For example, misrepresentation concerning the price. See s 53 of the Act.
179 See, inter alia, ss 65B, 65C, 65D of the Act.
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Thirdly, part V, division 2 concerns conditions and warranties in consumer
transactions. There are certain implied conditions in the Act concerning the fitness of
the purpose of the product, supply by description or sample and that the goods must
be of a merchantable quality.180
Fourthly, part V, division 2A deals with actions against manufacturers or importers of
goods.181 Section 74B(1) states that where a corporation, in trade or commerce,
supplies goods manufactured by the corporation to another person who acquires the
goods for re-supply and the goods are not fit for the particular purpose for which they
were acquired, then the corporation is liable to compensate the consumer or that other
person for the loss or damage and the consumer or that other person may recover the
amount of the compensation by action against the corporation in a court of competent
jurisdiction.182
The interests of consumers are of vital importance in the day-to-day running of a
corporation. The Trade Practices Act provides an extensive list of consumer rights,
like the general prohibition against misleading and deceptive conduct, in part V of the
Act.183 It would seem that consumers receive adequate protection in terms of this Axt.
3.2.6 The Different Interest Groups: Concluding Remarks
The recognition and protection of the interests of stakeholders are very important,
especially with regard to the long-term growth of a corporation. It seems that the
position in Australia is still that the interests of shareholders should receive primacy
when a company is managed.184 However, there is legislation that adequately
180 Sections 70, 71(2), 72, 66(2) of the Act.
181 Sections 74A–74M of the Act.
182 In terms of s 74B(2), subsection 74B(1) does not apply: “(a) if the goods are not reasonably fit for
the purpose referred to in that subsection by reason of: (i) an act or default of any person (not being the
corporation or a servant or agent of the corporation); or (ii) a cause independent of human control;
occurring after the goods have left the control of the corporation; or (b) where the circumstances show
that the consumer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for the consumer to rely, on the skill or
judgment of the corporation”.
183 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 24.
184 This issue of shareholder primacy has been widely debated by Australian commentators. Most of
them are in favour of shareholder primacy, see, for instance, Paper 3 of CLERP at p 16; Du Plessis et
al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 51–52 who suggests that there is not a
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addresses the needs of stakeholders.185 McConvill suggests that it is not necessary to
revise the duties of directors to take into account the interests of specific classes of
stakeholders when they make corporate decisions. He states that it is not necessary to
clarify the extent to which directors may take into account the interests of specific
classes of stakeholders when making corporate decisions. He argues that a proposal
of extending directors’ duties to include various stakeholders as beneficiaries is based
on three false assumptions.186 The first one is that directors do not take stakeholders’
interests into account. According to McConvill, this is not true as the general law and
corporate best practices187 require directors to consider the interests of other
stakeholders. The second false assumption is that the interests of stakeholders are
contrary to the best interests of the company. This is also not true. Directors have to
consider the interests of other stakeholders, because that is in the best interests of the
company. Directors should consider the short- and long-term benefits of their
decisions, provided that thye are in the best interests of the company. There is
therefore a very strong link between considering stakeholders interests and doing
what is best for the company.188 The last false assumption is that a stakeholder-
orientated approach to corporate governance requires legislative change.189 A culture
contradiction between the fact that the recognition of stakeholders interests is the best way to ensure
long-term sustainable growth for the firm and the fact that directors should manage a company in the
best interests of shareholders; McConvill “Directors’ Duties to Stakeholders” 88–102. But see Wood
“Whom Should Business Serve?” 266–285, who argues that although the shareholder conception of
the firm seems morally weak, it appears to have practical strengths. It is practical because it provides
directors with a clear goal, namely profit maximisation or shareholder wealth. The stakeholder
conception is morally strong, but it lacks practical direction. Morality in this context, according to
Wood, relates to the fact that directors should be concerned on how their actions affect others. He
argues that the shareholder conception cannot be morally rehabilitated, but the stakeholder conception
can be rehabilitated on a practical level. This issue of shareholder primacy has been debated and
discussed in various review initiatives of Australia, see par 4 below for a discussion of these
initiatives.
185 For example, consumer legislation. See par 3.2.5 above. This is not necessarily the case with all
stakeholders, see for example employees discussed in par 3.2.4 above.
186 McConvill “Directors’ Duties to Stakeholders” 88–102. He refers to the report of the Corporations
and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) on social responsibility (issued in December 2006). The
Parliamentary Secretary asked this committee in March 2005 to comment on the issue of stakeholder
protection. This report is discussed in par 4.3 below.
187 McConvill “Directors’ Duties to Stakeholders” 90–92. On corporate best practices see for instance:
ASX’s Recommendations and Principles of Good Corporate Governance (discussed in par 4.1 below).
188 McConvill “Directors’ Duties to Stakeholders” 95–96.
189 McConvill “Directors’ Duties to Stakeholders” 99.
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that appreciates and protects strong relationships with stakeholders will naturally
steer directors in the direction of stakeholder protection.
It is clear from the above discussion that the traditional viewpoint in Australia that a
company should be managed by the directors in the best interests of the company,
being the shareholders collectively, still prevails. However, when directors act in the
best interests of the shareholders collectively they also have to consider the interests
of other stakeholders. If they do not consider their interests they will be acting against
the best interests of the company. Corporate culture and norms, such as best practice
codes, are also moving towards stakeholder engagement.190
3.3 The Duty of Care, Skill and Diligence
The duty of care and skill is a general law duty. This duty arises from contract,191 the
existence of an equitable obligation or the common law.192 This duty of care was
originally developed in equity before the evolution of the modern tort of
negligence.193 Directors are subject to a common law duty to exercise reasonable care
and skill in addition to any contractual, equitable194 or statutory obligations.
The locus classicus on the standard of care is the English decision of Re City
Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd.195 The standard of care and diligence expected of
190 See the discussion below on corporate governance initiatives in Australia, especially the Corporate
Responsibility Report of June 2006. The drafters of this report favoured the enlightened shareholder
value approach.
191 The duty of care and skill owed to a company by a director under a contract of service with the
company will arise from an express term in the contract or, if no such term exists, from an implied
term that the employee will exercise reasonable care and skill expected of a person in his position. See
Lister Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555.
192 In Permanent Building Society (in liq) v McGee (1993) 11 ACSR 260 at 287 it was found that
directors owe a duty of care and skill at common law and in equity.
193 Farrar Corporate Governance 124.
194 The equitable duty of care and skill may arise from the same facts that give rise to a tortious duty,
see Permanent Building Society at 287. See, generally, on the Australian duty of care and skill
Worthington “The Duty to Monitor” 181–202.
195 [1925] Ch 407. This case is also discussed in ch 3 par 3.2. See Baxt et al. Corporations 428–431
and Redmond Companies and Securities Law 380ff on the duty of care and diligence. See also Marson
(Pty) Ltd v Pressbank (Pty) Ltd (1987) ACLC 338 at 343 and Fitzsimmons v R (1997) 23 ACSR 355 at
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directors was quite low and the courts expected some form of gross negligence in
order to establish a breach of this duty. A subjective test was used to determine
whether the duty had been breached. A director did not have to exhibit a greater
degree of skill when performing his duties than was reasonably expected of a person
with his knowledge and experience.196 This approach changed with the decision of
Daniels v Anderson197 where auditors of a company were held to be negligent
because they failed to comply with the Companies Code in respect of foreign
exchange operations.198 The court held that the auditors (as well as the chief
executive officer and management of the company) were negligent because the law
had developed since the City Equitable decision. Directors are now required to take
real steps to place themselves in a position to guide and monitor management of the
company.199 In terms of this case, the duty of directors to act with care and diligence
365 where it was held that the common law test relating to a breach of the duty of care and skill is
subjective.
196 At 407. See Cassidy Corporations Law 229; Baxt et al. Corporations 432 on this issue.
197 (1995) 13 ACLC 614. Rogers CJ in the Supreme Court of Appeal in AWA Ltd v Daniels (Trading
as Deloitte Haskins & Sells) (1992) 10 ACLC 933 laid down a framework against which the duties of
directors might be measured, specifically non-executive directors. The learned judge held that a
director may, inter alia, rely without verification on the judgement information and advice of the
officers so entrusted. A director may also rely on management to go carefully through the relevant
financial and other information of the corporation and draw the board’s attention to what is necessary.
Reliance would only be unreasonable where “the director was aware of the circumstances of such a
character, so plain, so manifest and so simple of appreciation that no person, with any degree of
prudence, acting on his behalf, would have relied on the particular judgment information and advice of
the officers” (AWA Ltd v Daniels at 1015). This part of the judgment was especially important for non-
executive directors. Rogers held that non-executive directors’ duty is subjective in nature. This
changed, however, with the subsequent appeal in Daniels v Anderson in 1995 where a subjective and
an objective test was applied for both executive and non-executive directors (Daniels v Anderson at
662).
198 Before the Daniels decision, the Supreme Court of Western Australia had further weakened the
standard of care and skill of non-executive directors. See ASC v Gallagher (1993) 11 ACLC 286;
Hurley v NCSC (1993) 11 ACLC 443; Vrisakis v ASC (1993) 11 ACLC 763. See Cassidy
Corporations Law 229 ff.
199 At 664 in the Daniels v Anderson case. The court also discussed various decisions in American law,
which placed the standards required from directors at a high level and held that the court could not
adopt a passive role. See, for example, Francis v United Jersey Bank 432 A 2d 814 (1981). The court’s
finding in Daniels v Anderson that the duty of care imposes an objective standard was followed in
South Australia v Marcus Clark (1996) 19 ACSR 606 at 627; Gamble v Hoffman (1997) 24 ACSR 369
at 372. See also, generally, Cassidy Corporations Law 231 ff.
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is largely objective, but there are no “uniform standards for directors”.200 Australian
courts now expect high levels of care and diligence of directors.201
The duty of care and skill is entrenched in Australian corporate legislation. 202 Section
180(1) of the Corporations Act of 2001 provides that a director or other officer of a
corporation should exercise his or her powers and discharge his or her duties with the
degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person would exercise if he or she was
a director or an officer of a corporation in the corporation’s circumstances and
occupied the office held by, and had the same responsibilities within the corporation
as, that of director or officer. This standard is much higher than the original one
imposed in terms of the common law. Directors cannot rely on the excuse that,
subjectively, they lacked the knowledge or experience to take a particular decision.203
Section 180(2) contains a statutory business judgment rule. It states that directors or
officers who make a business judgment are taken to meet the requirements of care
and diligence in terms of section 180(1), and the equivalent duties at common law
200 On the objective test see ASIC v Rich (2003) 44 ACSR 341; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v
Clark (2003) 45 ACSR 332; ASIC v Vines (2005) 55 ACSR 617; Federal Deposit Insurance Corp v
Bierman 2 F 3d 1424 (1993). See also Austin et al. Company Directors 256.
201 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 259; Austin et al. Company
Directors 250; Ford et al. Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law par 8.340. See also Wilkinson v
Feldworh Financial Services Pty Ltd (1998) 29 ACSR 642 at 693; Australian Securities Commission v
As Nominees Ltd (1995) 62 FCR 504 at 517–518 suggesting a higher standard of care and diligence.
202 In response to the recommendations contained in the Company Directors’ Duties: Report on the
Social and Fiduciary Duties and Obligations of Company Directors issued by the Senate Standing
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (November 1989) (also known as the Cooney Report)
available at http://www.lipton-herzberg.com.au/law_reform.htm (accessed 5 May 2008) the statutory
duty is now embodied in s 180(1) (formerly s 232(4)). This new section was an attempt to address
some of the criticism of the pre-Daniels v Anderson common law test. See Cassidy Corporations Law
235.
203 In Re One.Tel Ltd (in Liq); ASIC v Rich (2003) 44 ACSR 682, a joint managing director was held to
have breached s 180(1) by failing to monitor management, take reasonable steps to assess the
company’s financial position and performance, maintain cash reserves at a level that eensured liquidity
and ensure the establishment of appropriate systems to produce financial information which was
accurate and reliable. See further Austin et al. Company Directors 232 on the One.Tel case. See also
Forge v ASIC (2004) 213 ALR 574 (CA) where the directors breached s 232(4) (now s 180(1)) in that
the claims for management fees were fictitious and was seen as a way to benefit themselves financially
and ASIC v Loiterta (2004) 50 ACSR 693 where the directors breached s 232(4) (now s 180(1)) by
approving a dividend out of profits when the company did not have any profits. See Ford et al. Ford’s
Principles of Corporations Law at par 8.305 on the statutory standard of care and skill; Austin et al.
Company Directors 229–231.
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and in equity, if they make the judgment in good faith for a proper purpose, do not
have a material interest in the subject matter of the judgment, inform themselves
about the subject matter of the judgment to the extent they reasonably believe to be
appropriate and rationally believe that the judgment is in the best interests of the
corporation. The “judgment” refers to any decision taken or not taken concerning a
matter relevant to the business operations of the corporation.204
4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES AND THE
STAKEHOLDER DEBATE
In the next section a brief overview of the most important corporate governance
initiatives in Australia is provided. The discussion focuses on how stakeholders are
dealt with in terms of these initiatives.
4.1 ASX’s Best Practice Principles and Recommendations
ASX listed companies have to comply with the ASX’s Best Practice Principles and
Recommendations.205 If they do not comply with the recommendations they should
state in their annual report why they did not comply.206 These principles of good
corporate governance were established by the ASX Corporate Governance Council
which was founded on 15 August 2002. The Council developed ten principles on
corporate governance and approved the ASX’s Best Practice Principles and
Recommendations in March 2003. The ASX’s Best Practice Principles and
204 Austin et al. Company Directors 237–238; Farrar Corporate Governance 138–141; Redmond “Safe
Harbour or Sleepy Hollows” 79; Cassidy “Standards of Conduct” 180 on arguments for and against the
business judgment rule. See also Re HIH Insurance Ltd (in liq) v Adler (2002) 41 ACSR 72; Adler v
ASIC (2003) 46 ACSR 504. In these cases the defendants were denied the benefit of the business
judgment rule.
205 See par 3.2.4.2 above. Most of the recommendations only applied to companies from 1 July 2004.
There are comparable guidelines for non-listed companies, see Standards Australia (June 2003)
available at www.standards.org.au (accessed 10 April 2007). On these initiatives generally, see Baxt et
al. Corporations xxvii.
206 These principles and recommendations are therefore not mandatory rules, it operates on a comply
or explain basis or “if not why not” approach. It is therefore not completely voluntary as companies
still need to explain why they did not comply. This is similar to the approach followed in terms of
King II in South Africa, discussed in ch 6 par 4.1 below.
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Recommendations consist of four parts, namely: (1) corporate governance in
Australia, (2) the essential corporate governance principles, (3) best practice
recommendations and (4) two attachments. There are 28 recommendations207 that
provide implementation guidance for listed companies to satisfy the ten principles of
good corporate governance. The document consisted of ten chapters, each explaining
one of the ten corporate governance principles. For purposes of this thesis, principles
3 and 10 are important.208
Principle 3 concerns the promotion of ethical and responsible decision making. The
council recommendation states that: “investor confidence can be enhanced if the
company clearly articulates the practices by which it intends directors and key
executives to abide”.209 Recommendation 3.1 recommends the following: “Establish
a code of conduct to guide directors, the chief executive officer (or equivalent), the
chief financial officer (or equivalent) and any key executives as to the practices
207 These recommendations include that the majority of the board should be independent directors
(par 2.1), that the board should establish a remuneration committee (par 9.2) and, very importantly,
that a code of conduct should be established. Compliance with legal and other obligations to legitimate
stakeholders should also be disclosed (par 10.1). See Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary
Corporate Governance 134–137; Blackmore “Regulating Regime” 47–49; Havenga “Duties of the
Company Chairman” 145; Von Nessen “Corporate Governance in Australia” 199–200, 205–206. See
also Grantham “Corporate Governance Codes” 218–225 where he discusses the ASX’s Best Practice
Recommendations and Principles as well as the New Zealand version, Corporate Governance in New
Zealand: Principles and Guidelines (2004). Grantham discusses whether these two codes address the
agency-cost problem. The agency-cost problem concerns senior management who act in their own
self-interest. He argues that the codes do address this problem, based on the principles dealing with
independent boards and financial reporting. He also deals with the question of whether or not the codes
improve governance. He maintains that the solution does not necessarily lie in independent directors,
since they do not have detailed knowledge of the nature of the company’s business and must therefore
rely on senior management. Independent directors are also only part time and they do not always give
enough time to the affairs of the specific company. He believes further that the codes are overly
concerned with corporate scandals and corruption. Accountability is only one aspect of corporate
governance, the quality of decision making and the realisation of wealth is also important. Propriety in
management is a prerequisite for wealth maximisation, but it is not an end in itself. He therefore
considers it a pity that the codes did not pay more attention to the creation of wealth.
208 Principle 1 states that solid foundations should be laid for management and for oversight. A board
charter should be established for this purpose. Principle 2 concerns the structure of the board and that
it should add value. A nomination committee is proposed in this regard. Principle 4 concerns the
safeguarding of integrity in financial reporting. A formal audit committee charter should be established
to give effect to this principle. Principle 5 relates to timely and balanced disclosure. Written policies
should be established to ensure listing and statutory disclosures. Principle 6 states that the rights of
shareholders should be respected; this can be achieved by way of a communication policy. Principle 7
states that risk should be recognised and managed. A risk management policy is important to adhere to
this principle. Principle 8 concerns the encouragement of enhanced performance and principle 9 deals
with fair and responsible remuneration. A remuneration committee should be established for this goal.
209 ASX’s Best Practice Recommendations and Principles p 25.
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necessary to maintain confidence in the company’s integrity;210 the responsibility and
accountability of individuals for reporting and investigating reports of unethical
practices.”211 Such a code is an effective way to guide the behaviour of directors and
demonstrate the commitment of a company to its ethical practices.212 It is suggested
in Box 3.1 of ASX’s Best Practice Principles and Recommendations that the
following content should be addressed in this code: provisions on conflict of interests,
corporate opportunities, confidentiality, fair dealing, protection and proper use of
information, compliance with laws and regulations, and encouraging the reporting of
unlawful behaviour.
Principle 10 deals with the recognition of the legitimate interests of stakeholders. A
code of conduct is proposed and suggestions are provided as to what provisions
should be included in such a code.213 If these suggestions are not followed, an
explanation should be provided. Recommendation 10.1 states: “Establish and disclose
a code of conduct to guide compliance with legal and other obligations to legitimate
stakeholders.” Listed companies should have a code of conduct to guide compliance
with their legal and other obligations to stakeholders. Guidelines for the contents of
the code of conduct are also provided214 with reference to the company’s
responsibility towards consumers, employment practices, the community and how the
company should comply with legislation affecting its operations.215 These guidelines
include a clear commitment by the board of directors to adhere to the code of conduct
especially relating to its statements on the aspirations and objectives of the company
and its core values. Responsibilities to shareholders and the financial community in
general should also be included in the code of conduct. This might include reference
to the company’s viewpoints on delivering shareholder value and how it should be
210 See par 3.1.1 of ASX’s Best Practice Recommendations and Principles.
211 See par 3.1.2 of ASX’s Best Practice Recommendations and Principles.
212 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 204.
213 This code may stand alone or be part of the code mentioned in Principle 3 above.
214 See Box 10.1 in the ASX’s Best Practice Recommendations and Principles. This code can be
compared with the Code of Best Practice in the United Kingdom (see ch 3 par 4.1) and the South
African Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct in terms of King II (see ch 6 par 4.1).
215 See also the Corporate Responsibility Report ch 7 of June 2006 pars 7.27–7.38.
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achieved, as well as the company’s approach to accounting policies and practices.
The code of conduct should also make provision for responsibilities to clients,
customers and consumers. This might include reference to standards of product
quality or service and a commitment to fair value and safety of goods produced.
Environmental protection policies, support for community activities and donations or
sponsorships should also be included in the code of conduct. The company’s privacy
policy and the use of confidential information should, furthermore, be covered in the
code of conduct. The company’s compliance with legislation affecting its operations
and how the company monitors and ensures compliance with the code of conduct is
also very important and should be included in it. These guidelines are only
suggestions on the contents of the code of good conduct. Companies have flexibility
to include other issues or exclude some of the above-mentioned matters. The main
aim of a code of good conduct is to state the values and policies of a company and to
ensure adequate public or social accountability by corporations.216
ASX’s Best Practice Recommendations and Principles were reviewed during 2007
and new revised recommendations and principles were issued in August 2007. The
aim of the revision was to reduce the number of principles and to simplify the
principles. There are now eight, instead of ten, principles. The previous principles
8217 and 10 are no longer separate. Stakeholders are now dealt with in terms of
principle 3 and recommendation 3.1.218 Principle 3 deals with the promotion of
ethical and responsible decision making.219 It states that when companies make
ethical and responsible decisions they should not only be aware of their legal
obligations, but also consider the reasonable expectations of their stakeholders, like
shareholders, employees, customers and creditors. Recommendation 3.1 provides for
a code of conduct that companies should issue. In terms of such a code, companies
should state what their viewpoints are on stakeholder protection.
216 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 31.
217 Principle 8 related to the encouragement of enhanced performance.
218 Principle 10 is therefore embedded in principle 3, but only to a limited extent.
219 The new Principle 3 is much wider than Principle 3 in the March 2003 version of ASX’s Principles
and Recommendations. In terms of the new Principle 3, it is recommended that directors must have
regard to stakeholders’ interests when managing a company.
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It is clear that ASX has assumed an important role in the regulation of corporate
governance in Australia. Du Plessis and others argue that the extent to which ASX
becomes involved in corporate governance in Australia over the long and medium
term depends on two factors. First, the extent to which companies attempt to comply
with the recommendations and, second, the attitude of ASX towards monitoring and
enforcing non-compliance by listed companies. The principles and recommendations
have not yet been in force for long enough to allow for an accurate evaluation. Du
Plessis and others220 argue further that ASX should assume a dual role, namely as
educator and as regulator. As regards its role as educator, ASX should explain the
recommendations and how they operate. They should, furthermore, provide
guidelines on how companies can use the recommendations to set in place corporate
governance policies that will suit their particular business. As enforcer, ASX has not
assumed a strong role. The main reason for this is the nature of the principles and
recommendations. They are intended to be only guidelines. The principles and
recommendations are not prescriptive rules. However, the recommendations are
supported by the Listing Rules221 and Listing Rule 4.1.0.3 provides that listed
companies are required to comply with the recommendations or explain why they did
not comply in their annual reports. Failure to provide a sufficient explanation will
result in a breach of the Listing Rules.222 ASX did not make it clear what would
qualify as a sufficient explanation, but did indicate that they will question the
companies that did not comply with the recommendations and assist them in
complying, instead of imposing sanctions on companies.223
220 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 136–137.
221 The Australian Stock Exchange Listing Rules.
222 A breach of the Listing Rules would result in penalties: see ss 793B and 793C of the Corporations
At off 2001. See Ramsay and Hoad “Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices”, who conducted a
study to determine the extent to which Australian listed companies are disclosing their corporate
governance practices, in terms of rule 4.10.3, by examining the annual reports of 268 listed companies.
223 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 137.
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I submit that the ASX’s recommendations are similar to the suggestions made in the
King II Report in South Africa.224 They are mainly suggestions and encourage
flexibility in directors’ management of a company. Both sets of recommendations are
supported by the Listing Rules of the respective countries.225
In conclusion, in terms of the new revised ASX’s Principles and Recommendations
listed companies should ensure that stakeholders are aware of decisions made by
management. This should be included in a company’s code of conduct. Non-listed
companies should also strive to keep stakeholders informed.
4.2 The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program
4.2.1 Introduction
In March 1997 the Federal Treasurer announced the CLERP. It involved a review of
key areas of regulation affecting businesses and investment activities. The CLERP
was developed with the benefit of consultation with the Business Regulatory
Advisory Group. This group should provide feedback to the government on business
and corporate law reform. Since 1997 there have been nine policy proposal
documents.226
Paper 3 of CLERP,227 dealing with directors’ duties and corporate governance is
discussed below.228
224 This report is discussed in ch 6 par 4.1 below.
225 See ch 6 par 4.1 where King II is discussed.
226 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 149. Paper 1 concerns
accounting standards, Paper 2 fundraising, Paper 3 directors’ duties and corporate governance, Paper 4
takeovers, Paper 5 electronic commerce, Paper 6 financial markets and investment products, Paper 7
simplified lodging and compliance procedures with the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (ASIC) (see pars 2 and 3.1 above on ASIC), Paper 8 cross-border insolvency and Paper 9
audit reform and corporate disclosure. The first four papers and a part of the fifth one were reflected in
the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 156 of 1999. The sixth paper led to the Financial
Services Reform Act 2001 (which took effect in March 2004). Paper 7 was also adopted and took
effect from July 2003. Paper 9 (CLERP 9) took effect in July 2004. Paper 8 has not been implemented
as yet. See the speech by the Hon Justice IDF Callinan on 28 October 1998 at the Corporations Law
Update Conference at the Sydney Marriot Hotel available at www.treasury.gov.au (accessed 2 March
2007).
227 Corporate Law Economic Reform Program: Paper 3 (Directors’ Duties and Corporate
Governance).
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4.2.2 Paper 3: Directors’ Duties and Corporate Governance
The main objective of this policy proposal paper was to improve corporate
governance. It was accepted that entrepreneurial activity and directors’ accountability
need to be correctly balanced,229 but that flexibility and innovation should not be
compromised.230 A number of proposals are made in this paper. The first proposal
concerns a statutory business judgment rule and a statutory derivative action.231 The
second proposal relates to amendments concerning certain obligations of directors,
such as to replace the duty of directors to act honestly with a duty to act in good faith
in the best interests of the corporation and for a proper purpose.232 The third proposal
is that a company’s ability to indemnify officers for legal expenses should be
clarified.233 The fourth proposal concerns the desirability of a standard form of due
diligence defence for directors and the last proposal concerned the monitoring of
corporate governance practices by Australian companies.234
The second proposal is important for purposes of this thesis. It recommends that
directors should be certain of their duties to the company. A dual test is
recommended in respect of the duty of care and diligence based on objective and
subjective elements.235 It is also proposed that a breach of the duty of care and
diligence should only give rise to civil sanctions and not to criminal penalties.236
More importantly for purposes of this thesis, it is proposed that directors should
exercise their powers and discharge their duties in good faith in the best interests of
228 CLERP 9 constitutes one of the most significant packages of corporate law. Most of the reforms of
CLERP 9 are, however, in the area of audit and financial reporting and is not important for purposes of
this thesis. The issue of stakeholder protection is not discussed in CLERP 9.
229 Part 2 par 2.1
230 Part 3 par 3.4.
231 Part 5.
232 Part 4.
233 Page 50.
234 Page 54. See pp 1–4 for the proposals.
235 Proposal 2 in the report.
236 Part 4 par 4.3.2.
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the corporation and for a proper purpose.237 Part 4238 of the Policy Paper confirms
that the role of directors is to oversee the management of a company on behalf of its
members. Directors are responsible for maximising the value of the company for the
benefit of the members, subject to the legal framework and economic environment in
which the company operates. Directors should therefore also ensure that the company
meets its contractual and other obligations, such as in relation to the environment,
trade practices, fair trading and occupational health and safety.239 When directors
manage a company, they are subject to various duties as entrenched in the
constitution of the specific company, the general law and legislation, including but
not limited to, corporations law.240
Part 7 relates to corporate governance trends on domestic and international level. The
shareholder and stakeholder models are compared. It is confirmed that the corporate
governance structures of common law countries, such as Australia and the United
Kingdom, are based on the outside or shareholder model of corporate control.241 The
stakeholder or inside model, in contrast, is applied in civil law countries, such as
France, the Netherlands and Italy. In terms of this model, directors should seek to
align the interests of the various stakeholders, such as workers, creditors, suppliers
and customers.242 In Australia therefore the corporate managers are accountable to
the shareholders. The focus of this model is profit maximisation for the owners of the
corporation. It is, however, acknowledged that elements of the stakeholder or inside
model are also present in Australia. For example, the ability of creditors to initiate
voluntary administrative procedures of the corporations law is indicative of the
presence of elements of the stakeholder model.243
237 Paragraph 3.2 above.
238 See also part 6.5, par 6.5.1.
239 Part 4 par 4.1.
240 Other legislation may also impose duties on directors, such as environmental control legislation.
See part 4 par 4.4.
241 This model is discussed in ch 2 par 4 above.
242 Part 7 par 7.2.1.
243 Part 7 par 7.2.1.
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It is acknowledged that both the shareholder and stakeholder models have
experienced some failures in the past.244 A recent economic analysis of laws
governing investor protection in 49 countries was inconclusive in passing judgement
on the preferred system.245 The researchers indicated that the type of legal system is
not always that important as investors can generally contract around any limitations
of a particular system.246 It does, however, appear that the shareholder model is
preferred in Paper 3 of CLERP. The drafters make the following proposal on a
director’s duty of good faith:
The existing duty in subsection 232(2) to act honestly should be
reformulated to capture the fiduciary principles that a director or other
officer of a corporation must exercise their powers and discharge their
duties:
(a) in good faith in the best interests of the corporation; and
(b) for a proper purpose.
When discussing directors’ duties in part 4, the drafters state that directors should act
in the best interests of the corporation and maximise shareholder value. They qualify
this statement by stating that directors should also keep other obligations like
contractual obligations in mind.247 The interests of stakeholders and whether or not
directors should consider it when managing a company did not receive specific
attention in this Paper.
4.3 The Corporate Responsibility Report of June 2006
The Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial
Services issued a report on corporate responsibility and “triple-bottom line” reporting
in June 2006. This report is of specific importance for purposes of this thesis and is
discussed in detail below.
244 Part 7 par 7.2.1.
245 Part 7 par 7.2.1.
246 The particular system of corporate governance is, however, important for the stakeholders of the
company as they cannot always contract out of the limitations.
247 Part 4 par 4.1.
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The committee’s terms of reference for investigation of the committee, as provided in
chapter 1, were the following:
a) The extent to which organisational decision-makers have an existing regard for the
interests of stakeholders other than shareholders, and the broader community
b) The extent to which organisational decision-makers should have regard for the
interests of stakeholders other than shareholders, and the broader community
c) The extent to which the current legal framework governing directors’ duties
encourages or discourages them from having regard for the interests of stakeholders
other than shareholders, and the broader community
d) Whether revisions to the legal framework, particularly to the Corporations Act, are
required to enable or encourage incorporated entities or directors to have regard for
the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders, and the broader community. In
considering this matter, the committee will also have regard to obligations that exist
in laws other than the Corporations Act.
e) Any alternative mechanisms, including voluntary measures that may enhance
consideration of stakeholder interests by incorporated entities and/or their directors.
f) The appropriateness of reporting requirements associated with these issues
g) Whether regulatory, legislative or other policy approaches in other countries could
be adopted or adapted for Australia248
These issues are crucial to the investigation in this thesis and to the questions asked in
chapter 1.
Chapters 1 and 2 of the report provide an introduction and some background
concerning corporate responsibility. Chapter 3 deals with drivers and principles of
corporate responsibility,249 chapter 4 deals with directors’ duties and chapter 5 with
248 Page viii and ch 1 par 1.1.
249 In this chapter the question is asked whether companies should use their resources to undertake
activities that are without any direct financial benefits or return. It is stated that companies are
becoming increasingly aware that managing non-financial risks and pursuing opportunities to
undertake corporate responsibility activities may benefit the long-term performances of the company
(at par 3.16).
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institutional investors.250 Chapters 6 and 7 concern sustainability,251 and chapter 8
deals with the encouragement of corporate responsibility. For purposes of this thesis,
chapters 1, 2, 4 and 8 are particularly relevant.
It is stated in chapters 1 and 2 of the Corporate Responsibility Report that corporate
responsibility relates to the economic, social and environmental impacts of a
company’s activities.252 Corporate responsibility implies that companies take an
“enlightened” approach to consider the interests of company stakeholders.253
Stakeholders are, according to the report, groups and individuals that are impacted on
by the activities of a company and they can have an impact on corporate activity.254
The following definition is attributed to stakeholders:
The term ‘stakeholder’ covers a wide array of interest holders depending
on the definition used. It is important to recognise that the stakeholder
definition used impacts on what is required of corporations to meet CSR
demands. Early stakeholder theory focused on the managerial model of
an entity and, as a result, narrowly defined ‘stakeholder’ as a group that
impacts on the success of the organisation in terms of production
outcomes and transactions. The broader definition of the stakeholder view
of the firm includes those who may affect or be affected by the
organisation, employees, customers, local community, management,
owners and suppliers and so on.255
250 Institutional investors can have an important influence on corporate behaviour. Evidence shows that
institutional investors are increasingly considering non-financial factors, because these factors
influencing the company’s financial future. The availability of relevant information is important in
order for institutional shareholders or investors to consider these non-financial factors (at ch 5 of the
Corporate Responsibility Report).
251
“Sustainability” refers to the practice of measuring and publicly reporting on economic, social and
environmental performances, as well as future prospects. A number of arguments were raised
concerning voluntary versus mandatory reporting. The committee was in favour of voluntary
reporting, indicating that mandatory reporting can lead to box-ticking. Particular attention was given to
the reporting requirements in terms of the ASX’s Best Practice Principles and Recommendations,
although an “if not why not” approach is followed (at ch 6 of the Corporate Responsibility Report).
252 Chapter 1 pars 1.1–1.10 and also ch 2 par 2.7.
253 Chapter 2 par 2.7.
254 Paragraph 2.16.
255 Chapter 2 par 2.17.
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It is further held that “the terms ‘corporate social responsibility’, ’corporate social
transparency’, ’triple bottom line’, ‘corporate sustainability’ and ‘social and
environmental responsibility’ are all used to refer to the same concept”.256
Chapter 4 deals with directors’ duties.257 The committee considered a number of
arguments on whether or not directors should consider the interests of stakeholders
when they manage a company.258 The question whether a legislative change was
necessary to permit or require responsible corporate behaviour was specifically
considered. In contrast it was argued that directors will breach their duties if they give
consideration to any factors other than maximising profits.259 The committee, in turn,
received opinions that directors may consider the interests of other stakeholders, but
only to the extent that they are relevant to the corporation.260 The last-mentioned
approach is favoured in the report.261 This approach is referred to as the “enlightened
self-interest approach”. The committee argued that there is no need for any legislative
changes directing directors to take into account the interests of other stakeholders.262
Nothing in current legislation constrains directors from contributing to the long-term
development of the corporation, by taking account of the interests of stakeholders.
Any failure by corporations to focus on the interests of stakeholders is not due to the
fact that there is no legal regulation obliging directors to do so. The solution is
therefore unlikely to be of a legislative nature.
256 Chapter 2 par 2.5.
257 Chapter 4 pars 4.2–4.8.
258 Various interpretations of what the existing legal framework put forward regarding corporate
responsibility were discussed. These interpretations can be classified into four groups, namely: (1) the
directors’ restrictive interpretation (directors cannot undertake activities based on corporate
responsibility, such activities will not be in the direct best interests of the corporation), (2) the
shareholders’ restrictive interpretation (corporations undertake activities based on corporate
responsibility to invest those funds for shareholder wealth), (3) the short-term interests interpretation
(investment in corporate responsibility is allowed, but only if it can be justified on the basis of annual
return on investments), and (4) the enlightened self-interest interpretation (careful appropriate
corporate responsibility is almost always in the interests of the corporation, and thus falls within the
actions permitted by directors in terms of their current duties) (at 4.11).
259 This argument is referred to as the “directors’ restrictive interpretation”. See ch 4 par 4.12.
260 Chapter 4 par 4.32.
261 Chapter 4 par 4.39.
262 Chapter 4 par 4.40.
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The committee recommended “that the Corporations Act 2001 permits directors to
have regard for the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders, and recommends
that amendments to the directors’ duties provisions within the Corporations Act are
not required”.263
Chapter 8 concerns the encouragement of corporate responsibility. Despite the fact
that it was the view of the committee that the consideration of stakeholder interests
should not be included as part of directors’ duties, it recognised that it was necessary
to also consider broader corporate responsibilities. Corporate responsibility can be
encouraged through, for example, business and industry initiatives. Businesses could
undertake activities which fall under the broad banner of “corporate responsibility”,
for example, an industry led corporate responsibility network.264 Reference was made
to the Business in the Community (BITC) initiative in the United Kingdom as a
successful industry-led corporate responsibility network. BITC describes itself as “a
unique independent business led charity whose purpose is to inspire, engage, and
support and challenge companies, to continually improve the impact they have on
society”.265 BITC provides a platform for collaboration between businesses and for
sharing best practice. It works with businesses to develop practical and sustainable
solutions to manage and embed responsible business practice.266 The committee
recommended that “the Australian government provide seed funding to establish an
organisation, the Australian Corporate Responsibility Network, to be modelled on the
United Kingdom initiative Business in the Community”.267
The structuring of directors’ remuneration is another option to encourage corporate
responsibility. Directors’ remuneration and packages are generally based on the
263 Recommendation 1, par 4.78.
264 Chapter 8 par 8.12.
265 Chapter 8 par 8.12.
266 Chapter 8 par 8.13. The Australian Business and Community Network also joined BITC because
“because they recognise the value of integrating policy and practice and the internal dialogue this
prompts” (see par 8.15).
267 Chapter 8 paragraph 8.19.
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company’s 12- to 36-month returns to shareholders. It is therefore important for
directors to maximise profits over the short-term. The committee also heard evidence
that these short-term incentives work against corporate responsibility initiatives and
long-term shareholder value.268 Evidence was received on innovative remuneration
components being linked to specific community, market, environmental, health and
safety targets.269 The committee recommended that “investors, stakeholders and
relevant business associations should encourage companies to include long-term
(beyond a three- to five-year timeframe) and corporate responsibility performance
measures as part of the remuneration packages of company directors, executive
officers and managers”.270
The committee also discusses the role of government in facilitating and promoting
corporate responsibility. The Australian government is currently undertaking a range
of activities designed to promote corporate responsibility. These activities include the
Prime Minister’s Community Business Partnership and various sustainability
initiatives. The Australian Prime Minister’s Community Business Partnership271
consists of a group of prominent Australians from the community and business sector
who foster community business partnerships, act as a “thinktank” on philanthropic
matters and promote corporate giving and corporate social responsibility.272 The idea
is that the government, the community and businesses work together to address social
challenges. In terms of this partnership the Prime Minister issue awards for
excellence in community business partnerships every year. The award is given to a
business partnership who contributes to addressing community concerns in an
effective manner.273 Other major awareness activities undertaken by the partnership
include: National Community Business Partnerships Week, the Corporate Social
268 Chapter 8 paragraph 8.24.
269 Chapter 8 pars 8.24–8.30.
270 Recommendation 14.
271 Established in 1999.
272 Chapter 8 par 8.59–8.74. For a summary on ch 8 see pp xvi–xix.
273 Chapter 8 paragraph 8.66.
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Responsibility Essay Competition,274 and the granting of sponsorships for various
conferences and seminars.275 The evidence that the committee received indicated that
the work of the partnership was seen as a positive step by the Australian government
to promote corporate responsibility.276
The Corporate Responsibility Report therefore supports the enlightened shareholder
value approach (or enlightened self-interest approach) and states that an effective
director will realise that it is in the best interests of the corporation to consider the
interests of other stakeholders.277 It suggests that mandatory approaches to corporate
responsibility are not appropriate, because nothing in the Corporations Act of 2001
prevents directors from considering the interests of other stakeholders than the
shareholders. The committee recommends other methods to encourage directors to
consider the interests of other stakeholders.
4.4 The Social Responsibility Report of December 2006
In December 2006 another report, the Social Responsibility of Corporations Report,
was issued by the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee.278 The committee
confirmed that corporate social responsibility is in essence focused on the way in
which the affairs of companies are conducted, with particular reference to its
environmental and social impact.279 The committee considered various approaches to
the issue of social responsibility, including the compliance, philanthropic, business
and social primacy, and social obligation approaches. The first few approaches
mentioned are directly and indirectly linked to corporate benefit. But the social
primacy and social obligation approaches are not necessarily linked to corporate
274 The essay competition provides an opportunity for both high school and university students to
express their opinions about the role of business in society.
275 Chapter 8 paragraph 8.70.
276 Chapter 8 paragraph 8.71.
277 Chapter 4 par 4.76.
278 Hereafter the Social Responsibility Report available at www.camac.gov.au (accessed 15 October
2007).
279 Paragraph 2.1 of the Social Responsibility Report.
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benefit. In view of these approaches, the Advisory Committee was asked to consider
the interests directors should or may take into account in corporate decision making.
They also had to consider how corporations should report on the social and
environmental impact of their conduct.280
In terms of the compliance approach, companies are obliged to comply with the
“letter of the law”, but companies may benefit from complying with the “spirit of the
law”.281 The philanthropic approach involves companies giving to the community in
a variety of financial or other ways above and beyond their primary business
activities.282 The business approach, also referred to as the “self-interest approach”,
suggests that, beyond a company’s obligation to comply with environmental and
social laws, it is likely to be in a company’s own commercial interests (in terms of
long-term value and risk reduction) to take account of the environmental and social
contexts in which it operates.283 The social primacy and social obligation approaches
state that directors should take ethical goals into account in their corporate decision
making whether or not this enhances corporate profit or shareholder gain.284
In respect of directors’ duties, the committee did not support a revision of the
Corporations Act of 2001. They argued that the established formulation of directors’
duties allows sufficient flexibility to take relevant interests and the broader
community into account when managing a company. The committee suggested that
the business approach provides an appropriate framework within in which companies
can respond to issues of social responsibility. This conclusion was mainly based on
the fact that directors have adequate flexibility in terms of the current law to act in a
280 Paragraph 1.1 of the Social Responsibility Report.
281 Paragraph 2.3.1 of the Social Responsibility Report. To comply with “the spirit of the law” will help
to safeguard the company against reputational and other risks to longer-term shareholder value arising
from perceived attempts to flout the intent of the law.
282 Paragraph 2.3.2 of the Social Responsibility Report. Philanthropy in this context may go beyond
corporate donations to charitable causes. It can, for example, extend to corporate sponsorship and
direct involvement with particular communities in social projects.
283 Paragraph 2.3.3 of the Social Responsibility Report.
284 Paragraphs 2.3.4–2.3.5 of the Social Responsibility Report.
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socially responsible manner. They are able to have regard to the interests of
stakeholders, but they should remain accountable to the shareholders.285
The committee further recommended that the most effective way to address concerns
relating to environmental and social impacts are by specific legislative measures
directed at the specific issue. This is in line with the recommendations of the
Corporate Responsibility Report of June 2006.
5 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter considered in whose interests directors should act when they manage a
company under Australian law. First, a brief overview was provided on the general
and statutory duties of directors. It was seen that directors’ duties have been partially
codified in the Corporations Act of 2001.286 When considering Australian case law it
seems as if the statutory duties are relied on much more than the general duties.287 It
is clear from Australian case law that if a code of directors’ duties is drafted in clear
terms directors will be certain of what is expected of them.288
The traditional position in Australia is that directors should act in the best interests of
the shareholders collectively. However a number of corporate governance initiatives
such as the Corporate Responsibility Report of June 2006 in Australia indicate that
the enlightened shareholder value approach (or business approach or enlightened self-
interest approach) should be followed.289 Directors should therefore consider the
interests of other stakeholders when they manage a company. But stakeholders are
285 This approach is in line with the approaches followed in the United Kingdom and South Africa
(specifically in terms of the South African Policy Document of 2004). See chapters 3 and 6 in this
regard.
286 Paragraph 3.1 above.
287 Paragraph 3.1 above.
288 Paragraph 3.1 above.
289 Paragraph 4 above.
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not directly referred to in the Act as is the position in the United Kingdom.290 The
protection of stakeholders’ interests is still self-regulatory and is based on voluntary
corporate governance initiatives. Some reports suggest alternative methods on how to
consider the interests of other stakeholders.291 These suggestions include that an
industry led corporate responsibility network should be established and that the
remuneration of directors should be linked to corporate responsibility.292
Other legislation relating to the interests of employees, consumers and creditors was
also considered.293 It was found that consumers enjoy adequate protection in other
legislation.294 It would seem, however, that employees are not adequately
protected.295 Similar to the position in England, directors should consider the interests
of creditors when a company is nearing insolvency.296
290 Chapter 3 above.
291 Paragraph 4.3 above.
292 Paragraph 4.3 above.
293 See also ch 2 par 5.2 above where it is indicated that directors should take the protection that
stakeholders receive in other legislation into account when managing a company.
294 Paragraph 3.2.5 above.
295 Paragraph 3.2.4 above.
296 See the discussion on the interpretation of this duty of directors to creditors in ch 6 par 3.2 below.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Southern Development Coordination Conference was established in 1980.1 Its
main aim was to coordinate development projects in order to lessen economic
dependence on South Africa which was, at the time, governed by an apartheid
government. More specifically, its aims included decreasing economic dependency,
especially on South Africa, creating regional integration, mobilising local resources
and ensuring international cooperation.2
In August 1992 the organisation was transformed and the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) was formed.3 The SADC Treaty was signed in
Windhoek on 17 August 1992.4 Article 6 of the treaty places an obligation on
member states to adopt measures to promote the achievement of SADC’s objectives.
The treaty aims to give effect to this objective through a series of protocols.5 The
protocols set out principles and procedures under which member states will co-
1 In Lusaka, Zambia. The founding member states were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mozambique, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
2 Henning & Du Toit “Financial Markets in the Southern African Development Community” 41.
3 Hereafter SADC. The current member states are Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland,
United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
4 Hereafter the SADC Treaty (www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No43/TheTreaty.html (accessed 20
June 2006)).
5 Article 22 of the SADC Treaty.
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operate in specific areas.6 The treaty can therefore be seen as a declaration of intent,
rather than a firm agreement.7 The SADC objectives include achieving development
and economic growth, alleviating poverty, enhancing the standard and quality of life
of people in southern Africa, and supporting the socially disadvantaged through
regional integration, to evolve political values, systems and institutions, and to
achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes.8
The ultimate objective is to build a region in which there will be a high degree of
harmonisation. SADC is therefore the most important mechanism or body when it
comes to the promotion of economic co-operation in southern Africa.9
Member states must harmonise, rationalise and coordinate their policies and
strategies for sustainable development in line with the treaty. The treaty commits
member states to principles of sovereign equality, peace, security, human rights,
equity, balance and mutual benefit.10 The member states should indicate their
commitment to act in accordance with these principles. SADC’s vision is now one
“of a common future, within a regional community that will ensure economic well-
being, improvement of the standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social
justice and peace and security for the peoples of Southern Africa”.11
The principal institutions of SADC are: the Summit, the Troika, the Council of
Ministers, the Standing Committee of Senior Officials, SADC National Committees,
the Secretariat, the Organ on Defence, Politics and Security Cooperation and the
Tribunal.12
6 www.zuidafrika.nl/politics (accessed 20 June 2006).
7 Henning & Du Toit “Financial Markets in the Southern African Development Community” 43.
8 Article 5 of the SADC Treaty; www.sadc.int (accessed 20 June 2006).
9 Henning & Du Toit “Financial Markets in the Southern African Development Community” 42.
10 Article 4 of the SADC Treaty.
11 www.sadcreview.com/sadc/sadc_profile (accessed 11 June 2006).
12 Article 9 of the SADC Treaty. The Summit is the ultimate policy-making institution. The Troika
consists of the Chair, the Incoming Chair and the Outgoing Chair. The Council of Ministers consists of
Ministers from each member state, usually the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Council should
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As already mentioned, the aims of the treaty are given effect by means of various
protocols. SADC operates through a system of sectoral responsibilities. Each member
state assumes responsibility for the promotion and attainment of certain goals in a
specific sector. South Africa has been assigned with the portfolio of finance and
investment. Harmonisation of stock exchange listing requirements and central
banking regulation has already taken place.13 However, no initiatives are yet under
way in respect of the harmonisation of the corporate laws of the various SADC
countries.14
The Office of the Legal Affairs Unit was established in February 2002. This unit was
established to assist member states to harmonise their laws in areas such as trade,
commerce, finance and labour.15
oversee the functioning and development of SADC, ensuring that the policies are properly
implemented. The Standing Committee of Officials is the technical advisory committee to the Council.
The National Committees should provide inputs at the national level when regional policies and
strategies are formulated. The Secretariat is the principal executive institution of SADC and its
members are responsible for strategic planning, co-ordination and management of SADC programmes.
Priorities for the Secretariat are based on how they can best achieve the objectives of SADC. These
priorities include: trade, finance and investment, stakeholder participation and policy, formulation and
harmonisation. The Organ on Defence, Politics and Security Co-operation promotes peace and security
in the region. The Tribunal will ensure proper interpretation of the provisions of the SADC Treaty. See
Arts 10–16 of the SADC Treaty, and the profile of SADC at www.sadc.int (accessed 20 June 2006).
13 On 8 October 1999 a press statement was released announcing that the listing requirements of stock
exchanges in Botswana, South Africa, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe have been
harmonised. The 13 principles set out in the listing requirements of the JSE Limited have been applied.
Harmonisation relating to the regulation of central banks has also taken place. See Henning & Du Toit
“Financial Markets in the Southern African Development Community” 46.
14 Henning & Du Toit “Financial Markets in the Southern African Development Community” 45–46,
67. The Department of Trade and Industry has embarked on a programme dealing with the
harmonisation of business laws in Africa. The objective of harmonisation of business laws in Africa is
to facilitate business activity and transactions at relatively low costs. A workshop was held in
December 2006 in Tshwane, South Africa and it was stated that the way forward is to establish a
standing committee on the harmonisation of business laws in Africa. The committee should consist of
member states of the African Union. No further information on this programme is available.
15 The Protocol on Legal Affairs is available at http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union
/SADC.html dated 7 August 2000 (accessed 20 June 2006).
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2 THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY AND THE
HARMONISATION OF CORPORATE LAWS
It has already been mentioned that harmonisation of South African corporate law
with the laws of international investors and other southern African states is very
important.16 It is especially important to consider the laws in SADC countries,
because their circumstances are similar to those in South Africa.17 SADC and its
objectives were discussed in general above. The developments in the company law of
Botswana, as an example of a SADC country, are investigated below.
The format of this chapter differs from the United Kingdom, Australian and South
African chapters. The aim of this chapter is to provide another African perspective,
apart from South Africa, on stakeholder protection. The focus is on SADC’s aim of
harmonisation. An appraisal is conducted on whether or not Botswana went against
SADC’s gaol of harmonisation in southern African states by applying New Zealand
company law instead of English law.
African states have diverse legal systems, usually classified according to a common
law family, a continental European civil law family or a mixed legal family. Nigeria,
Ghana and Kenya are examples of common law families and Togo of the civil law
family.18 Former French or Belgium colonies usually fall within the civil law family.
Most Southern African countries have mixed jurisdictions, being a combination of
common law and Roman-Dutch law. The existence of these different legal families in
Africa have the advantage that it should be possible to harmonise the laws of certain
African states according to the specific system followed, thus facilitating regional
harmonisation.19
16 Havenga “Regulating Directors’ Duties” 609.
17 The Policy Document ch 3 par 3.5.
18 Bamodu “Transnational Law” 127.
19 Bamodu “Transnational Law” 125–135. The SADC process is an attempt to harmonise the laws of
countries in southern Africa. West and Central African Countries signed OHADA, a French acronym
for the Organisation for Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa. This is an attempt to harmonise the
laws of traditional civil law family countries, specifically business law (www.mpmagazine.com
(accessed 20 June 2006)).
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The February 2005 NEDLAC Report states:20
If there is a need for harmonization with company law in other countries,
it should be limited to those jurisdictions that are closely
aligned/approximated to that of South Africa, and to those countries
which provide a significant source of investment to South Africa…
This chapter therefore focuses on corporate law harmonisation between southern
African states and other African states are not considered.
Harmonisation in the context of international law relates to the process by which
different states adopt the same laws. Laliberte states:21
Virtually by definition, commercial legislation is focused on regulating
business activities within a given country. When the type of legislation
varies to some degrees [sic] from one country to another within a region,
it generally ensues that relationships may become more complex for
enterprises doing business in more than one country. This is why it would
be beneficial to create a business law model with the objective, through a
harmonisation process, of facilitating compliance with legal requirements
throughout the region and thus promote and facilitate trade and
investment in the region, both regionally and internationally.
The company laws in most of the southern African states are based on English law.
This makes the aim of harmonisation more achievable.22 However, as was pointed
out above, such harmonisation has not yet taken place.23
Henning points out that a number of issues need to be addressed when attempting to
harmonise company laws. These issues include the maintenance of share capital, the
transferability of shares, the protection of minority shareholders, the structuring of
company groups, takeovers and mergers, worker participation on the boards of
20 See February 2005 NEDLAC Report par 6.3.8.
21 Laliberte (1999) in Henning & Du Toit “Financial Markets in the Southern African Development
Community” 47.
22 Bamodu “Transnational Law” 133.
23 The SADC Programme for Regional Harmonisation of the Accountancy Profession of 1998
included harmonisation of the business laws of the SADC region, but this has not yet taken place. See
Henning & Du Toit “Financial Markets in the Southern African Development Community” 47.
187
companies, and the duties and responsibilities of the management board or board of
directors of a company.24 This discussion only focuses on directors’ duties, especially
in whose interests they should manage a company and whether or not their duties
should be codified.
Despite the obvious need for harmonisation and the objectives of the treaty, various
SADC countries are conducting their own review processes. The result of some of
these reviews has been to deviate from the English common law, which could make
eventual harmonisation even more difficult. This could arguably be seen as a
violation of the duties of the member states in terms of the treaty.25
Botswana is one of the countries that has recently reviewed its company laws,
resulting in a new Companies Act of 2003.26 Other countries also conducted reviews,
but they have not yet resulted in new company legislation.27 The developments in
Botswana are therefore discussed in more detail below.
24 Henning  & Du Toit “Financial Markets in the Southern African Development Community” 48.
25 See Art 6 of the SADC Treaty, which provides that “member states undertake to adopt adequate
measures to promote the achievement of the objectives of SADC, and shall refrain from taking any
measure likely to jeopardise the sustenance of its principles, the achievement of its objectives and the
implementation of the provisions of this Treaty”. Art 33 of the SADC Treaty also provides that
“sanctions may be imposed against any member state that persistently fails, without good reason, to
fulfil obligations assumed under this treaty or implements policies which undermine the principles and
objectives of SADC”.
26 This Act came into force on 3 July 2007, see n 57 below.
27 For example, Swaziland. The current Swaziland company legislation dates back to 1912 (see the
Companies and Associations Act 7 of 1912). This Act is still applicable. Their commercial legislation
is therefore outdated and in many aspects not sufficient for the modern businessman. Recognition of
the need for corporate law reform in Swaziland is not new. In 1977 a commission was set up to
investigate the commercial law regime in Swaziland, but no formal report was issued. In 1988 another
effort was made, but the work of the 1988 committee received almost no publicity and its sittings were
not public. In 1997 Prof J Kiggundu of the University of Botswana was appointed as a consultant to
review the 1912 Act. He produced an Interim and Final Report as well as a Draft Companies Bill in
2001. The process is, however, still ongoing. See Baloro “Corporate Law and National Development”
130–133; Kiggundu “Modern Company Law” 130.
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3 THE CASE OF BOTSWANA
3.1 The Company Law Review Process: An Overview
3.1.1 Introduction
In 1885 Britain proclaimed a protectorate over Bechuanaland (today known as
Botswana). The Bechuanaland Protectorate was formally established in 1891. The
law of the Cape Colony (which was under British occupation) was applied and
became the law of Botswana. Botswana company law was mainly based on English
law. In 1934 it was realised that these laws were not suitable for Botswana. The
government secretary suggested that it should be replaced with more modern
legislation. The crown prosecutor then drafted the first Bechuanaland company law.
It was largely based on the Companies Act of the South African Union.28 This
company law was also viewed as inadequate and in 1959 a draft Proclamation was
issued.29 Its aim was to establish a more modern and comprehensive company law,
based on English company law (the Companies Act of 1948), but suited to the
circumstances of the specific territory. The draft proclamation was modelled on the
Southern Rhodesia30 Companies Act of 1951 which, in turn, was modelled on the
Companies Act of 1948 of England. The draft Proclamation was passed as the new
Companies’ Proclamation in April 1959.31 The Companies’ Proclamation then
became the Companies Act of 1959.32 This Act has been amended several times; for
the last time in 1995.33
28 Act 46 of 1926.
29 The Proclamation was amended in 1961 by the Companies (Amendment) Act 8 of 1961.
30 Now Zimbabwe. The South Rhodesian Companies Act was amended by the Companies (Southern
Rhodesia) Amendment Act 20 of 1959.
31 Laws of Bechuanaland Protectorate, Proclamation 71 of 1959.
32 Laws of Botswana ch 42:01.
33 Act 7 of 1995 (hereafter the Companies (Amendment) Act of 1995). See Kiggundu “Company Law
Reform in Botswana” 496–499 for a complete discussion of the history of Botswana company law. He
also discusses the amendments that the 1995 Act brought about in detail. See also Kiggundu
“Botswana” 23–25.
189
The 1995 amendments were not a comprehensive reform of the company laws of
Botswana, but they brought about interesting changes that had profound effects on
Botswana company law.34 Disclosure and transparency were the main themes of the
amendments. The most important amendments relate to the strengthening of the
office of the Registrar, clarifying his duties and functions, reforming the rules on
capital maintenance and introducing new requirements relating to company directors
and secretaries.35
These amendments effected only piecemeal changes to the company legislation in
that jurisdiction. Kiggundu advocated for a complete review of the company law in
Botswana.36 In 1999 Professor Peter McKenzie was appointed as a consultant to
review Botswana company law. 37
McKenzie first issued an Interim Report38 on the Botswana Companies Act followed
by a Final Report.39
34 Kiggundu “Company Law Reform in Botswana” 496.
35 Sections 2, 14, 66–71.
36 Kiggundu “Company Law Reform in Botswana” 496; see also Kiggundu “Modern Company Law”
101.
37 Peter McKenzie is an eminent expert in company law in New Zealand. During a meeting with him
in New Zealand during April 2007, he kindly provided me with the following documents: The Interim
Report on the Review of the Botswana Companies Act (18 March 1999) (hereafter the Interim Report)
drafted by himself; commentary on the Companies Bill received by Michael Letsogile Mothobi from
the University of Botswana (undated) (his comments are mainly on the draft provisions concerning
company types and forms, on the application of the Act and on the transitional provisions and not on
directors’ duties); commentary received from Neil Armstrong of the Law Society of Botswana (May
2000) and McKenzie’s response thereto and A Review on the Final Report on the Review of the
Botswana Act drafted by Matheson Ormsby Prentice from Dublin (9 March 2000) (this review
document dealt mainly with the question of regulation and the protection of shareholders and the
public rather than with the structure of companies. Directors’ duties were not discussed in this review
document). The Final Report on the Review of the Companies Act (3 November 1999) (hereafter the
Final Report) on which the review of Mr Prentice was based was compiled by McKenzie. The draft
Companies Bill was attached to this report. A copy of this report was kindly provided to me by Prof
Kiggundu.
38 The Draft Companies Bill of Botswana has been prepared on the basis of this Interim Report. The
recommendations contained in this report were put forward at a seminar held in Gaborone on 21 April
1999.
39 It is important to discuss both the Interim and the Final Reports, because the Interim Report was
more detailed.
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In the Interim Report of March 1999 a brief background statement is provided on the
current Botswana Companies Act,40 followed by the approach taken in reviewing the
Act as well as a detailed statement on the main areas of reform.41
During the initial discussions, McKenzie canvassed two possible options concerning
the approach to be taken with the reform process. The first option was to update the
provisions of the current Act, but to retain that Act as far as possible. The second
option was to introduce a completely new Act which presented a straightforward
restatement of the law, without having to replicate the language or structure of the
present Act. The interested parties opted for the second option. The idea was
therefore to carry out a thorough review of the Act, but not to change the current law
if not necessary.42
It was stated in the Interim Report that cognisance had to be taken of certain issues
when reforming the Companies Act of Botswana. These issues included the
substantial increase in commercial activity in Botswana since the introduction of the
Botswana Companies Act of 1959; the need to update the current legislation by
having regard to the changes in the commercial practice of Botswana and the
comparable changes that had been introduced in other countries with an English-
based system of company law. The desirability of creating an efficient legal and
regulatory framework in order to facilitate domestic activity and encourage foreign
investments was also important. Botswana’s membership of SADC was also
mentioned as important, because the company law regime adopted in Botswana
should be compatible with the laws of other jurisdictions in the SADC region.43 The
revised Companies Act would therefore seek to be up to date, remove impediments
that would hamper business activities, and clarify and simplify the law.44
40 See the discussion on the background of the Companies Act of 1959 (hereafter the Companies Act
of 1959) below.
41 Paragraphs 1–2 of the Interim Report.
42 See par 6 of the Interim Report.
43 Whether or not Botswana, in fact, adopted a regime that is compatible with other SADC country’s
company law regimes is discussed below. See par 7 of the Interim Report.
44 See par 8 of the Interim Report.
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In paragraphs 10–16 of the Interim Report the appropriate company law model for
Botswana is discussed. These paragraphs are very important in view of the discussion
below on whether or not Botswana went against SADC’s goal of harmonisation by
mainly applying the law of New Zealand instead of the traditional English law. First
it is stated that various jurisdictions based on English law reviewed their company
legislation in the past 40 years. These countries include Canada, the United Kingdom,
Australia and New Zealand.45 The Australian Uniform Companies Act of 1961
provided an improved version of the English Companies Act of 1948. This improved
version was used as a model in various other Commonwealth jurisdictions, such as
Mauritius and Hong Kong. These Commonwealth countries have recently examined
their company legislation and rejected developments in Australia and the United
Kingdom as providing an appropriate model for other jurisdictions. Countries such as
Hong Kong and Sri Lanka used the New Zealand Companies Act as a model for
adoption in their company legislation. The Interim Report suggested that the New
Zealand model is simple and straightforward. It provides for a simple form of
incorporation of companies, and a more straightforward regime concerning disclosure
and accountability of directors. It therefore proposed that the New Zealand model be
used as a basis for the new Companies Act of Botswana, but that it should be adopted
to suit their local needs.46
The Interim Report then discusses and makes recommendations relating to small and
medium enterprises, the Registrar of Companies and the administration of insolvent
companies.47 This is followed with an outline provided on the main proposed
changes. The section dealing with directors’ duties is important.48 It points out that
there was no comprehensive statement of directors’ duties in the English Companies
45 South Africa is another example of a country that reviewed its company law during this period.
46 Since its inception in 1860 New Zealand company law was also modelled on English company law,
but rather followed the Canadian model when they reformed their company law in 1993. See generally
on the history of New Zealand law Du Plessis “Some International Developments” 226–227; Morison
Morisons’ Company Law New Zealand ch 1.
47 Paragraphs 21–41 of the Interim Report.
48 Paragraphs 42–132 of the Interim Report.
192
Act of 1948.49 Such a statement would, however, assist directors when exercising
their duties. It is suggested in the Interim Report that the statement on directors’
duties in the Mauritius Companies Act of 1984 is a useful example,50 due to the
balance that it creates between the need not to discourage enterprise and initiative on
the part of directors, but also to provide protection against misuse by directors of their
powers for personal advantage.51 It was therefore recommended that the new
Companies Act contain a statement of directors’ duties.52
The Final Report on the company law review process in Botswana was isused in
November 1999. The introduction to the Final Report states that the proposed
Companies Act provides a new restatement of company law for Botswana. It is
recommended that the New Zealand Companies Act of 1993 be adopted as the model
for the new company law legislation in Botswana, but adapted to the local needs and
infrastructure of Botswana.53 The Act should also be compatible with corresponding
provisions in South African and Zimbabwean company legislation.54 The remainder
of the Final Report deals with significant changes to company law in Botswana.
These changes include the abolition of the doctrines of ultra vires and constructive
notice, the abolition of the concepts of par value shares and nominal capital and
provides for a comprehensive statement of directors’ duties.55 For purposes of this
thesis the comprehensive statement of directors’ duties and powers is particularly
important.56
49 This is also currently the position in South Africa.
50 Sections 102–103 of the Mauritius Companies Act 57 of 1984. This Act is largely based on the
United Kingdom Companies Act of 1948 available at www.gov.mu/portal/gov/compdiv/file (accessed
16 November 2007).
51 See s 160(2) on the duty of a director to disclose, in writing, all the matters concerning the affairs of
the company relating to him personally.
52 Paragraphs 75–77 of the Interim Report.
53 This is in line with the approach proposed in the Interim Report.
54 Paragraph 2.1 of the Final Report. This is in line with the goal of SADC, namely the harmonisation
of business laws in southern African countries, as discussed above.
55 Paragraph 3.1 of the Final Report.
56 Sections 130–133; 158 of the Companies Act of 2003.
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McKenzie’s recommendations led to the Companies Bill of 2001, which was enacted
as the Companies Act of 2003.57
This Act demonstrates a radical departure from the English model, which was
previously applicable in Botswana.58 Some of the most prominent features of the
Companies Act of 2003 are the introduction of a simplified procedure for the
incorporation of a company;59 the abolition of the ulra vires doctrine and the doctrine
of constructive knowledge;60 the abolition of the concepts of par value shares and
nominal value;61 requirements regarding the disclosure of the beneficial ownership in
shares in the case of a public company;62 and providing for modern procedures
relating to the winding-up of a company.63 The Companies Act of 2003 introduced a
modern and comprehensive code of directors’ duties. It also regulates directors’ self-
dealing transactions and the disclosure of their interests.
3.1.2 Directors’ Duties
As background and to understand the changes that the 2003 Companies Act brought
about, a brief discussion is provided on the 1959 Companies Act in the next section.
Thereafter the relevant provisions in the 2003 Act are considered.
57 This Act is referred to as the ‘Companies Act of 2003’. It was enacted by Parliament on
10 December 2003. It only received presidential assent on 2 September 2004; therefore, it is cited as
Act 32 of 2004. This Act took a long time before it came into force, because there were no regulations
until June 2007. The Act eventually came into operation on 3 July 2007. For this Act, see Kiggundu
Botswana Company Law.
58 Act 105 of 1993. See par 3.1 of the Final Report. See also the discussion above on this issue as dealt
with in the Interim Report.
59 Sections 19–24, 29–44 of the Companies Act of 2003.
60 Sections 25–28 of the Companies Act of 2003.
61 Section 47 of the Companies Act of 2003.
62 Section 329 of the Companies Act of 2003.
63 Sections 364–488 of the Companies Act of 2003; Kiggundu “Modern Company Law” 101–103.
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3.1.2.1 The Companies Act of 1959
It was noted above that this Act was based on the English Companies Act of 1948.
The principles applicable to directors’ duties in terms of English law64 are therefore
relevant when interpreting the Companies Act of 1959.65
Several provisions in the Companies Act of 1959 were important regarding directors’
duties. Every public company had to have at least two directors and every private
company at least one. These directors had to be resident in Botswana.66 Directors
owed their company fiduciary duties, namely the duties of loyalty and good faith and
also had duties of care and skill. As a general rule, these duties were owed to the
company and not to individual shareholders.67
The duty of good faith entailed that directors should display good faith towards the
company when dealing on its behalf. The “company” was interpreted as meaning the
company as a whole being the shareholders collectively.68 This duty of good faith,
furthermore, entailed that directors were not allowed to place themselves in a position
where there was a conflict between their duties and their personal interests.69 This
duty was entrenched in legislation, which imposed a statutory obligation on directors
64 Traditional English law is relevant when discussing the 1959 Act. British company law has also
recently been reviewed and the United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006 is now applicable in
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (see ch 3 par 4.3 above).
65 See also the Interim Report where the current Botswana Companies Law, i.e. the Companies Act of
1959 is discussed. It is stated that this Act was based upon the English Companies Act of 1948 and
that the Companies (Amendment) Act of 1995 introduced significant changes (see pars 3–5 of the
Interim Report).
66 Section 139 of the Companies Act of 1959.
67 See Kiggundu “Botswana” 128–131. He refers to the English decisions of Percival v Wright [1902]
2 CH 421 and Allen v Hyatt (1914) 30 TLR 444 (PC). The last-mentioned case states that directors
may owe fiduciary duties to shareholders individually when they act as their agents. See ch 3 par 3.1.2
above.
68 See the following regarding the position in the United Kingdom: Percival v Wright at 421; Farrar &
Hannigan Company Law 380–391; Birds et al. Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 499; Davies Gower and
Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 371–379. These sources are relevant when referring to
the Companies Act of 1959 of Botswana because the company law of Botswana was based on the
English law, as discussed above.
69 Section 156 of the Companies Act of 1959. This statutory rule stated that a director should disclose
any personal interests to the board of directors.
195
to disclose any conflicting interest to the board.70 At common law a director was also
prohibited from the use of corporate property or information,71 usurping a corporate
opportunity,72 unfairly competing with the company and abusing confidence.73 A
director further had to exercise an unfettered discretion.74
Directors also owed a duty of care and skill to the company. The standard of care and
skill that was expected of a director was not very high.75
The Companies Act of 1959 also imposed various statutory duties on directors. It was
unlawful for a company to pay remuneration to a director free from income tax.76 A
company was also prohibited from making a loan to a director of that company or its
holding company.77 It was unlawful for a company to make any payment to its
directors by way of compensation for loss of office, without the full particulars of the
70 Section 156(2) of the Companies Act of 1959. If the director had a conflicting interest, the board
would decide whether the director could enter into a specific contract.
71 A director could not use a corporate opportunity, property or information to make a secret profit.
The company could, however, consent to such a profit being made at a general meeting. Kiggundu
refers to the South African case of Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co 1921 (AD) 168,
where a director was mandated to purchase a farm for the company, but could not agree on the terms
with the owner. The owner then promised that if he ever wanted to sell the farm, this director would
have first option to buy. The director later bought the farm, but never declared his interest and the
profit he made from the transaction to the company. The court held that the company was entitled to
recover the profit made by the director. See also Kiggundu “Botswana” 133–134.
72 A director was not allowed to take over a contract that was intended for the company. See Cook v
GC Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554 (PC). See Kiggundu “Botswana” 134–135.
73 A director could become a director of a rival company, but he was not allowed to subordinate the
interests of the first company to those of the second: Kiggundu “Botswana” 135.
74 Directors were not allowed to fetter their discretion. They could not contract on how they should
vote in future board meetings. See also Kiggundu “Botswana” 136.
75 See Kiggundu “Botswana” 137, where he refers to the English case of Re City Equitable Fire
Insurance Co Ltd [1925] 1 Ch 407 (CA) due to the 1959 Act being based on English company law.
There was no provision regulating the obligations of care, skill and diligence in the Companies Act of
1959.
76 Section 146(1) of the Companies Act of 1959.
77 Section 147(1) of the Companies Act of 1959. There were three exceptions to this general rule, see
Kiggundu “Botswana” 139; ss 139–159 of the Companies Act of 1959 relating to: “Directors: Position
and Duties”. There were also statutory provisions concerning directors’ compensation for loss of
office, (s 148 of the Companies Act of 1959) and provisions aimed at ensuring transparency in
directors’ dealings in company shares and debentures, (s 152(1) of the Companies Act of 1959). See
also Kiggundu & Havenga “The Regulation of Directors’ Self-Serving Conduct” 272–293.
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payment being disclosed to the members of the company and approved by the general
meeting.78 Directors’ interests in company securities were also regulated in the Act.
Botswana companies had to keep a register showing the number, description and
value of any shares or debentures of the company or any subsidiary or holding
company within a group of companies, held by or in trust for each director.79 A
director of a public company had to disclose to the board the number and class of
shares in which he held an interest as well as the nature of such interest.80
The 1959 Companies Act did not provide for a codification of directors’ duties. The
duties of directors were entrenched in the common law, case law and legislation. The
common law viewpoint prevailed, namely that directors should manage the company
in the best interests of the company as a whole, namely the shareholders
collectively.81 The provisions in this Act concerning directors’ duties were in line
with the current South African company law.82
3.1.2.2 The Companies Act of 2003
The 2003 Companies Act brought about several changes to the previous company
legislation. The most important change, for the purposes of this thesis, is the
comprehensive statement of directors’ duties.83 Kiggundu indicates that many
78 Section 148 of the Companies Act of 1959.
79 Section 152(1) of the Companies Act of 1959.
80 Section 223(b) of the Companies Act of 1959. See, generally, Kiggundu & Havenga “The
Regulation of Directors’ Self-Serving Conduct” 272–293.
81 See also ch 3 par 3.1.1 for a discussion of the position in the United Kngdom. See Percival v Wright
at 421; Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 380–391; Birds et al. Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 499;
Davies Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 371–379 for the position in the United
Kingdom (especially England).
82 Chapter 6 par 2.1.1 below.
83 The common law duties are therefore no longer applicable. See Kiggundu “Modern Company Law”
123: “the Companies Bill contains a comprehensive, modern codification of directors’ duties”.
(emphasis added). There is also no indication in s 130 of the Botswana Companies Act 2003 that the
common law is still applicable. In the South African Companies Bill, however, it is clearly stated in
clause 91(6) that “[t]he provisions in this section are in addition to, and not in substitution for, any
duties of the director of a company under the common law”. See the discussion below (n 99) on
whether or not the New Zealand Companies Act of 1993 provides for a comprehensive codification of
directors’ duties or not. (See generally on this issue, Morison Morisons’ Company Law New Zealand
ch 24; Farrar Corporate Governance 11).
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uncertainties prevailed regarding the duties of directors in terms of the common
law.84 In order to remove these uncertainties it was necessary to codify directors’
duties in clear and simple language. He also suggests that such a codification will
create a good balance between directors not misusing their powers, but still being
able to take initiative.85
Various sections relating to the duties of directors are important. Sections 126–160
regulate the position, powers and duties of directors and company secretaries. Section
126 defines a “director” and the “board”. A “director” is defined as any person
occupying the position of director or alternate director of a company, by whatever
name he may be called.86 “A board” is defined as directors of the company who
number no fewer than the required quorum acting together as a board of directors, or
if the company has only one director, that director. Section 127 provides that the
business of a company shall be managed under the direction or supervision of its
board. Section 128 concerns major transactions. A company may not enter into a
major transaction or make a substantial gift without approval by way of a special
resolution.87 Section 129 regulates the delegation of powers. The board of a company
may delegate its powers to a committee of directors, a director or an employee of the
company, or any other person, subject to any restrictions in the constitution of the
company.
Section 130 is of special importance for purposes of this thesis. It confirms the duty
of a director to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company. Section
130(5) states specifically that “the duties imposed by this section (130) shall be owed
to the company, and not to the shareholders, debenture-holders or creditors of the
company”. The section provides a list of directors’ duties. These duties include that
84 Kiggundu “Modern Company Law” 123. For example, it was uncertain whether or not the general
meeting should be allowed to ratify transactions where directors have acted in breach of their duties.
85 Kiggundu “Modern Company Law” 123–125.
86 Section 2 of the Companies Act of 1959.
87 An asset relates to any property of any kind, tangible or intangible and a major transaction means the
acquisition of assets whose value is more than half of the value of the company’s assets before the
acquisition or the disposition of assets whose value is more than half of the value of the company’s
assets before the disposition (see s 128(2)(a)(b) of the Companies Act of 2003).
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directors should exercise their powers in accordance with the Act and within the
limits and subject to the conditions established in terms of the constitution of the
company.88 Directors should obtain the authorisation of a general meeting before
doing anything for which such authorisation is required.89 Directors should exercise
their powers honestly and in the best interests of the company.90 They should exercise
the degree of skill, care and diligence required in section 158 of the Act.91 Directors
may not use any assets of the company for an illegal purpose,92 nor agree that the
company take on any obligation, unless they believe at that time, on reasonable
grounds, that the company will be able to perform in terms of that obligation.93
Directors must attend meetings of the directors of the company with reasonable
regularity.94
Since the Companies Act of 2003 is mainly based on the company law of New
Zealand, it is useful to consider how the phrase “the company” is interpreted in that
jurisdiction and whether or not their company legislation provides for a
comprehensive (or exhaustive) or partial codification of directors’ duties.95
In terms of New Zealand company law, directors owe a duty to “the company as a
whole” to act in good faith and in its best interests.96 This is interpreted as meaning
88 Section 130(a) of the Companies Act of 2003.
89 Section 130(b) of the Companies Act of 2003.
90 Section 130(c) of the Companies Act of 2003.
91 Section 130(d) of the Companies Act of 2003.
92 Section 130(j) of the Companies Act of 2003.
93 Section 130(e) of the Companies Act of 2003.
94 Section 130(l) of the Companies Act of 2003. “Reasonable regularity” is not defined in the Act.
Various other sections in the Act apply to the duties of company directors. Section 159 concerns
indemnity and insurance, s 140 relates to the use of company information, s 133 deals with the
approval of a company when a director wants to become a director or officer of a competing company.
Section 134 provides for the meaning of “interested”, when a director is interested in a transaction to
which the company is also a party, s 135 relates to the disclosure of such an interest by a director.
95 There are limited academic sources available on Botswana company law. New Zealand company
law may therefore provide some guidance on the interpretation of Botswana company law.
96 Section 131(1) of the New Zealand Companies Act of 105 of 1993 (hereafter the Companies Act of
1993).
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that they owe their duties to the shareholders collectively.97 However, in certain
instances they have a duty to act in good faith towards the company’s creditors.98
Section 131–149 of the New Zealand Companies Act of 1993 contains a codification
of directors’ fiduciary duties. There is no provision stating that the common law is
still applicable or that it is excluded. Most commentators are of the opinion that the
intention was to replace the common law and that these provisions reflect a
comprehensive code of directors’ duties.99 Additional duties may, however, be
imposed on directors by way of a contract or in terms of the company’s constitution.
If the interpretation of New Zealand sources is used as a basis, it can be said that the
new Botswana Companies Act follows the traditional position, namely that directors
should manage a company in the best interests of the shareholders collectively. The
97 Morison Morison’s Company Law New Zealand par 24.9. See also The Institute of Directors in New
Zealand “Deciding where Best Interest lies for Directors” at www.iod.org.nz/home/articles (accessed
20 April 2007).
98 See generally, Morison Morison’s Company Law New Zealand par 24.8. Case law of Australia and
New Zealand is referred to there. This is also discussed in detail in the South African chapter (ch 6 par
3.2).
99 Morison Morison’s Company Law New Zealand pars 23.2, 24.6 (in terms of the New Zealand
Companies Bill 1990 clause 116 it was originally intended that the statutory duties of directors be in
addition to the common law duties, but the final Act did not provide for this. The Act seems to be a
comprehensive set of duties, superseding the common law); Farrar Corporate Governance 109, 111
states that it is unclear as to whether the New Zealand law codifies directors’ duties, but it does seem
that the law is restated and case law occasionally reformed; Watson “Directors’ Duties” 495–499
suggests that these provisions seem to represent a comprehensive code of directors’ duties, although it
is not stated as such in the Act. Even if it is a comprehensive code, the common law will still be
relevant in interpreting these provisions at 498, 514; Re Russley Hotel Ltd; Mattison & Anor v Gough
& Ors (2000) 8 NZCLC 262 (HC) at 399; discussed by Campbell “Does the Companies Act Codify
Remedies?” 53, specifically in the context of remedies available for a company in the case of a breach
of directors’ duties. He also argues that the comprehensive manner in which the code was drafted as
well as the absence of a provision preserving the common law is an indication that the code should be
treated as exhaustive. See, however, Manukau City Council v Lawson [2001] 1 NZLR 599 (HC) where
Morris J made the comment that the duties in the Act supplement the common law. See also Benton v
Priore [2003] 1 NZLR 564 (HC) where Heath J made similar obiter comments. He held that it was not
the intention of the legislature to codify the duties in ss 130–133 of the Companies Act of 2003, but
that they were a restatement of the basic duties of directors in an endeavour to promote accessibility to
the law. The possibility of further duties being owed by directors is also not excluded by the Act. See
also the New Zealand Law Commission Report: Company Law Reform and Restatement No 9 of 1989
par 20 where it is stated that the Act provides for better accessibility to company law by setting up the
Act as a statement of first recourse in identifying rights and duties within the company (emphasis
added). See also New Zealand Law Commission: Company Law Reform: Transition and Revision No
16 of 1990 pp xxii–xxiii. The Commission refrained from a recommendation on whether or not the
common law is still applicable, but were confident that the courts would recognise a statutory
statement of directors’ duties as the first recourse when considering these duties.
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new Act also provides a comprehensive codification of directors’ duties. It seems that
courts can still refer to existing case law to interpret the provisions in the code.
3.1.3 SADC’s Goal of Harmonisation: Followed or Rejected?
The discussion in this chapter was limited to two issues, namely in whose interests
directors should manage a company and the codification of directors’ duties.
The position in New Zealand relating to these two issues was considered in order to
interpret the provisions in the Botswana Companies Act of 2003. Traditionally,
Botswana company law was based on the English common law. The drafters of the
new Botswana Companies Act deviated from English law and applied the company
law of New Zealand. This could lead to concern, especially if one keeps the goal of
SADC in mind, namely the harmonisation of business laws in southern African
states, seeing that most of the corporate laws of southern African states are based on
the English common law. Applying New Zealand company law, instead of English
law, seems to defeat this purpose.100 It is therefore important to understand the
position in the United Kingdom101 to determine whether Botswana went against
SADC’s goal of harmonisation. In chapter 3 of this thesis the United Kingdom’s
viewpoints on these two issues were discussed
It was argued that after considering New Zealand sources on the stakeholder debate
and the codification of directors’ duties, one can conclude that the Botswana
Companies Act of 2003 is in favour of directors managing the company in the best
interests of the company, namely the shareholders collectively. The Botswana
Companies Act also provides for a comprehensive statement of directors’ duties. This
does not, however, imply that the courts will no longer refer to the common law when
interpreting the statutory duties of directors.102
100 It is important to note that the importance of SADC and its goal of harmonisation was referred to in
the Interim Report (at par 7), as discussed above. See also par 3.1.1 above on why the drafters
followed the New Zealand law.
101 The new Companies Act of 2006 is applicable in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland,
unlike the Companies Act of 1985 which only applied in England and Wales.
102 See n 99 above on how New Zealand commentators interpret the codification of directors’ duties.
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When considering the United Kingdom Companies Act in chapter 3, it was concluded
that it was similar to the position in New Zealand (and thus Botswana) on these two
issues.103 The position in Botswana is therefore not significantly different from the
position in the United Kingdom. Both the Botswana Companies Act of 2003 and the
United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006 state that directors should manage a
company in the best interests of the company, upholding the traditional (common
law) viewpoint that the shareholders receive primacy when directors manage a
company.104 The Botswana Companies Act of 2003 provides for a comprehensive
statement of directors’ duties. Company law in the United Kingdom was also
reviewed and the Companies Act of 2006 now provides for an exhaustive statement
of directors’ duties. “Exhaustive” is interpreted as indicating that courts cannot
develop new principles concerning the general duties of directors, but they can
develop the existing principles by referring to particular cases and the common
law.105 Commentators in New Zealand also suggested that judges can take the
common law into consideration when interpreting the statutory duties of directors.106
South Africa is also a member of SADC. One therefore needs to determine whether
the proposed new company legislation in South Africa is compatible with the
Botswana company law set out above and vice versa. The Draft Companies Bill107
partially codifies108 directors’ duties.109 The Bill is, however, unclear on the preferred
103 Chapter 3 par 4.3 above.
104 See s 130(c) of the Companies Act of 2003 and s 172(1) of the United Kingdom Companies Act of
2006. Section 172(1) is, however, drafted in wider terms than s 130(c). Section 172(1) refers to
specific stakeholders, but it seems, as if s 172(1) still prefers the traditional viewpoint, as stakeholders
cannot enforce the rights contained in s 172(1). This is discussed in detail in ch 3 par 4.3 above. See
Keay “Section 172(1)” 106–110 for a detailed discussion of s 172 of the United Kingdom Companies
Act of 2006.
105 As seen from ch 3 par 4.3 above. See Developing the Framework pars 3.20; 3.82; Completing the
Structure pars 3.2; 3.6; 3.12 and the White Paper 2005 par 3.3.
106 See n 99 above.
107 February 2007.
108 Chapter 4 of the Bill provides for a codified regime of directors’ duties, which includes the
fiduciary duty and the duty of reasonable care. This codification is only partial as the common law
duties still apply. See the Explanatory Memorandum of the Bill (annexed to the Draft Companies Bill
of 2007) p 13. See ch 6 par 5.5 for a discussion of the codification in terms of South African law.
109 See clauses 91; 92; 92A of the Bill.
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approach concerning the protection of the interests of stakeholders.110 It seems, at this
stage, that the only difference between Botswana company law and South African
company law concerning the stakeholder debate and the codification of directors’
duties is the fact that South Africa has a partial codification and Botswana a
comprehensive one. The differences between a partial codification and a
comprehensive codification are not necessarily that significant. The common law will
still be relevant in terms of a comprehensive codification as judges will rely on it to
interpret the provisions in the code.111 It is also assumed that a comprehensive code is
comprehensive in the real sense of the word and contains the common law duties in
any event.112
4 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter focused on SADC and its goal of harmonisation in southern African
States.113 Harmonisation, in this context, relates to the process by which different
states adopt the same laws.114 It was stated that most southern African states company
laws are based on English law making eventual harmonisation easier.115 Botswana is
an example of a southern African country who reviewed its company legislation
recently.116 The new Companies Act of Botswana is, however, based on the New
Zealand, and not English, company legislation. It was argued that this seems like a
110 See clause 91(b). See ch 6 par 4.3 for comments on this clause.
111 Watson also argued this in “Directors’ Duties” 495–499. Australian company law also indicates
that there is not really such a big difference between a comprehensive and partial codification of
directors’ duties. There was no case law based on common law duties the past years in Australia. All
of the cases were based on one of the statutory provisions in the Act. Du Plessis et al. Principles of
Contemporary Corporate Governance 259 argue that the statutory duties are far more important than
the duties at common law or in equity. See also Abernethy & Weir Anderson’s Company & Securities
Law at 8.
112 The position in South Africa concerning the protection of stakeholders and the codification of
directors’ duties are discussed in detail in chapter 6 pars 4; 5 below.
113 Paragraph 2 above.
114 Paragraph 2 above.
115 Paragraph 2 above.
116 Paragraph 3 above.
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contravention of SADC’s goal of harmonisation. But when the New Zealand
Companies Act was compared with the United Kingdom Companies Act and the
South African Companies Bill, it was found that there are no major discrepancies
with regard to stakeholder protection and the codification of directors’ duties. The
Botswana’s Companies Act of 2003 (based on the position in New Zealand), the
United Kingdom’s Companies Act of 2006 and the South African Companies Bill of
2007117 state that directors should manage the company in the best interests of the
company. All of the aforementioned Acts118 and the Bill provide for a codification of
directors’ duties, subject thereto that the South African Companies Bill only provides
for a partial codification whereas the Companies Act of Botswana and the Companies
Act of the United Kingdom provide for a comprehensive statement of directors’
duties.119
Botswana’s company law is therefore in line with the reformed English company law
on these specific areas of company law. The threat of Botswana going against
SADC’s goal of harmonisation by applying the law of New Zealand is therefore not
valid regarding these issues. The Botswana Companies Act and the South African
Companies Bill are also not significantly different concerning the protection of
stakeholders and the codification of directors’ duties.120 This is important in the
SADC context, as both Botswana and South Africa are member states.
The successful review of company law in Botswana is commendable. Apart from
South Africa, it is one of the few southern African states that have concluded a
successful review process.
117 Although it is not sufficiently clear in terms of the Bill (see ch 6 par 4.3).
118 Except for the current South African Companies Act.
119 See ch 6 par 5.2 for a detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of a codification
(partial or comprehensive) of directors’ duties
120 Paragraph 3.1.3 above.
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SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
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6 CONCLUSIONS
1 INTRODUCTION
The South African Companies Act of 19731 applies to all companies incorporated in
terms of the Act. This Act is largely based on the English law.2 The Act is not a
complete codification of company law and common law principles also apply.3
The last comprehensive South African company reform was 1963 by the Van Wyk
De Vries Commission.4 This process led to the enactment of the Companies Act,
which was still mainly based upon English company law.5 There are increasing
differences between South African and English company law, mainly as a
consequence of the harmonisation of laws of the various European Union countries.6
1 Act 61 of 1973.
2 Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 17–19; Fourie “Vertrousenspligte” 119.
3 Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors 303; Havenga “Regulating Directors’ Duties” 610.
4 Fourie “South African Corporate Law Reform” 770. See the Van Wyk de Vries Commission
(Kommissie van Ondersoek na die Maatskappywet Hoofverslag RP 45/1970 and Aanvullende Verslag
en Konsepwetsontwerp RP 31/1972).
5 Mongalo “South Africanizing Company Law” 96.
6 See ch 3 focus on United Kingdom company law, especially the United Kingdom Companies Act of
2006. See also the discussion on the harmonisation of business laws in SADC countries, ch 5 par 3.1.3.
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In addition, the constitutional framework post 1994 established a new political, social
and economic environment for South Africa and necessitated a complete review of
corporate laws.7 Developments in the field of corporate governance also contributed
to the need for a complete review of corporate laws.8 Company law should be up to
date, competitive and designed for a modern corporation that can operate in a
constitutional environment as well as on an international level.9
In 1994 an international conference was held to identify key areas requiring review.10
In 1997 the Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law11 issued a discussion
document, through the South African Department of Trade and Industry, entitled:
“Proposed Guidelines for Competition Policy”,12 which outlined a broad legislative
review process on the development of entrepreneurial law in South Africa. This
process included a review of current practices and regulations in the area of corporate
governance.13 Since the publication of these guidelines King II14 has been issued.15
7 Section 39(2) of the Constitution states that every court, tribunal or forum should promote the spirit,
intent and objectives of the Bill of Rights when they develop the common law. The evaluation of
statutory and common law rules against constitutional principles are of the utmost importance.
Corporate laws should therefore be evaluated against the Constitution. See Havenga “Regulating
Directors’ Duties” 612–613; Havenga “Directors’ Fiduciary Duties Under our Future Company-law
Regime” 312; Havenga “Corporations and the Right to Equality”. Section 8(2) of the Constitution
states that a provision of the Bill binds a natural or juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is
applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of the duty imposed by the right
and it grants a court the right, when applying the provisions of the Bill, to: “apply, or if necessary to
develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right, and to develop
rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in accordance with the
limitation provisions of the Bill”.
8 The publication of King I and King II are important corporate governance developments in South
Africa. Compliance with these reports is voluntary, but some of its provisions are enforced in the JSE
Securities Exchange’s Listing Requirements, for example, that the chief executive officer could not
also be the chairperson of the board, see par 3.84. See Havenga “Regulating Directors’ Duties” 612 n
14; Hippert “Compliance with the King Code” 86. A King III Report is expected to be published in
2010.
9 The Policy Document, foreword.
10 Havenga “Regulating Directors’ Duties” 610.
11 A Standing Advisory Committee was established in terms of s 18 of the Companies Act of 1973.
The committee makes recommendations from time to time regarding amendments to company law.
12 Dated 27 November 1997. Available at www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/polity/competition.html.
13 It envisaged five main statues, namely a redrafted Companies Act, a separate Securities Act (dealing
with the raising of capital and the obligation to issue and register prospectuses), the Close
Corporations Act 69 of 1984 (hereafter the Close Corporations Act), a new Bankruptcy Act (dealing
with insolvency and judicial management), and a new Business Enterprises Act (focusing on
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It was clearly time for a comprehensive review of South African company law that
would also consider the effect of the Constitution on further developments in
corporate law. The Corporate Regulation Division of the Department of Trade and
Industry responded to this need with the commencement of the pending reform of
national corporate laws. In 2004 a policy document on the guidelines for corporate
law review was issued.16 The document envisaged an overall review of corporate
laws in South Africa, comprising the Companies Act 61 of 1973, the Close
Corporations Act 69 of 1984 and the common law relating to these corporate
entities.17
The objective of the review process is to ensure that company law in South Africa is
in line with social, economic and legal18 developments.19 According to the drafters of
the Policy Document, new company law should promote competitiveness and
development of the South African economy. New company law should do the
following: encourage entrepreneurship and enterprise diversity by simplifying the
formation of companies and reducing the costs associated therewith; promote
innovation and investment in South African markets by providing a predictable and
regulatory environment and flexibility in the formation of the management of
companies; promote the efficiency of companies and their management; encourage
transparency and high standards of corporate governance; recognise the broader
partnership law and the law of business trusts). See Havenga “Regulating Directors’ Duties” 610;
Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 23–28; Henning “The Future of Entrepreneurial Law” 58–88 where
he discusses the five principal statutes plan.
14 See par 4.1 below for a discussion of King II.
15 See the Foreword and the Introduction of the Policy Document. See also Havenga “Regulating
Directors’ Duties” 610.
16 May 2004.
17 The review does not include partnership law. There is therefore some deviation from the initial five
principle statutes plan, see Havenga “Regulating Directors’ Duties” 611.
18 For instance, the Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003; the Competition Act 89 of 1998;
the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000.
19 The Policy Document, Introduction.
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social role of enterprises and ensure compatibility and harmonisation with
international standards.20
In February 2007 a Draft Companies Bill was issued. The Department of Trade and
Industry invited comments from academics and practitioners on the Bill. On 19 and
20 March 2007 they hosted a conference at Velmore Estate to discuss the Draft Bill.
Amendments have been made to the Bill since then and the final Bill should be
considered by Cabinet during May 2008. This version of the Bill will subsequently be
submitted to the State Legal Advisors and should be introduced to Parliament by June
2008.
In this thesis I focus specifically on two of these objectives, namely the provision of a
predictable and regulatory environment by considering a codification of directors’
duties and the recognition of the broader social role of enterprises by considering in
whose interests directors should manage a company. King I and King II, the Policy
Document of the Department of Trade and Industry and the Companies Bill of 2007
are referred to. The viewpoints of the King Committees and the drafters of the Policy
Document on the issue of stakeholder protection are discussed below.21 The
codification of directors’ duties is also discussed in more detail below,22 with specific
focus on the partial codification in the Companies Bill of 2007.
20 The Policy Document ch 1 par 2.
21 Clause 91(1)(b) of the Companies Bill of 2007 deals with stakeholder protection and are discussed
in par 4.3 below.
22 Paragraph 5 below.
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2 DIRECTORS’ DUTIES
2.1 The Fiduciary Duty of Good Faith
A company is a legal entity that is separate from its management and shareholders.
The company must act through individuals. The directors carry out managerial
functions and responsibilities on behalf of the company.23
Company directors are subject to various duties. These duties include statutory duties
in terms of the Companies Act, 24 other legislation25 and common law duties. Many of
these duties have been confirmed in case law.26
23 Havenga “The Company, the Constitution and the Stakeholders” 134; Cilliers & Benade Corporate
Law 5, 115–163; Beuthin & Luiz Company Law 179; Henochsberg Commentary on the Companies
Act notes on s 214. See also Regulation 59 of Table A of the Companies Act in Schedule 1 that states:
“the business of the company shall be managed by its directors”.
24 For example, ss 234–251 of the Companies Act. Sections 234–241 deal with conflict of interests of
directors. Section 234 concerns the duty to disclose interests that a director may have in a contract.
Section 235 concerns the manner and the time of such declaration, and s 236 deals with the written
resolution that is required when a director has an interest in a contract. Section 237 deals with
disclosures by interested directors and s 238 provides when the particulars of interest should be stated
in a notice of a meeting. Section 239 provides for the minuting of such declarations of interests.
Section 240 relates to the register of interests and s 241 concerns the duty of an auditor to register
directors’ interests in contracts. Sections 242–246 deal with proceedings at directors’ meetings.
Section 242 deals with the keeping of minutes at directors’ and managers’ meetings, and s 243 relates
to the validity of proceedings of directors’ meetings. Section 244 deals with effective resolutions at
directors’ meetings and s 245 with the attendance register. Section 246 sets out the duty of an auditor
to satisfy himself that a minute book and attendance register are kept. Sections 247–251 are concerned
with indemnity and relief from directors’ liability and also deal with false statements by directors.
25 For example, the Constitution; the Black Economic Empowerment Act; the Promotion of Access to
Information Act; and the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereafter the Labour Relations Act).
26 Esser & Coetzee “Codification of Directors’ Duties” 26. See, inter alia, Symington v Pretoria-Oos
Privaat Hospitaal Bedryfs (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 550 (SCA) at 562 (the court refers to the situation
where a director makes a profit through a breach of his fiduciary duties to the company – such a
director will not be allowed to retain such a benefit); Cyberscene Ltd v i-Kiosk Internet and
Information (Pty) Ltd 2000 (3) SA 806 (C) at 813–814 (a director stands in a fiduciary relationship to
the company from the moment he begins to act as a director, even if he has not been formally
appointed); Sibex Construction (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Injectaseal CC 1988 (2) SA 54 (T) at 64 (this case
dealt with directors who formed a close corporation in competition with the company of which they
were directors); Du Plessis NO v Phelps 1995 (4) SA 165 (C) at 170 (apart from their statutory duties,
directors owe fiduciary duties to the company and common law duties to take reasonable care in the
management of the company’s affairs); Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen;
Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd 1980 (4) SA 156 (W) at
163 (a director should observe utmost good faith towards the company and have an independent
judgement when exercising his duties towards the company, he cannot be subject to the control of any
nominator, principal or employer other than the company); Shell Auto Care (Pty) Ltd v Laggar 2005
(1) SA 162 (D) (concerning s 226 of the Companies Act which prohibits the making of a loan to
directors in certain instances) in this case the plaintiff sought to recover certain loans made to the first
defendant (Laggar), and two close corporations and a company of which Laggar was either the sole
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Each company must have a director or directors.27 A director’s common law duties
include his obligations as a fiduciary. The term “fiduciary” is applied to a large
number of persons in diverse capacities, including commercial relationships. The
relationship between a company and a director of that company is an example of a
commercial fiduciary relationship.28 A director can be seen as an agent, due to the
fact that the director does not act on his or her own behalf, but on behalf of the
company. A director can also be regarded as a trustee, since he does not own
company assets, but controls them and exercises powers for the company’s and not
for his own benefit.29 But the relationship between a director and a company remains
unique. Categorising directors as agents or trustees is intended to prove the existence
of a fiduciary duty rather than to equate directors with those particular positions.30
A company directorship is generally regarded as one of the most complex fiduciary
offices. Directors’ fiduciary duties can be categorised into four headings, namely that
(1) directors should prevent a conflict of interests, (2) not exceed the limitation of
their power, (3) maintain an unfettered discretion and (4) exercise their powers for
the purpose for which they were conferred.31
member or a member. Laggar the managing director of Shell issued a third-party notice claiming a
contribution from his five fellow directors of one-sixth each of any amount that he was obliged to pay
to Shell in terms of section 226(4) of the Companies Act. The important issue was whether a breach by
any or all of the third parties of the provisions of section 226 entitled Laggar to claim an
indemnification from the third parties, as contemplated in Uniform Rule 13 of the High Court. The
court held that it did (see Havenga “Recent Cases” 137–138). See, generally, on directors’ duties
Pretorius et al. Hahlo’s Company Law 278ff.
27 A private company should have at least one director and a public company at least two: see s 208(2)
of the Companies Act. See also clause 84 of the 2007 Companies Bill. The Bill distinguishes between
not for profit, closely held and public interest companies (see clauses 8–10 for the definitions). A not
for profit company should have at least three directors, a closely held company (which is not a public
interest company) at least 1 and a public interest company at least four directors.
28 Havenga “Breach of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties” 366.
29 Sibex Construction (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Injectaseal CC at 65C; Dawson “Acting in the Best Interest of
the Company” 80; Beuthin & Luiz Company Law 192.
30 Havenga “Breach of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties” 366.
31 Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 141. See ch 3 par 3.1 where directors’ fiduciary duties are
discussed as applied in terms of the English law. The cases referred to there are relevant when
discussing directors’ fiduciary duties in terms of South African company law because South African
company law is based on English law.
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All of these duties form part of one overriding duty, namely to act in good faith for
the company as a whole.32 The interpretation thus far has been that the duties of
directors should be exercised in the best interests of the company.
Similar to the position in Australia33 and the United Kingdom,34 a director has a legal
duty to prevent conflicting interests between his own interests and those of the
company. A director may obtain no other advantage from his position as director than
that to which he is entitled to by way of his remuneration.35 This rule applies even if
the advantage was acquired openly, in good faith and not at the expense of the
company. The important question is whether or not the advantage arose from the
director’s occupation of his office.36 If a director enters into a contract with a third
party that represents a conflicting interest between his own interests and that of the
company the contract would be voidable.
If a director enters into a transaction on behalf of the company that goes beyond the
capacity of the director, neither the company not the third party can claim that the
contract is void.37 However, the director may incur liability within the company. The
32 Paragraph 2.1.1 below; Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors 25; Percival v Wright at
424; Sibex Construction (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Injectaseal at 65; Novick v Comair Holdings Ltd 1979 (2) SA
116 (W) at 130 and 151; Swanee’s Boerdery (Edms) Bpk (in Liquidation) v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd
1986 (2) SA 850 (A) at 854. See also Du Plessis “Direkteure se Pligte Teenoor Partye Anders as die
Maatskappy” 378; Havenga “Directors’ Fiduciary Duties Under our Future Company-law Regime”
310–313.
33 Chapter 4 par 3.2 above.
34 Chapter 3 par 3.1 above.
35 See Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co 1921 (AD) 168; Regal (Hastings) Ltd v
Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 378 (HL) on conflict of interests, see ch 3 par 3.1 above on these cases.  See
also Pretorius et al. Hahlo’s Company Law 305–309 for a discussion of these two cases. See further
Magnus Diamond Mining Syndicate v Macdonald & Hawthorne 1909 ORC 65, where directors
obtained information of diamondiferous land and purchased it in competition with their company.
They were ordered to transfer the land back to the company and account for their profits. In Industrial
Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley (1972) 1 WLR 443 the client of the company approached
Cooley. The client did no want to conclude a contract with the company. Cooley was still ordered to
account for its profits because the profits were made as a result of information that Cooley obtained in
his capacity as managing director (see ch 3 par 3.1 above).
36 Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 142.
37 Section 36 of the Companies Act of 1973.
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company may suffer damages due to the contract that the director concluded and the
director may be held liable for compensation.38
A director must exercise the affairs of the company in an objective manner. He must
not contract to act in a certain manner.39 Directors should also exercise their powers
for which they were conferred. A number of cases deal with the situation where
directors used their powers to issue unissued shares with the purpose of ensuring
continued control over the company instead of issuing shares with the purpose to
acquire more capital.40
2.1.1 The Traditional Position: Directors’ Duties Owed to Whom?
The concept of “a company as a whole” relates to shareholders “collectively”, “all the
shareholders, present and future”, and the company as a separate legal entity.41 Sealy
refers to this concept of the company, where the company is an object of directors’
duties, entirely perceived in terms of its members, as “corporate membership”.42
Directors therefore do not owe fiduciary duties to shareholders as such. They must
act in good faith in the interests of the company seen as the interests of the
shareholders collectively.43 Directors should treat all shareholders equally. 44
38 Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 144.
39 See Coronation Syndicate Ltd v Lilienfeld and New Fortuna Co Ltd 1903 TS 489 where the
directors contracted with a non-member to call a general meeting and to launch a proposal at the
meeting for the increase in capital. If it is in the best interest of the company to contract to vote in a
certain manner then the contract would be valid: Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v
Jorgensen; Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd 1980 (4) SA
156 (W) at 163.
40 Punt v Symons & Co Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 506; Piercy v S Mills & Co Ltd [1920] 1 Ch 77.
41 See ch 3 par 3.1.1 above where the concept was discussed in the context of United Kingdom
company law. See further Du Plessis “Direkteure se Pligte Teenoor Partye Anders as die Maatskappy”
378; Havenga “The Company, the Constitution and the Stakeholders” 136; Sealy “Directors’ Wider
Responsibilities” 166; Havenga “Directors’ Fiduciary Duties Under our Future Company-law Regime”
317; Larkin “The Fiduciary Duties of the Company Director (II)” E11–E17. This viewpoint was
confirmed in the Policy Document ch 3 par 3.2.2. See also September 2005 NEDLAC Report pars 3.3.8
and 3.4.8 and generally February 2005 NEDLAC Report and the Executive Summary of King II par 17.
42 Sealy “Directors’ Wider Responsibilities” 173.
43 Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 381; Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 139–140; Beuthin & Luiz
Company Law 199; Henochsberg Commentary on the Companies Act notes on s 248; Blackman et al.
Commentary on the Companies Act at 8–51.
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The proper test to determine whether a director acted in the best interests of the
company as a whole is to ask whether an intelligent and honest person in the same
situation as the director would also have believed that the specific transaction was in
the best interests of the company.45
The traditional viewpoint is that directors do not stand in any fiduciary relationship
with third parties. According to this view, a director has no general fiduciary duty to
consider the interests of others. Obviously, directors are allowed to consider the
interests of other groups and sometimes good management will require this, but
ultimately the interests of these groups are subordinate to those of the company.46
Fiduciary law does not exclude outside interests being taken into account, as long as
the interests of the beneficiary are still served.47
Pennington states the following on directors’ duties: “These duties are owed
exclusively to the company of which the defendant is a director. The fact that they are
owed to the company does not impose parallel duties on a director towards the
company’s members or creditors.” 48
If the traditional viewpoint that directors should act in the best interests of the
company as a whole, namely the shareholders collectively is accepted, it has to be
44 See Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 149; Havenga “The Company, the Constitution and the
Stakeholders” 136. See also Galloway v Halle Concerts Society (1915) 2 Ch 233; Mutual Life
Insurance Co of New York v Rank Organisation Ltd 1985 BCLC 11. These cases remain relevant due
to South African company law being based on United Kingdom company law. Shareholders do not
have to act in the best interests of the company as a whole, they are not in a fiduciary relationship with
the company: Ben-Tovim v Ben-Tovim 2001 (3) SA 1074 (C) at 1088.
45 See Henochsberg Commentary on the Companies Act notes on s 248. This test is also applied in
other jurisdictions. See, for example, Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 385; Davies Gower and
Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 371–372. See further ch 3 par 3.1.1 above.
46 Fourie “Die Plig van Direkteure Teenoor Maatskappyskuldeisers” 25.
47 This was also indicated during the United Kingdom company law review “Company Directors’
Duties: “Directors’ Wider Duties – Creditors” Chapter 5 available at www.aph.gov.au/senate
/committee (accessed 20 May 2006). See also ch 3 where the United Kingdom company law is
discussed in detail.
48 Pennington Company Law 709. This comment, although made in respect of English law, remains
relevant for South African law in view of our common law basis for company law.
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considered whether and to what extent other groups should also be protected. Sealy
states the issue crisply: “The issue is not necessarily whether these other groups
should receive protection or not, but rather whether this can be achieved through the
current company law structure as we know it.”49 In this thesis the discussion of other
interest groups is limited to those of individual shareholders, creditors, employees,
consumers and suppliers, because these stakeholders are the most important in order
to conduct any business successfully. Stakeholders are usually classified according to
two main groups, namely internal, primary or contractual stakeholders and external,
secondary or non-contractual stakeholders. This thesis focuses on the first group.50
In chapter 2 a combined theory was proposed relating to the protection of the
different stakeholders. This theory holds that directors should manage a company in
the best interests of the company as a separate legal entity, and that the protection
afforded different stakeholders varies during different stages of the life of a company.
It was argued that legislation other than the Companies Act, should also play an
important role in determining how and when a specific stakeholder should be
protected.51 Various groups of stakeholders and the protection currently afforded to
them are therefore discussed later in this chapter.
3 THE VARIOUS STAKEHOLDERS
3.1 Individual Shareholders
The common law fiduciary duties of directors are owed to the shareholders
collectively, and not individually. It is impossible for a director to have a fiduciary
duty towards the company and individual shareholders simultaneously, because the
49 Sealy “Directors’ Wider Responsibilities” 173. Again, this comment was made with regard to
English law, but it is equally applicable to South African law.
50 Lubbe states that stakeholders of a company can be divided into traditional stakeholders, for
instance, shareholders and lenders and emerging stakeholders like employees and consumers. See
Lubbe “Die Toename in die Getal Belanghebbendes in Ondernemings” 60.
51 See ch 2 par 5.2 where a theory on the protection of stakeholders is proposed.
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interests of shareholders and that of the company may be different. It will place a
director in an untenable position if he has to observe fiduciary duties towards both.52
Specific directors can have dealings with certain shareholders and then incur duties to
that specific shareholder. These duties differ from the fiduciary duty a director has
towards a company by virtue of his office as director. An example of the former duty
is, for instance, when a shareholder authorises a director to sell his or her shares on
the shareholder’s behalf. If the director then comes across any relevant information
concerning, for instance, the purchase price, the director is under a duty to disclose
such information to the shareholder concerned.53 Such a duty arises if a director
places himself in one of the established legal relationships to which fiduciary duties
are attached, as with agency discussed in the example mentioned above.54
Directors have access to information regarding the company and that they are
therefore clearly at an advantage when dealing with members’ shares. The question
arises whether a director can owe a fiduciary duty to an individual shareholder if an
established legal relationship (such as agency) is not present. In Percival v Wright55
the directors purchased shares from their members without revealing that negotiations
were taking place regarding a takeover of the company. The shareholders had,
however, approached the directors directly regarding the purchase of their shares,
52 Henochsberg Commentary on the Companies Act notes on s 214; Beuthin & Luiz Company Law
201; Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 148. See also ch 3 par 3.1.2 where the position of individual
shareholders is discussed as applied in terms of United Kingdom company law and ch 4 par 3.2.2 for
the Australian position.
53 See generally Beuthin “The Range of a Company’s Interests” 155–176; Fourie “Vertrouenspligte”
127–138. Some English decisions also confirm this, for example, Briess v Woolley [1954] AC 333
(HL); Allen v Hyatt (1914) 30 TLR 444 (PC) (it was stated that the fiduciary duties of the director
arose by virtue of agency and not his directorship); Peskin v Anderson (2001) 1 BCLC 372 (CA) at
379 (the duties against the shareholders were based on a special factual relationship and not on
directorship, events may take place that put directors in close and direct contact with the shareholders
in a manner resulting in fiduciary duties, such as the duty to disclose certain information). See also
Davies Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 374. See ch 3 par 3.1.2 on these
decisions.
54 These established legal relationships can arise from agency (as discussed), representation or, special
circumstances. These special circumstances include a duty of disclosure or a duty to give correct
information. See Beuthin & Luiz Company Law 199; Henochsberg Commentary on the Companies Act
notes on ss 214, 440A.
55 [1902] 2 Ch 421. See generally Davies Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law
374–376.
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rather than asking them to act as their agents. The court held that there was no
fiduciary relationship between the directors and the shareholders individually.56
In Gething v Kilner57 the court in the Chancery Division stated that where a takeover
bid has taken place, the directors of the offeree company owe a duty to their own
shareholders, which includes a duty to be honest.
In Coleman v Myers58 the New Zealand Court of Appeal stated that a fiduciary duty
can arise even in the absence of a relationship of agency. The court qualified its
statement, holding that this is only possible in the case of small and family
companies, as shareholders often rely on directors for advice in this type of company.
The facts were briefly as follows: the plaintiffs, who were minority shareholders in a
small private company sold their shares to Myers, the managing director of the
company. Myers then became the sole shareholder and liquidated certain of the
company’s surplus assets to declare a capital dividend, which was more than his
acquisition costs. The plaintiffs then claimed that Myers had acquired their shares at
an undervaluation.59 The court held that there is no general principle that prevents
directors from having fiduciary duties towards shareholders and that the managing
director had a fiduciary duty towards the shareholders to protect their interests as well
56 This judgment is not interpreted in such a broad manner by South African courts. Directors are not
absolved from all responsibilities towards a buyer or seller of shares in their companies. See Sage
Holdings Ltd v The Unisec Group Ltd 1982 (1) SA 337 (W) at 366; Fourie “Vertrouenspligte” 133–
138; Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 149. The decision of Percival was also widely criticised in
England. See the Cohen Report on Company Law Amendments (1945) at pars 86–87 and the Jenkins
Report on Financial Reporting (1995) at pars 89, 99(b). See also Farrar & Hannigan Company Law
380; Davies Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 551; Rider “Percival” 471;
Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors 25 at n 21.
57 [1972] 1 WLR 337 at 341. Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 149; Fourie “Vertrouenspligte” 133–
134; Pretorius v Natal South Sea Investment Trust Ltd 1965 (3) SA 410 (W) at 418C (the directors of a
company were obliged to provide material information to subscribers concerning the affairs of the
company. It is therefore possible that South African courts will deviate from the Percival decision);
Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors 28 n 22; McLelland v Hullett 1992 (1) SA 456 (D),
discussed by Van der Merwe “Die Beskerming van Minderheidsaandeelhouers” 216, where it was
considered whether shareholders had a cause of action against directors after the dissolution of a
company. It was held that a shareholder does not have a right of action to enforce the maximization of
his shareholder value.
58 [1977] 2 NZLR 225 (SC). See Rider “Percival” 471–476; Fourie “Vertrouenspligte” 136 for a
discussion of the judgment in Coleman.
59 Coleman v Myers. See Sealy Cases and Materials 264 on this case.
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as the interests of the company. The court did not, however, state that the Percival
decision was wrongly decided on its particular facts. The decision of Coleman v
Myers was approved in the decision of Peskin v Anderson.60
At first glance it may seem as if these cases suggest that directors have fiduciary
duties towards shareholders. However, their implication is explained in the following
quotation from the Outer House in the case of Dawson International plc v Coat Paton
plc.61 Lord Cullen stated the following:
If directors take it upon themselves to give advice to current shareholders,
the cases cited to me show clearly that they have a duty to advise in good
faith and not fraudulently, and not to mislead whether deliberately or
carelessly . . . However, these cases do not, in my view, demonstrate a
pre-existing fiduciary duty to the shareholders but a potential liability
arising out of their words or actions which can be based on ordinary
principles of law . . .
Thus, directors may find themselves liable to shareholders, individually, under
ordinary principles of law, but this does not mean that they owe fiduciary duties to
them directly.62
3.2 Creditors
3.2.1 Introduction
It has been generally accepted in South African law that directors have no direct
fiduciary duties towards creditors.63 As stated above, any duty owed by directors was
60 (2001) 1 BCLC 372 (CA). In Peskin it was held that fiduciary duties owed by directors to
shareholders only arise if there is a special factual relationship between the directors and the
shareholders in the specific case resulting in fiduciary obligations, such as a duty of disclosure of
material facts or an obligation not to use confidential information. Coleman was also approved in Platt
v Platt (1999) 2 BCLC 745 (CD). See ch 3 par 3.1.2 on the Peskin and Platt decisions.
61 (1988) SLT 854 at 861.
62 Farrar & Hannigan Company Law 380–383.
63 Fourie “Die Plig van Direkteure Teenoor Maatskappyskuldeisers” 25; Havenga Fiduciary Duties of
Company Directors 36; Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 162–163. See Lombard “ŉ Historiese
Perspektief 1” 236 regarding the historical development of the interests of creditors through the
different development stages of company law.
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regarded as being to the company as a whole, because the company was regarded as a
separate legal entity with its own rights and duties.64
Case law, especially in other jurisdictions, started to show a trend to include the
interests of creditors, among the interests that directors should consider when they
manage a company, in certain circumstances.65 South African case law has not yet
ruled on this issue, but a number of commentators expressed their views on it.66
This section considers whether directors, when they manage a company, should owe
creditors a direct obligation to consider their interests, or whether an indirect
obligation is sufficient. A direct obligation implies that creditors are direct
beneficiaries of directors’ duties. A direct obligation therefore changes the traditional
viewpoint that directors manage the company in the best interests of the shareholders
collectively. An indirect obligation entails that directors manage a company in the
best interests of the company as a whole, that is, in the interests of the shareholders
collectively. This does not mean that the interests of creditors are ignored as
directors’ consideration of creditors’ interests would in any event usually be in the
best interests of the company. It is argued below that directors should have an indirect
duty towards creditors, but that the interests of creditors would receive priority in
certain circumstances.67
64 Aron Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL) at 22; Dadoo v Krugersdorp Municipal
Council 1920 AD 530 at 550; RP Crees (PVT) Ltd v Woodpecker Industries (PVT) Ltd 1975 (2) SA
485 (R) at 489; Lategan v Boyes 1980 (4) SA 191 (T) at 200.
65 See ch 4 par 3.2.3 for a discussion of case law in Australia and New Zealand and ch 3 par 3.1.3 for a
discussion of English case law.
66 See Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 1; Botha “Directors’ Fiduciary Duties to Bondholders?”
287; Fourie “Die Plig van Direkteure Teenoor Maatskappyskuldeisers” 25; Du Plessis “Direkteure se
Pligte Teenoor Partye Anders as die Maatskappy” 378; Locke “Fiduciary Duties Towards Creditors”;
Luiz “Extending the Liability of Directors” 63; Havenga “Creditors, Directors and Personal Liability”;
Cassim “Fraudulent or Reckless Trading” 328; Fourie “Dorklerk Investments” 328.
67 The exact trigger as to when directors should consider the interests of creditors specifically is
discussed below.
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3.2.2 Arguments for and Against a Direct Duty Towards Creditors
As was stated above, directors do not currently have a direct duty to consider the
interests of creditors in South African law. Du Plessis68 states that the justification for
this lies in the fact that creditors can protect themselves by way of a contract. There
are a number of arguments for and against extending directors’ fiduciary duties
towards creditors. These arguments mainly relate to contractual protection, directors’
conduct; traditional company law principles; sufficient and adequate remedies that
are already available to creditors and concerns relating to the enforcement of the
duty.69
These arguments are discussed in detail below.
3.2.2.1 Contractual Protection
This argument relates to the fact that creditors can protect themselves by way of a
contract.70 They negotiate the terms and conditions of their contract with the
company. It is, however, impossible to draft a contract that makes provision for every
possible future event.71 It is also very expensive to draft a formal contract that covers
for every possible contingency, making the costs of extending credit higher.72 A
contract is only as good as the foresight of the parties and the advisors involved.
There are a number of contractual mechanisms that creditors can use to protect
themselves.73 These mechanisms have their own difficulties. Creditors can firstly
make use of security. They are then given a privileged position if the debtor company
becomes insolvent. Security is, however, not a viable option for all creditors. It is
68 Du Plessis “Direkteure se Pligte Teenoor Partye Anders as die Maatskappy” 379.
69 Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 5.
70 Du Plessis “Direkteure se Pligte Teenoor Partye Anders as die Maatskappy” 388.
71 To explain this further: it is difficult for creditors to anticipate what a company might do. Creditors
cannot, for example, foresee that a director may invest in a risky asset or lend to borrowers with poor
credit ratings. See Keay “Directors’ Duties to Creditors” 665–699.
72 Keay “Directors’ Duties to Creditors” 691; Botha “Directors’ Fiduciary Duties to Bondholders?”
289.
73 Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 27–32.
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especially time consuming to arrange for the granting and approval of security.74
Smaller creditors also do not know how to monitor a security arrangement. Personal
guarantees are another option, should the company not be able to repay the debt.
Creditors, other than banks, are usually not in the position to demand such a
guarantee. Creditors can also undertake a risk assessment of the company before
extending the credit. The higher the risk, the higher the interest rate would be that
they charge. The cost of such a risk assessment in many cases exceeds its benefits.
Furthermore, many events that have a potential impact on risk cannot be foreseen by
the creditors, for instance, a major change in the market industry. It can, however, be
argued that creditors are adequately compensated for the risks they take by charging
the company interest. The counter-argument is that the interest charged by the
creditors is not always sufficient as risks can arise after the conclusion of the
contract.75
Some commentators suggest that contractual protection to creditors is feigned
protection, because of the fact that creditors cannot assess the risks associated with
the contract adequately.76 It is, however, important to realise that creditors deal with a
company as a matter of bargain, and not of trust, and bargain involves risk.77
3.2.2.2 Directors’ Conduct
This argument relates to the fact that directors’ conduct might be influenced by the
possible personal liability they could incur if they have a direct fiduciary duty
towards creditors. Examples of such conduct include that they may be deterred from
serving on boards,78 or that they may become resistant to taking the necessary risks.79
74 Keay “Directors’ Duties to Creditors” 687.
75 Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 30. Creditors charge interest based on the risks they bear.
Creditors usually assess their risks before they conclude a contract according to their expectations of
the specific company and its financial position. Sometimes companies act outside of these
expectations, but creditors will take unforeseeable events into account when calculating their risks. See
also Wishart “Models and Theories” 335–336.
76 Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 52; Wishart “Models and Theories” 335–336; Havenga
Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors 34.
77 Sealy “Directors’ Wider Responsibilities” 176.
78 This problem can be addressed by providing directors with adequate measures of relief; see the
discussion below. See also Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 43–48.
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The latter aspect can have a negative impact on company’s wealth maximisation (and
would thus not be to the benefit of the shareholders collectively). To explain this
further, directors will rather protect their own positions than take risks and focus on
what the shareholders want, namely profit maximisation. This is valid especially with
regard to larger companies. In smaller companies directors are often also the
shareholders. They will take more risks in order to save their company from financial
distress. A way to overcome this problem of risk taking is to take out the necessary
insurance. With such a safety net, directors might be more willing to continue to take
necessary risks. The negative side of this is that directors might now take even higher
risks, because they know they have the safety net of insurance.80
3.2.2.3 Traditional Company Law Principles
This argument concerns the problem that an extension of director’s duties would be
contrary to company law principles. This is probably the strongest argument against
fiduciary duties owed directly to creditors. The current company law model sees the
company as a whole as the beneficiary of directors’ direct fiduciary duties and will
therefore be inadequate when directors consider wider interests than those of the
shareholders collectively. If directors have to consider the interests of creditors, it
would also not be appropriate only to regard the members as the group which can
ratify and condone directors’ actions. With the current model, only shareholders (and
no other beneficiaries, such as creditors) have a say in the election and removal of the
directors, and only the shareholders have voting rights.81
79 Section 424 of the Companies Act, discussed in par (a) below, provides no defences that may be
used by directors to escape personal liability. This can cause them to be more risk-adverse. Section
248 of the Companies Act provides for a defence against personal liability, if the director acted
reasonably and honestly. Section 248 is, however, only available when directors breach their common
law duties and not for relief from statutory provisions, such as s 424. See further Lombard Directors’
Duties to Creditors 69.
80 Keay “Directors’ Duties to Creditors” 685.
81 See s 208(2) of the Companies Act of 1973. The subscribers of the memorandum of a company are
deemed to be the directors until the first directors are appointed. The articles usually provide that the
directors be appointed by the general meeting. See Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 119. See further
s 220 of the Companies Act of 1973. This section enables a company to remove a director by way of
an ordinary resolution of the general meeting before the expiration of his period of office. See Cilliers
& Benade Corporate Law 126. See also Swerdlow v Cohen 1977 (1) SA 178 (W) at 182E–182G for
the meaning of “ordinary resolution”.
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If one is of the view that directors should exercise their duties in the best interests of
the company as a whole (in other words, with profit maximisation as their main goal),
then direct fiduciary duties to creditors are problematic. Grantham maintains that
“[a]n obligation on the board to act in the interests of non-shareholder groups, where
the traditional notion of the company is retained, must entail an increase in the
residual loss suffered by the shareholders”.82
At present directors exercise their business judgment in ways that will promote the
interests of the company. This will not always be possible if directors have direct
fiduciary duties towards creditors too.83 Then directors would have to consider the
interests of creditors too and that may conflict with the interests of the company or
the shareholders collectively.
3.2.2.4 Sufficient Remedies Available to Creditors
Some commentators argue that sufficient remedies are available to protect the
interests of creditors and that an extension of directors’ duties is therefore not
necessary. These remedies include statutory remedies in terms of which directors can
be held personally liable for fraudulent, reckless, wrongful or insolvent trading as
well as traditional insolvency law remedies. These remedies are discussed in more
detail below.
a) Section 424 of the Companies Act
Section 424 of the Companies Act provides for personal liability of directors in
certain circumstances. The section states that when it appears in a winding-up,
judicial management or otherwise that any business of the company was carried out
recklessly, or with the intention to defraud creditors of a company or any other person
for any fraudulent purpose, the court may declare that any person, who was
knowingly a party to the carrying-on of the business, is personally responsible,
without any limitation of liabilities, for all or any of the debts or other liabilities of
82 Grantham “The Judicial Extension of Directors’ Duties to Creditors” 13.
83 Grantham “The Judicial Extension of Directors’ Duties to Creditors” 12–13. See also the discussion
of this problem where the position of employees is discussed in par 3.3 below.
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the company. Proceedings in terms of section 424 can be instituted by way of motion
or action.84
Many commentators suggest that this remedy provides adequate protection for
creditors and that an extension of directors’ fiduciary duties is therefore not
necessary.85 Lombard86 argues that this is not necessarily the case. She provides the
following arguments: firstly, there are a number of uncertainties concerning the
application of section 424. It is, for example, uncertain whether creditors’ claims
against the company should be quantified.87 Secondly, section 424 provides for the
protection of creditors against reckless trading by directors. “Reckless” has been
interpreted either as acting “with gross negligence” or as “fraudulent[ly]”.88 It is clear
that fault is required in both instances. This implies that directors, who acted in
84 See generally Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 160–162 on this section. Actions are normally
commenced by way of a summons. It may lead, after pleadings, to a trial with oral evidence and cross-
examination. Applications may be ex parte or on notice. An application need not be supported by an
affidavit, but if a dispute arises regarding the facts, the court has a choice either to receive evidence
orally or by way of an affidavit or order that the issues in dispute be tried by way of an action. See
Ellis “Evidence” in LAWSA vol 3(2) par 73.
85 This discussion only considers s 424 with regard to the question of whether s 424 provides adequate
protection to creditors. See generally Cassim “Fraudulent or Reckless Trading” 162; Fourie “Dorklerk
Investments” 328; Havenga “Director’s Personal Liability” 719; Havenga “Creditors, Directors and
Personal Liability” 65; Havenga “Directors’ Fiduciary Duties Under our Future Company-law
Regime” 321; Luiz “Extending the Liability of Directors” 788; Mackenzie “Directors’ Liability” 370
for detailed discussions of s 424.
86 Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 57–71.
87 See Dorklerk Investments (Pty) Limited v Bhyat 1980 (1) SA 443 (W) at 448, where it is stated that
the claim should be quantified; Cronje NO v Stone 1985 (3) SA 597 (T) at 604 where the court held
that a specific amount need not be claimed. See also Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 58.
88 See Philotex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman; Braitex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman 1998 (2) SA 138 (SCA) at 144; S v
Goertz 1980 (1) SA 269 (C) at 272; S v Parsons (1980) 2 SA 397 (D) at 400 for “gross negligence”.
See Anderson v Dickson NNO (Intermenua (Pty) Ltd Intervening) 1985 (1) SA 93 (N) at 110 for
“recklessly”. In Terblanche NO v Damji 2003 (5) SA 489 (C) at 511 the court held: “The remedy
created by section 424 is a punitive one and a director can attract liability for the debts of the company
without proof of any causal connection between his sanctioned conduct and [those] debts.” See
Henochsberg Commentary on the Companies Act notes on s 424. See also the recent case of Heneways
Freight Services (Pty) Ltd v Grogor 2007 (2) SA 561 (SCA) where the company instituted a claim
against Grogor (the sole director of ITITC) to be held personally liable for ITITC’s indebtedness to the
appellant. The appellant claimed that Grogor acted fraudulently by providing creditors with cheques
when Grogor knew or reasonably foresaw that there might not be sufficient funds in ITITC’s bank
account to honour the cheques. The court referred to s 424(1) of the Companies Act and states that
“recklessness” includes gross negligence with or without consciousness risk taking. The mere fact that
Grogor put the creditors at risk does not mean that he acted negligently. The court declined to hold
Grogor personally liable.
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breach of their fiduciary duties, but without fault, would not be held personally liable.
However, Lombard mentions a number of arguments that indicate that section 424
provides protection to creditors.89 The scope of section 424 is wider than that of
directors’ common law duties.90 Section 424 does not only apply to an insolvent
company or a company in financial distress, but also to a company that is financially
sound.91 Directors who are in breach of their fiduciary duties are usually only liable
for the amount of the benefit they took for themselves. This is not the case with
section 424, because section 424 also contains a punitive element.92
I submit that section 424 remains a powerful remedy in the hands of creditors.93
However, the effectiveness of this remedy depends on the cost implications and
whether or not the particular creditors’ claim against the company is paid, if the claim
is successful.94 But, as was shown above, this remedy is not without shortcomings.
They relate, inter alia, to the uncertainty of the application of section 424 and the fact
that fault is required of directors who acted recklessly or fraudulently. Directors, who
acted in breach of their fiduciary duties, but without fault, will therefore not be
personally liable.95 Despite these shortcomings in the section, an extension of
89 Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 67–70.
90 For example, s 424 is not limited to companies that are insolvent or in financial distress.
91 See Body Corporate of Greenwood Scheme v 75/2 Sandown (Pty) Ltd 1999 (3) SA 480 (W) at 487–
488. See van der Linde “A Wake-up Call” 2–4 who discusses reckless trading and responsibility when
approving financial statements in the context of close corporations. See Harri NNO v On-Line
Management CC 2001 (4) SA 1097 (T), where the court referred to s 64(1) of the Close Corporations
Act 69 of 1984 and said that the purpose of s 64(1) is to discourage members from mismanagement of
a close corporation. In terms of this case, the corporation’s liability is replaced with the joint and
several liability of the corporation and those who conducts its business, thus eroding the protection of
limited liability. This case was overturned in the case of L&P Plant Hire BK v Bosch 2002 (2) SA 662
(SCA). The court ruled that the purpose of s 64(1) was to provide creditors with a remedy. Section
64(1) could only be used if the corporation was unable to pay its own debts. The purpose of s 64(1)
was therefore not to punish those who mismanage the corporation, but to protect creditors who
suffered a financial loss. This was confirmed in thee decision of Saincic and Others v Industro-Clean
(Pty) Ltd and Another [2006] JOL 17559 (SCA). See also Havenga “Close Corporations Law 2002”
130–132 where she also discusses the L&P Plant Hire BK v Bosch decision.
92 Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 66.
93 See also Fourie “Dorklerk Investments” 330; Havenga “Creditors, Directors and Personal Liability”
65.
94 Havenga “Creditors, Directors and Personal Liability” 65.
95 See the discussion above.
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directors’ duties to include a direct fiduciary duty to creditors is not proposed. The
current company law regime, where shareholders are granted rights to remove and
appoint directors, does not provide for such a direct fiduciary duty to creditors.
Furthermore, if one provides creditors with direct protection other interests groups
would also have to be considered. Employees, suppliers and consumers would
arguably require the same protection.96 I suggest that creditors can only be direct
beneficiaries of directors’ fiduciary duties if they do not receive adequate protection
elsewhere. Despite its shortcomings, section 424 of the Companies Act is a powerful
remedy in the hands of creditors and it cannot be stated that creditors are not
adequately protected.97
b) Insolvency Law Remedies
Commentators also suggest that creditors can rely on typical insolvency remedies to
protect their interests. These remedies include statutory provisions or common law
measures in terms of which transactions concluded by an insolvent company prior to
winding-up can be set aside by the liquidator.98 The statutory measures are contained
in sections 26(1)(a) and (b), 29(1) and 30(1) of the Insolvency Act.99 The common
law action is the actio Pauliana.
The Insolvency Act provides for statutory grounds to avoid certain dispositions.100
These remedies are only available after sequestration of the debtor’s estate. The
common law actio Pauliana is available before and after sequestration.101
96 See the discussion below of other interest groups.
97 See also ch 2 par 5.2 where a theory on the protection of stakeholders is proposed.
98 Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 83–89.
99 Act 24 of 1936.
100
“Dispositions” is defined in s 2 of the Insolvency Act and means “[a]ny transfer or abandonment of
rights of property and includes a sale, lease, mortgage, pledge, delivery, payment, release,
compromise, donation or any contract therefore, but does not include a disposition in compliance with
an order of the court”.
101 See Boraine “Towards Codifying the Actio Pauliana” 221–224; Lombard Directors’ Duties to
Creditors 83–89.
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Section 26(1)(a) and (b) of the Insolvency Act concerns “dispositions not for value”.
This refers to the disposition of assets by an insolvent company without receiving a
fair consideration in turn. The liquidator may recover these assets in certain
circumstances.102 Section 26 therefore deals with situations where dispositions by the
debtor causes or increases his insolvency.
Section 29(1) of the Insolvency Act concerns “voidable preferences”. This relates to
the situation where one creditor is preferred to another. A disposition by a debtor can
be set aside as a voidable preference if it appears that the debtor, due to his financial
position, was unable to pay all his creditors, but favoured a particular one. The
transaction must have occurred no more than six months prior to liquidation and the
liabilities of the company must immediately thereafter exceed its assets.103
Section 30(1) of the Insolvency Act provides that where a debtor disposed of property
at a time when the debtor’s liabilities already exceeded his assets, with the intention
to favour one of his creditors over another and the debtor’s estate was subsequently
sequestrated, the court may set aside the disposition.104
In terms of the common law, a transaction can be set aside by way of the actio
Pauliana.105 The requirements to succeed with this remedy are as follows: the
disposition must be of such a nature that the debtor’s assets are diminished by it, the
102 See s 26(1)(b) of the Insolvency Act. If the disposition occurred more than two years prior to the
insolvent liquidation of the insolvent, the transaction may be set aside by the court if the liquidator can
prove that the liabilities of the company exceeded its assets immediately after the disposition was
made. If the disposition occurred within two years of the insolvent liquidation of the company, the
onus is on the person benefited by the disposition to prove that, immediately after the disposition was
made, the assets of the company exceeded its liabilities, in order to ensure that the transaction is not set
aside by the court. On s 26 of the Insolvency Act, see generally, Hockly et al. Insolvency Law 129–
131. See also Rousseau NNO v Visser 1989 (2) SA 289 (C) at 307; Louw NO v DMA Fishing
Enterprises (Pty) Ltd 2002 (2) SA 163 (SE).
103 See Boraine “Towards Codifying the Actio Pauliana” 223; Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors
84.
104 See Boraine “Towards Codifying the Actio Pauliana” 223; Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors
84. See generally Hockly et al. Insolvency Law 134–136.
105 Hockly et al. Insolvency Law 136–138.
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recipient must not receive his own property, there should be an intention to defraud
and the fraud106 must have caused the loss suffered by the creditors.107
It has been argued that these insolvency law remedies do not provide sufficient
protection to creditors. The statutory measure relating to voidable preferences only
covers preferences six months prior to liquidation. Section 30(1) relating to undue
preferences may provide creditors with better protection, but the liquidator needs to
prove that the liabilities of the insolvent exceeded the assets, which is not always an
easy task. The liquidator also needs to prove the intention to prefer. In terms of one of
the requirements of the actio Pauliana, the recipient should not receive his own
property. This implies that the actio Pauliana cannot be applicable in preference
situations. A number of general arguments against the use of these typical insolvency
remedies can also be provided. First, they are only available once the company is in
formal liquidation. Secondly, creditors have to rely on liquidators to institute actions
on their behalf. They can only institute action themselves if the liquidator fails to do
so and then they will have to indemnify the liquidator against possible costs of the
proceedings.108
3.2.2.5 Conclusions
Various arguments have been advanced against the recognition of a direct fiduciary
duty to creditors. It was held that not all of the arguments have sufficient merit. The
first argument relates to the fact that creditors can protect themselves by way of a
contract.109 It was held that some commentators suggest that contractual protection to
creditors is feigned protection, because of the fact that creditors cannot adequately
assess the risks associated with the contract. It was, however, argued that creditors
deal with a company as a matter of bargain, and not of trust, and bargain involves
106 The test is simply whether the object of the transaction was to give one creditor an unfair advantage
over the others in insolvency. The normal criminal meaning of fraud is therefore not applicable in this
case. See Scharff’s Trustee v Scharff 1915 TPD 463 at 476 in this regard.
107 As set out in Hockey v Rixom 1939 SR 107. See further Boraine “Towards Codifying the Actio
Pauliana” 226–227; Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 84–85.
108 See Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 87–89.
109 Paragraph 3.2.2.1 above.
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risk.110 Directors’ conduct might be influenced by the possible personal liability they
could incur if they have a direct fiduciary duty towards creditors and this would result
in directors not taking the necessary risks. Directors can, however, obtain the
necessary insurance and then take too high risks.111 It was also indicated that
sufficient remedies are available to protect the interests of creditors and that an
extension of directors’ duties is therefore not necessary.112 It was then argued that
statutory insolvency remedies do not provide sufficient protection to creditors and
section 424 of the Companies Act, as a means to hold directors personally liable in
certain circumstances, has its shortcomings.113
I submit that the argument concerning traditional company law principles has the
most merit. First, if one is of the opinion that a company needs to be managed in the
best interests of the company as a whole, then direct fiduciary duties to creditors can
create difficulties. Second, if creditors are protected by such a direct duty, the
question arises whether directors should also consider other interest groups.114 The
main justification for creditors to receive protection to the exclusion of other groups’
interests would be if creditors are not sufficiently protected by other means.115
Recognition of a fiduciary duty towards creditors is therefore necessary in certain
instances.116 This is explored in more detail below. A theory on the protection of
stakeholders was proposed in chapter 2.117 In terms of the proposed theory, directors
should manage a company in the best interests of the company as a separate legal
entity. A company is represented by several stakeholders such as shareholders,
creditors and employees. These interests and the importance attached to them may
differ at the various stages of a company’s existence. It was argued that the protection
110 Paragraph 3.2.2.2 above.
111 Paragraph 3.2.2.2 above.
112 Paragraph 3.2.2.4 above.
113 Paragraphs (a) and (b) above.
114 Paragraph 3.2.2.3 above.
115 Paragraph 3.2.2.3 above.
116 Paragraph 3.2.2.3 above.
117 Chapter 2 par 5.2 above.
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that these stakeholders receive in other legislation should play an important role to
determine how much weight should be attached to the different interests.
3.2.3 A Fiduciary Duty to Creditors: Some Problems with the Construction of
Such a Duty
Despite the general arguments against a duty to creditors, which were discussed
above, certain jurisdictions started to rule in favour of such a duty. The rationale for
the existence of a duty towards creditors was considered to be that if a company is in
some form of financial difficulty, creditors should receive some form of special
protection.118 A number of problems have, however, been highlighted in these rulings
relating to the basis of the duty. South African courts have not yet ruled on this
issue.119 The discussion below therefore focuses on case law in Australia, New
Zealand and England, as discussed in chapters 3 and 4 above.120
3.2.3.1 Beneficiary of the Duty
Courts were faced with the issue as to who should be beneficiaries when directors
have a duty to protect the interests of creditors. To put this in other words, do
directors have a direct or indirect duty to creditors? An indirect duty is in line with
the traditional position that directors should manage a company in the best interests
of the shareholders collectively. This indirect duty entails that directors would
consider the interests of creditors if it is in the best interests of the company as a
whole. The “company” therefore remains the beneficiary of directors’ fiduciary
duties, but the “company” is redefined to include the interests of creditors in certain
instances. Hence, directors could be liable for a breach of their fiduciary duties if they
did not act in the best interests of the company, because they neglected to consider
the interests of creditors. A direct duty indicates that directors have an independent
duty to consider the interests of creditors.121
118 Keay “Interests of Company Creditors: When is it Triggered?” 335.
119 See, however, the Companies Bill of 2007 in which creditors are protected by the provision of
specific remedies to protect their personal interests. This is discussed in par 4.3 below.
120 See ch 4 par 3.2.3 for a detailed discussion of the case law of Australia and New Zealand and ch 3
par 3.1.3 for the English cases.
121 See Lombard Directors’ Duties to Creditors 114–115; Riley “Directors’ Duties and the Interests of
Creditors” 91; Fourie “Die Plig van Direkteure Teenoor Maatskappyskuldeisers” 37
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It seems as if the Australian cases favour an indirect duty. In Walker v Wimborne122
an indirect duty to creditors was favoured. It was also stated in Spies v The Queen123
that directors’ duties are not owed to creditors directly. In contrast, in Jeffree v
National Companies & Securities Commission124 it was held that directors have a
direct duty to creditors. This decision was, however, based on the English case of
Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co Ltd125 and it has been argued that this
decision is not compelling evidence for a direct duty to creditors. His Lordship only
made the remarks relating to directors’ duties to creditors obiter.
Most cases suggest that this duty to creditors arises at near insolvency. In the Walker
decision insolvency was not expressly referred to as a requirement to establish a duty
to creditors, but the company was insolvent. In Horsley & Weight Limited126 the court
held that a company should be insolvent or near insolvency in order for directors to
consider the interests of creditors. In Ring v Sutton127 the court held that directors
have an indirect duty to consider the interests of creditors, even if the company is
solvent. The cases are therefore confusing as to when and precisely at what point
directors should consider the interests of creditors. Keay suggests an objective test,
stating that the best trigger would be that the circumstances of a specific company
indicate that a director could reasonably be able to expect that his or her actions could
lead to insolvency of the company.128
122 (1976) 137 CLR 1 (HC) at 449. See also Ring v Sutton (1980) 5 ACLR 546 at 550 where the
Walker decision was cited with approval. See ch 4 par 3.2.3 above, where these cases are discussed.
123 (2000) 201 CLR 603 (HC) at 635. See ch 4 par 3.2.3 above
124 (1989) 15 ACLC 217 at 228. See ch 4 par 3.2.3 above
125 [1987] 1 All ER 114 (HL). See ch 3 par 3.1.3 above.
126 [1982] 1 Ch 442 (CA) at 451. See ch 3 par 3.1.3 above.
127 (1980) 5 ACLR 546 at 547. See ch 4 par 3.2.3 above.
128 The Re Horsley & Weight Ltd [1982] 1 Ch 442 (CA) decision also worked with an objective test at
454–456. The question is asked whether at the time of the payment in question the directors “should
have appreciated or ‘ought to have known’ that it is likely to cause loss to creditors or threatened the
continued existence of the company”.
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3.2.3.2 When Does the Duty to Creditors Arise?
Case law reflects different opinions on the question of when a duty to creditors arises.
It has been decided that the duty should arise at insolvency of a company129 or that it
should be a continuous duty130 that directors owe creditors. Other cases suggest that
this duty only arises in cases of near insolvency.131 Most cases assume that the
company should be in some form of financial difficulty before directors’ fiduciary
duties include a consideration of the interests of creditors.132 The reason for a duty to
creditors when a company is insolvent or in circumstances of near insolvency lies in
the fact that the creditors’ funds are at risk, and not the funds of the shareholders.133
The Walker case was one of the first decisions to give consideration to the interests of
creditors. In this decision, the court did not state expressly that insolvency was a
condition to establish a duty to creditors. The company in question was, however,
insolvent. In Ring v Sutton134 the court held that directors had a fiduciary duty to
creditors, although the company was solvent. In Horsley & Weight Limited135 the
court held that the company should be insolvent or nearly so in order for directors to
have fiduciary duties to the creditors. In the Nicholson136 case the court also stated
that insolvency was a requirement in order for directors to have fiduciary duties
towards creditors. However, the court went further and stated that creditors can have
129 See West Mercia Safetywear Ltd (in liq) v Dodd at 252 and Kinsela v Russell Kinsela (Pty) Ltd (in
liq) at 401. In Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd [1985] 1 NZLR 242 (CA) at 254 it was stated that: “If
a company is insolvent in the sense of its assets exceeding liabilities there can, I think, be no question
of a separate duty to creditors”. See Fourie “Die Plig van Direkteure Teenoor Maatskappyskuldeisers”
38–40; Barrett “Directors Duties to Creditors” 229; Keay “The Duty to Creditors” 382. See ch 4 par
3.2.3 above.
130 Winkworth v Edward Barron Development Co Ltd at 118.
131 In Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd [1985] 1 NZLR 242 (CA).
132 See, however, the Ring v Sutton decision discussed above. In this decision the court of Appeal of
New Zealand held that directors should consider the interests of creditors, although the company in
question was clearly solvent.
133 Keay “Directors’ Duties to Creditors” at 668 where he states that “[t]he interests of the company
are in reality the interests of the creditors alone”.
134 (1980) 5 ACLR 546 at 547.
135 [1982] 1 Ch 442 (CA) at 451.
136 [1985] 1 NZLR 242 (CA) at 249.
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an action against directors for a breach of a particular duty of care, but based on “the
ordinary negligence principles”.137
These cases provide quite confusing rulings as to when directors should consider the
interest of creditors. If one accepts that directors have an indirect duty towards
creditors (as discussed above), but that creditors should receive priority in certain
instances, then one needs to know exactly when this duty should arise. Having a
vague obligation imposed on directors to consider the interests of creditors in certain
circumstances is not helpful.138
The general opinion of the courts is that directors have an indirect duty to consider
the interests of creditors that arises in cases of insolvency or near insolvency. It is,
however, unclear whether insolvency relates to the fact that the company’s liabilities
exceed its assets or whether it relates to the fact that the company is unable to pay its
debts as they become due and payable.139 It has been argued that it is not ideal to link
directors’ duties to creditors to the financial position of the company. Fourie and
Sealy140 suggest that insolvency as a trigger for a duty to creditors is not the answer.
Insolvency is regarded as too vague a concept. Sealy suggests the following:
It would be absurd, in any case, to allow a body of rules to develop which
allowed directors to do X when the company has divisible profits, Y
when there where profits which were not divisible, Z when there were
profits but the funds at risk were nationally the shareholders’ capital
contributions, and something else again when what they were hazarding
was ‘creditors’ money.141
137 At 250. As stated above, these comments lead to concern that a direct duty to creditors was implied.
See also ch 4 par 3.2.3 on these Australian cases.
138 Keay “Directors’ Duties to Creditors” 671.
139 Riley “Directors’ Duties and the Interests of Creditors” 89.
140 Fourie “Die Plig van Direkteure Teenoor Maatskappyskuldeisers” 37; Sealy “Directors’ Wider
Responsibilities” 178–180. See also Grantham “The Judicial Extension of Directors’ Duties to
Creditors” 15; Keay “Interests of Company Creditors: When is it Triggered?” 320.
141 See Sealy “Directors’ Duties” 178. See also Grantham “The Judicial Extension of Directors’ Duties
to Creditors” 15
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Keay142 refers to the various possibilities when a duty to creditors should arise,
namely insolvency, near insolvency, doubtful solvency and the risk of insolvency. All
of these possibilities concern a company being in financial difficulty. It was indicated
above that it is difficult to have insolvency as a requirement, because it is unclear
what is meant by insolvency.143 A further problem with the requirement of insolvency
is whether or not it should apply strictly or only when the directors knew that the
company was insolvent. It is very difficult to prove knowledge. It might be better to
introduce an objective element (e.g., by requiring the director to have known that the
company was insolvent). Near insolvency144 also creates problems as a requirement.
It is very difficult in most situations to say from what point on a company is nearing
insolvency. Doubtful solvency has no definition in legislation. It is a broader concept
than insolvency. The question also arises who must doubt the solvency. The last
option concerns the risk of insolvency. The duty to creditors arises when there is a
risk of insolvency. To require knowledge when there is a risk of insolvency is also
problematic. A director who has not sought to apprise himself of the state of affairs of
the company will be at an advantage since he will have no knowledge of the
insolvency.
Owing to these problems Keay145 suggests an objective test to determine when
directors should consider the interests of creditors.146 I agree with his proposal of an
objective test:147 “It is suggested that the most appropriate trigger would be where the
142 Keay “Interests of Company Creditors: When is it Triggered?” 315.
143 See Kinsela v Russell Kinsela (Pty) Ltd (in liq) at 401; West Mercia Safetywear Ltd (in liq) v Dodd
at 252; Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd at 254.
144 As required in Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd.
145 Keay “Interests of Company Creditors: When is it Triggered?” 320.
146 A number of factors should be considered when determining when such a duty arises. These factors
include the need for risk taking (the more obvious it is that creditors’ interests are at risk the lower the
risk must be to which directors expose the company); an increase in costs (a duty towards creditors
will increase the company’s cost, as directors would have to undertake investigations to ascertain
whether their contemplated actions could precipitate insolvency) and the need for certainty (the law
must allow directors to manage a company as they deem fit, but the law should not allow directors to
ignore the interests of creditors. A balance is thus needed). See Keay “Interests of Company Creditors:
When is it Triggered?” 320–328.
147 The Horsley & Weight Ltd decision also worked with an objective test at 454–456. The question is
asked as to whether at the time of the payment in question the directors “should have appreciated or
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circumstances of a company are such that its directors know, or can reasonably
expect, that the action upon which they are going to embark could lead to insolvency
of the company.”148 The moment when directors’ fiduciary duties to creditors are
triggered would therefore not be the same in all cases. In determining whether or not
directors complied with their fiduciary duties, the court would have to take the
specific circumstances of each company into account. In the Nicholson decision the
court held that courts can inquire into the state of a company’s affairs.149 The court
should take all relevant factors at the time of the director’s decision into account.
Wishart150 argues that judges do not necessarily have the expertise to determine
whether a director made an acceptable business decision. However, in the decision of
Kinsela151 it was accepted that although courts have traditionally been cautious to
interfere in the decisions of directors, the Nicholson decision indicated that an
examination of the decisions made by a board is necessary in some cases.152
3.2.3.3 Conclusions
In this section the protection awarded to creditors was examined. Arguments were
raised for and against a direct duty to creditors.153 The majority of cases indicated that
this duty to creditors should be an indirect duty.154 Owing to some shortcomings in
the protection currently afforded creditors, mainly the problems associated with
section 424 and contractual protection, it is submitted that directors should consider
the interests of creditors in certain instances. The interests of creditors would
therefore sometimes receive priority. The rationale for this lies in the fact that the
company is effectively trading with the creditors’ money when it is in financial
‘ought to have known’ that it is likely to cause loss to creditors or threatened the continued existence
of the company”.
148 At 328.
149 At 250.
150 Wishart “Models and Theories” 341.
151 At 402.
152 Keay “Interests of Company Creditors: When is it Triggered?” 328.
153 Paragraph 3.2.2 above.
154 Paragraph 3.2.3.1 above.
234
distress. The decided cases do not provide clear guidelines as to when such a duty
would arise. Keay suggests an objective test, stating that the best trigger would be
that the circumstances of a specific company indicate that a director could reasonably
be able to expect that his or her actions could lead to insolvency of the company.155 I
agree that this is the best option to determine when directors should consider the
interests of creditors. I therefore submit that directors should consider the interests of
creditors in certain instances, even if this consideration can be to the detriment of the
shareholders. These instances include when a company is in financial difficulty, as
discussed above. This suggestion is in line with the theory proposed in chapter 2
stating that different stakeholders should be recognised at different stages in the life
of a company. Stakeholders should especially be protected if they do not receive
adequate protection in legislation.156 Creditors are an example of such stakeholders.
3.3 Employees
3.3.1 Introduction
The traditional view is that directors should exercise their fiduciary duties in the best
interests of the company as a whole. As discussed in paragraph 3.2.3.3, when a
company is in financial distress directors may give the interests of creditors
preference over those of the shareholders.
Employees are not protected in terms of the current Companies Act. The position in
South Africa would arguably be similar to the common law position in England when
it comes to the interests of employees. The legal justification for gifts or any other
benefit that directors may allow employees to acquire is the ultimate benefit of the
company as a whole.157 For instance, directors can provide employees with pension
benefits if the object is to attract loyal employees, because it will be to the benefit of
155 Paragraph 3.2.3.2 above.
156 Chapter 2 par 5.2 above.
157 See ch 3 par 3.1.4 above on the Hutton v West Cork Railway Co (1883) 23 ChD 654 (CA); Parke v
Daily News Ltd [1962] Ch 927 cases.
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the shareholders.158 Employees’ interests should, however, be considered by directors
in certain instances. Possible methods of protecting employees are discussed below.
3.3.2 Possible Methods of Protecting the Interests of Employees
3.3.2.1 Worker Participation
It has been suggested that worker participation on company boards may promote their
interests.159 Worker participation can take various forms, for example,
• co-ownership by the employees by concluding an agreement with them that
they will receive more than half of the issued share capital within a certain
period of time;
• separation of power by way of works councils; and
• appointment of directors who are also employees.160
The two main organs of the modern company in South Africa are the general meeting
of shareholders and the board of directors.161 The board of directors is usually
involved in the day-to-day management of the company.162 The board has powers to
bind the company, but these powers are not unlimited.163 General meetings are
158 Beuthin “The Range of a Company’s Interests” 167–168.
159 Du Plessis “Werkersdeelname” 380–395.
160 Delport “Werkplekforums” 414.
161 The managing director, often referred to as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), sits on the board of
directors. Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 92, 116; Beuthin “The Range of a Company’s Interests”
155. See also Havenga “Corporate Opportunities” 40–41; Delport “Werkplekforums” 410–411; Du
Plessis “Werkersdeelname” 383.
162 It is a typical feature that the board is involved in the management of a company, in other words,
the day-to-day affairs of the company, in terms of the traditional unitary board structure. But South
African boards do not make use of the traditional unitary board structure. The board plays more of a
supervisory role, especially due to the presence of non-executive directors and the managers who
conduct the day-to-day affairs of the company. See par (a) below. See also Delport “Werkplekforums”
410; Du Plessis “Werkersdeelname” 383–385; Beuthin “The Range of a Company’s Interests” 155.
163 The constitution of the company usually provides which issues should be considered by the general
meeting and which by the board of directors. See ss 180–198 in the Companies Act on general
meetings and ss 242–246 in the Companies Act on board meetings.
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usually convened by the board of directors.164 They should convene such a meeting if
it is in the best interest of the company as a whole.165
The board of directors perform certain acts of management and agency.166 The
directors are appointed by the members at an annual general meeting.167 The general
meeting may also remove directors from office by way of a general resolution.168 The
board of directors acts with the general meeting concerning internal matters, but there
is a clear separation of powers.169 If certain matters are assigned to the board of
directors in terms of the articles of association, then only the board has the power to
deal with those matters. The general meeting may, however, intervene with the
powers of the board in certain matters. These matters include situations where the
board of directors refuses or is unable to institute action on behalf of the company;170
when the board of directors cannot or will not exercise powers reserved for it; or
when certain powers have been reserved for the board of directors, but the particular
164 The Registrar may also call a meeting where the directors of a company became incapacitated or
have ceased to be directors (see s 182). The court may also call a meeting on its own initiative or on
application by the Registrar (see s 183).
165 Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 95; Blackman et al. Commentary on the Companies Act at 7–17;
Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors 1.
166 See Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 116; Beuthin “The Range of a Company’s Interests” 156;
Beuthin & Luiz Company Law 199; Blackman et al. Commentary on the Companies Act at 8-07-8-11.
167 The annual general meeting is a general meeting subject to a number of provisions stipulated in the
Companies Act. A company should have an annual general meeting within 18 months after the
company’s incorporation and subsequent annual general meetings are to be held every 9 months after
the end of each ensuing accounting date, but still within 15 months of the date of the previous meeting
(see s 179 (1) of the Companies Act). The annual general meeting should deal with the matters as
stipulated in the Companies Act and in the articles of association of the company (s 179(2) of the
Companies Act). These matters typically include the sanctioning of a dividend, the consideration of
the financial statements, the election of directors and the appointment of an auditor See ss 185(6)
(resolutions to which members have notice by requisition), 221(3) (extention of general authority to
directors to issue shares), 226(3)(b) (approval of certain loans to directors), 286 (annual financial
statements to be considered). See Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 93; Henochsberg Commentary on
the Companies Act for notes on these sections. See also Wixley & Everingham Corporate Governance
24.
168 Section 220 of the Companies Act. The shareholders can also amend the articles of association by
way of a special resolution, s 62 of the Companies Act.
169 Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 116. See Du Plessis “Die Algemene Vergadering en die
Direksie” 267 where the status of the general meeting and the board of directors is discussed.
170 See Naudé Die Regsposisie van die Maatskappydirekteur 92; Davies Gower and Davies’ Principles
of Modern Company Law 187.
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act is voidable because the board has exceeded or abused its powers.171 The board of
directors also acts on behalf of the company in transactions with third parties, but the
directors do not have unlimited powers to bind the company.172
Employees do not participate in company boards of South African companies.
Neither do they have any role in the appointment or removal of directors.173 This
decision lies with the general meeting.174 Clause 88 of the Draft Companies Bill of
2007 also states that directors of a company are elected by the holders of shares
entitled to vote at such election.175 In terms of clause 88(4) the terms of directors of a
widely held company176 must be arranged so that as nearly as is possible, the terms of
one third of the directors expire each year. A company’s memorandum of
incorporation may, however, state otherwise. A director may be removed by way of a
171 See generally Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 88. See also LSA UK Ltd (formerly Curtainz Ltd) v
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd (2000) SCA case number 222/98 available at
http://www.uovs.ac.za/apps/law/appeal/files/2000/1/253Lsa.doc (accessed 30 July 2007); Ben-Tovim v
Ben-Tovim 2001 (3) SA 1074 (C) at 1085I–1086D (if the board does not want to or cannot exercise the
powers vested in them, then the general meeting may do so). The powers conferred on a specific organ
by the articles of association of a company are the exclusive powers of that organ (see John Shaw and
Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw (1935) 2 KB 113 (CA)). The general meeting may not simply usurp the
powers of the board (see Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate v Cunninghame (1906) 2 Ch 34
(CA)).
172 Delport “Werkplekforums” 410.
173 Du Plessis “Werkersdeelname” 384, 393; O’Regan “Possibilities for Worker Participation” 113–
132.
174 See s 208(2) on the appointment of directors and s 220 of the Companies Act on the removal of
directors. See n 70 above where s 220 is briefly discussed.
175 This is subject to clause 90(3), which provides that if a vacancy arises in the board, the remaining
members of the board may appoint a person to fill the vacancy and serve until the time that the
vacating director’s term would otherwise have ended.
176 See clause 8 of the Draft Companies Bill of 2007 regarding the definition of a widely held
company. It is defined as:
(1) For the purposes of this Act, every for profit company is either a widely held
company, or a closely held company.
(2) A for profit company is a widely held company if –
(a) the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation –
(i) permits it to offer any of its shares to the public, within the meaning of sections
60 and 61;
(ii) limits, negates or restricts the pre-emptive right of every shareholder set out in
section 36 (1); or
(iii) provides for the unrestricted transferability of any of its shares; or
(b) a majority of its shares are held by another widely held company, or collectively
by two or more related or inter-related persons, any one of which is a widely held
company.
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special resolution at a meeting of holders of the shares entitled to vote in terms of the
Companies Bill.177
In England, directors also do not participate on boards, but178 section 309 of the (now
repealed) Companies Act of 1985 stated that directors of a company are to have
regard to the interests of employees of the company in the performance of their
functions.179 This duty was still owed to the company and not to the employees
individually. It did not create any enforceable rights for employees.180 The full impact
of this section was not clear. Before the enactment of this section, directors were
entitled to consider the interests of employees, if it was in the best interest of the
company as a whole. Section 309 went somewhat further and required directors to
take the interests of employees into account. It did not, however, state whose interests
would receive priority in the case of a conflict between the interests of employees and
those of the company. The section did not change the meaning of “the company as a
whole”, which would still be paramount.181 It was seen in chapter 3 that the
Companies Act of 2006 now lists factors that directors should keep in mind when
managing a company. But employees do not have any remedies to enforce their
rights.182 It was therefore argued that section 172(1) does not provide employees with
more protection than the previous section 309.
177 See clause 88.
178 Du Plessis “Direkteure se Pligte Teenoor Partye Anders as die Maatskappy” 386–387. The position
in England is discussed in detail in ch 3. See ch 3 par 4.3 on the 2006 United Kingdom Companies Act
and specifically s 172(1).
179 See also Section 719 of the Companies Act of 1985 where it was stated that the powers of the
company shall be deemed to include a power to make provision for the benefit of persons employed or
formerly employed by the company. It seems that this power may be exercised even if it is not in the
best interest of the company.
180 See ch 3 par 3.1.4 above. See further O’Regan “Possibilities for Worker Participation” 120.
181 Birds et al. Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 503.
182 See ch 3 par 4.3 for comments on this section. This section lists various stakeholders, but
stakeholders will not be able to enforce their “rights” against directors.
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South Africa currently applies the unitary board structure.183 In Germany, where a
two-tier board structure applies, employees have board representation through the
system of co-determination.184 The structure of a company board may be relevant to
the effectiveness of worker participation on board level. In order to decide which
board structure is best suited for South Africa, it is necessary to consider its
counterpart, the two-tier board structure. It was stated above that the unitary board
structure in South Africa consists of a board of directors and managing directors. The
board monitors, oversees and guides the managing directors, who conduct the day-to-
day affairs of the company. It is usually required of the board of directors to comprise
of non-executive and independent directors.185 The different versions of the unitary
board are discussed below.186
The two-tier board structure operates on two levels, namely the supervisory board
and the management board. The supervisory board oversees the activities of the
management board and the management board conducts the day-to-day affairs of the
company.187
It is, however, not always that easy to distinguish between these two structures due to
their similarities. For example, in a large public company with a unitary board
structure, the board of directors has similar functions compared to the supervisory
board in a company with a two-tier board structure. It is stated below that the
supervisory board is independent and oversees the work done by the management
board in a two-tier board structure. The board of directors in a unitary board structure
is also independent, especially if the board consists of a balance of non-executive and
executive directors, and oversees the work done by the managers.
183 See, however, n 162 above.
184 See, generally, Hopt “The Two-Tier Board”
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=159555#PaperDownload (accessed 8
May 2008).
185 See par (e) below for explanations of these terms.
186 See par (a) below.
187 This is discussed in detail in par (b) below.
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a) The Unitary Board Structure as Applied in South Africa
South African companies have a unitary board structure (one-tier structure), but the
board structure applicable in South Africa differs from the traditional unitary board
structure.188 In the typical traditional unitary board structure the functions of the
board of directors and that of the managers overlap. The chairperson is also one of
the managers and therefore supervises himself.
The Cadbury Report released in the United Kingdom189 in 1992 highlighted that the
traditional unitary board structure was adapted: the chairperson would still be part of
the people who conduct the day-to-day affairs of the company, but it was
recommended that the board of the company also have non-executive directors and
not just executive directors. King II and the United Kingdom Combined Code of 2006
recommended a board structure where190 the board of directors (comprising both
executive and non-executive directors) oversees and monitors the managers who
conduct the day-to-day business of the company. This board structure is currently
applicable in South Africa.
b) The Two-Tier Board Structure as Applied in Germany
German company law traditionally uses the two-tier board system which strictly
separates the management and supervisory functions.191 The two-tier board structure
188 The Policy Document ch 4 par 4.4.2, February 2005 NEDLAC Report annexure 2 par 4.4.2. See
Havenga et al. Commercial Law 333; Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 85 concerning the organs of a
company.
189 This report is discussed in detail in ch 3 par 4.1 above.
190 This code is discussed in ch 3 par 4.1 above.
191 This was introduced into German law in 1861 with the General German Commercial Code (this
code applies to all merchants, all companies are regarded as merchants notwithstanding the nature of
their activities). See Du Plessis “Corporate Governance Reflections on the German System” 22;
Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors 229. See generally on corporate governance issues in
Germany Du Plessis et al. German Corporate Governance. On 8 October 2001 the European Council
Regulation for the establishment of the European company (SE) was adopted. This Regulation was
accompanied by another Regulation on co-determination by employees. The Regulation on the SE
became law in October 2004. The member states of the EU can now choose between a two-tier and a
unitary board structure. This is also confirmed in the Corporate Governance Code for Listed German
Corporations (discussed in par (c) below). See, generally, on the SE Hannigan Company Law 57–59;
Du Plessis et al. German Corporate Governance 159–161 (The SE was originally proposed by the
European Commission in 1970. It took a long time before it was implemented mainly due to issues
like the interface between European and national law.)
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is rather complex. This is particularly so in respect of its element of employee
participation.
All German publicly traded companies (Aktiengesellschaftten) are incorporated under
the Stock Corporation Act of 1965 (Aktiengesetz).192 The public company has three
organs,193 a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) consisting of employees and
shareholders (usually on a 50:50 ratio), a managment board (Vorstand) which
conducts the day-to-day management of the company and a general meeting
(Hauptversammlung). In a private company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung
(GmbH)), only two organs are required, namely a management organ (similar to the
management board in public companies) and the organ for the corporators (similar to
the general meeting in the public company). The element of co-determination is
compulsory in larger private companies. In the discussion that follows, the focus is on
public companies, since the relationship between the different organs is best
illustrated in this type of company.194
Members and shareholders enforce their rights through voting at the general
meeting.195 The general meeting may only decide on matters concerning management
when requested by the management board.196 The general meeting also appoints the
members of the supervisory board.197 The general meeting is responsible for deciding
192 Referred to as AktG. This discussion focuses on the public company (Aktiengesellschaft). In the
case of private companies (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung), a supervisory board is only
required in two instances: if a company has more than 500 employees or if a company is involved in
the metal, steal or coal industries. See Du Plessis “Werkersdeelname” 388.
193 Du Plessis ‘Werkersdeelname” 387; Du Plessis”Corporate Governance Reflections on the German
System” 21.
194 German enterprise law consists of the sole proprietor, partnerships, private undertakings with
limited liability and the public corporation (Aktiengesellschaft). See Du Plessis “Corporate
Governance Reflections on the German System” 21; Beuthin “The Range of a Company’s Interests”
174; Du Plessis “Werkersdeelname” 388–391.
195 See s 118(1) of the AktG. See also Du Plessis et al. German Corporate Governance 39–40 on the
functions of the general meeting. See Volhard & Arndt German Limited Liability Company (GmbH)
ch 11 on labour law of the GmbH and ch 12 on the supervisory board; Chew & Gillan Corporate
Governance ch 29 on corporate ownership and control in the United Kingdom and Germany and
Monks Corporate Governance at p 287 on the position in Germany.
196 Sections 76(1), 121(2) of the AktG.
197 Section 101(1) of the AktG.
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on the distribution of profits within the corporation.198 It is also the general meeting
that will institute action against a member of the supervisory or management boards
who is in breach of his duties.199 Special functions can be allocated to the general
meeting in the articles of association of the company.200
The supervisory board appoints and dismisses members of the managing board and it
checks the capabilities of the members of the managing board.201 Members of the
supervisory board are appointed by the general meeting by way of a resolution passed
with a simple majority of votes. Only fully competent, natural persons may serve on
the supervisory board.202 No person may serve on more than ten supervisory boards
at the same time.203 No person is allowed to serve on the supervisory board and the
management board of the same corporation.204 Members of both boards should
conduct their affairs in a diligent manner with the necessary care.205
The supervisory board includes an element of co-determination by employees.206 It is
important to note that the two-tier board structure and the system of co-determination
developed separately in Germany. The two-tier board structure was already
introduced in Germany in 1861207 and made compulsory for public companies in
198 Sections 58, 173, 174 of the AktG.
199 As far as this is not regulated otherwise. See s 147(1) of the AktG.
200 Section 119(1) of the AktG.
201 This is seen as the cornerstone of the two-tier board structure. It ensures indirectly influencing
decision making in public corporations. See Du Plessis “Corporate Governance Reflections on the
German System” 25; Spisto “The Significance of the King Reports” 310. See Du Plessis et al. German
Corporate Governance for a discussion on the supervisory board 65–110.
202 Section 100(1) of the AktG.
203 Section 100(2)(1) of the AktG.
204 Section 105(1)2 of the AktG.
205 This is discussed by Du Plessis et al. German Corporate Governance 68.
206 The composition of the supervisory board is determined by the labour legislation applicable to the
specific company. See also André “Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance” 1820–1849;
Spisto “Stakeholder Interests in Corporate Governance” 139–141; Delport “Werkplekforums” 415;
Shandu “Shareholders’ Interests” 89 regarding the composition of the two-tier board structure.
207 The two-tier structure was introduced by the German Commercial Code of 1861. See generally Du
Plessis et al. German Corporate Governance 119.
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1870. In 1922 co-determination at supervisory level was introduced. This only
applied in cases where the supervisory board consisted of more than three members.
Two supervisory members then had to be employee representatives.208 In 1934 all
forms of employee participation were, however, abolished. In 1951 parity employee
representation209 at supervisory board level was established. But the functions of the
supervisory board did not change and the employees therefore had seats on a board
developed for supervision by shareholders, and not employees.210
The Co-Determination Act of 1951 made employee representation on the supervisory
board compulsory for all companies within the mine (including coal), iron and steel
industries. These mining, iron and steel companies are divided into three categories,
namely companies with a stated share capital up to 10 million euros,211 companies
with a stated share capital up to 10 and 25 million euros,212 and companies with a
stated share capital of more than 25 million euros.213 Membership on the supervisory
board in companies outside of these fields is determined by the Co-Determination
Act of 1976 (Mitbestimmungsgesetz).214 Companies, outside of the coal, metal and
steal industries, 215 who employ more than 2 000 employees must consist of an equal
208 This was regulated in terms of the Works Constitution Act of 1920. This Act was amended in 1922.
See Official Journal of the Former Reich XVIII of 25 February 1922 (Part 1) at 209–210.
209 In other words, the supervisory board consists of an equal number of employee and shareholder
representatives, plus one additional member who is elected by the shareholders’ meeting on the
proposal of the majority of both groups on the supervisory board.
210 Du Plessis et al. German Corporate Governance 119–122.
211 Their supervisory boards must have 11members, 5 must be representatives of shareholders and 5 of
employees. The eleventh person should be a neutral person, who serves as chairperson.
212 Their supervisory boards may have 11 members in the same way as described in n 211, but these
companies may determine in their articles of association that the supervisory board has 15 members, 7
representatives of shareholders, 7 of employees and the fifteenth person should be a neutral person,
who serves as chairperson.
213 Their supervisory boards may have 11 members in the same way as described in n 211, but these
companies may determine in their articles of association that the supervisory board has 21 members,
ten representatives of shareholders, 10 of employees and the last person should be a neutral person,
who serves as chairperson.
214 Du Plessis “Corporate Governance Reflections on the German System” 23–24; Du Plessis
“Werkersdeelname” 387–390.
215 These companies include public companies, private companies and companies with one or more
general partner limited by shares, see s 1(1) of the Co-Determination Act of 1976.
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number of labour and shareholder representatives.216 If there is a deadlock and the
shareholders and employees cannot reach consensus on a specific point, the
chairperson will have a decisive vote. The chairperson is always elected by the
shareholders and the employees appoint the vice-chairperson.217 The casting vote of
the chairperson makes the power balance in the supervisory board slightly in favour
of the shareholders. In terms of the One Third Participation Act
(Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz) of 2004 public and private companies with more than 500
employees must have one third employee representatives and two thirds of
shareholder representatives on their supervisory boards.218
Removal of the members of the supervisory board rests with those who appointed
them, but the articles of association of the company can prescribe a different method
of removal.219 The remuneration of the members of the supervisory board is
determined by the general meeting or prescribed in the articles of association.220 The
remuneration should be reasonable and proportional to the functions being performed
by the specific member.221
The management board222 is concerned with the day-to day-affairs of the corporation.
It should, inter alia, keep financial records and convene general meetings.223 The
216 Section 7(1) of the Mitbestimmungsgesetz of 1976, hereafter MitbestG.
217 Section 27 of the MitbestG.
218 This Act replaced the Works Constitution Act of 1952. The rules on employee representation on the
supervisory boards are similar to the 1952 Act, but simpler. Du Plessis et al. German Corporate
Governance 118.
219 Section 103(1) of the AktG. As a general rule the members of the supervisory board can be removed
by a three-quarter majority of the general meeting, but the articles of incorporation may provide for a
different majority.
220 Section 113(1) of the AktG.
221 Du Plessis “Corporate Governance Reflections on the German System” 24–25; Du Plessis et al.
German Corporate Governance 73–80 on the remuneration of the members of the supervisory board.
222 See Du Plessis German Corporate Governance 40–64 for a detailed discussion of the management
board.
223 Sections 76(1), 91, 121(2) of the AktG, also Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company Directors 231–
232. The members or shareholders enforce their rights at the general meeting (s 118(1) of the AktG):
Du Plessis “Corporate Governance Reflections on the German System” 38–39; Du Plessis et al.
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board also represents the company as far as third parties are concerned. The doctrine
of ultra vires is unknown in the German system. The company is bound by contracts
concluded with third parties even if they fall outside their scope of business. A third
party may not, however, rely on the unlimited powers of the management board if he
was aware of the limitation. The members of the management board are appointed by
the supervisory board for a maximum period of five years.224 This period is regarded
as sufficient for members to establish themselves, but not so long that they become
disinterested in the management of the corporation.225 The appointment process of
members of the management board is quite complex. In the first round, the members
of the management board are elected by a majority of two-thirds of the supervisory
board. If this majority is not achieved, a committee must be formed.226 The
committee consists of the chairperson of the supervisory board, the vice-chairperson,
a representative of the shareholders and an employee representative.227 This
committee then has a month within which to propose suitable names to the
supervisory committee. Proposals may also be made by other members of the
supervisory board who are not on the committee. For the second round of elections,
only a general majority is required.228 In the case of a tie the chairperson has a casting
vote.229 A member of the management board may only be removed for good reasons,
before the end of his term. A gross breach of duties and a lack of competence are
examples of good reasons for dismissal.230 The supervisory board determines the
remuneration of the members of the management board.231
German Corporate Governance 41. See also Keller “Employment Relations in Germany” in Bamber
et al. International and Comparative Employment Relations.
224 Section 84(1) of the AktG.
225 Du Plessis “Corporate Governance Reflections on the German System” 25 n 58.
226 Section 31(2) of the MitbestG.
227 Section 27(3) of the MitbestG.
228 Section 31(3) of the MitbestG.
229 Section 31(4) of the MitbestG. See Du Plessis “Corporate Governance Reflections on the German
System” 25–26 generally.
230 Du Plessis “Corporate Governance Reflections on the German System” 26.
231 Du Plessis “Corporate Governance Reflections on the German System” 27.
246
In November 1996 a Ministerial Draft Bill, also generally known as the
Aktienrechtsreform 1997, was released. This Draft Bill dealt with a number of issues
such as the duties, responsibilities and liability of the members of the supervisory
board. After a few amendments to the Bill it was enacted law in May 1998.
Amendments to German corporate law were piecemeal rather than as a result of a
comprehensive reform process.232
c) Evaluation of the Two-Tier Board Structure
A number of corporate scandals233 in Germany led to considerable criticism of the
two-tier board structure.234 Firstly, the most common criticism relates to the fact that
major German banks dominate the supervisory boards of large German companies.235
German banks own (usually quite large) equity stakes in German public companies
and are therefore representatives on the boards of those companies.236 If a major
shareholder or a constituency like a bank can dominate a particular sector of the
board, he or she can usually dominate the entire board.237
Secondly, employees are usually quite inactive on the supervisory boards. Therefore,
they normally have limited impact on decisions reached by the board.238 Reasons for
232 As was the case in South Africa, the United Kingdom and Australia.
233 The Balsam scandal was Germany’s third major financial scandal in less than six months. In terms
of the Balsam scheme, top managers of Balsam AG, a leading manufacturer of flooring, speculated in
financial markets using borrowed funds. Two other financial scandals include the bankruptcy of the
property developer Jürgen Schneider AG and the near-collapse of the big German blue-chip industrial
and trading conglomerate Metallgesellschaft AG. These companies have also been involved in
allegations of fraud or derivatives speculation.
234 This criticism is mainly of the supervisory boards, seeing that they should oversee the business of
the company. See Du Plessis “Corporate Governance Reforms in Germany” 389; Du Plessis et al.
Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 307–308; Du Plessis “The German Two-Tier
Board” 1139.
235 André “Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance” 1822.
236 André “Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance” 1834. Deutsche Bank alone is a
representative on more than 400 supervisory boards.
237 André “Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance” 1828.
238 See André “Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance” 1827 who refers to an article by
Henry Hansmann where it is stated that “[c]o-determination does not generally seem to have resulted
in effective worker participation in control of the corporation at the board level; rather, control
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this apathy may be that the interests of the employees and the shareholders are not
necessarily that different, especially when the company is prospering. Employees and
shareholders then want what is best for the company. Furthermore, employees are
sometimes not involved in decision making. Some decisions are made outside the
formal board meetings and only presented to the board as a formality; others have
already been made by the management board and are only ratified by the supervisory
board.239 Employee representatives on the supervisory board usually have no
influence on the day-to-day activities of the management board, such as appointments
and dismissals of employees, training offered, working hours and holidays.240 These
issues are, however, important to them. Works councils have therefore been
established, in terms of the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (Works Constitution Act) of
1972. In terms of this Act, all companies with more than five employees are
compelled to have a works council, irrespective of their field of activity. Works
councils have a considerable say concerning the shop floor and the matters that affect
employees the most. The works council therefore represents the interests of the
employees. Employees would rather participate through works councils. Their role as
representatives on board level is therefore only an add-on and even leads to
duplication in some instances.241
The above conclusion that employees do not necessarily benefit from being
represented on the supervisory board leads to the argument that the two-tier system is
not necessarily the most suitable option for employee participation in South African
companies. Other options to provide employees with the necessary protection without
necessarily opting for the two-tier structure also have to be explored. It has,
furthermore been argued that the supervisory board is ineffective. Some
essentially remains in the hands of the investors” and “employees are usually quite inactive on the
supervisory board and have relatively little impact on substantive decisions reached by the board. The
two-tier structure does therefore not necessarily provide the solution for increased employee
participation”. See further O’Regan “Possibilities for Worker Participation” 128 who refers to research
in Germany that indicates that worker participation on board level is unlikely to lead to worker
interests being powerfully put forward at board level.
239 André “Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance” 1827.
240 André “Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance” 1827.
241 Lutter “The German System of Worker Participation” 155–159.
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commentators suggest that the members of the supervisory board do not take their
task seriously enough. They only meet a few times a year, making it difficult to fulfil
their functions properly.242
Thirdly, the relationship between the supervisory board and the management board
has also been criticised.243 The supervisory board must provide the management
board with advice. By implication the management board has an obligation to allow
the supervisory board to provide it with advice. This leads to many questions
concerning the rights and duties of the respective boards, for instance, whether or not
the supervisory board can really act as an advisor to the modern, professional
management board of large corporations. Moreover, the supervisory board has to rely
fully on the information that it obtains from the management board and this
information is not always adequate or comprehensive enough.244
These points of criticism relating to the relationship between the supervisory and
management boards, and the issue of the ineffectiveness of the supervisory board,
have been substantially addressed in recent German corporate law reforms.245
In May 2000 a government commission was appointed chaired by Theodor Baums.
Its recommendations led to the publication of the Corporate Governance Code for
Listed German Corporations. The code was adopted in February 2002.246 The code is
voluntary and based on a “comply or explain” principle. This principle is entrenched
242 Du Plessis “Corporate Governance Reflections on the German System” 42; Du Plessis et al.
Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 308.
243 Du Plessis “Corporate Governance Reforms in Germany” 389.
244 Du Plessis “Corporate Governance Reflections on the German System” 42.
245 See Du Plessis “The German Two-Tier Board” 1140. See par 3 (cooperation between the
management board and the supervisory board), pars 4–5 relating to the tasks and duties of the
management and supervisory boards as well as the composition of these boards in the Corporate
Governance Code for Listed German Corporations. See generally Du Plessis “Corporate Governance
Reforms in Germany” 389; Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 309–
312.
246 The code was reviewed in June 2007.
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in legislation.247 The code represents essential regulations for the management and
supervision of German listed companies. The code is aimed at making the German
corporate governance system transparent and understandable. The code confirms that
the management board is responsible for managing the enterprise and that the
supervisory board appoints, supervises and advises the members of the management
board.248
The relationship between the supervisory and management boards is now clearly
stipulated in paragraph 3 of the code. It states, inter alia, that these two boards should
co-operate closely to the benefit of the company. The functions of both the
management board and supervisory boards are also listed in the code.249 The
amendments to the Act and the introduction of the Corporate Governance Code for
Listed Corporations,250 discussed above, broaden the rights of the supervisory board
considerably.251 It can now insist that the management board report to it on the extent
of any deviations from the original business plan of the specific company. Providing
sufficient information is also the joint responsibility of the management and
supervisory boards.252
Lastly, the two-tier system can operationally be more tedious because the
shareholders and employees sitting on the supervisory boards can delay the reaching
of consensus. Decisions are taken with more speed when a unitary board structure is
used.253 The more parties that are involved, the more difficult it is to reach consensus.
247 Section 161 of the AktG. See generally, Du Plessis “The German Two-Tier Board” 1139 for a
detailed discussion of the code.
248 Foreword of the code.
249 See pars 4 and 5 of the code.
250 This code is available at http://www.ikb.de/content/en/ir/corporate_governance
/030521_Corp_Gov_E.pdf (accessed 10 August 2006). See André “Some Reflections on German
Corporate Governance” 1822 for a discussion of the corporate governance reform in Germany.
251 Davies “Employee Representation” 137.
252 Paragraph 3.3 of the code.
253 Shandu “Shareholders’ Interests” 93.
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The two-tier system has the advantage that many parties are involved at supervisory
level and thus reducing the risk for strategic mistakes.
d) Conclusions: The Unitary Board Structure Versus the Two-Tier Board Structure
From the above it is clear that, first, the board of directors in the unitary structure is
similar to the supervisory board in the two-tier structure and the managing directors
in the unitary board are similar to the management board in the two-tier structure. I
suggest that the addition of non-executive directors on the board of directors in the
unitary structure brings the unitary board even closer to the two-tier structure. The
supervisory board in a two-tier structure is independent and separate from the
management board. The inclusion of non-executive directors on the unitary board of
directors ensures similar independence and separateness on a unitary board.
Second, the board of directors in the unitary structure and the supervisory board in
the two-tier structure are both appointed by the shareholders. The supervisory board
also appoints the management board and the board of directors the relevant managing
directors. It can therefore be argued that unitary boards and two-tier boards are not
really alternatives to each other, but rather two board structures with differences and
similarities.
Third, information flows more easily in the unitary board structure and there is a
closer relation between those supervising and those managing. The two-tier structure
provides a stricter separation between the supervision and management functions.
Fourth, the main difference between the two-tier structure and the unitary structure is
that in the unitary structure the managing directors also serve on the board of
directors. In South Africa, it is recommended that the managing director be a non-
executive director.254 In the two-tier structure members of the supervisory board are
not allowed to sit on the management board and vice versa. The supervisory board
254 See p 53 in King II.
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also includes the element of co-determination (employee participation at supervisory
board level).255
Fifth, when one considers these two structures in trying to find the most appropriate
structure for a particular country, the history, circumstances of, and current situation
in, that country are very important.256 This is especially true in South Africa, which
has had a new political dispensation since 1994.257 When considering foreign
systems, it must be taken into account that labour relations in a particular country are
usually the product of political, socio-economical and historical factors in that
country. This means that the transplantation of legal rules from one system to another
will not necessarily provide the same results.258
It would seem that the proponents of a stakeholder or pluralist approach are usually in
favour of the two-tier board structure, especially due to the co-determination element.
In terms of the pluralist approach directors should consider the interests of
stakeholders when managing a company and by having employee representation on
boards this consideration of stakeholder interests (especially employee interests)
would be easier. It also seems as if those who favour the enlightened shareholder
value or shareholder primacy approach usually favour a unitary board structure where
employees are not represented on the board.259
255 See Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 58–63, who also provide
illustrations on the operation of the traditional unitary board, the modern unitary board and the two-tier
board. See also Delport “Werkplekforums” 417–418; Du Plessis “Corporate Governance Reforms in
Germany” 389.
256 Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 58–63.
257 Paragraph 1 above.
258 O’Regan “Possibilities for Worker Participation” 122.
259 See Shandu “Shareholders’ Interests” 93 where he states the following: “The main difference
between the two models is that the Anglo-Saxon model is traditionally directed at maximising
shareholder value (thus the enlightened shareholder value approach) whereas the two-tier board seeks
to balance the interests of both the shareholders and the stakeholders (thus the pluralist approach)
(emphasis added). As indicated above, the two-tier board structure is, however, not always linked to
the pluralist approach. See also Spisto “The Significance of the King Reports” 310; André “Some
Reflections on German Corporate Governance” 1827. See pars (e) and (f) below for the advantages
and disadvantages of the two-tier board structure. It is stated in the Policy Document that the two-tier
board provides the opportunity for stakeholder representation: at ch 4 par 4.4.2. Those in favour of the
unitary board structure are generally in favour of the enlightened shareholder value approach; see the
position of Business South Africa in the February 2005 NEDLAC Report annexure 2 par 4.4.2. See
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A simple link between the two-tier board structure and a model in favour of the
protection of stakeholders or a unitary board structure and a model advocating for
shareholder primacy is, however, not always easy to identify. Countries usually make
use of a mixture of models. It would seem that the stakeholder model is favoured in
Germany, and this is particularly true if the supervisory board consists of
shareholders and employees in a 50:50 ratio.260 In such cases, shareholders’ interests
will not receive priority, but they will be equal to the interests of employees.261 The
co-determination element on the German two-tier board can therefore be seen as
indicative that the pluralist approach is preferred, but only to a limited extent as only
one group, namely employees, is favoured. Other interest groups such as consumers
and suppliers are excluded. The pluralist approach, if properly applied, implies that
directors should have direct fiduciary duties towards a number of interest groups, and
not only to employees.
It is important to note that the two-tier board structure is not necessarily linked to the
pluralist approach. The German Corporate Governance Code262 states that the
management board should manage the enterprise independently, and is obliged to do
so in the best interests of the enterprise.263 This indicates that the enlightened
shareholder value approach, where directors should exercise their fiduciary duties for
the benefit of the company as a whole, is preferred.
To summarise: the two-tier system, as applied in Germany, provides employees with
protection, but ignores other stakeholders, such as suppliers and consumers. Proper
further generally Dine “Company Law Developments” 245; Botha “Confusion in the King Report”
29–39. See ch 2 par 5.1 on the pluralist and enlightened shareholder value approaches.
260 In German law this would be the case concerning all companies within the coal, steal and metal
industries that have more than 1 000 employees (in terms of the Montan-Mitbestimmunsgesetz of
1951) or companies with more than 2 000 employees that must consist of an equal number of labour
and shareholder representatives (in terms of the Mitbestimmungsgesetz). See par (b) above.
261 See the discussion above on the different type of companies in Germany and when the chairperson
will have a casting vote.
262 Available at http://www.ikb.de/content/en/ir/corporate_governance/030521_Corp_Gov_E.pdf)
(accessed 10 August 2006).
263 Paragraph 4.1.1 of the code.
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justification is needed to provide only employees, and not other interest groups, with
protection. One could argue that other stakeholders can be adequately protected
receive by way of contracts and other legislation.264 Whether this is the case in a
particular legal system will have to be investigated.
This issue of employee protection in South Africa was considered in King I and King
II as well as the Policy Document. The views expressed in these documents are
discussed below. The Draft Companies Bill of 2007 does not provide employees with
direct protection and opts for a unitary board structure. This is discussed in paragraph
4.3 below.
e) Worker Participation in South Africa
King I confirmed that the unitary board structure has always been applied in South
Africa and that the personal interaction associated with the unitary structure is one of
the main advantages of this structure.265 The committee also addressed the issue of
worker participation at board level.266 Firstly, a company is a nexus of inter-relations
between its various stakeholders. Therefore, all stakeholders are entitled to
representation at board level. One cannot exclude certain stakeholders, but it will be
impractical to have all stakeholders represented on the board. Secondly, the
committee believed that workers should be involved in the corporate governance of a
company, because by involving them resources and skills would be pooled together
to ensure that the company survives and strives. It is stated that the basic element of
good governance is to make decisions honestly in the best interests of the company.
A worker representative would have to act with intellectual honesty even if it is a
difficult decision for an employee to make.267 Thirdly, a system of worker
participation should grow out of the company’s business, culture and the workers’
264 For example, creditors are protected by way of insolvency law and shareholders can draw up a
shareholders’ agreement with the company. See, generally, Sealy “Directors’ Wider Responsibilities”
173.
265 King I ch 4 par 11.
266 King I ch 4 par 12.
267 King I ch 4 par 12.5.
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organisation. Companies should therefore develop their own system of worker
participation by way of workers’ committees, or at management or board level.268
In King II it was reiterated that the unitary board structure is the preferred option.269
The committee also favoured the enlightened shareholder value approach, as it
creates the necessary balance between economic efficiency and the broader objectives
of society.270 It recommended that executive and non-executive directors should serve
on boards.271 An executive director is involved with the day-to-day business of the
company, and a non-executive director is not a full-time director and is not involved
with the day-to-day management of the company.272 A non-executive director should
therefore be independent from management.273 The committee further recommended
that the majority of directors should be non-executive directors.274
The drafters of the Policy Document also favoured the “triple-bottom line” approach
and thus the enlightened shareholder value approach.275 They favoured the unitary
268 See King I ch 4 pars 12.1–13.3.
269 King II s 1ch 1 par 1.
270 They refer to it as the “triple-bottom line” or the “inclusive approach”; see King II par 17; the
Executive Summary of King II pars 17, 37. See also Shandu “Shareholders’ Interests” 93.
271 King II s 1 ch 4; Executive Summary of King II par 2.1.2. The reports state that non-executive
independent directors have also evolved in practice. Such a director is a non-executive director who is
not a representative of a shareowner, is not employed by the company, is not a member of immediate
family of an individual who is or has been in the past three years employed by the company, is not a
professional advisor or significant supplier of the company, has no contractual relationship with the
company and is free from any relationship that can materially interfere with the individual’s capacity
to act in an independent manner (King II s 1, ch 4, par 7.3)
272 King II s 1 ch 4.
273 King II s 1 ch 4; Executive Summary of King II par 2.4.3. It is specifically stated that non-executive
directors should be individuals of calibre and credibility who have the necessary skill and experience
to make decisions independent from the management (see par 2.4.2 of the Executive Summary of King
II). See generally Spisto “The Significance of the King Reports” where he provides reasons why he is
in favour of the two-tier board structure. He also refers to King I and King II and the Policy Document,
and suggests that they do not provide valid reasons why they are not in favour of the two-tier structure,
at 338, 339. I submit that their reasons are valid.
274 King II s 1 ch 1 par 3.
275 The Policy Document ch 3 par 3.2.3.
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board structure with optional stakeholder representation.276 The following reasons
were provided for using the unitary board structure rather than the two-tier structure:
the two-tier structure is often inefficient;277 it may deter investors; and it is not
necessarily desirable for all stakeholders.278
A two-tier structure may deter investors for various reasons. Investors are usually
interested in wealth maximisation and the involvement of employees on board level
can prevent that. As stated above, the number of parties involved may delay decision
making. Imposing a new structure will also be costly, especially in respect of
paperwork involved when converting to another system.279
It is submitted that the advantages of a two-tier board structure, namely supervision
and independence, can also be achieved in the unitary structure, especially with the
inclusion of non-executive and independent directors.280 In Germany the co-
determination aspect of the supervisory board in the two-tier system has proved to be
unsuccessful mainly due to inactive employees.
f) Conclusions
In terms of the traditional position that directors must act in the best interests of the
company, worker participation on boards can be problematic. Conflicts of interest
276 The Policy Document ch 4 par 4.4.2; February 2005 NEDLAC Report par 6.3.16, annexure 2 par
4.4.2.
277 This reason has been discussed above. See the Policy Document par 4.4.2.
278 The Policy Document ch 4 par 4.4.2; Havenga “Regulating Directors’ Duties” 617 note 39.
279 The Policy Document ch 4 par 4.4.2. Business supports the drafters of the Policy Document, Labour
is also in favour of a unitary board, but recommends the inclusion of non-executive directors to
represent key stakeholders, February 2005 NEDLAC Report annexure 3 par 4.4.2; Spisto “Stakeholder
Interests in Corporate Governance” 129–147 states (at 147): “Thus, the most desirable option is a
model which represents the best economic efficiency after balancing the economic benefits and the
cost of introducing the new model. It is also highly recommended that the workers’ involvement in
corporate governance be increased to a significant level. It is along these lines that a new model of
corporate governance for South Africa has been proposed.” It is uncertain how one will give effect to
these ideas practically.
280 See also Delport “Werkplekforums” 418; Du Plessis “Werkersdeelname” 391–392; King I at ch 4
par 10 where it is suggested that “every objective of the two-tier structure can also be attained in a
unitary structure”.
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may arise between employees and shareholders.281 For example, where a company is
in financial difficulty, the directors may have to choose between the employees and
the shareholders. Shareholders may be protected by making some of the employees
redundant. This will obviously not be in the interest of the employees.
The two-tier board structure has merit,282 but the co-determination element has some
shortcomings. I submit that the two-tier structure is not the best option for increased
stakeholder (especially employee) protection in South Africa. There are other options
that will increase employee participation, without changing fundamental principles of
company law and that are less costly. These options are discussed below. Delport and
Du Plessis confirm that, in practice, South African law is in any event very similar to
German company law in respect of larger public companies. The board of directors
does not actually handle the day-to-day business affairs of the company. This is left
to managers who are appointed by the board. The only difference is that in South
Africa the managing director is also a member of the board. Should a director be an
employee and he or she has a conflict of interest between the interests of the
employees and those of the company, that director should preferably abstain from
voting.283 Increased participation on the boards by specific interests groups may
hamper directors’ attempts to conduct the company’s affairs in an effective
manner.284 It therefore seems that the unitary board structure is the preferred option.
In chapter 2 it was argued that stakeholders should be protected, but directors have to
bear the circumstances of each specific case in mind when determining in whose
interests they should manage the company. The protection that a stakeholder receives
in other legislation should play a role when courts balance the interests of different
281 Hodes “The Social Responsibility of a Company” 480. See also Mackenzie “The Employee and the
Company Director” 689. This is also discussed in ch 2 par 5.2 above where a proposed theory is
suggested.
282 Du Plessis “Corporate Governance Reflections on the German System” 44.
283 See the discussion on workplace forums below. Delport “Werkplekforums” 418; Du Plessis
“Werkersdeelname” 391–392.
284 Beuthin “The Range of a Company’s Interests” 174; see generally Du Plessis “Werkersdeelname”
387–393.
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stakeholders.285 The board of directors usually “supervises” the managers and the
inclusion of non-executive directors increases independence of the board. The unitary
structure does not necessarily imply the loss of the advantage of supervision.
Employee participation can be achieved in other ways than by a two-tier structure.286
In the South African unitary board structure directors should manage the company in
the best interests of the company as a whole.287 This does not mean that stakeholder
interests will be disregarded. Employees, for example, would still be able to voice
their opinions in workplace forums or through collective bargaining.288 Directors will
also consider their interests, because it would usually be to the benefit of the
company to do so. Employees can also be directors and executive directors are
usually employees, and will therefore be able to serve on the unitary board. This can
lead to a conflict of interests. Directors should, however, abstain from voting in such
cases.289
3.3.2.2 Workplace Forums
Stakeholders can be protected by statutes other than company statutes. Protection by
way of legislation aimed at particular groups would arguably achieve better
protection than to broaden the fiduciary duties of directors.290 I argue that the
protection of employees should rather be regulated in legislation dealing with labour
law issues.
In South Africa the Labour Relations Act (as amended)291 is the main statute dealing
with labour relations. It came into operation on 13 December 1995.292 The purpose
285 See ch 2 par 5.2 above.
286 Even in Germany, where the two-tier system is well established, there is currently debate on
whether or not employees should participate on the supervisory board. See Du Plessis et al. Principles
of Contemporary Corporate Governance 62.
287 The Policy Document ch 4 par 4.4.2; the Executive Summary of King II par 2.1. Havenga
“Regulating Directors’ Duties” 617.
288 See pars 3.3.2.2, 3.3.2.3 below.
289 See Delport “Werkplekforums” 418 in this regard.
290 The Policy Document ch 3 par 3.2.3; Havenga “Directors’ Fiduciary Duties Under our Future
Company-law Regime” 321; Havenga “Regulating Directors’ Duties” 615.
291 Act 66 of 1995 (hereafter the Labour Relations Act).
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statement of the Act293 makes it clear that the Act is there to promote, inter alia,
orderly collective bargaining and employee participation in decision making in the
workplace.294
The Labour Relations Act introduced workplace forums. They seek to establish
worker participation. Section 79 of the Labour Relations Act provides for the general
functions of workplace forums and provides that they should seek to promote the
interests of all employees in the workplace, whether or not the employees are trade
union members, enhance efficiency in the workplace, are consulted by the employer
with a view to reaching consensus regarding the matters listed in section 84 or
participate in joint decision making concerning the issues in section 86.295 Workplace
forums should therefore promote company management where employees participate
rather than adversarial bargaining within a particular enterprise. Workplace forums
are “in-house” institutions operating within a particular company or division, and
therefore differ from trade unions. They provide a framework within which
employers and employees (or their representatives) jointly solve their problems.
Workplace forums are not alternatives to trade unions, but are there to promote
participative management through consultation and joint decision making.296 A
workplace forum may be established in any workplace, where there are more than
one hundred employees.297
292 In August 1994 the government appointed a task team to draft a new Labour Relations Act. In
February 1995 the Labour Relations Act of 1995 was passed by Parliament and it came into operation
on 11 November 1996. The Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 and the Employment
Equity Act 55 of 1998 followed. A review was launched in 1999 by the government concerning the
Labour Relations Act and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (mainly due to a decrease in
foreign direct investments and high levels of unemployment). In July 2002 draft Bills were published
to amend these Acts. They were promulgated on 1 August 2002. See Du Toit et al. Labour Relations
Law 5–51.
293 Chapter 1 of the Labour Relations Act.
294 It also regulates, inter alia, strikes and lockouts and the establishment of labour courts. See Du Toit
et al. Labour Relations Law ch V.
295 Du Toit et al. Labour Relations Law 326. These sections are further discussed below.
296 See Grogan Workplace Law 293.
297 Du Toit et al. Labour Relations Law 326.
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The distinction between consultation and joint decision making is important.298 Most
of the issues that a workplace forum can negotiate on only require “consultation”.299
Consultation suggests that the employer should notify the forum of any proposals and
consider their suggestions in good faith.300 Section 84(1) lists the matters that the
workplace forum must consult on. These matters include changes in organisation of
work, job grading, education and training, export promotion, and product
development plans. Before an employer may implement a proposal in relation to any
of these matters, the employer must first consult with the workplace forum and try to
reach consensus. An agreement is, however, not necessary. Directors cannot be
forced to accept a decision made at a workplace forum (on section 84(1) issues)
because the workplace forum only has to be consulted on the specific issue.301 Only
those aspects listed in section 86 require joint decision making or an agreement. For
instance, any proposals concerning disciplinary codes and procedures, and rules
relating to the proper regulation of the workplace other than work-related conduct
should be agreed on.302 Joint decision making goes further than consultation in the
sense that an employer may not implement any proposal without the forum’s
consent.303
The establishment of workplace forums in the Labour Relations Act enhances the
protection of employees. Workplace forums achieve the same results as co-
298 Section 79 of the Labour Relations Act.
299 Du Toit et al. Labour Relations Law 340–341.
300 Section 85 of the Labour Relations Act; Grogan Workplace Law 296.
301 Du Toit et al. Labour Relations Law 327; Grogan Workplace Law 296–298.
302 Section 86 (1) states that:
Unless the matters for joint decision-making are regulated by a collective
agreement with the representative trade union, an employer must consult and
reach consensus with a workplace forum before implementing any proposal
concerning (a) disciplinary codes and procedures; (b) rules relating to the proper
regulation of the workplace in so far as they apply to conduct not related to the
work performance of employees; (c) measures designed to protect and advance
persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination; and (d) changes by the employer
or by employer-appointed representatives on trusts or boards of employer-
controlled schemes, to the rules regulating social benefit schemes.
303 Section 85 of the Labour Relations Act; Grogan Workplace Law 297.
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determination on the German two-tier board.304 The enlightened shareholder value
approach (or an approach mainly based on shareholder primacy) can be problematic
with regard to workplace forums. This can be explained as follows: should a decision
made at a workplace forum on issues listed in section 86 be to the detriment of the
company and to the benefit of the employees, directors may be liable for a breach of
their fiduciary duties.305 They will be personally liable as their fiduciary duties are
still owed to the company and not to other stakeholders directly. It is, however,
important to distinguish between consultation and joint decision making, when
considering possible personal liability of a director in terms of matters provided for in
sections 84 and 86. Should a director be liable for a breach of his fiduciary duties due
to a decision taken by the company after a decision by the workplace forum on a
section 84 matter, the forum cannot be blamed. Rather, the specific director will be
held accountable based on his own breach of duty, because he does not have to accept
anything decided at the workplace forum.306 The director would be in breach of his
fiduciary duties if he accepts something that is to the detriment of the company.
Section 86 issues307 require joint decision making and not consultation. Directors
may be personally liable if the company acts to the employees’ benefit on issues
listed in section 86, but to the detriment of the company, following a decision made
in the workplace forum.308 It is therefore important that directors protect their own
interests. They may, for example, record their dissent on a decision. Whether this will
have the effect of relieving a director from personal liability is difficult to tell. One
will have to wait and see whether a director will be held accountable when he ratifies
a decision made in the workplace forum that was not in the best interests of the
company as a whole.
304 Paragraph (b) above.
305 Havenga “Directors’ Fiduciary Duties Under our Future Company-law Regime” 323; Delport
“Werkplekforums” 417.
306 On matters listed in s 84(1) of the Labour Relations Act.
307 For instance, any proposals concerning disciplinary codes and procedures and rules relating to the
proper regulation of the workplace other than work-related conduct should be agreed on.
308 As indicated by Delport “Werkplekforums” 417.
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When determining whether workplace forums protect employees, it is important to
note that these forums are currently not widely implemented in South Africa.309 The
main reason for this is the fact that the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(Cosatu) is opposed to these forums. It contends that these forums will clash with its
shop steward committees and threaten trade union organisation.310 It also fears these
forums will undermine its independence and its traditional adversarial role in
collective bargaining.311 There are no reported cases dealing with workplace forums.
3.3.2.3 Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining is also a method of protecting employees’ interests and of
ensuring worker participation in decision making. It relates to the process whereby
trade unions and management negotiate terms and conditions of employment.312
Collective bargaining happens between employers and trade unions concerning
matters of mutual interest rather than “rights disputes”. The Labour Relations Act
does not define these forms of dispute. It is, however, generally accepted that a
“dispute of interest” arises when a party claims a benefit to which it is not entitled by
law, while “rights disputes” occur when parties cannot agree whether one of them is
legally entitled to a benefit.313 Chapter III of the Labour Relations Act relates to
collective bargaining. Part A of chapter III deals with organisational rights such as
the trade unions’ right to access to the workplace, and the right of an employee to
authorise an employer to deduct his subscription levy from his salary.314 It also deals
with trade union representatives. The number of employees indicates the number of
309 As indicated by labour law practitioners: Steenkamp et al. “The Right to Bargain” 958; Du Toit et
al. Labour Relations Law 42.
310 Du Toit et al. Labour Relations Law 42.
311 Steenkamp et al. “The Right to Bargain” 958.
312 O’Regan “Possibilities for Worker Participation” 114–119. A “collective agreement” is defined in s
213 of the Labour Relations Act as “[a] written agreement concerning the terms and conditions of
employment or any other matter of mutual interest concluded by one or more registered trade unions,
on the one hand and, on the other hand – one or more employees”.
313 Grogan Workplace Law 293. “Right disputes” are about the interpretation or application of existing
rights. “Disputes of interest” arise due to a failure to agree on a new term or condition of employment.
See Ceramic Industries Ltd v NCBAWU (1) (1997) 18 ILJ 716 (LC) on these definitions.
314 Sections 12, 13 of the Labour Relations Act.
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representatives allocated to them. For example, if there are ten employees who are
members of a trade union, they will be allocated one representative.315 Part B
concerns collective agreements, their legal effect and the procedures to be followed
concerning disputes over these agreements.316 Part C regulates the establishment,
powers, functions, registration and constitution of a bargaining council. One or more
registered trade unions may establish a bargaining council for a specific sector.317
Collective bargaining as a form of worker participation has some limitations. For
instance, unions often bargain from a position of ignorance, since they do not always
have the relevant information to place them in a superior bargaining position. Chapter
III, section 16 specifies the type of information that an employer must disclose in
order for the trade unions to be able to perform their functions effectively. This
section states, for instance, that an employer is not required to disclose information
which is legally privileged.318
Collective bargaining cannot fully meet the needs of the employees. The process of
collective bargaining usually accepts that management is the decision-maker and
merely attempts to influence those decisions by negotiation.319 In practice, employers
and trade unions usually engage in collective bargaining as a result of some decision
made by management, with which the employees are not happy. Collective
315 Section 14 of the Labour Relations Act.
316 Sections 23–26 of the Labour Relations Act.
317 Sections 27–34 of the Labour Relations Act. Part D concerns bargaining councils in the public
sector and part E statutory councils. These provisions are not important for purposes of this thesis.
318 No definition or explanation is provided on what constitutes “legally privileged” information.
However, see Schmidt et al. “Civil Procedure” in LAWSA vol 9 par 751 on privilege. It must be
claimed by the person in whom it vests. Professional privilege has a wide ambit: a party with a right to
such a privilege may not only claim it when such a party testifies, but the party may also prevent his or
her legal advisor or agent from making disclosures. An employer is also not required to disclose
information that is confidential, and if disclosed, may cause substantial harm to the employee or
employer. If there is a dispute on whether or not certain information is required to be disclosed, any
party may refer this dispute to the Commission, see s 16(5) of the Labour Relations Act. Sections 11–
13 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act provide for the right of access to certain
information. Sections 33–46 concern grounds for the refusal of access to information, for example,
mandatory protection of commercial information of a third party. See Le Roux “Access to
Information” 101–110.
319 O’Regan “Possibilities for Worker Participation” 118–119.
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bargaining is reactive and not proactive. It is, therefore, not really the correct vehicle
to facilitate joint decision making of workers, but rather a mechanism to negotiate on
the terms and conditions of employment.320
It has, however, been stated that it is not just the workers that will benefit from
collective bargaining. Management can also benefit:
[T]he principal interest of management in collective bargaining has
always been the maintenance of industrial peace over a given area and
period, and…the principal interest of labour has always been the creation
and the maintenance of certain standards over a given area and period,
standards of distribution of work, or rewards, and of stability of
employment.321
3.3.3 Conclusions
A company is managed by its directors. This should be done in the best interests of
the company as a separate legal entity. A director should balance various interests
when making decisions concerning the company. The protection that stakeholders
receive in other legislation is important when balancing the various interests of
different stakeholders. In determining how directors should balance the interests of
different stakeholders the fact that employees are protected in other legislation will
therefore be an influential factor.322
Different means of ensuring that employees are adequately protected were explored
above. Worker participation on board level does not seem to be the preferred route in
South Africa.323 There are two main reasons for this. First, in a unitary board
structure, a conflict of interest may arise when a director is also an employee.324 The
two-tier board structure that allows for worker participation has proved not always to
320 Grogan Workplace Law ch 20; Du Toit et al. Labour Relations Law ch V; Steenkamp, Stelzner &
Badenhorst “The Right to Bargain” 959.
321 Davies & Freedland Kahn-Freud’s Labour and the Law as per O’Regan “Possibilities for Worker
Participation” 117.
322 See the proposed theory in ch 2 par 5.2 above.
323 Paragraph 3.3.2.1.
324 This issue can be solved if those directors just abstain from voting as indicated by Delport in
“Werkplekforums” 418.
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be effective, especially in Germany where employees are usually inactive and more
concerned with decisions taken at plant level by works councils.325 The fact that
employees are not the only other interest group is another reason not to have worker
participation on board level. It will be impractical to provide creditors, consumers,
suppliers and the general public with board representation, and there is no good
reason why employees should receive preferential treatment. Another option
available is to give effect to worker participation in workplace forums.326 The
concern that a decision, which is not in the best interests of the company can be taken
at the forum, is not well founded, especially on section 84 matters where only
consultation is required.327 An employer must allow the workplace forum an
opportunity to voice its opinions. On most issues, the forum’s consent or agreement is
not required.328
Collective bargaining is also a means of worker protection.329 It obliges management
to consider issues that are important to employees. It has been admitted that
collective bargaining has shortcomings, but it provides a platform for employees to
voice their concerns through their trade union representatives with regard to their
terms and conditions of employment.
Lastly, employees can also be directors. This is usually so in the case of managing
directors in particular. If a director is also an employee, he will usually have a
contract of employment with the company concerned.330 A director’s position as such
is totally independent from his position as an employee.331 Should there be a conflict
325 Paragraph 3.3.2.1 above.
326 Paragraph 3.3.2.2.
327 Section 84 of the Labour Relations Act.
328 Section 84 (1) of the Labour Relations Act.
329 Paragraph 3.3.2.3.
330 Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 166.
331 Peens & Swart v MKTV Beleggings Beherend BK & Another 2003 (3) ALL SA 426 (T); Rosebank
Television & Appliances Co (Pty) Ltd v Orbit Sales Corp (Pty) 1969 (1) SA 300 (T) at 303.
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of interests, the specific director should abstain from voting.332 The specific director
does not, however, represent a specific group of employees when casting his vote as
an employee.
3.4 Other Stakeholders
3.4.1 Introduction
The bulk of authorities deals with directors’ fiduciary duties towards individual
shareholders, creditors and employees of a company. Nonetheless, there are other
interest groups who also need to be considered. In this section consumers and
suppliers are discussed as examples of such specific interest groups .
A company has commercial relationships with consumers and suppliers.333 It can be
argued that consumers have a right to be included as beneficiaries when directors
exercise their fiduciary duties, since they are the people who buy and use the
company’s products. It has been suggested that directors should have a duty towards
consumers not to impose excessive prices and to produce goods of a good quality.334
However, the counter-argument is that if a consumer is not satisfied with a
company’s approach or if the company charges too high prices, the consumer does
not have to support the company. A company’s approach towards consumers will
have an effect on the profits of the company over the long and medium term. If the
company acts in a fair and reasonable manner towards consumers, they will keep on
supporting the company.335
332 Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 166.
333 Hodes “The Social Responsibility of a Company” 482.
334 Beuthin “The Range of a Company’s Interests” 170.
335 See also ch 3 par 3.1.5 where the possible reasons why consumers need protection in the United
Kingdom context are discussed. These reasons are also relevant in the South African context and
include the fact that consumers need to be protected from fraudulent trading practices. Not all
consumers have the necessary skill and knowledge to make informed decisions on what to purchase.
Advertising and marketing strategies are very sophisticated, and can result in misleading or confusing
information being provided to consumers. Consumers are generally awarded with credit and they also
have high disposable incomes.
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The relationship between a company and its suppliers is also important. If the
company uses the specific suppliers often and treats them well, it may result in
possible discounts for the company. Suppliers will also provide good service if they
have an ongoing and good relationship with the company. For example, the supplier
will ensure the timely delivery of goods and the availability of staff when there is a
crisis, such as a strike at the offices of the specific supplier.
It can therefore be argued that it may be in the best interests of the company as a
whole for directors to consider the interests of consumers and suppliers. Specific
legislation is aimed at the protection of consumers.336 In paragraph 3.4.2 this
legislation is discussed in order to determine whether it adequately protects the needs
of consumers.
3.4.2 Consumer Protection
The Department of Trade and Industry defines a “consumer” as any natural person to
whom any commodity is offered or supplied or made available or from whom any
investment is solicited or who supplies337 or makes available any investment.338 The
department has a number of ongoing initiatives to accomplish its goal of creating a
competitive, enabling economic environment that will inspire investors, consumers
and business confidence in South African markets, products and services through fair,
transparent and effective business regulation. The Consumer and Corporate
Regulation Division of the department offers, inter alia, the following products and
services to consumers: information and advice, inspections, investigations, business
compliance; consumer rights protection, brochures and posters; and handling of
complaints in terms of the Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act.339
336 There is no specific legislation aimed at the protection of suppliers. Suppliers are, however,
creditors too. The arguments discussed above relating to the protection of creditors are therefore
relevant.
337 The definition of a “consumer” therefore includes suppliers.
338 See www.dti.gov.za/protecting consumers/saconsumerwellbeing.htm (accessed 10 October 2006).
This definition is similar to the definition used in the Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices)
Act 71 of 1988. A “consumer” is also defined in the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 and the Consumer
Protection Bill of 2007, discussed below.
339 Act 71 of 1988. This Act is discussed below. See www.dti.gov.za/protectingconsumers
/saconsumerwellbeing.htm. (accessed 10 April 2007).
267
The Department of Trade and Industry, through the Consumer and Corporate
Regulation Division, also administers legislation that deals with consumer protection.
Several of these statutes are discussed in the next section.340
3.4.2.1 Specific Legislation Aimed at Protecting Consumers
a) The Competition Act 89 of 1998, the Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices)
Act 71 of 1988 and the Estate Agency Affairs Act 112 of 1976
Consumers are protected in separate statutes. They are, for example, protected in
terms of legislation promoting competition and competitive prices. Fair business
practices are also regulated. Consumers are also protected in circumstances where
abuse is particularly possible, for example, when a consumer buys or sells property
through an estate agent. The Competition Act, the Consumer Affairs Act and the
Estate Agency Affairs Act are some of the Acts that provide consumers with
protection in these areas. It was argued above that the protection of stakeholders in
separate legislation should have an effect on a court’s decision concerning the
existence of directors’ fiduciary duties towards these stakeholders. Legislative
protection limits the obligation of directors to have fiduciary duties to that specific
stakeholder.341
The Competition Act342 promotes and maintains competition in order to provide
competitive prices and product choices to consumers. The Act also provides for a
competition commission that is responsible for the investigation, control and
evaluation of restrictive practices, abuse of dominant positions, and for the
establishment of a competition tribunal responsible to adjudicate such matters.343 The
purpose of the Act is to provide for an efficient, competitive, economic environment,
balancing the interests of workers, owners and consumers in order to provide all
340 See also ch 3 par 3.1.5 on the protection afforded consumers in the United Kingdom.
341 See ch 2 par 5.2 above.
342 Act 89 of 1998.
343 See the Preamble and s 2 of the Competition Act.
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South Africans with the opportunity to participate fairly in the national economy.344
It, furthermore, provides for markets in which consumers have access to, and can
freely select, the quality and variety of goods and services they desire. It also creates
greater capability and an environment for South Africans to compete effectively in
international markets.345
The Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act346 protects consumers by
providing for the protection and control of certain business practices. A consumer is
defined as, inter alia, any natural person to whom any commodity is offered, supplied
or made available or any natural person from whom any investment is solicited or
who supplies or makes available any investment.347 A business practice includes,
inter alia, any scheme, practice or method of trading, any advertising or any other
344 Section 2 of the Competition Act.
345 See generally on the Competition Act, Reyburn & Sutherland Competition Law of South Africa
(December 2006).
346 Act 71 of 1988. See Woker “Business Practices and the Consumer Affairs Act” 315–323 where she
discusses this Act. She also discusses Janse van Rensburg NO v Minister of Trade and Industry 2001
(1) SA 29 (CC) where the constitutionality of the Act was considered. In the High Court the applicants
wanted the court to declare the whole Act unconstitutional based on s 22 of the Constitution (right to
freedom of trade). The High Court only declared certain sections (ss 7(3) and 8(5)) of the Act
unconstitutional. Section 7(3) deals with the right of an investigating officer to enter, inspect and
search premises without a search warrant and to seize whatever is found. Section 8 concerns
investigations by a committee, a committee can investigate any business practice and if such a practice
is considered to be unfair the committee can make a recommendation to the Minister. The Minister can
then issue a notice in the Government Gazette stating that the business practice is unfair and directing
the parties to refrain from practicing it. In terms of s 8(5) the Minister is, however, empowered to act
after the notice has been published, but before the committee’s report has been received. The Minister
may attach money or property and he or she may prohibit a person from dealing with the money or
property. The High Court found that this provision is drastic and does not provide for the audi alteram
partem principle. The Constitutional Court found that s 8(5) was unconstitutional (s 7(3) had already
been amended (stating that a search warrant is necessary) by the Harmful Business Practices
Amendment Act 23 of 1999 and the Constitutional Court did not have to decide on it). The Consumer
Protection Act will, however, have the effect of repealing this Act.
347 Section 1 of the Consumer Affairs Act 71 of 1988.
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manner of soliciting business.348 The Act authorises a committee349 to investigate
business practices and to report unfair business practices to the Minister.350
The Estate Agency Affairs Act351 protects consumers, especially those who buy or
sell property through estate agents. It provides for the establishment of an estate
agency affairs board and an estate agents fidelity fund to control certain activities of
estate agents that will be in the public interest.
There is also legislation specifically designed for the protection of consumers in the
context of the provision of credit and the regulation thereof. The National Credit Act
and the Consumer Protection Bill provide extensive protection to consumers and are
discussed in more detail below.
b) The National Credit Act 34 of 2005
On 15 March 2006 the National Assembly approved the National Credit Act.352 The
Act came into effect on 1 June 2006, but certain sections only came into effect on
348 Section 1 of the Consumer Affairs Act 71 of 1988. This definition is very wide, see Woker
“Business Practices and the Consumer Affairs Act” 317–318.
349 The committee is a statutory body and its members are not full-time members. They are appointed
on the grounds of having special knowledge or experience of consumer advocacy, economics and law.
See s 2(2)(a).
350 See Woker “Business Practices and the Consumer Affairs Act” 316.
351 Act 112 of 1976. See generally www.dti.gov.za/protecting consumers/consumer rights (accessed 23
June 2007).
352 Act 34 of 2005. In March 2002 the Department of Trade and Industry established a task team to
review the legislation that has an impact on consumer credit. In June 2005 the National Credit Bill was
tabled by Parliament. See the Policy Framework for consumer credit published by the Department of
Trade and Industry, Consumer Credit Law Reform: Policy Framework for Consumer Credit 2004
available at http://www.dti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/policyjune2005.pdf (accessed 10 April 2007). See
Roestoff & Renke “Debt Relief for Consumers (1)” 561. The National Credit Regulator was
established on 1 June 2006 and the National Consumer Tribunal on 1 September 2006. See also
www.ngr.org.za (accessed 25 June 2007) – this website explains the National Credit Act and its
application in simple terms to the public. The objectives of the Act are listed as well as its key features.
The objectives include promoting black economic empowerment and ownership within the consumer
credit industry; prohibiting certain unfair credit and credit-marketing practices; and regulating credit
information (see the preamble of the Act). Some of the key features of the Act include that the
language in credit agreements should be simple, clear and understandable (s 64); quotes must be given
on all credit agreements and are binding for 5 days (s 92(3)); automatic increases in credit limits are
regulated ( s 119) and reckless lending is prohibited (s 80).
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1 June 2007.353 This Act relates to the promotion and advancement of the social and
economic welfare of South Africans.
The National Credit Act promotes a fair and non-discriminatory marketplace for
access to consumer credit and regulates the provision of consumer credit.354 This Act
is aimed at protecting consumers,355 but specifically consumers within the consumer
credit industry.
The purpose of the Act is to promote the development of a credit market that is
accessible to all South Africans, to ensure consistent treatment of different credit
products and different credit providers, to promote responsibility in the credit market
by encouraging responsible borrowing, avoidance of over-indebtedness and
fulfilment of financial obligations by consumers and to discourage reckless credit
granting by credit providers.356 The Act also aims to address the imbalances in
negotiating power between consumers and credit providers. A proper balance
between these parties will be achieved by educating consumers about credit and
353 These sections include those on disclosure, limits on interest and fees, reckless lending and all
related requirements. See Havenga et al. Commercial Law 204–234 on the application of the national
Credit Act.
354 On the Act see generally Otto The National Credit Act Explained.
355 A “consumer” is defined in the Act as a party to whom goods and services are sold under a discount
transaction, incidental credit agreement or instalment agreement. A discount transaction concerns an
agreement in terms of which goods or services are provided to a consumer over a period of time and
more than one price is quoted for the goods or services, the lower price being applicable if the account
is paid on a certain date and a higher price if the account is paid after that date. An “incidental credit
agreement” is an agreement in terms of which an account was tendered for goods or services that have
been provided to the consumer, or goods or services that are to be provided to the consumer over a
period of time where either or both of the following conditions apply: a fee, charge or interest became
payable when payment of an amount charged in terms of that account on or before a determined period
or two prices were quoted for settlement of the account, the lower price being applicable if the account
is paid on or before a determined date and the higher price if the account is not paid by the determined
date. An “installment agreement” is a sale of movable property in terms of which all or part of the
price is deferred and is to be paid by periodic payments, possession and use of the property is
transferred to the consumer, ownership of the property either passes to the consumer only when the
agreement if fully complied with or immediately subject to a right of the credit provider to re-possess
the property if the consumer fails to satisfy all the consumer’s financial obligation in terms of thee
agreement, and interest, fees or other charges are payable to the credit provider in respect of the
agreement, or the amount that has been deferred.
356 See Roestoff & Renke “Debt Relief for Consumers (1)” 561 regarding the purpose of the Act,
namely to protect consumers by addressing and preventing over-indebtedness.
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consumer rights, adequate disclosure of standardised information and providing them
with protection against unfair fraudulent conduct by credit providers.357
The Act is applicable to all credit agreements between parties, excluding certain
juristic persons,358 the State or an organ of the State. An agreement constitutes a
credit agreement if it is a credit facility, credit transaction, a credit guarantee or a
combination of all three.359
The Act also provides for consumer credit institutions. The National Credit Regulator
is an example of such an institution and the Act also provides for a consumer credit
industry regulation process.360 A person must be registered as a credit provider, if that
person on his own is alone or in conjunction with associated persons the credit
provider in respect of at least a hundred credit agreements.361
357 Section 3 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005.
358 Section 8 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005.
359 An agreement constitutes a credit facility if, in terms of that agreement, the credit provider
undertakes to supply goods or services or to pay an amount or amounts, as determined by the
consumer from time to time, to the consumer or on behalf of the consumer either to defer the
consumer’s obligation to pay any part of the cost of goods or services or to repay the credit provider
any part of an amount. An agreement constitutes a credit transaction if it is a pawn transaction or
discount transaction; an incidental credit agreement, an installment agreement; a mortgage agreement
or secured loan; a lease; or any other agreement, other than a credit facility or credit guarantee, in
terms of which payment of an amount owed by one person to another is deferred, and any charge, fee
or interest is payable to the credit provider in respect of, the agreement; or the amount that has been
deferred. An agreement constitutes a credit guarantee if, in terms of that agreement, a person
undertakes or promises to satisfy upon demand any obligation of another consumer in terms of a credit
facility or a credit transaction to which this Act applies. See also Roestoff & Renke “Debt Relief for
Consumers (1)” 564–569 for the application of the Act.
360 The National Credit Regulator is responsible for regulating the consumer credit industry by
registering credit providers. The Regulator must also enforce the Act by promoting informal resolution
of disputes between consumers and credit providers arising in terms of the Act, without intervening in
or adjudicating such disputes (see ss 14, 15 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005). It should also
monitor the credit market to ensure that prohibited conduct is prevented, investigate that national and
provincial registrants comply with the Act, issue and enforce compliance notices and investigate and
evaluate alleged contraventions of the Act. The Regulator is also responsible for increasing knowledge
of the nature and dynamics of the consumer credit industry and for promoting public awareness of
consumer credit matters by implementing, for example, information measures and to provide guidance
to the credit market (see s 16 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005). The National Consumer Tribunal
is another body established in terms of this Act (see s 26 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005). The
Tribunal may adjudicate any application that is made in terms of the Act and may make any order
provided for in the Act (see ss 26–38 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005).
361 Section 40 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. There are a number of exemptions, for example
incidental credit agreements are not covered.
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Lastly, provision is made for consumer rights in the credit industry, namely the right
to apply for credit, protection against discrimination in respect of credit, the right to
reasons if credit is refused, the right to information in an official language, the right
to receive information in clear and understandable language, the right to receive
documents and the right to confidential treatment.362
c) The Consumer Protection Bill
The Consumer Protection Bill of 2006 was first published in March 2006 for public
comment.363 In December 2007 the third draft of the Consumer Protection Bill was
approved by Cabinet.364 The Consumer Protection Bill promotes a fair, accessible and
sustainable marketplace for consumer products and services.365 It establishes national
norms and standards relating to consumer protection, provides for improved
standards of consumer information, prohibits certain unfair business practices and
362 See ss 60–68 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. This relates to consumer rights that are
especially relevant in the credit industry. The Department of Trade and Industry also lists
internationally recognised consumer rights on their website. These rights include the right to
satisfaction of basic needs (consumers should have access to basic needs such as food, housing and
clothing), the right to safety (consumers should be protected against production processes and products
or services that are dangerous to health or life), the right to information, the right to choice (consumers
should be able to choose from a range of products), the right to representation (consumers’ interests
should be represented in the making of government policy), the right to redress (consumers should
receive fair settlement of just claims), the right to consumer education and the right to a healthy
environment. Most of these rights are also entrenched in the Consumer Protection Bill, which deals
with consumers generally and not in a specific industry.
363 See Government Gazette 28629 of 15 March 2006 for the first draft of the Bill. Another draft of the
Consumer Protection Bill was issued in September 2006, but not to the general public. It was only
issued to those people who commented on the first draft. The Consumer Protection Bill was released
for comments soon after the introduction of the National Credit Act. This entails many changes for
retail companies. Both Acts will have a significant impact on the cost of doing business. Contracts
have to be available in one of the official languages (the supplier can state two official languages in
which documents will be made available in); it will be costly and difficult to draft some of the terms
and conditions of a contract in some of the official languages. Consumers should also be supplied with
various information making the cost of doing business also higher (see clauses 33; 34 of the Bill). See
Floor “Consumer Protection Bill” available at www.tradelaw.co.za/news/articles (accessed 10 April
2007).
364 The discussion below is based on the third draft of the Consumer Protection Bill. This Bill
emanates from comments received after consulting on the first (of March 2006) and second (of
September 2006) drafts. This Bill should be approved by Parliament during May 2008.
365 South African common law relating to consumer rights will be codified in the Bill. The Consumer
Protection Bill is applicable to the sale of all goods and services to both individuals and companies.
Transactions falling under the National Credit Act are exempted from the Bill as well as transactions
concluded with consumers whose turnover exceeds the threshold determined by the Minister by notice
in the Gazette. See ss 5; 6 of the Consumer Protection Bill.
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promotes responsible consumer behaviour.366 Chapter 2 of the Bill deals with the
fundamental consumer rights.367 These rights are similar to the internationally
recognised consumer rights advocated by the Department of Trade and Industry.
They include the following: the right to equal access to the consumer market,368 the
right to privacy,369 the right to choose,370 the right to disclosure and information,371
the right to fair and responsible marketing,372 the right to honest and fair dealing,373
the right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions,374 and the right to fair
value, good quality and safety.375 Chapter 5 of the Bill deals with consumer
protection institutions.376
366 Preamble of the Consumer Protection Bill.
367 A “consumer” is defined as “(a) a person to whom those particular goods or services are marketed
in the ordinary course of the supplier’s business; (b) a person who has entered into a transaction with a
supplier in the ordinary course of the supplier’s business, unless the transaction is exempt from the
application of this Act by section 5(2), or in terms of section 5(3); (c) if the context so requires or
permits, a user of those particular goods or a recipient or beneficiary of those particular services,
irrespective whether that user, recipient or beneficiary was a party to a transaction concerning the
supply of those particular goods or services; and (d) a franchisee in terms of a franchise agreement, to
the extent applicable in terms of section 5(6)(b) to (e)”. A “supplier” is defined separately as “a person
who markets any goods or services”.
368 This right includes protection against discriminatory market targeting, protection against
discrimination in consumer transactions and fair or reasonable grounds for different treatment of
consumers. See ss 8–10 of the Consumer Protection Bill.
369 This right includes the right to privacy of personal information and the right to restrict unwanted
telephonic access to consumers. See ss 11–12 of the Consumer Protection Bill.
370 This right consists, inter alia, of the right to select suppliers and products, authorise services,
choose or examine goods, the consumer’s right to acceptance of goods or services and the right to
cancel an agreement or transaction. See ss 13–21 of the Consumer Protection Bill.
371 This right deals with disclosure of the price of goods or services, product labelling and trade
descriptions, the right to information in an official language in plain and understandable language. See
ss 22–28 of the Consumer Protection Bill.
372 This right includes the general standards for the promotion of goods and services, customer loyalty
programs and promotional competitions. See ss 29–39 of the Consumer Protection Bill.
373 This right comprises of auctions and the right not to receive false, misleading or deceptive
representations. See ss 40–47 of the Consumer Protection Bill.
374 This right deals, inter alia, with unfair, unreasonable or unjust contract terms and written consumer
contracts. See ss 48–52 of the Consumer Protection Bill.
375 This right includes the general right to fair value, good quality and safety, implied warranty of
quality, warranty on repaired goods, duty to notify consumers of defects and the repair or replacement
of hazardous goods. See ss 53–61 of the Consumer Protection Bill.
376 See ss 83–98 of the Consumer Protection Bill.
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The Bill provides for the establishment of the National Consumer Commission.377
The commission is a mechanism implemented by the Bill which enables consumers
to enforce their rights. Thus, it is an alternative to the court system.378 It is a
watchdog of consumer protection issues and the first place where complaints can be
lodged.379 The members of the National Consumer Commission must have regard to
international developments in the field of consumer protection when they carry out
their functions. These functions include the monitoring of interests of vulnerable
consumers, the investigation and resolution of complaints, the development of codes
of practice relating to the Consumer Protection Act, the promotion of legislative
reform, the promotion of consumer protection within organs of State, increasing
knowledge of the nature and dynamics of the consumer market and promoting public
awareness of the consumer market.380
The Bill is a milestone in South Africa’s treatment of consumer protection. It will be
the first comprehensive legislation codifying the rights of consumers in South Africa.
The Bill attempts to codify the common law regarding the rights of consumers and
the obligations of those providing services and products to them.381
It is clear from this discussion that consumers are protected by various statutory
measures. In respect of legislative protection of stakeholders, as stated above, 382 it
might be better to afford protection to interest groups by way of legislation and not to
377 The Commission is established as an organ of State within the public administration, but as an
institution outside the public service. See ss 85–91 of the Consumer Protection Bill.
378 See Floor “Consumer Protection Bill” available at www.tradelaw.co.za/news/articles (accessed 10
April 2007).
379 Mackenzie “Landmark Consumer Protection” available at www.mondaq.com/article (accessed 10
April 2007).
380 See ss 92–98 of the Consumer Protection Bill. See also Mackenzie “Landmark Consumer
Protection” available at www.mondaq.com/article (accessed 10 April 2007).
381 The aim of this section of the thesis is to indicate that consumers have sufficient protection in other
legislation and that it is therefore not necessary to award them with further protection in the
Companies Act.
382 See ch 2 par 5.2 above.
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broaden the list of beneficiaries of the fiduciary duties of directors. Directors will still
be able to consider the interests of consumers when they exercise their fiduciary
duties, if it would be in the best interests of the company as a separate legal entity to
do so.383
3.4.3 Supplier Protection
As explained above, the relationship between a company and its suppliers is
important for various reasons. From the company’s point of view, it is important that
suppliers provide a good service to them, with timely deliveries and possible
discounts if the company has been using the specific supplier for some time. A
company needs to be able to trust and rely on its suppliers. From a supplier’s point of
view, it would want to be certain of payment and sure that the company does not
cancel the contract without a valid reason.
Unlike in the case of consumers, there is no specific statute protecting suppliers. I
submit that suppliers are nonetheless sufficiently protected. If a specific supplier is
not paid, then the he is in a similar position as a creditor and the same rules will be
applicable.384
3.4.4 Conclusions
It is clear from the discussion above that consumers (and suppliers as a specific type
of creditor) receive adequate protection in other legislation. Consumers receive ample
protection in terms of legislation promoting competition and competitive prices.385
Fair business practices are also regulated. The National Credit Act promotes a fair
marketplace for access to consumer credit and regulates the provision of consumer
credit. The Consumer Protection Bill is the first extensive piece of legislation
codifying the rights of consumers.
383 See generally Havenga “The Company, the Constitution and the Stakeholders” 134–139. See ch 2
par 5.2 above.
384 Paragraph 3.2 above.
385 See the Competition Act 89 of 1998.
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Suppliers are also creditors and the rules applicable to creditors are equally applicable
to them.386 It was argued in chapter 2387 of this thesis that directors should consider
the protection afforded stakeholders in other legislation when determining in whose
interests they should manage a company. I suggest that consumers receive extensive
protection in other legislation in South Africa, and directors should keep that in mind
when managing a company.
3.4.5 The Duty of Care, Skill and Diligence
A director must exercise his duties in good faith and for the benefit of the company.
In doing so he must exercise the necessary degree of care and skill. The concept of
care and skill received substantial attention in English company law.388 A summary
on the extent of a director’s care and skill has been provided in Fisheries
Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen, in the light of English decisions.389
It was held that the extent of a director’s care and skill depends largely on the nature
of the company’s business and any specific obligations assumed by, or assigned to,
him. A director is not required to have special expertise, but he must exercise the care
that can reasonably be expected of a person with his knowledge and experience. A
director is not liable for mere errors of judgement.390 A director who does not adhere
to this duty of care and skill is liable towards the company in delict for damages.391 If
there is also a contract between the director and the company he would also be guilty
of breach of contract.
386 Paragraph 3.2 above.
387 Chapter 2 par 5.2 above.
388 Chapter 3 par 3.2 above. English case law on the duty of care and skill is relevant when discussing
the South African duty of care and skill because South African company law is based on English law.
See the following cases on the standard expected of directors when acting with the necessary care and
skill: Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company Ltd [1925] 1 Ch 407 (CA); Re D' Jan of London Ltd
[1994] 1 BCLC 561 (CD). The extent of a director’s duty of care and skill depends largely on the
nature of the business and any particular obligations assumed by him or assigned to him: Wolpert v
Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 (2) SA 257 (W) at 267.
389 Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen; Fisheries Development Corporation of
SA Ltd v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd 1980 (4) SA 156 (W).
390 Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 147–148.
391 Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 148. See also McLennan “Directors’ Duties” 398; Botha
“Holding and Subsidiary Companies” 178 and the English case of Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v
Stebbing (1989) BCLC 498 (Ch).
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The Draft Companies Bill of 2007 provides for an objective and subjective test when
determining whether a director did act with the necessary care and skill.392 Clause
91(2) also states that a director’s judgement that an action is in the best interests of
the company is reasonable if the director has taken diligent steps to become informed
about the subject matter and does not have a personal financial interest in the subject
matter. It should also be a judgement that a reasonable individual in a similar position
could hold in comparable circumstances.393
4 THE STAKEHOLDER DEBATE: APPROACHES FOLLOWED IN THE
KING REPORTS, THE POLICY DOCUMENT AND THE COMPANIES
BILL OF SOUTH AFRICA
In chapter 2 the enlightened shareholder value and pluralist approaches were
discussed and evaluated. The first approach concerns shareholder protection and the
second deals with the recognition of stakeholder interests. In this section these
approaches are discussed as referred to in the King Reports, the Policy Document and
the Companies Bill of 2007.
4.1 The King Reports
The protection afforded stakeholders and “stakeholder communication”394 were
addressed in the King Reports and are important for purposes of this thesis. Although
King II replaced King I it is important to refer to the approach on stakeholder
protection followed in King I. King II built on this approach and attempted to clarify
the inclusive approach referred to in King I.395
392 Clause 91(1)(a0(i) and (ii) of the Bill.
393 This clause is similar to the business judgment rule applicable in Australia (ch 4 par 3.3). This
clause, as drafted in the Bill, is not evaluated in this thesis.
394 Stakeholder communication concerns the provision of relevant information to stakeholders in a
clear and understandable manner. This is not the same as stakeholder recognition, which relates to the
recognition of stakeholder interests.
395 See King II par 29 in the Introduction. See also par 4.3 below.
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The King I Report explored the concept of different stakeholders and the possibility
that the interests of a wider variety of groups should be considered.396 Stakeholders
were divided into three categories, namely (1) shareholders, (2) stakeholders with
contractual relations with the company and (3) stakeholders with non-contractual
relations with the company. Contractual stakeholders include employees, consumers
and suppliers; and non-contractual stakeholders include the government and local
authorities.397
The importance of communication with stakeholders was also highlighted.
Communication with all stakeholders is of the utmost importance to facilitate a good
working relationship between them and the company. The King I Committee
suggested that communications should be open, understandable and transparent, and
that the position of the company should be set out in a clear manner. Reporting
should include matters such as providing information to employees on staffing, skills,
retrenchments and training programmes, environmental issues and social
responsibility activities. The following guidelines were provided with regard to the
transfer of information to stakeholders: promptness, openness, substance over form,
truth and fair participation.398
It is important to distinguish between communication with stakeholders, as discussed
above, and the recognition of the different interests of stakeholders by directors when
they manage a company. The following is stated in chapter 1 paragraph 3 of King I:
Consequently the concept of corporate governance has grown. Other
interested parties or stakeholders have become part of corporate
governance in the different systems of corporate governance which
prevail in different countries. The different stakeholders include
shareholders, employees, bankers, suppliers, consumers,
396 King I chapters 4, 12, 16.
397 King I ch 16.
398 King I ch 12 par 17. Thus, in the issuing of any information to shareholders, directors should ask
themselves whether the information was transferred in an open and transparent manner, was the
communication prompt, relevant and substantial, or was it merely a communication of form and,
lastly, did it fairly set out the position?
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environmentalists, the community or country in which it operates and the
State. One can appreciate that a corporate governance system which
attempts to satisfy the needs of each of these differing interest groups
would be complex. It must be remembered, however, that it is the
primary duty of a board to act honestly in the best interests of the
corporation.
Communication with stakeholders is therefore a means of protecting them. It can be
seen as recognition of their interests, but it is not the same as acknowledgment of a
duty owed to them.
Chapter 1 of King I states that the duty of the board is to act honestly in the best
interests of the corporation and acknowledging the traditional viewpoint that
shareholders should receive primacy when directors manage a company.399 Chapter 5
further maintains that directors must strive to increase shareholder value, while
having regard to the interests of all stakeholders.400
It therefore seems as if King I is in favour of directors managing a company in the
best interests of the company, being the shareholders collectively, subject thereto that
directors should still have regard to the interests of other stakeholders. Stakeholders
should also receive efficient and relevant information from directors concerning the
affairs of the company.
King II refers to the acknowledgment of the interests of various stakeholders or the
“triple-bottom line” approach.401 This approach or line of thinking embraces various
factors when applied in respect of the management of a company. Social, economic
and environmental concerns shape the “triple-bottom line” approach. The economic
aspect of this approach concerns financial and non-financial aspects of the business
of the company. The environmental aspect relates to the effect on the environment
caused by the products or services of the specific company. The social aspect
399 Chapter 1 par 3 of King I.
400 Chapter 5 par 2.7 of King I.
401 King II par 17.1, Introduction; Executive Summary of King II par 5.1, 17. See on the “triple-bottom
line” Mongalo “The Emergence of Corporate Governance” 177; Shandu “Shareholders’ Interests” 87;
Havenga “Regulating Directors’ Duties” 618.
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embraces relationships with stakeholders, other than only the company’s
shareholders.402 The shareholders (collectively) are still the most important
beneficiary of directors’ fiduciary duties, but social, economic and environmental
concerns should also be considered. By considering these factors, the shareholders
will usually benefit in any event. The concept that the company should be
accountable to all legitimate stakeholders is rejected for the simple reason that to ask
boards to be accountable to everyone would result in them being accountable to no
one.403 The “triple-bottom line” approach is relevant in understanding the enlightened
shareholder value approach and specifically its focus on the recognition of
stakeholder interests.404
King II also refers to the inclusive approach, as mentioned in King I.405 This approach
is linked to the “triple-bottom line” approach and requires that the purpose of the
company be defined and its values identified. The relevant stakeholders should be
identified.406 The inclusive approach further requires that the purpose and values of
the company be defined and communicated to all stakeholders. The King Committee
confirmed that evidence showed that the inclusive approach is the best way to create
business success and long-term growth in shareholder value.407
402 King II par 17.1, Introduction.
403 Mongalo “The Emergence of Corporate Governance” 177; Executive Summary of King II par 5.1.
See also Mongalo “The Emergence of Corporate Governance” 177, where he refers to King II, stating
that the board is responsible for relations with stakeholders, but the directors are accountable to the
shareholders.
404 It is necessary to draw a distinction between “accountability” and “responsibility”. The “triple-
bottom line” approach is concerned with responsibility. The focus of the enlightened shareholder value
approach is on accountability towards shareholders and responsibility towards other stakeholders. See
Introduction, par 5.1 of King II: “One is liable to render an account when one is accountable and one is
liable to be called to account when one is responsible. In governance terms, one is accountable at
common law and by statute to the company if a director, and one is responsible to the stakeholders
identified as relevant to the business of the company.”
405 As discussed above.
406 King II Introduction, par 6, 35. The inclusive approach can go further than the “triple-bottom line”
approach as it can identify stakeholders beyond the social, economic or environmental areas.
407 King II par 6, 35, Introduction, par 8 of the code.
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Although King I and King II do not specifically refer to their approach on the
protection of the interests of stakeholders as the enlightened shareholder value
approach, I submit that they do follow it. As stated before, the “triple-bottom line”
and inclusive approaches point towards the recognition of different stakeholders, but
still see the shareholders as the main beneficiaries of directors’ duties. I therefore
submit that King II clearly follows the inclusive approach. Shareholders are still the
dominant stakeholder, but the report recognises the importance of other
stakeholders.408 South African commentators409 argue that King I and King II are not
sufficiently clear on the preferred approach.
Botha suggests that King I created confusion regarding the recognition of stakeholder
interests.410 He argues that the committee failed to state the philosophy with regard to
the nature and role of the corporation in South Africa, and that it seems as if there are
elements of both the managerialist (or stakeholder) model411 and the contractarian
approach412 in King I.413
Botha further suggests that references in King I to both these approaches or models
cause confusion as many references are made to directors acting in the best interests
of the “corporation”, which seems to indicate supporting the contractarian
408 See pars 4; 5.1 on p 5, pars 5.1; 5.2; 6 on p 6, pars 25–27 on pp 14–15, pars 34–41 on pp 17–19, par
1.2 on p 20, par 2.1.5 on p 21, par 2.6.5 on p 28, par 3.1.4 on pp 30–31, par 3.2.3 on p 32, par 5.1.2 on
pp 35–36, par 5.2 on p 37 and par 8 on pp 40–41b of King II.
409 Botha “Confusion in the King Report” 26–39. See also Spisto “The Significance of the King
Reports” 338.
410 Botha “Confusion in the King Report” 26–39.
411 The managerialist or stakeholder model states that directors do not owe fiduciary duties exclusively
to shareholders; there are other groups in addition to shareholders whose interests should also be
considered by directors. See Botha “Confusion in the King Report” 24–35.
412 As stated above, the contractarian approach, on the other hand, states that the essence of the
corporation is to maximise shareholder wealth. As discussed in ch 2 par 3 above.
413 See also Dine “Company law Developments” 246–251.
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approach.414 Reference is, however, also made to other interest groups and the
protection of their interests, indicating that the stakeholder model is preferred.415
I agree that King I may be confusing in the sense that reference is made to
“stakeholders” and to “the corporation”. When referring to “stakeholders” and the
protection of their interests, the impression is created that King I favours the
stakeholder model. For example, chapter 1 paragraph 2.4 mentions that the interests
of consumers, suppliers and the community are relevant to corporate decision
making. The report also refers to the “corporation” and it holds that directors should
act in the best interests of the company (or corporation) as a whole, creating the
impression that King I favours the contractarian approach. Traditionally, “the
company” has been interpreted as referring to the shareholders collectively.416
This is, however, not as confusing as it may seem at first glace and can be explained
as follows: the stakeholder model consists of two variants. In terms of the first variant
the company is seen as being managed in the interests of shareholders by taking into
account other stakeholders. In terms of the second variant it is accepted that interests
of other groups must be taken into account because such an approach directly benefits
the company.417 By following the first variant (being similar to the enlightened
shareholder value approach), there will be reference to both the “corporation” and to
“other stakeholders or interest groups”. The corporation consisting of the
shareholders collectively, receives primacy when directors manage a company, but
the interests of other stakeholders are also considered. The interests of the consumers,
suppliers and the community are therefore relevant in corporate decision making, but
this does not imply that shareholders no longer receive primacy. King I therefore
refers to the “corporation” and that directors should act in the best interests of the
company as a whole (being the shareholders collectively), because that is still the
414 Botha “Confusion in the King Report” 33. King I ch1 par 3, ch 5 par 2.1.
415 See Botha “Confusion in the King Report” 35. King I ch 1 pars 2.4; 10, ch 2 par 10, ch 4 par 12, ch
5 par 2.7, ch 13 par 1, ch 20 par 13.2.
416 See par 2.1.
417 This is discussed in ch 2 par 3.2 above.
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focus of the enlightened shareholder value approach. King I also refers to other
interest groups as directors should consider their interests too. I therefore submit that
King I (and subsequently King II) favours the enlightened shareholder value approach
when indicating that shareholders should receive primacy when directors manage a
company, but that other stakeholders should also be considered (as advocated in
terms of the “triple-bottom line” and inclusive approaches). It should, however, be
noted that King II deals with stakeholders in a rather disorderly manner. It is clear,
from the above-mentioned discussion, that stakeholders are referred to throughout the
report. Stakeholders are not dealt with in a structured manner in one specific
paragraph. This way of dealing with stakeholders can create confusion when reading
the report and it is easy to miss references to the protection of stakeholders.418
The King III Report is also currently being worked on. It has been indicated that this
report will only be issued after the new Companies Act has come into operation. This
makes sense, as the two documents should complement each other and not have
conflicting provisions.419
418 To focus on different issues in various chapters obscure the complete picture. Discussions on the
same topics are therefore in different chapters making it difficult to “follow” the golden line.
“Stakeholders” are referred to throughout the report and one has to determine the approach preferred
by the committee. It is not dealt with in clear terms in a specific chapter or section. In King II
stakeholders are dealt with in the introduction and in various chapters of section 1. The King Reports
can be compared with The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council’s
Principles of Good Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (March 2003 and August 2007).
In this document, one paragraph is devoted to the protection of stakeholders stating in clear terms that
directors should also consider the interest of stakeholders when they manage a company (see principle
10 of the March 2003 version and principle 3 of the August 2007 version). This code is discussed in
ch par 4.1. Compare also for example the King II Report with the Combined Code in the United
Kingdom (see ch 3 par 4.1 above). It is much easier to determine what the view on the protection of
stakeholders (and other governance principles such as the composition of the board) is in terms of the
Combined Code than King II. The Combined Code has different sections with a main principle and
supporting principles followed by the code provisions.
419 See Rose “A State of Mind” 31–35 on a possible King III. Roy Anderson is the chair of the
committee dealing with board and director committees, Anton van Wyk is in charge of the internal
audit committee, Suresh Kana heads the accounting and auditing committee, Reuel Khoza deals with
sustainability issues, Miranda Feinstein with enforcement issues and David Burdette is the chair of the
business rescue committee.
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4.2 The Policy Document
The Policy Document issued by the Department of Trade and Industry in May 2004,
states that company law should promote the competitiveness and development of the
South African economy.420
The Policy Document deals with the issue of the “scope of company law”, thus the
protection of stakeholders, in chapter 3. The drafters refer to the question that every
company law reform process usually starts with: “in whose interests should the
corporation be run?” They then discuss the history of the debate of stakeholder
protection. In terms of the common law, directors are obliged to act honestly in the
best interests of the company.421 The common law is therefore similar to the
enlightened shareholder value approach. The interests of the company have generally
been regarded as the interests of the members.422
The Policy Document also discusses the question in whose interests a company
should be managed by referring to the enlightened shareholder value and pluralist
approaches. The enlightened shareholder value approach is summarised as follows in
the Policy Document: “[I]n this model directors should have regard, where
appropriate, to the need to ensure productive relationships with a range of interested
parties – often termed “stakeholders’ – and have regard to the longer term, but with
shareholders’ interests retaining primacy.”423 The pluralist approach, asserts that
“[c]o-operative and productive relationships will only be optimised where directors
are permitted (or required) to balance shareholders’ interests with those of others
committed to the company”.424 The document thus confirms that the main aim of the
enlightened shareholder value approach is the maximisation of shareholder wealth,
whereas the pluralist approach may ignore the interests of shareholders in certain
420 See discussion above. Policy Document ch 1 par 2.
421 The drafters refer to the English case of Hutton v West Cork Railway (1883) 23 ChD 654 (CA).
422 The Policy Document ch 3 par 3.2.1.
423 The Policy Document ch 3 par 3.2.2.
424 The Policy Document ch 3 par 3.2.2.
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instances, in favour of other interest groups. A number of arguments in favour of the
enlightened shareholder value approach are mentioned in the Policy Document:
• It is the shareholders who invested their capital in the company and they
should be entitled to its profits after other claims have been satisfied;
• The shareholders, as residual claimants of whatever is left after all other
claims have been paid, are best positioned to police the efficiency of the
company;
• The survival and economic success of a company will deliver social benefits
to many stakeholder constituencies.425
The Policy Document states that “in enhancing economic success of the company
(corporate profit and shareholder gain), directors should take account of the policies
and principles that are reflected in the Constitution and various kinds of regulation for
the benefit of other groups”.426 The Policy Document expresses a preference for the
enlightened shareholder value approach.427 The Policy Document proposes that in the
South African context company law should take account of other interest groups, but
only in circumstances mandated by the Constitution and related legislation.428
The Policy Document suggests the following model:
[A] company should have as its objective the conduct of business
activities with a view to enhancing the economic success of the
corporation, taking into account, as appropriate, the legitimate interests of
other stakeholder constituencies.429
425 See the Policy Document par 3.2.2. These are the arguments advocated by the drafters of the Policy
Document. See also par 5.1.3 below regarding general arguments for and against exclusive shareholder
protection. See further Dean “Stakeholding and Company Law” 66; Miles “Company Stakeholders”
56; Esser “The Protection of Employees” 410.
426 The Policy Document par 3.2.2.
427 See also the position of Business of South Africa in the NEDLAC Report on Corporate Law Reform
(February 2005) (hereafter the February 2005 NEDLAC Report) Annexure 2 par 3.2.2 who expresses
their preference for the enlightened shareholder value approach.
428 This is in line with the approach taken in King II, referred to as the “triple-bottom line” approach.
429 The Policy Document at ch 3 par 3.2.3.
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This approach could result in a situation where the interests of other groups will have
value independent of the interests of the shareholders. For example, the directors may
find themselves compelled to provide the employees with certain information as
envisaged in their right to access of information as contained in the Constitution430
and in the Promotion of Access to Information Act,431 even though doing this might
be to the shareholders’ detriment.432
The Policy Document concludes that it may be better to deal with the advancement of
certain stakeholder interests in separate legislation, subject to the Constitution.433 If
social and environmental changes are incorporated in company law alone, such
changes will only affect South African incorporated companies and not overseas
companies operating though a South African branch. Companies, as economic agents,
have an impact on society and a broader range of stakeholders, but some of these
relations are best regulated in separate legislation.434
4.3 The Companies Bill of 2007
Clause 91(1)(b) of the Companies Bill of 2007 is relevant when evaluating which
approach to the protection of stakeholders the drafters preferred. It states that a
director has a duty to act honestly and in good faith, and in a manner the director
reasonably believes to be in the best interests and for the benefit of the company.435
The Companies Bill of 2007 provides for a partial codification of directors’ duties.436
One of the advantages of such a codification is the clarity that it should provide to
430 Section 32.
431 Act 2 of 2000.
432 But see Clutchco (Pty) Ltd v Davis 2005 (3) SA 486 (SCA) where it was stated that the
shareholders cannot rely on the above-mentioned Act in the specific circumstances. See Esser “The
Enlightened-Shareholder-Value Approach” 723; Havenga “Regulating Directors’ Duties” 615–617;
Locke “Access to a Company’s Accounting Records” 222 on the Clutchco case.
433 The Policy Document ch 3 par 3.2.3.
434 The Policy Document ch 3 par 3.2.3.
435 Emphasis added.
436 See ch 2 of the Companies Bill concerning directors’ duties and clause 91(6) stating that the
common law is still applicable. See par 5.5 for a discussion of the codification of directors’ duties in
terms of the Companies Bill.
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directors concerning their duties.437 Clause 91(1)(b) has not been drafted in
sufficiently clear terms. Firstly, “honestly” and “good faith” are treated as two
separate issues. It is unclear as to what the difference is between these two
concepts.438 Secondly, the clause provides that directors should act in the best
interests and for the benefit of the company. It is not clear what is meant by “benefit”.
It is uncertain if this term only relates to a financial benefit or whether any benefit is
relevant. By not qualifying “benefit”, it can be argued that it implies that all benefits
are relevant when directors manage a company.439 Thirdly, it is unclear what is meant
by “the company”. This last aspect is discussed in more detail below.
By stating in clause 91(1)(b) that a director has a duty to act honestly and in good
faith, and in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests and
for the benefit of the company,440 it appears that the drafters of the Companies Bill
had opted for the enlightened shareholder value approach. This is, however, by no
means clear as will be seen from the discussion below.
The meaning of the “the company” is not clear in terms of the common law and
various academics have debated its exact meaning.441 The Companies Bill created the
ideal opportunity to clarify this issue. With the current drafting, it is still unclear
whether directors should manage a company for the sole benefit of the shareholders
or whether they should consider the interests of other stakeholders. It can be argued
that the traditional viewpoint is still applicable due to the wording of the clause (“the
company” has always been interpreted as meaning the shareholders collectively) and
the Policy Document favouring the enlightened shareholder value approach. In
437 See par 5.2 for the advantages and disadvantages of a codification.
438 As indicated by Mervyn King (SC) at the Department of Trade and Industry Conference at Velmore
Estate held on 19 and 20 March 2007.
439 These issues where discussed at the Department of Trade and Industry Conference by various
speakers.
440 Emphasis added.
441 To name a few South African commentators: Fourie “Die Plig van Direkteure Teenoor
Maatskappyskuldeisers” 25–52; Havenga “The Company, the Constitution and the Stakeholders” at
134–139; Mongalo “Self-Regulation versus Statutory Codification” 264–273; Spisto “Stakeholder
Interests in Corporate Governance” 129–147. See also Birds et al. Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 499;
Davies Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 371–379; Farrar & Hannigan
Company Law 380–391 discussing the definition of “a company” in the United Kingdom context.
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contrast, it can be argued that the application of the Companies Bill is wider than the
traditional position concerning in whose interests directors should manage a company
when considering the remedy provisions.
Clauses 163, 164 and 166 in chapter 7, part B of the Companies Bill of 2007 deal
with various rights to seek specific remedies. Clause 163 relates to an application to
declare a director delinquent or to place a director under probation. A company, a
shareholder, director, company secretary or other officer of a company, a registered
trade union or other representative of the employees of a company, or the
Commission or the Takeover Regulation Panel may apply to a court for an order
declaring a person delinquent or under probation. Clause 164 states that a
shareholder, creditor, or director of a company may apply to a court for relief if
directors, inter alia, exercised their powers in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly
prejudicial to, or unfairly disregards the interests of the specific applicant.442 Clause
166 relates to derivative actions. A shareholder, former shareholder, a person entitled
to be registered as a shareholder, a director, a former director, a registered trade union
or another representative of employees may apply to a court on behalf of the
company in terms of a derivative action.
It is clear from these provisions that specific parties, who are afforded remedies, have
an interest in the management of a company’s affairs. The question arises as to
whether this changes the traditional common law viewpoint, of directors managing a
company in the best interests of the company as a whole, in other words the
shareholders collectively.
In clause 164 creditors may apply for relief if their own personal interests are affected
by the actions of the directors. This provision therefore provides creditors with a
remedy to protect their own interests (as opposed to the interests of the company).
This can be interpreted as indicating that directors have fiduciary duties towards
creditors, thus changing the traditional common law viewpoint referred to above.
442 Emphasis added. See clause 164(1)(c) of the Companies Bill of 2007.
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Clauses 163 and 166 may also create confusion as to whom directors owe their
duties, although not as directly as is done in terms of clause 164. Clauses 163 and 166
only provide specific parties with certain remedies regarding the interests of the
company, whereas clause 164 provides the parties concerned with remedies regarding
their own interests.
By defining “the company” this confusion will be eliminated. Should one favour the
enlightened shareholder value approach, then the definition of “the company” should
state that “the company” refers to the shareholders of the company, with the
possibility of including other stakeholders (such as, but not limited to, creditors,
employees, consumers, suppliers and the environment), but only when it will be for
the purpose of profit maximisation for the shareholders.443 In this way the provision
will be in line with the enlightened shareholder value approach and directors will be
clear on their duties. In chapter 7 clauses are recommended which should clarify in
whose interests directors should manage a company.444
4.4 Conclusions
It was argued that the King Reports and the Policy Document favour the enlightened
shareholder value approach, thus advocating for shareholder primacy. The
Companies Bill is not sufficiently clear on the approach to follow concerning the
protection of stakeholders. A proposed combined theory was recommended in
chapter 2.445 It was argued that the proposed theory is currently the best way of
recognising the various interests of a company, without neglecting the important role
of the shareholders or the members as a whole. It cannot be denied that a company is
a separate legal entity, represented by several interests, including those of
shareholders, employees, investors, consumers, the community and the environment.
One therefore cannot require directors only to act in the best interests of the
shareholders collectively when acting in “the best interests of the company”. The
443 See s 172 of the United Kingdom’s Companies Act of 2006. This section clearly refers to the
interests of different stakeholders. It is therefore clear what is meant by “the company”. See ch 3 par
4.3.3.
444 Chapter 7 par 2.6.1.1 below.
445 Chapter 2 par 5.2 above.
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courts need to give different weight to the degree of interests represented in a
company. These interests and the amount of weight attached to them may differ
during the various stages of a company. The protection that these stakeholders
receive in other legislation may also play a role when a court decides on the
competing interests of different stakeholders.446
5 CODIFICATION OF DIRECTORS’ DUTIES
5.1 Introduction
The section that follows is a discussion of the codification of directors’ duties. The
King Reports are only briefly referred to as they did not deal with the codification of
directors’ duties in detail. The Companies Bill is discussed in more detail on and
provides for a partial codification of directors’ duties.
Directors’ common law duties are still applicable in terms of a partial codification. In
terms of a comprehensive code, courts can still refer to the common law duties when
interpreting directors’ statutory duties envisaged in the comprehensive code, but they
cannot develop new duties. It is therefore argued below, as it was in chapter 4, that
the differences between a partial and a comprehensive code are not that significant.447
It is important to distinguish between a codification and self-regulation. A code is a
“list” of directors’ duties entrenched in a statute. These duties are not voluntary;
directors have to act in terms of the listed duties. Self-regulatory codes, such as the
King Report, contain guidelines of best practice and are voluntary. The advantages
and disadvantages of a statutory code and a self-regulatory code are discussed below.
446 Esser & Du Plessis “Stakeholder Protection” 358. The protection afforded to individual
shareholders, creditors, employees and consumers is discussed in par 3 above.
447 Chapter 4 par 5 above.
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It is important to note that the codification referred to in this discussion concerns a
codification of a specific part of company law, this should be distinguished from an
“all-embracing” or a “wholesale” codification of civil or common law.448
5.2 General Arguments for and Against a Codification of Directors’
Duties
The most obvious argument in favour of a codification of directors’ duties is the fact
that it will provide clear and efficient guidelines for directors.449 Traditionally,
directors’ duties are contained in the common law, case law as well as the Companies
Act. A code can save directors much time, effort and money in ascertaining the law
and complying with it because it should provide clear guidelines on how directors
should act. The main advantage of codifying directors’ duties is that it will enable
directors to clearly identify the scope of their duties.450
However, to include all relevant duties of directors into one statement can lead to
unnecessary brevity. Consider, for example, the duty that a director must exercise his
powers for “a proper purpose”. It is unclear what is meant by “a proper purpose”
without having knowledge on how the courts have previously interpreted this phrase.
It is therefore important that the statutory statement is clear on whether or not one
will be able to look back at existing law when interpreting the statement.451 Directors
may also think that the statement is a complete list of their duties, whereas some
448 As discussed by Hahlo in “Codifying the Common Law” 23. In this article Hahlo argues against an
all-embracing codification of the common law. He indicates specifically that he is not against “law
reform by remedial legislation, which will obviously be necessary” (at 23).
449 See Goode “The Codification of Commercial Law” 137 where he states that: “Codification fulfils a
number of objectives. It simplifies the law and makes it more accessible and more readily
ascertainable.”
450 See Esser & Coetzee “Codification of Directors’ Duties” 26–31; Birds “The Reform of Directors’
Duties” 154–156 generally. See also Linklater “Codifying Directors’ Duties” 261 where she indicates
that research has also shown that directors favour such a statement.
451 See Havenga “Regulating Directors’ Duties” 620 where she refers to Hannigan Company Law who
points out that statements are often difficult to interpret without background knowledge as developed
by the cases. This was also pointed out by the South African Policy Document ch 4 par 4.4.2. See ch 5
par 3.1.2 where the position in New Zealand is considered. New Zealand commentators also state that
it should be possible to refer to existing case law when interpreting a statement of directors’ duties.
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duties and obligations may be contained in other legislation and regulations.452 One
of the main disadvantages of codification is therefore the lack of flexibility.
The law is also too complex to be reduced into one statement. Self-regulatory codes
(such as the King Report) can address the problem of a lack of flexibility. Self-
regulatory codes are easier to amend and are more flexible, because they derive from
public debate. The main disadvantage of self-regulation relates to its enforcement.
Persons who would benefit from the regulating regime would probably also be
responsible for regulating it.453 Because of the possible lack of flexibility when
codifying directors’ duties, both the United Kingdom and New Zealand made it clear
that it should be possible to refer to existing case law when interpreting the
statement.454 The United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006 clearly follows an
exhaustive statement of directors’ duties, subject to this reliance on existing case law.
This exhaustive statement of the United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006 is
discussed in detail in chapter 3 above.
Clearly, directors will be more certain of their duties if the duties are codified. Self-
regulation provides for flexibility as it can be easily amended. A comprehensive
statement or self-regulation is, however, not the only option. The 2007 Companies
Bill opted for another option, namely a partial codification of directors’ duties where
the common law is still applicable.455 It is important to state that should one opt for a
partial code, then it should be very clear what the relationship is between the code
and the common law. It is submitted that the differences between a partial and a
comprehensive codification of directors’ duties are not necessarily that significant.
Judges can still refer to the common law when interpreting directors’ statutory duties
452 The Department of Trade and Industry in the United Kingdom proposed to give guidance on the
statement in “plain language”, by distributing authoritative pamphlets. This step would be helpful if
the status of the guidance is clear and carefully drafted.
453 Esser & Coetzee “Codification of Directors’ Duties” 26–31
454 See Developing the Framework at pars 3.20; 3.82; Completing the Structure at pars 3.2; 3.6; 3.12
and The White Paper of 2005 at par 3.3 stating that the code is exhaustive in nature and that it will
replace the common law; Keay “Section 172(1)” 106–110. See ch 5 pars 3.1.2, 3.1.4 above.
455 See par 5.5 below.
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in terms of a comprehensive statement.456 A comprehensive code is also supposed to
be drafted in such a way that it contains all the important common law duties. An
exhaustive or comprehensive statement may be a better option compared to a partial
one, if courts are allowed to refer to existing principles of case law to interpret the
statement. The United Kingdom Companies Act provides for an exhaustive statement
and makes it clear that courts should be able to refer to existing case law.457
5.3 Codification of Directors’ Duties in the King Reports
The King Committee on corporate governance was formed under the auspices of the
Institute for Directors in Southern Africa, with support from, inter alia, the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange458 and the South African Chamber for Business. The
report was based on the Cadbury Report of the United Kingdom, but modified to
adopt the specific circumstances of South Africa.459 Corporate governance is a very
wide topic460 and the discussion on the King Reports is limited to aspects relevant to
directors’ duties, especially concerning the codification of their duties.
In 1994 the King I Report on Corporate Governance was released. It dealt with a
number of corporate governance issues.461 Its purpose was to create the highest
standard of corporate governance in South Africa.462 It resulted in a Code of
Corporate Practices and Conduct, being a set of principles recommended as integral
456 Watson “Directors’ Duties” at 495–499 also argued this. Du Plessis et al. argue that the statutory
duties of directors in Australia are far more important than the duties at common law or in equity, see
Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance at 259–260. See also Abernethy
& Weir Anderson’s Company & Securities Law at 8. This argument is also discussed in ch 5 par 3.1.2
when referring to the law of Botswana and New Zealand.
457 As discussed in ch 3 par 4.3 above.
458 As it then was. It is now the JSE Limited.
459 See ch 3 par 4.1 regarding the Cadbury Report. See also Armstrong “The King Report on Corporate
Governance” 65. The King Report also had a wider application than the Cadbury Report. The Cadbury
Report mainly focused on the financial aspects of corporate governance such as financial accounting.
King I also considered social accounting (including stakeholder protection).
460 See Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 1–3 on the various
meanings of “corporate governance”.
461 See generally Armstrong “The King Report on Corporate Governance” 65–70.
462 King II par 3, Introduction.
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to good governance.463 Compliance with the code was, however, voluntary.464 The
consequences of not complying with King I were therefore not as severe as the case
in a regulatory system, such as that of the United States.465 However, self regulatory
codes have indirect consequences such as the negative effect of non-compliance on
the reputation of directors and the positive effect that compliance may encourage
investment.466 The King Code applied to all companies listed on the Johannesburg
Stock Exchange,467 large public entities as defined in the Public Entities Act,468
banks, financial and insurance entities as defined in the various Financial Services
Acts and large unlisted public companies.469
In 2002 the King Report on Corporate Governance (King II) replaced King I. The
review of King I was based on four guiding principles. Two of them are directly
relevant to this thesis, namely to clarify earlier proposals of an “inclusive” approach
and to recommend how compliance with a new code of best practices should be
measured.470
463 King I ch 20.
464 Armstrong “The King Report on Corporate Governance” 65; Botha “Confusion in the King Report”
26.
465 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 of the United States regulates certain aspects of corporate
governance and is not based on self-regulation. The Act deals with the following issues: The public
company accounting oversight board, auditor independence, corporate responsibility, enhanced
financial disclosures, conflicts of interest, commission resources and authority, corporate and criminal
fraud accountability, white-collar crime penalty enhancements, corporate tax returns, corporate fraud
and accountability. See generally on the Act: http://www.sarbanes-oxley.com/ (accessed 25 January
2008).
466 In Australia James Hardie Ltd, a large product manufacturer, was subject to a special commission
of inquiry in 2004 concerning personal injury due to asbestos related injuries. The asbestos settlement
that was reached is a good example of the importance of complying with good corporate governance
practices and specifically stakeholders’ interests. In this case a company was not able to support
medical claims of employees who suffered due to previous operations of the company. Eventually the
company did create a fund for these victims based on pressure from politicians, the government and
even the shareholders. See Du Plessis et al. Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 47 for
a discussion of this case.
467 Now the JSE Ltd.
468 Act 93 of 1992.
469 King I ch 20 par 1.1.
470 The other two principles were: to assess the validity of King I against developments, locally and
internationally and to recognise the importance placed on non-financial issues and to recommend
reporting on issues associated with social and ethical accounting, auditing and safety, health and
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King II mainly deals with principles of good governance relating to boards and
directors,471 risk management,472 internal audits,473 integrated sustainability
reporting474, accounting and enforcement.475 The essential corporate governance
principles identified in King II are discipline, transparency, independence,
accountability, responsibility, fairness and social responsibility.476 The report also
contains a Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct, which replaced the Code
incorporated in King I.477 Compliance with King II is voluntary and the principles in
King II are based on a “comply or explain” basis.478 It is not always clear whether all
principles contained in the King Report should be explained, if not complied with, or
whether some “principles” in King II are merely suggestions or expectations that
companies should strive to meet.479 The underlying principle of King II is that
directors should act not only in accordance with the letter of the law, but also in the
spirit of their fiduciary duties.480
environmental issues; King II par 29 in the Introduction; Executive Summary of King II par 29. See par
4.2 relating to the “inclusive” approach.
471 See pp 21–30 of the code and pp 46–76 of King II.
472 See pp 30–31 of the code and pp 76–90 of King II.
473 See pp 34–35 of the code and pp 90–96 of King II.
474 See pp 35–38 of the code and pp 96–133of King II. See pp 38–40 of the Code and pp 133–153 of
King II.
475 See pp 38–41 of the code and pp 153–171 of King II. See ss 1–6 of King II.
476 See pp 10–11 of King II.
477 See pp 20–41 in King II. See also Loubser “Does the King II Report Solve Anything?” For the
application of the code see par 1 of the Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct in King II.
478 See, for example, the values, visions and profile of JD Group Pty Ltd at
www.jdgroup.co.za/2007/corporate_governance.htm (accessed 17 August 2007). It is stated that the
company complied with King II, except for the requirement that the chair should be a non-executive
director. The reason for this is then explained in the report.
479 In terms of par 8.4 p 41 of King II a company has to explain if it did not comply with the code. It
can therefore be argued that everything in the code should be interpreted as “comply or explain”
provisions. It is uncertain whether provisions in King which are not contained in the code itself also
resort under “comply or explain” provisions. The latter may only be suggestions to enhance good
corporate governance.
480 Esser & Coetzee “Codification of Directors’ Duties” 27.
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King I did not deal with the codification of directors’ duties in detail. In chapter 5 of
King I a list of directors’ duties is provided. These duties include that directors should
remain knowledgeable about the financial, social and political milieu in which a
company operates, they must never permit a conflict of interests, must act
independently, and with care and skill when exercising their duties with the utmost
good faith. It must be noted that the list is not exhaustive and the committee does not
support a statutory manual of directors’ duties.
King II does not deal with the issue of a possible codification of directors’ duties. The
report focuses more on good corporate governance principles and is important for
purposes of this thesis due to its emphasis on the inclusive approach, as discussed in
paragraph 2.2.2 above.
5.4 Codification of Directors’ Duties in the Policy Document
The codification of directors’ duties was considered in the Policy Document in more
detail compared to the King Report.481 It confirms that the regulation of directors’
duties is a very difficult issue. In South Africa most of the duties of directors are
found in the common law and case law, and research shows that directors are not
clear about their duties.482
A statutory standard can assist in providing clarity in respect of directors’ duties.
However, the advantages of a statutory statement need to be evaluated against the
constraints that it can place on the development of common law.483 The Policy
Document prefers a statutory statement of directors’ duties. It is argued that a
statutory statement will provide clarity, making the law more accessible for directors
and ensuring that they are clear about their duties and obligations. Foreign and
domestic investors will also have more clarity on the rules that govern the behaviour
of directors and the remedies that are available should these rules be violated.484
481 The Policy Document ch 4 par 4.4.2.
482 Paragraph 1 above and the Policy Document ch 4 par 4.4.2.
483 The Policy Document ch 4 par 4.4.2.
484 Havenga “Regulating Directors’ Duties” 619.
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5.5 Codification of Directors’ Duties in the Companies Bill
Chapter 4 of the 2007 Bill addresses issues relating to corporate governance.485 The
aim of the provisions in chapter 4 is to enhance transparency and accountability.486
Part B of chapter 4 introduces a new law in the form of a codified regime of
directors’ duties, which includes both a fiduciary duty and a duty of care, skill and
diligence. This codification is intended to operate in addition to existing common law
duties.487 The Companies Bill of 2007, especially clauses 91–94, therefore provides
for a partial codification of directors’ duties, as discussed above.
Clause 91 governing directors’ duties of good faith and care, skill and diligence are
supplemented by new provisions (in clauses 92–94) addressing conflict of interests,
directors’ liability, indemnities and insurance.488 Clause 92 deals with a director’s use
of information and conflicting interests. A director must not, directly or indirectly,
use his position as director to make a secret profit or otherwise gain an advantage for
himself or for someone else. He may also not use his position to cause detriment to
the company. He must also not use any information that he obtained due to his
position as a director improperly by gaining an advantage for himself or someone
else, or by causing detriment to the company. If a director has a financial conflicting
interest concerning a matter that will be voted on at a meeting, then he should declare
that interest, leave the meeting and not take part in any discussion relating to that
specific matter. Clause 93 relates to loans and other financial assistance to directors.
A company may not provide a loan to, secure a debt or obligation for, or otherwise
provide direct or indirect financial assistance to, a director or a director of an
interrelated company unless certain conditions are present. These conditions include
that the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation must expressly permit the giving
485 Clause 84 deals with the board of directors, clause 85 with board meetings, clause 86 with directors
acting other than at a meeting, clause 87 with board committees, clause 88 with the election and
removal of directors, clause 89 with disqualified persons who may not act as directors and clause 90
with vacancies on the board.
486 Especially relating to the manner and form of shareholder meetings, the exercise of proxy rights
and the standards for adoption of ordinary and special resolutions (see p 13 of the Explanatory
Memorandum). These provisions are not discussed in detail in this thesis.
487 Clause 91(6) of the Bill and p 13 of the Explanatory Memorandum.
488 Clause 91(1)(b) is of specific importance and was discussed in par 4.3 above.
298
of financial assistance, the company should comply with the solvency and liquidity
tests, and the terms of the finance agreement should be fair and reasonable. Clause 94
deals with the liability of directors and officers, and states that any provision in a
Memorandum of Incorporation is void if it directly or indirectly relieves a director of
liability. The remaining part of chapter 4 largely retains existing law regarding
financial records and statements, auditors, audit communication and company
secretaries.489
The codification of directors’ duties (or the statement of directors’ duties) is
welcomed because directors will be clearer on what their duties are. The common law
will, however, still be applicable and will ensure that directors’ duties are still flexible
and capable of development. When opting for a partial code it is, however, important
that the relationship between the statutory duties and the common law be clear. I
submit that this is currently not the case in terms of the Companies Bill. It was also
argued in chapter 3 that an exhaustive code is not necessarily problematic as courts
will still be able to refer to existing case law when interpreting the code. In the end, it
is more important to have a code of directors’ duties, as this will make the law more
assessable for directors. Whether the code is partial or comprehensive is not that
important, as argued before.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter an attempt was made to determine in whose interests directors should
manage a company. It was stated that the traditional viewpoint is that a company
should be managed in the best interests of the shareholders collectively.490 The
protection of different stakeholders is, however, important when directors manage a
company.491 This chapter focused on the primary stakeholders,492 namely individual
489 See parts C, D and E of ch 4 of the Bill
490 Paragraph 2.1.1.
491 This is referred to as the “triple-bottom line” or “inclusive” approach by King II.
492 Paragraph 3 above.
299
shareholders, creditors, employees, consumers and suppliers. The legislative
protection currently afforded them in South African law was discussed and evaluated.
Directors may find themselves liable to shareholders individually under ordinary
principles of law, but they do not owe fiduciary duties to them directly.493 With
regard to employees, different means of protection were explored to determine
whether they are adequately protected or not.494 If they do not receive adequate
protection elsewhere, it was argued that directors should consider their interests when
they manage a company.495 It was also argued that worker participation on board
level does not seem to be the preferred route in South Africa. The conclusion was
drawn that worker participation will not work in a unitary board structure, even if the
unitary board structure has similarities to the two-tier board structure, as is the case in
South Africa.496 The fact that employees are not the only other interest group is
another reason not to have worker participation at board level. It will be impractical
to provide consumers, suppliers and the general public with board representation and
there is no good reason why employees should receive preference in this regard.
There are other options available to enable worker participation. Workplace forums
are one option,497 although these forums are currently not widely implemented in
South Africa.498 Collective bargaining499 is also an option for trade unions as
management can discuss issues that are important to employees. Admittedly
collective bargaining has shortcomings, but it provides a platform for employees to
voice their concerns through their trade union representatives with regard to their
terms and conditions of employment. Directors can also be employees. This is
usually the case with managing directors. Should there be a conflict of interests
between the director’s interests as an employee and the interests of the company, the
493 Paragraph 3.1.
494 Paragraph 3.3 above.
495 Chapter 2 par 5.2 above.
496 Paragraph 3.3.2.1 above.
497 Section 79 of the Labour Relations Act.
498 Paragraph 3.3.2.2 above.
499 Section 213 of the Labour Relations Act.
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specific director should abstain from voting. Employees therefore enjoy various other
forms of protection in labour legislation in South Africa.
The position of creditors was also considered. Arguments were raised for and against
a direct duty owed by directors to creditors. The majority of cases indicated that this
duty towards creditors should be an indirect one.500 Because of the shortcomings in
the protection currently afforded creditors, mainly the problems associated with
section 424 of the Companies Act of 1973 and contractual protection, it is submitted
that directors should have fiduciary duties to creditors in certain instances.501 The
interests of creditors would, therefore, sometimes receive preferential treatment. The
rationale for this lies in the fact that the company is effectively trading with the
creditors’ money when it is in financial distress.502 Case law does not provide clear
guidelines as to when such a duty would arise. Keay suggests an objective test,
stating that the best trigger would be that the circumstances of a specific company
indicate that a director could reasonably be able to expect that his or her actions could
lead to insolvency of the company. 503 I agree that this is the best option to determine
when directors should consider the interests of creditors. I therefore submit that
directors should consider the interests of creditors in certain instances, even if this
consideration can be to the detriment of the shareholders. These instances include
when a company is in financial difficulty.504
Consumers are also protected in other legislation. They receive protection in different
areas, such as in cases of the provision of credit or when a consumer buys or sells a
house through an estate agent. The new Consumer Protection Bill provides protection
in a wide variety of instances.505
500 Paragraph 3.2 above.
501 Paragraph 3.2 above.
502 Paragraph 3.2 above.
503 Paragraph 3.2.2 above.
504 Paragraph 3.2 above.
505 Paragraph 3.4.2 above.
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In view of the theory proposed in chapter 2, directors need to be aware of the
protection that these stakeholders receive elsewhere in order to know when and to
what extent to consider their interests when they manage a company. It is proposed
that companies should issue guidelines to directors indicating what type of protection
these stakeholders receive in other legislation. In this way it will be clearer to
directors when to consider which stakeholder.506 It was argued that the King Reports
and the Policy Document prefer the enlightened shareholder value approach. The
Companies Bill is, however, unclear on its approach concerning stakeholder
protection.507
506 Chapter 2 par 5.2 above.
507 Paragraph 4.3 above.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1 REVIEW OF RESEARCH CONDUCTED
2 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1 REVIEW OF RESEARCH CONDUCTED
This thesis investigated in whose interests directors should manage a company. The
focus was on directors’ duties and specifically the duty to manage a company in good
faith and in the best interests of the company as a whole. This duty of directors was
discussed and evaluated as applied in South Africa, Botswana, Australia, New
Zealand and the United Kingdom. The codification of directors’ duties was also
considered as a means to provide directors with clarity on their duties.1
At the outset it was stated that various questions arose. Firstly, it had to be
determined whether companies should be managed for the benefit of only the
shareholders, or whether a wider variety of stakeholders had to be considered.
Secondly, the extent to which companies should advance broader social goals had to
be considered. The final issue was whether any such obligation to consider the
interests of other stakeholders had to be enforceable by the stakeholders against the
directors.
In order to answer these questions the following matters were addressed.
In chapter 2 a theoretical foundation was provided concerning shareholder primacy
and the more current development to consider the interests of other stakeholders, such
as employees, creditors and consumers. The various theories of corporate governance
and the models based on the theories were considered. The Berle–Dodd debate on the
role of directors in a corporation and specifically for whose benefit directors should
1 Chapter 3 par 4.3.4; ch 4 par 5; ch 6 par 5.
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manage a company was referred to.2 Three main theories on the nature of a company
were considered.3 It was indicated that any specific theory usually has a shareholder
or stakeholder emphasis. A combined theory was proposed recommending whose
interests directors should consider when they manage a company.4
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 provided an international comparative survey. In chapter 3 the
position in the United Kingdom was considered. The main reason for considering this
jurisdiction is that South African company law is largely based on the English
system. Furthermore, the recent review of company law in the United Kingdom may
provide useful guidelines for the South African company law review.5 The protection
currently afforded individual shareholders, creditors, employees and consumers in the
United Kingdom was discussed.6 Corporate governance codes, the consultation
documents issued during the United Kingdom company law review by the Steering
Group and the Companies Act of 2006 were also considered in order to determine the
viewpoints of the drafters on the protection of stakeholders and the codification of
directors’ duties.7
In chapter 4 the position in Australia was discussed. The company laws in Australia
are based on English law. But, similar to South Africa, Australia deviated from
English law after Australia’s company law reviews. It is therefore important to
consider Australian company law and its corporate governance initiatives to
determine whether South Africa can benefit from developments in Australia.
Protection granted to shareholders, creditors, employees and consumers was
2 Chapter 2 par 2.
3 Chapter 2 par 3.
4 Chapter 2 par 5.2.
5 Chapter 1 par 4.
6 Chapter 3 pars 3.1.2–3.1.6.
7 Chapter 3 par 4.
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considered8 and corporate governance documents issued in Australia were evaluated,
focusing on their viewpoints on stakeholder protection.9
In chapter 5 the law of Botswana was discussed. It was indicated that it is especially
meaningful to consider another African and SADC country with circumstances
similar to those in South Africa. The new Botswana Companies Act of 2003 was
considered with the view to determining whether Botswana went against SADC’s
goal of harmonisation of business laws in southern African states by adopting New
Zealand company law instead of English law.10
Chapter 6 dealt with the position in South Africa. A brief overview was provided on
the fiduciary duties of directors and specifically the duty to act in good faith to the
benefit of the company.11 The traditional interpretation of a director’s duty to act in
good faith in the best interests of the company was discussed.
The protection currently afforded individual shareholders, creditors, employees and
consumers was evaluated.12 It was considered important to determine whether these
stakeholders receive adequate protection elsewhere, other than in company
legislation, as this would determine the role that company law should play in
protecting these stakeholders. The current company law review process was also
considered focusing on stakeholder protection and the codification of directors’
duties. The recommendations in the two King Reports on corporate governance of
1994 and 2002, the Policy Document and the Draft Companies Bill of 2007 were
considered in this regard.13
8 Chapter 4 pars 3.2.2–3.2.6.
9 Chapter 4 par 4.
10 Chapter 5 par 3.1.3.
11 Chapter 6 par 2.1.
12 Chapter 6 par 3.
13 Chapter 6 pars 4; 5.
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2 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
2.1 A Theoretical Foundation
In chapter 2, a foundation was provided on the theories of a company. The theories
on the nature of a company derive from the origin and purpose of corporations. A
theory usually emphasises a shareholder or stakeholder approach. The agency,
communitaire and concession theories were discussed.14
The agency or contractual theory focuses on shareholder primacy. In terms of this
theory, the company is seen as a “nexus of contracts”.15 The corporation is seen as a
constantly re-negotiated contract where each party wants to maximise his own
utility.16 The communitiare and concession theories focus on the role of the State as
well as the recognition of different stakeholders. In terms of the concession theory, a
corporation’s existence and operation is a concession of the State in granting the
ability to use this corporate tool.17 The communitaire theory regards the company as
an instrument (and not a mere concession) of the State.18 Both these theories have a
strong social dimension, emphasising that directors should consider the interests of
stakeholders when they manage a company.19
In recent company law review processes in South Africa and the United Kingdom
drafters referred mainly to two theories when attempting to determine in whose
interests directors should manage a company, namely the enlightened shareholder
value approach and the pluralist approach.20 In the enlightened shareholder value
approach the primary role of the directors is seen as promoting the success of the
14 Chapter 2 par 3. As discussed in this chapter there are many theories. I focused on only the most
generally accepted ones.
15 Chapter 2 par 3.1.
16 Chapter 2 par 3.1.
17 Chapter 2 par 3.2.
18 Chapter 2 par 3.3.
19 Chapter 2 par 3.
20 Chapter 2 par 5.1.
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company for the benefit of the company as a whole and generating maximum value
for shareholders. This conclusion is based on the “too many masters” argument;
namely if more stakeholders were recognised in whose favour the duties of directors
had to be exercised, the various stakeholder groups would have to be identified and
the nature and the extent of directors’ duties and responsibilities to each of them
would need to be determined.21 The result would be that directors would not
effectively be held accountable to anyone, since there would be no clear yardstick for
judging their actions. The second school is that of pluralism, which sees shareholders
as one constituency among many and recognises the interests of various groups.
Thus, a company’s existence and success are seen as inextricably intertwined with the
consideration of the interests of its employees and other potentially qualifying
stakeholders in the business, such as suppliers and customers.22 It is important to note
that these two approaches are not the only relevant ones. The difference in emphasis
(focusing on shareholder primacy or stakeholder protection) in the two approaches
underlies all theories on the nature of a company.23
2.2 Recommendation: A Proposed Combined Theory
Arguments for and against the traditional position where shareholders receive
primacy when directors manage a company were discussed. Because of the
shortcomings in the arguments relating to exclusive shareholder protection, a
combined theory was proposed in chapter 2 as a possible way forward in recognising
the interests of stakeholders without disregarding shareholders’ interests. The starting
point of the proposed theory is a very fundamental one: directors owe their duties to
the company and only to the company, as a separate legal entity. A company is
represented by several interests, including those of shareholders, employees and
creditors. It was argued that to require directors to act in good faith in the interests “of
the company”, cannot nowadays mean anything else but that a blend of all these
interests would have to be considered. Directors should first and foremost act in the
best interests of the company as a separate legal entity. An interest that may be
21 Chapter 2 par 5.1.
22 Chapter 2 par 5.1.
23 Chapter 2 par 5.1.
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primary at one point in a company’s existence may be become secondary at a later
stage. This continuing process was compared to a merry-go-round. Different weights
needs to be attached to the various interests represented in a company at various
times. These interests and the importance attached to them may differ during the
various stages of a company’s existence. The protection that different stakeholders
receive by means other than company law plays an important role when determining
how much weight to attach to the different interests.24 It was, furthermore, suggested
that directors should be aware of the protection afforded stakeholders in order to
know how to balance the competing interests of stakeholders. Codes of best practice
may be a possible way to achieve this and to ensure that directors are informed about
the protection that stakeholders receive in other legislation.25
2.3 The Law in the United Kingdom
United Kingdom company law was considered with reference to two issues, namely
the protection of stakeholders and the codification of directors’ duties. The traditional
viewpoint provides shareholders collectively with primacy in both the United
Kingdom and South Africa when directors manage a company.26 The stakeholder
debate was influential in the company law reform processes in both the United
Kingdom and South Africa. Both countries opted for the enlightened shareholder
value approach indicating that shareholders should receive primacy when directors
manage a company, but that other stakeholders should also be considered when the
consideration of their interests will promote profit maximisation for the
shareholders.27 Other stakeholders should, obviously, also be considered when
company management is mandated to do so in terms of specific legislation, even if
such consideration will not necessarily maximise profits for the shareholders. It is
interesting to note that the United Kingdom and South Africa dealt with the issue of
stakeholder protection differently. Section 172(1) of the United Kingdom Companies
24 This is why the protection afforded individual shareholders, creditors, employees and consumers
was discussed in the different chapters.
25 See ch 2 par 5.2 and Esser & Du Plessis “Stakeholder Protection” 358.
26 Chapter 3 par 3.1.1.
27 Chapter 3 par 4.3.3 and ch 6 par 4.2.
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Act of 2006 specifically provides that directors should consider stakeholders’
interests when managing a company.28 However, no remedies are provided to assist
stakeholders with the enforcement of the rights given to them in section 172(1). But
in South Africa no specific reference is made to stakeholders in clause 91(1)(b) of the
Draft Companies Bill of 2007, but remedies are provided to certain stakeholders in
specific circumstances.29
2.3.1 Stakeholder Protection and the Codification of Directors’ Duties
Various corporate governance codes, the consultation documents of the company law
reform committees, the Companies Bill of 2006 and the Companies Act of 2006 were
considered to determine the viewpoints of the drafters and committees on stakeholder
protection.30 The codification of directors’ duties entrenched in the Companies Act
was also considered.31
It was found that the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports did not specifically deal with
the issues of stakeholder protection and in whose interests directors should manage a
company.32 The committees equated a company’s interests with those of its
shareholders and they based their recommendations on this viewpoint.33 They
therefore favoured the traditional viewpoint. The Hampel Report is also in favour of
directors managing a company in the best interests of the shareholders collectively
with reference to the interests of other stakeholders.34 The Steering Group
distinguished between the enlightened shareholder value and pluralist approaches
during the company law review process. Various consultation documents published
during the review process such as the Strategic Framework, Developing the
Framework and Completing the Framework as well as the White Papers were
28 Chapter 3 par 4.3.3.
29 Chapter 6 par 4.3
30 Chapter 3 par 4.2.3; 4.3.3.
31 Chapter 3 par 4.3.4.
32 Chapter 3 par 4.1.
33 Chapter 3 par 4.1.2.
34 Chapter 3 par 4.1.2.
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evaluated. It was concluded that the drafters of these documents followed the
enlightened shareholder value approach.35 The Companies Act of 2006, following the
recommendations of the Steering Group, also prefers the enlightened shareholder
value approach and states, in section 172(1), that directors should consider the
interests of stakeholders when they manage a company. Shareholder primacy was
therefore maintained.36 It was, however, argued that it is unclear how this provision
will operate in practice as no guidelines are provided in the Act on how directors
should balance the interests of different stakeholders.37
With regard to the codification of directors’ duties, it was noted that the Companies
Act of 2006 contains an exhaustive code of directors’ duties. This was also
recommended by the Steering Group during the company law review process. It was
argued that the word “exhaustive” does not preclude courts from referring to existing
case law when developing directors’ duties, but that they cannot develop new
duties.38
2.3.2 Protection Afforded Stakeholders
The protection afforded individual shareholders, creditors, employees and creditors
was considered.39 It was indicated that it is important to be aware of the protection
that stakeholders receive in other legislation as this should influence directors’
decisions to consider stakeholders’ interests when they manage a company.40
The consideration of case law indicated that in the absence of a special relationship,
directors will not have fiduciary duties towards individual shareholders.41
35 Chapter 3 par 4.2.3.
36 Chapter 3 par 4.3.3.2.
37 Chapter 3 par 4.3.3.
38 Chapter 3 par 4.3.4.
39 Chapter 3 par 3.1.1.1.
40 Chapter 2 par 5.2.
41 Chapter 3 par 3.1.2.
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It was concluded that directors do not have a general fiduciary duty to consider the
interests of creditors.42 This issue was discussed in detail during the company law
reform process. It was argued that directors should not act in the best interests of
creditors. It was specifically concluded that creditors should not be included as
stakeholders to whom directors should have regard when managing a company. This
was mainly based on the fact that creditors receive sufficient protection in section 214
of the Insolvency Act of 1986. Case law dealing with the protection of creditors was
also considered. It was concluded that directors should consider the interests of
directors in cases of doubtful solvency.43
Employees are protected in various statutes in the United Kingdom.44 Collective
consultation between employers and their employees through recognised trade unions
or elected employee representatives is required in a number of specific situations.45
These consultation obligations have steadily been expanded over recent years and
have been entrenched in various regulations like the Transnational Information and
Consultation of Employees Regulations of 1999, the Information and Consultation of
Employees Regulations of 2004 and the Occupational and Personal Pension Schemes
(Consultation by Employees and Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations of 2006.46
Consumers generally receive extensive protection.47 Specific legislation48 (and
websites and public bodies)49 provide general protection to consumers in the retail
42 Chapter 3 par 3.1.3.
43 Chapter 3 par 3.1.3.
44 Chapter 3 par 3.1.4.
45 For example, the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 SI
2006/246 regulations 13 – 15, facilitated further by the Employment Relations Act 1999 s 1.
46 Chapter 3 par 3.1.4.
47 Chapter 3 par 3.1.5.
48 For example, the Enterprise Act of 2002 and the Consumer Credit Act of 2006.
49 For example, the Office of Fair Trading, a non-ministerial department established in terms of the
Fair Trading Act of 1973 (see www.oft.gov.uk). At www.consumerdirect.gov.uk consumers receive
advice on their rights concerning guarantees, buying on credit, refunding or cancelling of orders,
dealing in disputes and unfair clauses in contracts. This website is a government-funded telephone and
online service for consumers. At www.tradingstandards.gov.uk consumers are also advised on their
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markets. The laws of competition and credit protection also provide consumers with
protection.50
2.4 Australian Law
Australian company law was considered in chapter 4. First, a brief overview was
provided on the general and statutory duties of directors. Australia has partially
codified directors’ duties in the Corporations Act of 2001.51 It was, however,
indicated that the statutory duties are of much more practical importance compared
with the general duties in Australia since parties usually rely on a statutory and not a
general duty in litigation.52 This is mainly due to the fact that the code is drafted in
clear terms and is based on the common law. It was found that the differences
between these two types of codes are not necessarily significant because judges may
still refer to case law when interpreting the duties of directors in terms of a
comprehensive code.
2.4.1 Stakeholder Protection and the Codification of Directors’ Duties
With regard to the protection of stakeholders it was found that the traditional position
in Australia is that directors should act in the best interests of the shareholders
collectively.53 But a number of corporate governance initiatives in Australia indicate
that the enlightened shareholder value approach (or business approach or enlightened
self-interest approach) should be followed.54 Directors should also consider the
interests of other stakeholders when they manage a company. Stakeholders are,
however, not directly referred to in the Act as in the United Kingdom. The protection
of stakeholders’ interests is self-regulatory and based on voluntary corporate
governance initiatives.55 Some reports suggested alternative methods on how to
position in the United Kingdom. This website is supported by the Trading Standards Institute. See
Keenan & Riches Business Law 416–417.
50 Chapter 3 par 3.1.5.
51 Chapter 4 par 1.
52 Chapter 4 par 5.
53 Chapter 4 par 3.2.1.
54 Chapter 4 par 4.
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consider the interests of other stakeholders, including the suggestion that the
remuneration of directors should be linked to corporate responsibility.56
2.4.2 Protection Afforded Stakeholders
Other means of protecting the interests of employees, consumers and creditors were
also considered. Directors do not have a duty to consider the interests of individual
shareholders.57 Following an analysis of case law, it was found that Australian case
law suggests that directors should consider the interests of creditors when that
company is nearing insolvency.58 Directors do not, however, have a direct duty to
consider the interests of creditors, according to Australian law.
It was concluded that corporate governance initiatives, such as the Corporate
Responsibility Report of 2005, favour shareholder primacy, subject thereto that
stakeholders such as employees should also be protected. It was indicated that
employment contracts and labour legislation seemingly do not provide sufficient
protection to employees in Australia. As has been indicated, the protection that a
specific stakeholder receives in legislation, other than corporate legislation, plays an
important role in deciding whether or not directors should acknowledge the interests
of a specific stakeholder.
With regard to consumers, it was found that the Trade Practices Act59 provides an
extensive list of consumer rights, especially in part V. It seems that consumers
receive adequate protection in this Act.60
The Australian corporate law review provides guidelines on how directors’ duties to a
company could be regulated. Firstly, the reports drafted during the corporate
55 Chapter 4 par 4.
56 Chapter 4 par 4.3.
57 Chapter 4 par 3.2.2.
58 Chapter 4 par 3.2.3.
59 Act 51 of 1974. Chapter 4 par 3.2.5.
60 Chapter 4 par 3.2.5.
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governance initiatives in Australia are clear and precise. They provide certainty on
what is expected of directors, namely that they should act in the best interests of the
shareholders collectively, but should also consider the interests of other stakeholders
when appropriate. Secondly, it is clear from the Australian position that resistance to
a codification, whether partial or comprehensive, is not justified. If a code is drafted
in clear terms directors will be certain of their obligations.61 It seems that courts will
initially refer to previous case law when interpreting the code, but that the statutory
provisions will become sufficient to rely on based on the fact that they are clearly
drafted and in line with the common law.62
2.5 Harmonisation of Business Laws in SADC with Specific Reference to
the Position in Botswana
In chapter 5 developments in the Southern African Developmental Community
(SADC) are considered, with specific reference to the position in Botswana.63 It is
important to consider the laws in SADC countries, because their circumstances are
similar to those in South Africa and to facilitate harmonisation of business laws in
SADC countries.64 The company law of Botswana is given specific consideration, in
view of recent developments in that jurisdiction.
It was found that Botswana did not violate SADC’s goal of harmonisation by
applying New Zealand company law instead of English law.65 Botswana’s
Companies Act of 2003, which is based on the position in New Zealand, states that
directors should manage a company in the best interests of the company. This is in
line with the United Kingdom’s Companies Act of 2006 and the South African
Companies Bill of 2007. The best interests of “the company” are interpreted in the
United Kingdom, Botswana and South Africa as the shareholders collectively. All of
the aforementioned Acts and the Bill provide for a codification of directors’ duties,
61 Chapter 4 par 5.
62 Chapter 4 pars 3.1; 5.
63 Chapter 3 par 1.
64 Chapter 3 par 1.
65 Chapter 5 par 4.
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but the South African Companies Bill only provides for a partial codification whereas
the Companies Act of Botswana and the Companies Act of the United Kingdom
provide for a comprehensive statement of directors’ duties.66 It was argued elsewhere
that there is not a substantial difference between a partial and a comprehensive
codification of directors’ duties.67
2.6 South African Law
In the South African chapter an overview was provided on directors’ duties. The
traditional interpretation given to “the company as a whole” was also evaluated. The
viewpoints of the drafters of the King Reports, the Policy Document on company law
reform and the Draft Companies Bill were evaluated to determine in whose interests
directors should manage a company and whether or not directors’ duties should be
codified in a partial or comprehensive manner. Other protection, than only company
legislation, afforded various stakeholders was also investigated. This chapter focused
on the primary stakeholders, namely individual shareholders, creditors, employees,
consumers and suppliers.68
2.6.1 Stakeholder Protection and the Codification of Directors’ Duties
A comprehensive study was conducted to determine in whose interests directors
should manage a company. It was stated that the traditional viewpoint in South Africa
is to manage a company in the best interests of the shareholders collectively.69
Corporate social responsibility is, however, of substantial importance when directors
manage a company and the protection that different stakeholders receive was
considered. Various corporate governance initiatives were evaluated to determine the
viewpoints of the drafters on stakeholder protection.70
66 Chapter 5 par 3.1.3.
67 Chapter 4 par 5.
68 Chapter 6 par 3.
69 Chapter 6 par 2.1.1.
70 Chapter 6 par 4.
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The viewpoint of the drafters of the King Reports, the Policy Document and the Draft
Companies Bill on codifying directors’ duties were also considered. It was argued
that the codification of directors’ duties is welcome as directors will have more
certainty regarding their duties. The common law will still apply to a partial
codification, thereby ensuring that directors’ duties are still flexible and capable of
development. It is important that the relationship between the statutory duties and the
common law be clear when opting for a partial code. It was argued that this is
currently not the case in terms of the Companies Bill.71 It was submitted elsewhere
that an exhaustive code is also an option as courts will still be able to refer to existing
case law when interpreting the code.72
2.6.1.1 Clauses Recommended for Future Company Legislation
The Policy Document expresses a clear preference for the enlightened shareholder
value approach where the shareholders are of paramount importance when directors
manage a company. The interests of stakeholders should also be considered if it
promotes profit maximisation for the shareholders, subject to the Constitution and
related legislation.73 King II refers to the “triple-bottom line”74 and inclusive
approaches, supporting the fact that other interest groups should be considered as
advocated by the enlightened shareholder value approach.75 It was argued that the
Companies Bill of 2007 is not clear enough on this issue.76 On the one hand, the Bill
upholds the traditional viewpoint of shareholder primacy, mainly based on the fact
that the word “company” is still used and that no reference is made to other
stakeholders in clause 91. Stakeholders are only referred to in the remedy provisions
in chapter 7, part B of the Bill, and only employees are referred to in the business
rescue provisions. On the other hand, the remedy provisions, which provide some
71 Chapter 6 pars 5.3–5.5.
72 Chapter 3 par 4.3.4.
73 Chapter 6 par 4.2.
74 The “triple-bottom line” refers to economic, social and environmental factors. Directors should
consider all three of these factors when they manage a company.
75 Chapter 6 par 4.1.
76 Chapter 6 par 4.3.
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stakeholders with direct protection, seem to suggest that the traditional viewpoint is
no longer applicable.77 Thus it is still not absolutely clear in whose interests directors
should manage a company. It was suggested that the new Companies Act should
eliminate debate on this issue and state in clear terms which approach is preferred.78
This inadequacy can be addressed by applying the theory proposed in chapter 2
above. In terms of this theory, it cannot be denied that a company is a separate legal
entity, represented by several interests, including those of shareholders, employees,
investors, consumers, the community and the environment.79 One therefore cannot
require directors to act only in the best interests of the shareholders collectively when
acting in “the best interests of the company”. The courts need to give different weight
to the interests represented in a company. These interests and the weight attached to
them may differ during the various stages of a company. The protection that these
stakeholders receive by way of means other than company law, may also play a role
when a court decides on the competing interests of different stakeholders.80
Elsewhere Du Plessis and I81 therefore proposed that “the company” should be
defined in the Act as follows:82
77 Chapter 6 par 4.3.
78 Chapter 6 par 4.3.
79 Chapter 2 par 5.2.
80 Chapter 2 par 5.2.
81 Esser & Du Plessis “Stakeholder Protection” 361.
82 Esser and Du Plessis have also proposed draft clauses on the duty of care, skill and diligence and
directors’ fiduciary duties. In their article, the duty of care, skill and diligence, and directors’ fiduciary
duties were drafted in separate clauses. The discussion in this thesis focuses only on the current clause
91(1)(b) of the Draft Bill and an improved drafting thereof. The clauses that Esser & Du Plessis
proposed read as follows:
91. Directors’ duty of care, skill and diligence
A director of a company must exercise his powers and discharge his duties with a degree
of care, skill and diligence that a reasonable person would exercise if –
(a) he is a director of the company; and
(b) had the same responsibilities within the company as that director.
92. Directors’ fiduciary duties towards the company
(1) A director of a company must discharge his duties in good faith in the best
interests of the company and for a proper purpose;
(2) A director of a company must not improperly use his position to gain an
advantage for himself or another person or to cause harm to the company;
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“company” means a juristic person to the extent that it is, or its activities
are, regulated by this Act in terms of section 7 and includes, from time to
time, any or all the interests of –
(a) the company’s members as a whole;
(b) the company’s employees;
(c) the company’s suppliers, customers and others;
(d) the community and the environment to the extent that it could be
affected by the company’s business activities;
The above-mentioned definition of “the company” was proposed for various reasons:
firstly, directors should manage a company in the best interests of the company. By
defining “a company” directors would be clear who the beneficiaries of their
fiduciary duties are. It was argued that it is unclear in whose interests directors should
manage a company in terms of the Draft Bill. The drafting of clause 91(1)(b) in the
Bill seems to indicate that the traditional viewpoint is still followed, but the remedy
provisions seem to indicate otherwise, suggesting that directors have direct duties to
certain stakeholders.83
Secondly, the definition states clearly that directors should manage the company in
the best interests of the company as a juristic person, which should, from time to
time, include other interests. This proposed drafting can be compared with the
drafting of section 172 in the United Kingdom Companies Act.84 It was indicated that
the United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006 is clear on in whose interests directors
should manage a company because the specific stakeholders that directors should
consider are listed in the Act.85 But the practical application was questioned. It was
(3) A person who obtains information in his capacity as a director of a company must
not use the information improperly to gain advantage for himself or another person or to
cause harm to the company.
93. Presumption in favour of directors
In is presumed that a director fulfilled his duty of care, skill and diligence under section
91 or his fiduciary duties under section 92 if –
(a) the director –
(i) has taken reasonably diligent steps to become informed about the subject matter; and
(ii) does not have a personal financial interest in the subject matter; and
(b) fulfilled the duty in the same way as a reasonable person in a similar position would
do in comparable circumstances.
83 Chapter 6 par 4.3.
84 Chapter 3 par 4.3.3.
85 Chapter 3 par 4.3.3.
318
indicated that, in terms of section 172 of the United Kingdom Companies Act, the
shareholders collectively are still the main beneficiary of directors’ duties and that the
stakeholders listed have no enforceable rights.86
The proposed drafting differs in two ways from section 172. Firstly, the company, as
a separate legal entity, and not the shareholders collectively, is the primary
beneficiary of directors’ duties. The suggested definition of “the company” is based
on the proposed theory and provides that directors should manage a company in the
best interests of the company as a separate legal entity. The shareholders collectively
should not be the primary beneficiary of directors’ duties. This conclusion was
reached after traditional arguments for exclusive shareholder protection were
considered and it was found that there are a number of shortcomings in the
arguments.87 It was further argued that to act in the best interests of the company as a
separate legal entity, directors should consider the interests of various stakeholders.88
Which stakeholder to consider will depend on the specific circumstances of the
company.89 This means that different stakeholders should be protected at different
times of a company’s existence. That is why “from time to time, any or all the
interests of” has been added to the definition. Directors should therefore strive to act
in the best interests of the company and act in the interests of the specific stakeholder
that will best give effect to the interests of the company. The protection that
stakeholders receive elsewhere is important as that will help directors to determine
whether they should protect a specific stakeholder or not.
Secondly, it is important to consider whether the stakeholders mentioned in the
proposed definition would have enforceable rights. It is argued that any of the
stakeholders listed in the proposed definition of “the company” should be able to
institute action if a director did not act in the best interests of the company. In this
way any stakeholder can ensure that directors manage a company in the best interests
86 Chapter 3 par 4.3.3.2.
87 Chapter 3 par 5.1.1.
88 Chapter 3 par 5.2.
89 Chapter 3 par 5.2.
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of the company, as a separate legal entity, and therefore indirectly in their interest.
This does not imply that stakeholders may also institute action if their personal
interests were affected, the interests of the company is still of paramount importance.
In the light hereof, clause 166 (statutory derivative action) should be amended.
Currently “shareholders, directors or registered trade unions or representatives of
employees” may institute a derivative action to protect the interests of the company. I
suggest that employees, creditors, consumers and other relevant stakeholders should
also be able to institute a derivative action. There is no reason why only shareholders
and employee representatives should have this right.
Clause 164, in its current format, is also problematic. Currently, clause 164 states that
“a shareholder, creditor or director of a company may apply to a court for relief if any
act or omission of the company, or a related person, has had a result that is oppressive
or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of, the applicant”. It
was argued in chapter 690 that this creates the impression that directors have direct
fiduciary duties to shareholders and creditors because it is stated in the clause that
they may apply for relief if their own interests have been prejudiced. This should be
amended to only provide individual shareholders with such a right. It was indicated in
chapter 691 that individual shareholders do not receive sufficient protection
elsewhere. It is therefore justified to provide them with protection in company
legislation.
The above-mentioned recommendations can be explained by way of the following
scenario. If a director did not consider the interests of a specific stakeholder during
company management, that stakeholder can argue that the director did not act in the
best interests of the company as a separate legal entity by using clause 166 of the Bill.
For example, the directors did not consider the interests of employees during a
restructuring of the company, but only focused on profit maximisation for the
shareholders. The employees can argue that it would have been in the best interests of
90 Chapter 6 par 4.3 above.
91 Chapter 6 par 3.1 above.
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the company to consider their interests. They can argue, for instance, that it would
have been in the best interests of the company to have experienced employees, even
if the cost to the company to employ them was higher. Directors would also have to
determine whether they need to consider the employees’ interests or whether there
are adequate labour legislation protecting their interests.92
If “the company” is clearly defined, it would be possible for directors to act in the
best interests of the company (as stated in clause 91(1)(b) of the Bill), because they
will be clear on what is meant by “the company”.
However, in chapter 6 a number of problems in the drafting of clause 91(1)(b) were
discussed. The current clause 91(1)(b) reads as follows:
a second, fiduciary, duty to act honestly and in good faith, and in a
manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of, and
for the benefit of, the company.
The problems discussed include that, firstly, it seems as if “honestly” and “good
faith” are treated as two separate issues. It is unclear as to what the difference is
between these two concepts. Secondly, the clause provides that directors should act in
the best interests and for the benefit of the company. It is not clear what is meant by
“benefit”. It is uncertain if this term only relates to a financial benefit or whether any
benefit is relevant. By not qualifying “benefit” it can be argued that it implies that all
benefits are relevant when directors manage a company.93 A clause regulating
directors’ duty of good faith should read as follows:
A director of a company must discharge his duties in good faith in the
best interests of the company.
By deleting “honestly” and “benefit” the potential for confusion is removed.
92 Protection afforded employees in terms of labour legislation was discussed in ch 6 par 3.3.
93 Chapter 6 par 4.3.
321
2.6.2 Protection Afforded Stakeholders
It was indicated above that any other protection given to various stakeholders should
play a role when a court decides on the competing interests of different stakeholders.
The protection afforded individual shareholders, creditors, employees and consumers
was considered. It was seen that directors do not have direct fiduciary duties to
individual shareholders.94 It was indicated that specific directors may incur duties
towards specific shareholders when an established legal relationship, such as agency,
is present. But if no such relationship is present, then shareholders do not have
adequate protection.95
With regard to employees, different options were explored to determine whether or
not they are adequately protected.96 Firstly, it was indicated that worker participation
on board level does not seem to be practical in South Africa. It was argued that
worker participation will not work in a unitary board structure, even where the
unitary board structure has similarities to the two-tier board structure, as is the case in
South Africa.97 The fact that employees are not the only other interest group is
another reason not to have worker participation on board level. It will be impractical
to provide consumers, suppliers and the general public with board representation and
there is no compelling reason why employees should receive priority above the other
stakeholders. Secondly, workplace forums are another method for employees to
participate in company management. These forums are for various reasons currently
not widely implemented in South Africa, but it remains a valid option.98 Thirdly,
collective bargaining may also protect employees since it enables management to
discuss issues that are important to employees with their representatives. It was
acknowledged that collective bargaining has shortcomings, but it provides a platform
for employees to voice their concerns through their trade union representatives with
regard to the terms and conditions of their employment. Fourthly, employees can also
94 Chapter 6 par 3.1.
95 Chapter 3 par 3.1.
96 Chapter 6 par 3.3.
97 Chapter 6 par 3.3.2.1.
98 Chapter 6 par 3.3.2.2.
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be directors. This is usually so in the case of managing directors. Should there be a
conflict of interests the specific director should abstain from voting.99 Employees
therefore have various means of protection in labour law legislation in South
Africa.100
The position of creditors was also considered. Arguments were raised for and against
a direct duty towards creditors.101 The majority of cases indicated that this duty
towards creditors should be an indirect duty.102 Because of the shortcomings in the
protection currently afforded creditors, mainly the problems associated with section
424 of the Companies Act and contractual protection, it is submitted that directors
should have fiduciary duties to creditors in certain instances.103 In other words, the
interests of creditors would sometimes receive priority. The rationale for this
argument lies in the fact that the company is effectively trading with only the
creditors’ money when the company is in financial distress. The cases do not provide
clear guidelines as to when such a duty would arise.104 Keay suggests an objective
test on when a duty to creditors should arise. He states that the best trigger would be
that the circumstances of a specific company indicate that a director could reasonably
be able to expect that his or her actions could lead to insolvency of the company.105 I
agree that this is the best option to determine when directors should consider the
interests of creditors. I therefore submit that directors should consider the interests of
creditors in certain instances, even if this consideration can be to the detriment of the
shareholders. These instances include when a company is in financial difficulty.106
99 Chapter 6 par 3.3.3.
100 Chapter 6 par 3.3.3.
101 Chapter 6 par 3.2.2.
102 Chapter 3 par 3.1.3; ch 4 par 3.2.3.
103 Chapter 6 par 3.2.2.
104 The following problems were identified: when does a duty to creditors arise and who is the
beneficiary of such a duty (ch 6, par 3.2.3.)
105 Chapter 6 par 3.2.3.
106 Chapter 6 par 3.2.3.3.
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It was shown that consumers also receive adequate protection, especially in statutes
on consumer protection, competition law and credit regulation.107 The Consumer
Protection Bill, in particular, provides general protection in a wide variety of
instances to consumers.108
To conclude, the recommendations in this chapter are based on the following: firstly,
a theory was recommended where the company as a separate legal entity is the
primary beneficiary of directors’ duties. When acting in the best interests of the
company, the directors should have regard to the interests of various stakeholders, if
the consideration of their interests will benefit the company. Which stakeholder
should get specific attention at a given time will vary during the different stages of
the existence of a company. Secondly, directors need to be aware of other measures
protecting the various stakeholders as this should play a role when directors decide
which stakeholder to consider when managing a company. Thirdly, it was proposed
that “the company” should be defined. In terms of the proposed definition, directors
would be clear in whose interests they should manage a company. If “the company”
is clearly defined a clause stating that “a director of a company must discharge his
duties in good faith in the best interests of the company” is sufficient. These
recommendations are derived from an evaluation of directors’ duties, various
corporate governance initiatives and protection afforded different stakeholders in
Australia, the United Kingdom, Botswana and South Africa.
It is therefore suggested that the recognition of other protective measures, the
proposed theory and the proposed clauses in the new company legislation will
contribute to a clearer understanding of the issue in whose interests directors manage
a company at any given time.
107 Chapter 6 par 3.4.2. This thesis focused on the statutory protection, other than company law,
available to various stakeholders.
108 Chapter 6 par 3.4.2.1. This Bill should be approved by Parliament during May 2008.
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